PREMIER MINISTRE
Secretariat General for National Defence
French Network and Information Security Agency
Certification Report ANSSI-2009/14
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC,
AA and EAC RSA or EAC ECC, on
STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Paris, 23rd
July 2009
Courtesy Translation
Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Page 2 out 17 CER/F/07.5
Warning
This report is designed to provide sponsors with a document enabling them to assess the
security level of a product under the conditions of use and operation defined in this report for
the evaluated version. It is also designed to provide the potential purchaser of the product with
the conditions under which he may operate or use the product so as to meet the conditions of
use for which the product has been evaluated and certified; that is why this certification report
must be read alongside the evaluated user and administration guidance, as well as with the
product security target, which presents threats, environmental assumptions and the supposed
conditions of use so that the user can judge for himself whether the product meets his needs in
terms of security objectives.
Certification does not, however, constitute a recommendation product from ANSSI (French
Network and Information Security Agency), and does not guarantee that the certified product
is totally free of all exploitable vulnerabilities.
Any correspondence about this report has to be addressed to:
Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale
Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information
Centre de certification
51, boulevard de la Tour Maubourg
75700 PARIS cedex 07 SP
France
certification.dcssi@sgdn.gouv.fr
Reproduction of this document without any change or cut is authorised.
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0 Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Page 3 out 17
Certification report reference
ANSSI-2009/14
Product name
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC
RSA or EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-
A/1.1.0
Product reference
MORPHOEPASSCC/ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Protection profile conformity
[PP EAC]
Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control
Evaluation criteria and version
Common Criteria version 2.3
compliant with ISO 15408:2005
Evaluation level
EAL 4 augmented
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4
Developers
Sagem Sécurité SA
Etablissement d’Osny, 18 Chaussée Jules
César, 95520 Osny, France
STMicroelectronics
Smartcard IC division, ZI de Rousset,
BP2, 13106 Rousset Cedex, France
Sponsor
Sagem Sécurité SA
Etablissement d’Osny, 18 Chaussée Jules César, 95520 Osny, France
Evaluation facility
CEA - LETI
17 rue des martyrs, 38054 Grenoble Cedex 9, France
Tél : +33 (0)4 38 78 40 87, mél : cesti.leti@cea.fr
Recognition arrangements
CCRA
The product is recognised at EAL4 level.
SOG-IS
Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Page 4 out 17 CER/F/07.5
Introduction
The Certification
Security certification for information technology products and systems is governed by decree
number 2002-535 dated April, 18th 2002, and published in the "Journal Officiel de la
République Française". This decree stipulates that:
• The French Network and Information Security Agency draws up certification
reports. These reports indicate the features of the proposed security targets. They may
include any warnings that the authors feel the need to mention for security reasons.
They may or may not be transmitted to third parties or made public, as the sponsors
desire (article 7).
• The certificates issued by the Prime Minister certify that the copies of the products or
systems submitted for evaluation fulfil the specified security features. They also
certify that the evaluations have been carried out in compliance with applicable rules
and standards, with the required degrees of skill and impartiality (article 8).
The procedures are available on the Internet site www.ssi.gouv.fr.
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0 Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Page 5 out 17
Content
1. THE PRODUCT........................................................................................................................... 6
1.1. PRESENTATION OF THE PRODUCT........................................................................................... 6
1.2. EVALUATED PRODUCT DESCRIPTION ..................................................................................... 6
1.2.1. Product identification.................................................................................................... 7
1.2.2. Security services............................................................................................................ 7
1.2.3. Architecture................................................................................................................... 7
1.2.4. Life cycle ....................................................................................................................... 9
1.2.5. Evaluated configuration.............................................................................................. 10
2. THE EVALUATION.................................................................................................................. 11
2.1. EVALUATION REFERENTIAL ................................................................................................. 11
2.2. EVALUATION WORK ............................................................................................................. 11
2.3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS..................................................... 11
3. CERTIFICATION...................................................................................................................... 12
3.1. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 12
3.2. RESTRICTIONS...................................................................................................................... 12
3.3. RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE..................................................................................... 12
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS).................................................................................. 12
3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)................................................... 13
ANNEX 1. EVALUATION LEVEL OF THE PRODUCT.......................................................... 14
ANNEX 2. EVALUATED PRODUCT REFERENCES .............................................................. 15
ANNEX 3. CERTIFICATION REFERENCES ........................................................................... 17
Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Page 6 out 17 CER/F/07.5
1. The product
1.1. Presentation of the product
The evaluated product is Morpho ePass EAC CC with BAC, AA & EAC RSA or EAC ECC
software, developed by Sagem Sécurité SA, embedded in the secure microcontroller
ST19NR66-A Rev. C, developed and manufactured by STMicroelectronics.
The evaluated product is a contactless smart card with its antenna. It’s an ICAO compliant
eTravel document. It is a contactless microcontroller with embedded software dedicated to
authenticate the eTravel document and to identify its owner at borders controls, using an
inspection system, in charge of:
- The integrity protection of the eTravel document’s holder sensitive data: country
or issuance organization, travel document number, expiration date, holder name,
birth date, gender, user’s facial picture, optional data, additional holder’s biometric
data and various information dedicated to document enforcing security;
- eTravel document user’s authentication and inspection system’s authentication
(document’s reader) before any border control operation, using Basic Access
Control mechanism;
- User’s data integrity and confidentiality protection, during the reading process
using the secure messaging mechanism;
- Authentication of the hardware chip using Active Authentication function (if
activated, if not, chip authentication will be done);
- Strong chip and reader authentication before any attempt to read biometric data via
the Extended Access Control mechanism.
The product is also providing eServices dedicated to eAdministration, such as Identification,
Authentication & Signature (IAS), in full conformance with the specifications of the common
platform for eAdministration, but these eServices are outside the scope of the evaluation.
The microcontroller is also providing a contact interface allowing the final product to be used
with the contact interface.
This chip and its embedded software are to be inserted in a regular passport’s cover. This
could be done using modules or inlays. The final product could be an ePassport, a smart card,
or use different other form factors.
1.2. Evaluated product description
The security target [ST] defines the evaluated product, its evaluated security functionalities
and its operational environment.
This security target conforms to [PP EAC] protection profile.
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0 Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Page 7 out 17
1.2.1. Product identification
The configuration list [CONF] identifies the product’s constituent elements.
The certified version of the product can be identified by the following elements:
- Product’s name & version: MorphoEpassCC version 1.1.0;
- Microcontroller name & version: ST19NR66-A en version C;
- Platform identification: MORPHOEPASSCC/ST19NR66-A/1.1.0.
All those data can be checked by the CPLC data, as indicated in the Configuration
management plan (cf. [CONF]).
1.2.2. Security services
The product mainly provides the following security services:
- Authentication: Personalization user authentication, BAC authentication, “Active
Authentication”, “Chip Authentication”, “Terminal Authentication”;
- Cryptography: ECDSA, RSA, ECDH, DH, TDES, Retail MAC, SHA;
- « Secure Messaging » with BAC & EAC;
- Sensitive data access control;
- Crypto-Keys secure management;
- Life cycle management;
- Embedded applications separation;
- Safe state control for embedded applications;
- Protection against attacks.
The security services provided by the hardware microcontroller are described in the chip
certification report (cf. [2007/23]).
1.2.3. Architecture
The product is based on a microcontroller, an embedded operating system and three
applications:
- AIP dedicated to product’s personalization process, deactivated in user phase;
- ICAO application for services management during the regular use phase;
- IAS for eAdministration during the use phase that could be instantiated several times
(the applet code in ROM is unique, it addressed data which can be changed for the
various applications’ instances); the IAS application is outside the scope of the
evaluation.
Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Page 8 out 17 CER/F/07.5
The following picture sums up the product architecture:
AIP data ICAO data
IAS
data
AIP instance
IAS
data
AIP application
ICAO instance
ICAO application
IAS
instance
IAS application
IAS
instance
Operation system
ST19NR66-4
Non part of the evaluation scope
Application non activated in « user » mode
TOE
AIP data ICAO data
IAS
data
AIP instance
IAS
data
AIP application
ICAO instance
ICAO application
IAS
instance
IAS application
IAS
instance
Operation system
ST19NR66-4
Non part of the evaluation scope
Application non activated in « user » mode
AIP data ICAO data
IAS
data
AIP instance
IAS
data
AIP application
ICAO instance
ICAO application
IAS
instance
IAS application
IAS
instance
Operation system
ST19NR66-4
Non part of the evaluation scope
Application non activated in « user » mode
TOE
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0 Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Page 9 out 17
1.2.4. Life cycle
The product’s life cycle is organized as follow:
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Développement du
logiciel embarqué
Développement
Développement du micro-
circuit et de son logiciel dédié
Construction de la base de
données du produit
Fabrication du masque
Pré-personnalisation
Fabrication du micro-circuit
Fabrication des passeports
Personnalisation
Utilisation
Fin de vie
Fabrication
Gemalto
(Meudon, La Ciotat,
Vantaa)
NXP
(Hambourg)
Personnalisation
Légende
Livraison sécurisée avec
procédure de contrôle
Livraison réalisée dans
une enceinte sécurisée
Gemalto
(Gémenos, Vantaa)
NXP
(Hambourg, Bangkok)
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Embedded software
development
Development
IC design and dedicated -
software development
Product database
construction
Mask fabrication
Pre-personalization
IC manufacturing -
Passport manufacturaing
Personnalization
Uasage
End of life
Manufacturaing
SagemSécurité SA
(Osny)
STMicroelectronnics
(Rousset)
Personnalization
Usage
Légende
Livraison sécurisée avec
procédure de contrôle
Livraison réalisée dans
une enceinte sécurisée
é)
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Développement du
logiciel embarqué
Développement
Développement du micro-
circuit et de son logiciel dédié
Construction de la base de
données du produit
Fabrication du masque
Pré-personnalisation
Fabrication du micro-circuit
Fabrication des passeports
Personnalisation
Utilisation
Fin de vie
Fabrication
Gemalto
(Meudon, La Ciotat,
Vantaa)
NXP
(Hambourg)
Personnalisation
Légende
Livraison sécurisée avec
procédure de contrôle
Livraison réalisée dans
une enceinte sécurisée
Gemalto
(Gémenos, Vantaa)
NXP
(Hambourg, Bangkok)
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Embedded software
development
Development
IC design and dedicated -
software development
Product database
construction
Mask fabrication
Pre-personalization
IC manufacturing -
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Développement du
logiciel embarqué
Développement
Développement du micro-
circuit et de son logiciel dédié
Construction de la base de
données du produit
Fabrication du masque
Pré-personnalisation
Fabrication du micro-circuit
Fabrication des passeports
Personnalisation
Utilisation
Fin de vie
Fabrication
Gemalto
(Meudon, La Ciotat,
Vantaa)
NXP
(Hambourg)
Personnalisation
Légende
Livraison sécurisée avec
procédure de contrôle
Livraison réalisée dans
une enceinte sécurisée
Gemalto
(Gémenos, Vantaa)
NXP
(Hambourg, Bangkok)
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Embedded software
development
Development
IC design and dedicated -
software development
Product database
construction
Mask fabrication
Pre-personalization
IC manufacturing -
Passport manufacturaing
Personnalization
Uasage
End of life
Manufacturaing
SagemSécurité SA
(Osny)
STMicroelectronnics
(Rousset)
Personnalization
Usage
Légende
Livraison sécurisée avec
procédure de contrôle
Livraison réalisée dans
une enceinte sécurisée
é)
Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Page 10 out 17 CER/F/07.5
The software has been developed on the following site :
Sagem sécurité SA
Etablissement d’Osny,
18 Chaussée Jules César,
95520 Osny,
France
The microcontroller has been developed and manufactured by STMicroelectronics on the
following site:
STMicroelectronics
Smartcard IC division, ZI de Rousset, BP2,
13106 Rousset Cedex,
France
The manufacturing phase for the eTravel document (Pre-Personalization) could be performed
by STMicroelectronics or by a contractor. This phase, out of the evaluation scope, is
addressed by the guidance (cf. [GUIDES]).
The inlays and eTravel document covers’ manufacturing phases are not part of the evaluation,
they are considered without impact on platform’s security because the product is protected
during these phases.
1.2.5. Evaluated configuration
The evaluated product is a generic ePassport platform, which could be personalized via
several configurations. The certificate applies to the following configurations:
- Basic Access Control;
- Extended Access Control with RSA or ECC ;
- Active Authentication.
IAS Application is out of the evaluation perimeter as none of associated data are identified in
the ST as sensitive data to be protected by the product. Anyway, as an embedded application,
it has been taken into account by the evaluation process, especially for the vulnerability
assessment.
The antenna and the eTravel document manufacturing phase are not included in the evaluation
scope.
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0 Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Page 11 out 17
2. The evaluation
2.1. Evaluation referential
The evaluation has been performed in compliance with Common Criteria version 2.3 [CC],
with the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM].
For assurance components above EAL4 level, the evaluation facility own evaluation methods
consistent with [AIS 34], validated by DCSSI, have been used.
In order to meet the specificities of smart cards, the [CC IC] and [CC AP] guides have been
applied.
2.2. Evaluation work
The evaluation has been performed according to the composition scheme [COMP] as defined
in the guide [COMP] in order to assess that no weakness comes from the integration of the
software in the microcontroller already certified.
Therefore, the results of the evaluation of the microcontroller “ST19NR66-A version C” at
EAL5 level augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4, compliant with
the [PP/9806] and [PP0002] protection profiles have been used. This microcontroller has been
certified by DCSSI (cf. [2007/23]).
The microcontroller robustness level has been confirmed on 11 March 2008 in a surveillance
process (Cf. N°483/SGDN/DCSSI/SDR).
The evaluation relies on evaluation results related to:
- Sagem Sécurité development environment, evaluated on July 2008 under the control
of BSI1
with satisfactory results (This will be stated in a BSI report BSI-DSZ-CC-
0449 in an on going project);
- The previous version of the product also certified by DCSSI (cf. [DCSSI-2008_23]).
The evaluation technical report [ETR], delivered to DCSSI the 19 March 2009 provides
details on the work performed by the evaluation facility and assesses that all evaluation tasks
are “pass”.
2.3. Cryptographic mechanisms robustness analysis
The robustness of cryptographic mechanisms has been analyzed by DCSSI on the previous
version of the product (which has been certified by DCSSI (cf. [DCSSI-2008_23]) during
DCSSI qualification process (cf. [DCSSI-QS_1979]).
1
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Page 12 out 17 CER/F/07.5
3. Certification
3.1. Conclusion
The evaluation was carried out according to the current rules and standards, with the required
competency and impartiality of a licensed evaluation facility. All the work performed permits
the release of a certificate in conformance with the decree 2002-535.
This certificate testifies that the product MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA & EAC RSA
or EAC ECC, developed by Sagem Sécurité SA and embedded in the microcontroller
ST19NR66-A Rev. C, developed by STMicroelectronics, submitted for evaluation fulfils the
security features specified in its security target [ST] for the evaluation level EAL4 augmented.
3.2. Restrictions
This certificate only applies on the product specified in chapter 1.2 of this certification report.
The user of the certified product shall respect the operational environmental security
objectives summarized specified in the security target [ST] and shall respect the
recommendations in the guidance [GUIDES].
3.3. Recognition of the certificate
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS)
This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the SOG-IS agreement [SOG-
IS].
The European Recognition Agreement made by SOG-IS in 1999 allows recognition from
Signatory States of the agreement1
, of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates. The
European recognition is applicable up to ITSEC E6 and CC EAL7 levels. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
1 The signatory countries of the SOG-IS agreement are: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0 Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Page 13 out 17
3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)
This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA [CC RA].
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement allows the recognition, by signatory
countries1
, of the Common Criteria certificates. The mutual recognition is applicable up to the
assurance components of CC EAL4 level and also to ALC_FLR family. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
1 The signatory countries of the CCRA arrangement are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States of America.
Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Page 14 out 17 CER/F/07.5
Annex 1. Evaluation level of the product
Composants par niveau
d’assurance
Niveau d’assurance retenu
pour le produit
Classe Famille
EAL
1
EAL
2
EAL
3
EAL
4
EAL
5
EAL
6
EAL
7
EAL
4+
Intitulé du composant
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2 1 Partial CM automation
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 4
Configuration support and
acceptance procedures
ACM
Gestion de
configuration
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3 2
Problem tracking CM
coverage
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 Detection of modification
ADO
Livraison et
opération ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Installation, generation and
start-up procedures
ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 2
Fully defined external
interfaces
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5 2
Security enforcing high-level
design
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3 2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2 1 Descriptive low-level design
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1
Informal correspondence
demonstration
ADV
Développement
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3 1
Informal TOE security policy
model
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Administrator guidance
AGD
Guides
d’utilisation AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 User guidance
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2 2
Sufficiency of security
measures
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3 1
Developer defined life-cycle
model
ALC
Support au
cycle de vie
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3 1
Well-defined development
tools
ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3 1 Testing: high-level design
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 Functional testing
ATE
Tests
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 Independent testing – sample
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3 3
Analysis and testing for
insecure states
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Strength of TOE security
function evaluation
AVA
Estimation des
vulnérabilités
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 Highly resistant
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0 Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Page 15 out 17
Annex 2. Evaluated product references
[ST] Reference security target for the evaluation:
- Security Target: Morpho-ePass V3,
reference SK 00000 63506, version 1.6, 29/08/08,
For the needs of publication, the following security target has been
provided and validated in the evaluation:
- Security Target - MorphoePass EAC CC - Public Version,
reference SSE-0000070468, version 1.2,
[RTE] Evaluation technical report :
- ré-évaluation HELIOS,
reference LETI.CESTI.HEL.RTE.002,
version 1.0, 18/03/09,
CESTI LETI
[CONF] Configuration list:
- Plan de gestion de configuration logiciel,
reference SK 0000066065, version 1.1, 06/06/07,
- Fiche de Version du Logiciel MorphoEpassCC 1.1.0 Cible
ST19NR66-A,
reference SSE-0000067783, version 1.2, 06/02/09,
[GUIDES] Installation guidance:
- Documentation d’installation, de génération et de démarrage,
reference SSE-0000068096, version 1.1, 10/01/08,
Administration guidance:
- Procédures de livraison Fondeur ST Microelectronics,
reference SSE-0000067784, version 1.1, 29/11/07,
- ICAO Application Pre-personalisation manual,
reference SSE-0000070088, version 1.2, 17/06/08,
- ICAO Application Personalisation manual,
reference SSE-0000067414, version 1.2, 17/06/08,
User guidance:
- ICAO Application User manual,
reference SSE-0000067415, version 1.2, 17/06/08,
Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0
Page 16 out 17 CER/F/07.5
[2007/23] DCSSI certificate issued on 13 December for ST19NR66-A Secure
Microcontroller. Certified by DCSSI under the reference2007/23
[DCSSI-
2008_23]
DCSSI certificate issued on 28 July 2008 for the passport product
Morpho-ePass V3 with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or EAC ECC, on
STMicroelectronics IC. Certified by DCSSI under the reference DCSSI-
2008/23.
[DCSSI-
QS_1979]
DCSSI qualification, standard level, issued on 15 September 2008,
under 1979/SGDN/DCSSI reference, for the passport product Morpho-
ePass V3 on ST19NR66-A révision C microcontroller, for its AA and
EAC mechanisms, along with conditions on ECC and RSA key length
due a passport type product lifetime.
[OACI] ICAO Doc 9303, Sixth Edition, 2007
[PP/9806] Protection Profile Smart Card Integrated Circuit Version 2.0, September
1998. Certified by DCSSI under the reference PP/9806.
[PP0002] Protection Profile, Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile Version
1.0 July 2001. Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik) under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001.
[PP EAC] Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Extended Access Control, version 1.2, 19 November 2007.
Certifier by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik)
under the reference BSI-PP-0026
Passeport MorphoePass EAC CC with BAC, AA and EAC RSA or
EAC ECC, on STMicroelectronics ST19NR66-A/1.1.0 Certification report ANSSI-2009/14
Page 17 out 17
Annex 3. Certification references
Decree number 2002-535 dated 18th
April 2002 related to the security evaluations and
certifications for information technology products and systems.
[CER/P/01] Procedure CER/P/01 - Certification of the security provided by IT
products and systems, DCSSI.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-001;
Part 2: Security functional requirements,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-002;
Part 3: Security assurance requirements,
August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-003.
The content of Common Criteria version 2.3 is identical to the
international ISO/IEC 15408:2005.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, August 2005, version 2.3, ref
CCMB-2005-08-004.
The content of CEM version 2.3 is identical to the international ISO/IEC
18045:2005.
[CC IC] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, reference
CCDB-2006-04-003 version 2.0, revision 1, April 2006.
[CC AP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - Application of attack potential to smart-cards, reference
CCDB-2008-04-001 version 2.5 revision 1, April 2008.
[COMP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - Composite product evaluation for smart cards and similar
devices, reference CCDB-2007-09-001 version 1.0, revision 1,
September 2007.
[CC RA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common criteria certificates in the
field of information Technology Security, May 2000.
[SOG-IS] Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security
Evaluation Certificates, version 2.0, April 1999, Management
Committee of Agreement Group.
[AIS 34] Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme - Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+, AIS34, Version
1.00, 01 June 2004, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik