BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010
for
GeNUGate Firewall 6.3
from
GeNUA mbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.35
BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010
Firewall
GeNUGate Firewall 6.3
from GeNUA mbH
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 September 2010
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Abteilungspräsident for components up
to EAL4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................20
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................21
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................21
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................24
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
● for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom.
● for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and United Kingdom.
In Addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product GeNUGate Firewall 6.3 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product GeNUGate Firewall 6.3 was conducted by Tele-Consulting
security | networking | training GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24 August 2010.
The Tele-Consulting security | networking | training GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: GeNUA mbH.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010 Certification Report
The product was developed by: GeNUA mbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should/shall [Anm.: „shall“ verwenden wenn Auflage zur
regelmäßigen Neubewertung erfolgt s.u] apply for the certified product being monitored
within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-
certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product GeNUGate Firewall 6.3 has been included in the BSI list of the certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
GeNUA mbH
Domagkstraße 7
85551 Kirchheim
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) GeNUGate Firewall 6.3 is part of a larger product, the
firewall GeNUGate 6.3 Z (Patchlevel 007), which consists of hardware and software. The
TOE GeNUGate Firewall 6.3 itself is part of the shipped software. The operating system is
a modified OpenBSD.
GeNUGate 6.3 Z is a combination of an application level gateway (ALG) and a packet filter
(PFL), which are implemented on two different systems. It is thus a two-tiered firewall. The
network connection between ALG and PFL is a cross cable.
Besides the network interface to the PFL, the ALG has (at least) three more interfaces to
connect to the external network, the administration network and the secure server network.
For the high availability option, the ALG needs another network interface for the HA
network. The PFL has a second interface which is connected to the internal network.
The aim of the firewall is to control the IP-traffic between the different connected networks.
Therefore the ALG uses proxies that control all data transmitted between the different
networks, while the PFL uses packet filtering as an additional means to control all data that
is send to and from the internal network.
To mitigate hardware failures the GeNUGate has a high availability option where two or
more GeNUGate systems are operating in parallel and take over a failing system.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF_SA Security audit
SF_DF Data flow control
SF_IA Identification and Authentication
SF_SM Security management
SF_PT Protection of the TSF
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010 Certification Report
The TOE can be configured in such a way that the security needs for each network are
optimally met. A standard configuration consists of the following networks connected to the
TOE:
● Internal network: This is the network that has to be secured against attacks form the
external network. Usually only a few services from the internal network are accessible
from the external network, secured by user authentication. This is the network that is
secured by both the ALG and the PFL, using filtering mechanisms at two different levels
of the IP stack. This network is usually controlled by a defined security policy.
● External network: This is the most insecure network, e. g. the internet. In general, no
security policy exists, and all kind of attacks can occur in this network.
● Administration network: This network is used to allow a secure administration of the
TOE. This network is isolated from all other networks and only administrators have
access.
● Secure server network: This network allows access to common services for the external
network, without the need to open the internal network. Usually, Web- and FTP-servers
are installed in this network. This network is usually controlled by a defined security
policy.
● HA network: This network is used for the high availability option. To mitigate hardware
failures the TOE has a high availability option where two or more TOE systems are
operating in parallel and take over a failing system.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
GeNUGate Firewall 6.3
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW GeNUGate Firewall 6.3 CD-ROM
2 DOC GeNUGate Installations- und
Konfigurationshandbuch,
Version 6.3 Z
63.D043, August
2010
Manual and CD-ROM
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
To make sure the GeNUGate CD-ROM originates from GeNUA and has not been
manipulated during delivery process, an identification of the installationpackages can be
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010
done. Therefore MD5, SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 checksums are provided on the GeNUA-
server under the following URL:
http://www.genua.de/customer/gg_support/checksums/cs_630z.html
The valid checksums of the TOE are:
Installationspakete in dem Verzeichnis 4.4/i386
MD5 (INSTALL.i386) = 506da8fd2ab79095a5c0824909e9864c
MD5 (INSTALL.linux) = 34ab7e52e8b1ed96682349a2f0addcce
MD5 (base44.tgz) = 7ef86235809ad7bf7e458e14c03f01c8
MD5 (cd44.iso) = cce2a234907f83e3a5f925d6cee0c1aa
MD5 (cdboot) = 4a70ab74371088bff958ecda8a98af9c
MD5 (cdbr) = f609db1eeaf4dc7dc6a280a6c99eea0f
MD5 (cdemu44.iso) = d063d1da57015b2e6b7c8eab6b1ca347
MD5 (comp44.tgz) = 509e442afafcfb74c3a879d4bff423c2
MD5 (etc44.tgz) = ef1efebaa4d650af6d1d6ecbab313c78
MD5 (game44.tgz) = a1b38b380b28ea3e516b06bc8fd73155
MD5 (man44.tgz) = 9b00241c9ef1ee8fdd24af4e14e31ebd
MD5 (misc44.tgz) = 7e44c8c1f61f7b040428940632b4eb4e
MD5 (pxeboot) = 938b1ed43dcdbab09b7add8147b6e43f
MD5 (xbase44.tgz) = 03ff7b5b14cb7c71ba35d86c1dff9087
MD5 (xetc44.tgz) = 9faf8c287e2561c2a26fb927cd57f4ba
MD5 (xshare44.tgz) = 963d39520f9de0f6a1a5649a5c1bf975
SHA1 (INSTALL.i386) = b402b9b40c35df66c670f85a05ea0a90e6a8f4ba
SHA1 (INSTALL.linux) = 238f5edc8c3a9bd9a6cad9cef08ab9997d66134e
SHA1 (base44.tgz) = 73c6ac00d21338a2a20975bed9d2831ee1b6ebb4
SHA1 (cd44.iso) = 92939aaff4eb210438e37baf13182e3cf4c5ec14
SHA1 (cdboot) = 5950bc5c1e72c661582a47a2345d275fec81904e
SHA1 (cdbr) = 2780c318e455723980eb67a11aba8111cf2330c6
SHA1 (cdemu44.iso) = 417c85bd9180e6e8d41d8a912cc7258f29f34afb
SHA1 (comp44.tgz) = 8445fc7a6f5e50c9734e73ec45dee2df90f172dc
SHA1 (etc44.tgz) = bc8af210963a21910d738dc19e58cfc2063cb42c
SHA1 (game44.tgz) = 3d980afe4159118bcc8f017fd23c8a5a8cb950aa
SHA1 (man44.tgz) = a0f1fae015faf68520acaba4089f2518b65c644d
SHA1 (misc44.tgz) = aeb19df78eb9037b6e5085e7fc32e789a3e8365e
SHA1 (pxeboot) = 152b0b3799c8e5dee6790bb2e6332abc4aafd709
SHA1 (xbase44.tgz) = 52afa60460a8e4d08d6f2eb619b63e8a9a677851
SHA1 (xetc44.tgz) = a785df11d200b6ffeebb3f6acb590ad94f5a92c3
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010 Certification Report
SHA1 (xshare44.tgz) = 13bb8259873e241ef52dd60356bc105f05ee057d
RMD160 (INSTALL.i386) = 8ad60900127b80d45df25f4d27389234544a8f5f
RMD160 (INSTALL.linux) = fd302d99871329572bff0a7c580d29b3123b7963
RMD160 (base44.tgz) = a39dcd9b7f2a77aa7e28a151cc607183a647b27b
RMD160 (cd44.iso) = 53d7984742fed5e0760e9799f5b1b74ac464672b
RMD160 (cdboot) = f75d8e355a38d1048b6c16f7f11e168a99794891
RMD160 (cdbr) = 680f1e206016ae8aafc37d57dabd680a2f3d2fa7
RMD160 (cdemu44.iso) = 5f999a5f00bb455a2d407f41e2529c9b80a62fcd
RMD160 (comp44.tgz) = 2a273022236f33376290b41d9c8bfb3874cc7c09
RMD160 (etc44.tgz) = 2ffe052ee5b7fff60b04809702fd1b2bca6282f5
RMD160 (game44.tgz) = a4e06c4180e06867d9efee665816e65e1606999b
RMD160 (man44.tgz) = f9636940b743a9eb9dfe90c16dd4a663bf186dfd
RMD160 (misc44.tgz) = a38b36cfaf9d0e0afc47651d19b021c28cbaefe5
RMD160 (pxeboot) = 9008afe55fc0adf4e69a4852ae9f3f1ebedcd461
RMD160 (xbase44.tgz) = 5e69e581861c94232291968db3494bf47adbaae9
RMD160 (xetc44.tgz) = d6eed602133b85e3707d0fc4db216e07df5c94ef
RMD160 (xshare44.tgz) = 926de72c24e1c76fa50acd9686572ff762bb5abe
Handbuch:
MD5(manual-de.pdf)= b3c3ba08f8839a6592513cdb2f81474b
SHA1(manual-de.pdf)= 320f9e327a5b387062735a9a950f1b6fa89050ca
RMD160(manual-de.pdf)= 3088eda6f282fa2eb8b64ae1bf74775cd1e65591
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security audit: The TOE generates log data whenever important events occur. All relays
generate log data when the connection state changes. All administration through the
administration web generates log data. The log data is analysed by automated tools that
look for pattern in the log data. The log data can be transformed into a human readable
form and can be searched by all administrators and auditors.
● Data flow control: The packet filter at the ALG and PFL implement the flow control at the
network layer (IP) and transport layer (TCP/UDP). The filter rules take the information
from the IP and TCP/UDP Header (where applicable) in order to apply the filter rules.
● Identification and Authentication: Administration is only possible after successful
authentication at the administration web server. Auditors (administrators with read-only
rights) can view the configuration after successful authentication at the administration
web server. All of the different authentication methods disable a user/administrator
account after a configurable number of unsuccessful attempts.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010
● Security management: The security management can be divided into three different
roles: normal users do not have any rights, auditors (administrators with read-only rights)
can view the configuration, and (normal) administrators can change the configuration.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Those responsible for the TOE must assure that the TOE is placed at a secured place
where only authorised people have access.
● Those responsible for the TOE must assure that all administrators and auditors are
competent, regularly trained and execute the administration in a responsible way.
● Those responsible for the TOE must assure that administration is only done in the
administration network during normal operation mode.
● Those responsible for the TOE must assure that the TOE is the only connection between
the different networks.
● Those responsible for the TOE must assure that the security policy for the internal
network allows only administrators access to the network components and the network
configuration. They must assure that the policy is maintained.
● The IT-environment must supply reliable timestamps for the TOE.
● The IT-environment must supply a physical network for transfer of TSF data between
nodes for the optional high availability setup.
● Those responsible for the TOE must assure that the users follow the user guidance,
especially that they choose not easily guessable passwords and that they keep them
secret.
● The IT-environment must assure that the non-TOE parts of the kernel space do not
interfere with the security functions of the TOE.
● The IT-environment must assure that the non-TOE parts of the user space do not
interfere with the security functions of the TOE.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE GeNUGate Firewall 6.3 is part of a larger product, the firewall GeNUGate 6.3 Z
(Patchlevel 7), which consists of hardware and software. The TOE GeNUGate Firewall 6.3
itself is part of the shipped software. The operating system is a modified OpenBSD.
GeNUGate 6.3 Z is a combination of an application level gateway (ALG) and a packet filter
(PFL), which are implemented on two different systems. It is thus a two-tiered firewall. The
network connection between ALG and PFL is a cross cable.
Besides the network interface to the PFL, the ALG has (at least) three more interfaces to
connect to the external network, the administration network and the secure server network.
For the high availability option, the ALG needs another network interface for the HA
network. The PFL has a second interface which is connected to the internal network.
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The aim of the firewall is to control the IP-traffic between the different connected networks.
Therefore the ALG uses proxies that control all data transmitted between the different
networks, while the PFL uses packet filtering as an additional means to control all data that
is send to and from the internal network.
To mitigate hardware failures the GeNUGate has a high availability option where two or
more GeNUGate systems are operating in parallel and take over a failing system.
The TOE, GeNUGate Firewall 6.3, consists of the software that implements the IP traffic
control and related functionality of the firewall. This includes the proxies, the modified
OpenBSD kernel modules IP-stack, packet filter, but also other supportive functionality as
logging of security events.
The TOE has a special maintenance mode. During normal operation IP packets are
handled as usual and the file system is secured by the BSD flags. In maintenance mode,
however, the BSD flags can be altered for maintenance operation. In this mode all IP
packets are dropped for security reasons.
Both ALG and PFL run on Intel compatible hardware that works with OpenBSD. As the
product GeNUGate 6.3 Z is a combination of hardware and software, the hardware
components are selected by GeNUA. The end user has no need to check for compatibility.
The TOE is located on CD-ROM.
The physical connections are:
● the network interfaces to the external, internal, secure server, administration networks,
and high availability network,
● connections for the keyboard, monitor, and serial interfaces at the ALG and PFL,
● power supply.
GeNUGate product family includes the following security features:
● The ALG does not perform IP forwarding.
● The modified OpenBSD kernel performs extra spoofing checks. The source and
destination address of the IP packet are checked against the IP address (and netmask)
of the receiving interface.
● The modified OpenBSD kernel logs all events that occur while checking incoming IP
packets.
● The filter rules of the PFL cannot be modified during normal operation.
● Proxies that accept connections from the connected networks run in a restricted runtime
environment.
● The log files are analysed online.
● The administrators are notified about security relevant events.
● File system flags prohibit the deletion of log messages.
● The internal network is protected by a two-tiers security architecture that filter on
different levels of the network stack (ALG and PFL).
● The TOE has a special maintenance mode. During normal operation IP packets are
handled as usual and the file system is secured by the BSD flags. In maintenance mode,
however, the BSD flags can be altered for maintenance operation. In this mode all IP
packets are dropped for security reasons.
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● To mitigate hardware failures the GeNUGate has a high availability option where two or
more GeNUGate systems are operating in parallel and take over a failing system. The
different systems synchronize their configuration with one another.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Developer Tests
The test configuration in the GeNUA laboratory includes four systems installed with the
TOE. These are the systems GeNUGate Version 800, GeNUGate Version 400, GeNUGate
Version 600 and GeNUGate Version 200. For those tests which need a DMZ (Secure
Server Network) the DMZ is located as an alias on a consisting interface card. They are
tested on single systems as well as HA-configurations.
The Security Target specifies ten assumptions about the environment of the TOE:
Assumptions A.PHYSEC, A.NOEVIL, A.ADMIN, A.SINGEN, A.POLICY, A.TIMESTMP,
A.HANET, A.USER, A.TRUSTK and A.TRUSTU. A.PHYSEC, A.NOEVIL and A.POLICY
are not applicable to the test environment. A.ADMIN, A.HANET and A.SINGEN are given
in the test environment. A.TIMESTMP, A.TRUSTK and A.TRUSTU are given in all TOE
configurations because of the properties of the environment.
For the most part the tests are automatically running under control of the tool aegis (see
[10], [11]). The tool also provides automatically the test results. The test procedures are
executable scripts (Perl or Shell).
The developer provides his tests respectively the scripts in a directory. The scripts relevant
for the certification are included in the subdirectory zert. Beside zert there exists 38
additional subdirectories which also contain test scripts. Tests in zert usually contain
several single tests. These are independent tests which are put into the context of the
execution of other tests. Thus dependencies among tests are demonstrated. More than
640 single tests are provided in zert.
Every tests includes rich comments. Tests of the type auto (most of the tests) are started
with an aegis-test driver. Integrated in their program code all scripts compare real result
with the expected one. The output is the status value PASS (if the real result is equal the
expected one), FAIL (if the real result is not equal the expected one) or NORESULT
(problems occur during runtime e.g. cable break). The volume of the script protocol is
influenced through the AET_DEBUGLEVEL option. Tests of the type manual need manual
interventions, which is documented in the description of the script.
Using the test scripts the developer automatically ensures for the most part that the
entrance conditions and the dependencies between tests are considered. Therefore the
responsibility for the correct testing is transferred to the developer.
Complete coverage was achieved for all the TOE security functions as described in the
functional specification. The overall test depth of the developer tests comprises the TOE
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design subsystems and the internal interfaces of those subsystems as required for the
assurance level of the evaluation.
A selected subset from the test scripts provided by the developer have been successfully
repeated by the evaluation facility. The achieved test results matched the expected results
as documented by the developer in the developer test documentation.
All real test results are equal with the expected test results.
Independent Evaluator Tests
The test equipment provided by the developer consists of two GeNUGates (model 600 R4,
model 200 R2), a GeNUScreen 100 C (OSPF-Router) and the TOE.
According to the Security Target the evaluator has installed the GeNUGates in a separate
administrator network. The evaluator has configured the ALG with 5 interfaces (external
network, admin network, HA network, DMZ, internal network to the PFL) and the PF with
2 interfaces (internal network to the ALG, internal network).
The connection to the internal network was realised with an OSPF router. The
administrative network, the DMZ and the external network were realised with a switch. The
HA network was realised with a crossover cable.
The needed endsystems (several servers/clients under ubuntu, laptop under windows,
management station with MS Internet Explorer 6.0) were connected with the TOE with the
OSPF router respectively with the corresponding switches.
The configuration is consistent with the configuration in the Security Target.
The Security Target specifies ten assumptions about the environment of the TOE:
Assumptions A.PHYSEC, A.NOEVIL, A.ADMIN, A.SINGEN, A.POLICY, A.TIMESTMP,
A.HANET, A.USER, A.TRUSTK and A.TRUSTU. A.PHYSEC, A.NOEVIL and A.POLICY
are not applicable to the test environment. A.ADMIN, A.HANET and A.SINGEN are given
in the test environment. A.TIMESTMP, A.TRUSTK and A.TRUSTU are given in all TOE
configurations because of the properties of the environment.
The testing of the ITSEF was performed in 2 phases. Phase 1: Repeating developer
testing and Phase 2: main phase.
Phase 1: The developer testing was repeated in the developer laboratory (03. and
04.11.09).
Phase 2: The testing was performed with several versions of the TOE. The main phase of
testing was performed in December 2009 and January 2010, March 2010, May 2010 and
in June 2010 (terminating tests in August with the TOE "build.63.D043”).
Testing in the premises of the evaluator covers among the complex installation all security
functions. The main focus was the data flow control and the self protection mechanism.
The aim of testing was to detect failure due to the changed presentation of the GUI and
the changed environment (OpenBSD).
The analysis of the vulnerability does show that none of the identified vulnerabilities in the
intended environment of the TOE is exploitable. For all identified vulnerabilities no attack
has been identified, the evaluator has to renounce to specify and perform penetration
testing.
In early phases of the evaluation the evaluator has worked towards to identify
vulnerabilities and to let them eliminate.
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Moreover the evaluator has continued searching for vulnerabilities especially during the
preparation and realisation of its own testing. At the beginning penetration against
“obvious” vulnerabilities were provided (portscan, vulnerability check etc). This were done
with an tool from Tele-Consulting (tajanas). This tool implements nessus and nmap. This
testing was performed direct after installation as well as after activating services.
To outline further penetration tests, there were analysed starting points, coming off the
“onion skins model” of the security and self protection functions of the TOE. Therefore the
ITSEF has provided tests with high communication load to activate self protection
functions. Furthermore testing was provided using the system console of the ALG –this
interface usually is not available to an attacker. This tests exert a negative influence to
important components (especially terminate processes), trying to suspend security
functions.
For this product the border between functional and penetration testing is merging because
the product belongs a lot of self protection functions.
Penetration tests of the evaluators have shown that there are no exploitable vulnerabilities
in the assumed environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE can be configured in such a way that the security needs for a network are met.
The TOE has to be configured following the TOE guidance.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 [4] (AIS 34).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2
ASE_TSS.2
AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
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● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_FLR.2, ASE_TSS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include crypto algorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered
by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE shall be used. If non-certified updates or patches
are available he should request the sponsor for providing a re-certification. In the
meantime risk management process of the system using the TOE shall investigate and
decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or to take additional
measures in order to maintain system security.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
For a secure operation it is necessary to follow all recommendations of the Installations-
und Konfigurationshandbuch and to follow all requirements to the environment described
in the Security Target.
The assumptions to the IT environment in the Security Target suppose that the TOE
operates in a physically secure environment which prevents access from unauthorised
users (OE.PHYSEC). This assumption includes the protection of the boot disc and the
USB stick with the PFL configuration. Boot disc and USB stick has to be protected against
theft, exchange and manipulation and it has to be made sure that the PFL will be only
booted with the assigned boot diskette respectively USB-stick. This aspect has to be
considered in a defined security policy (A.POLICY).
Plausibility of the information about existing bootinstall scripts have to be checked by an
administrator each time before booting GeNUGate.
External authentication servers are subject to the same organizational and physical
restrictions as the GeNUGate.
Administration and revision of the TOE should only performed by personnel which dispose
about solid knowledge about networking, packet filter firewalls and secure use of public
key procedures.
There should regularly performed inspections (revisions) of the TOE configuration,
especially of the packet filter rules. During those revisions also the procedures to import
public keys should be examined.
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Sidechannel-Authentication
Depending on the environment of the client systems the usage of the sidechannel
authentication incur risks. These will be implemented in network environment where IP-
addresses can not unambiguously assigned to users. Therefore Sidechannel-
Authentication should only be used, provided that
● Sidechannel-Authentication is not activated on external interfaces.
● If using Sidechannel-Authentication, a security model has to be established.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
ALG Application Level Gateway
BPF Berkeley Packet Filter
BSD Berkeley Software Design
BSDI Berkeley Software Design, Inc.
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CASE Computer Aided Software Engineering
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CGI Common Gateway Interface
CLI Command Line Interface
CPAN Comprehensive Perl Archive Network
DMZ Demiliarised Zone
DNS Domain Name Service
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTML Hyper Text Markup Language
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
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IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDA Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MD Message Digest
MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
MSSQL Microsoft SQL Server relational Database Management System
MTA Message Transfer Agent, Mail Transfer Agent
MX Mail Exchanger
MySQL a relational Database Management System
NFS Network File System
NNTP Network News Transfer Protocol
NTP Network Time Protocol
OS Operating System
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PDF Portable Data Format
Perl Practical Extraction and Reporting Language
PF Packet Filter (Komponente von OpenBSD)
PFL Packet Filter (Komponente des GeNUGate)
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure SHell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
UDP User Datagram Protocol
URI Universal Resource Identifiers
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URL Uniform Resource Locator
VPN Virtual Private Network
WWW World Wide Web
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
GeNUGate - The two-tiered (packet filter/application level gateway) firewall from GeNUA.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
pf - The name of the OpenBSD packet filter
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0616, Version 9, 17.08.2010, GeNUGate 6.3,
GeNUA mbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 24.08.2010, Evaluation Technical Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0616 for GeNUGate Firewall 6.3 from GeNUA mbH of Tele-Consulting
GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE:
A4A2083, configuration list „cc.5“ GeNUGate 6.3, 13.08.2010 (confidential
document)
A4A2097, configuration list gg63 (Baseline), 13.08.2010 (confidential document)
[9] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Installations- und Konfigurationshandbuch,
Version 6.3 Z, August 2010, Revision: gg.63.D043
[10] Peter Miller, Aegis - A Project Change Supervisor - Reference Manual, Version 4.16,
October 2004
[11] Peter Miller, Aegis - A Project Change Supervisor - User Guide, Version 4.16,
October 2004
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (Ccv3.1)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0616-2010 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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