BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023
for
IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h,
IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h, IFX_CCI_0037h
design step T31 and M31 with optional HSL
v2.62.7626, optional SCL version v2.04.003,
UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with specific IC-dedicated
firmware identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023 (*)
IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h,
IFX_CCI_0034h, IFX_CCI_0037h design step T31 and M31 with optional HSL
v2.62.7626, optional SCL version v2.04.003, UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with
specific IC-dedicated firmware identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-
0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
valid until: 6 July 2028
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria
for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details
on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of
the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 7 July 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Matthias Intemann L.S.
Head of Section
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................21
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................22
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................22
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................22
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................25
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................26
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h,
IFX_CCI_0034h, IFX_CCI_0037h design step T31 and M31 with optional HSL v2.62.7626,
optional SCL version v2.04.003, UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with specific IC-dedicated
firmware identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V2-2021. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V2-2021 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h,
IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h, IFX_CCI_0037h design step T31 and M31 with optional
HSL v2.62.7626, optional SCL version v2.04.003, UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with specific IC-
dedicated firmware identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 28 June 2023. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023 Certification Report
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 7 July 2023
is valid until 6 July 2028. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h,
IFX_CCI_0034h, IFX_CCI_0037h design step T31 and M31 with optional HSL v2.62.7626,
optional SCL version v2.04.003, UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with specific IC-dedicated
firmware identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h,
IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h, IFX_CCI_0037h design step T31 and M31 with optional
HSL v2.62.7626, optional SCL version v2.04.003, UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with specific IC-
dedicated firmware identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management:
The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several
phases. Different operation modes help to protect
the TOE during each phase of its lifecycle.
SF_PS Protection against Snooping:
The TOE uses various means to protect from
snooping.
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks:
This TOE implements protection against
modifying attacks of various TOE parts.
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support:
The TOE is equipped with a hardware accelerator
and an optional symmetric cryptographic library
(SCL) to support the standard symmetric
cryptographic operations TDES and AES.
Additionally, the TOE is equipped with a True
Random Number Generator for the generation of
random numbers
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.1 / 3.2.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h,
IFX_CCI_0037h design step T31 and M31 with optional HSL v2.62.7626, optional SCL
version v2.04.003, UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with specific IC-dedicated firmware
identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
HW IFX_CCI_000Dh,
IFX_CCI_0020h,
IFX_CCI_0031h,
IFX_CCI_0032h,
IFX_CCI_0034h,
IFX_CCI_0037h
T31 and M31
(produced in
Singapore)
Complete modules, plain wafers
in an IC case or in bare dies
FW Flash Loader v8.07.006 located at the end of User NVM
for non-blocked derivatives
FW BOS FW identifier:
80.301.05.1
stored in IFX ROM region on IC
(BOS Patch Area in IFX region
on NVM)
SW HSL library (optional) v2.62.7626 Secure download (object code)
via ishare. (optional)
SW UMSLC library v01.00.0234 Secure download (object code)
via ishare.
SW SCL library (optional) v2.04.003 Secure download (object code)
via ishare. (optional)
DOC 32-bit Security Controller –
V02, Hardware Reference
Manual
[12]
V9.2,
2020-02-06
Secured download (PDF) via
ishare.
DOC 32-bit ARM-based Securtity
Controller, SLC 37/40-nm
Technology, Programmer’s
Reference Manual
[13]
V4.6,
2020-10-13
Secured download (PDF) via
ishare.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023 Certification Report
Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
DOC 32-bit Security Controller –
V02, Security Guidelines
[14]
V1.00-2737,
2021-06-02
Secured download (PDF) via
ishare.
DOC Production and
personalization 32-bit ARM-
based security controller
[15]
V3.4,
2018-05-14
Secured download (PDF) via
ishare
DOC HSL library for SLCx7 in
40nm V02.62.7626
(optional)
[16]
Rev 1.2,
2020-12-17
Secured download of compiled
html help (chm) file via ishare
(optional)
DOC UMSLC library for SLCx7 in
40nm, Version 01.00.0234
[17]
V1.1,
2018-05-23
Secured download of compiled
html help (chm) file via ishare
DOC SCL37-uSCP-v3-C40
Symmetric Crypto Library for
uSCP-v3 DES /AES
[18]
V2.04.003,
2023-02-16
Secured download (PDF) via
ishare (optional)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by its Common Criteria Identifiers (CCI)
IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h
and IFX_CCI_0034h in conjunction with the design steps T31 or M31. The complete chip
identification data is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM).
In dependence of the chosen delivery procedure (flashed at developer site or not), the
following remark needs to be taken into account:
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE Manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
(developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
In detail, regarding identification:
The Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) can be activated after power-on with a
dedicated signalling sequence and is also accessible by the user software. This GCIM
outputs amongst other identifiers for the platform, chip mode, ROM code, chip type, design
step, fabrication facility, wafer, die position, firmware, temperature range, system
frequency and the CCI. The interpretation of the chip identification data is described in
[12], section 4.6.
Additionally, the customer can identify the present configuration by reading the relevant
data (see [13], section 7.9).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023
The SCL (optional), UMSLC and HSL library (optional), as separate software parts of the
TOE, are identified by their unique version numbers. The user can identify these versions
by calculating the hash signatures of the provided library files. The mapping of these hash
signatures to the version numbers is provided in [6] and [9], chapters 9–11.
In detail, regarding delivery:
“TOE Delivery” is uniquely used to indicate
● after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn
wafers (dice) or
● after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.
Therefore three different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE manufacturer to the IC embedded software developer.
● Delivery of the IC embedded software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalization data, Bundle Business package) from the IC embedded software
developer to the TOE manufacturer.
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE manufacturer to the composite product
manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
The TOE is delivered via the logistics sites:
● DHL Singapore (Distribution Center Asia),
● KWE Shanghai,
● K&N Großostheim (Distribution Center Europe).
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional
Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True
Random Number Generator (TRNG).
The optional SCL provides TDES and AES cryptography, which is partly implemented on
the hardware component μSCP and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and
DFA attacks. The SCL is delivered as object code and in this way integrated into the user
software.
The optional HSL provides functionality via APIs to the Smartcard Embedded Software,
which contains SOLID FLASH™ NVM service routines and functionality for tearing-safe
programming of SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
The UMSLC library provides a wrapper around the UMSLC hardware functionality with
some software measures to counter fault attacks.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023 Certification Report
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES and Triple-DES cryptographic functions performed by the
TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and
against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE,
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance:
The ST only includes one security objective for the IC Embedded Software Developer, the
objective OE.Resp-Appl.
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) appropriately. The IC Embedded Software Developer gets
sufficient information on how to protect user data adequate in the security guidelines [14].
The ST includes the following security objectives for the operational environment, which
are relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer: OE.Process-Sec-IC,
OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage and OE.TOE_Auth.
The objective OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the protection of the TOE, as well as of its
manufacturing and test data up to the delivery to the end-consumer. As defined in [6] and
[9] section 1.4.5, the TOE can be delivered to the composite product manufacturer after
phase 3 or after phase 4. However, the single chips are identical in all cases. This means
that the test mode is deactivated and the TOE is locked in the user mode. Therefore it is
not necessary to distinguish between these forms of delivery. Since Infineon has no
information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software it is
not possible to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the
composite product manufacturer.
The objective OE.TOE_Auth requires that the environment has to support the
authentication and verification mechanism and has to know the corresponding
authentication reference data. The composite product manufacturer receives sufficient
information with regard to the authentication mechanism in [16], section 4.2.2.
The objective OE.Loader_Usage requires that the authorised user has to support the
trusted communication with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the
loaded data and he has to meet the access conditions defined by the flash loader. [15],
section 4 provides sufficient information regarding this topic.
The objective OE.Lim_Block_Loader requires the composite product manufacturer to
protect the loader against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader and to terminate the
loader irreversibly after the intended usage. The permanent deactivation of the flash loader
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023
is described in [16], section 4.5.1.3. This objective for the environment originates from the
“Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only”. However, this TOE
also implements “Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only” and
thus the flash loader can also be used in an unsecure environment and is able to protect
itself against misuse if the authentication and download keys are handled appropriately.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a SmartCard (Security IC). Detailed information on the TOE hardware
architecture is to be found in [6] and [9] section 1.2, 1.3 and especially 1.4.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer performed the following categories of tests:
• Simulation Tests (Design Verification),
• Qualification Tests / Software Verification,
• Verification Tests and
• Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed
forthe underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
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8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h,
IFX_CCI_0037h design step T31 and M31 with optional HSL v2.62.7626, optional SCL
version v2.04.003, UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with specific IC-dedicated firmware
identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance.
Hardware Configuration:
The hardware of the TOE can be ordered with different SOLID FLASHTM
and RAM sizes
(up to 800 kBytes SOLID FLASH™ and up to 20 kBytes RAM). The configuration (as listed
in [6] and [9] table 3 and 4) can be done during the manufacturing process of the TOE
according to the choice of the user. The TOE operating temperature range configuration
options are reflected by the different design steps M31 and T31.
Firmware Packages:
The firmware of the TOE comprises the BOS (FW identifier provided in table 2) and the
Flash Loader (version provided in Table 2). The latter can be configured in three different
ways as outlined in the following:
● Option 1: The user or/and a subcontractor downloads the software into the SOLID
FLASH™ memory. Infineon Technologies does not receive any user software.
Result: Flash Loader can be activated or reactivated by the user or subcontractor to
download software into the SOLID FLASH™ memory.
● Option 2: The user provides software to download into the SOLID FLASH™ memory to
Infineon Technologies AG. The software is loaded into the SOLID FLASH™ memory
during chip production.
Result: No Flash Loader present.
● Option 3: The user provides software to download into the SOLID FLASH™ memory to
Infineon Technologies AG. The software is loaded into the NVM memory during chip
production.
Result: Flash Loader is blocked by Infineon but can be activated or reactivated by the
user or subcontractor to download software into the SOLID FLASH™ memory. The user
is required to provide a reactivation procedure as part of the software to Infineon
Technologies AG.
An overview about the different Flash Loader options is also given in [6] and [9], section
1.4.8.
Optional Software Libraries:
The TOE can be delivered with up to three software libraries, as described in [6] and [9]
section 1.4.1.2. All libraries are delivered as object code and in this way integrated into the
user software.
The optional software libraries listed in Table 2 can be combined according to the
demands of the user. Based on the library selection the TOE can be delivered with or
without the functionality of the HSL and/or SCL library. This is considered in the developer
documentation and corresponding notes are added where required.
If the user decides not to use the HSL and/or SCL library, it is not delivered to the user and
the accompanying additional specific security functionality as listed in Table 2 is not
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provided by the TOE. Upon deselection of a library the code implementing the functionality
is excluded and thus this functionality is not available to the user.
Excluding the code of the deselected functionality has no impact on any other security
policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to
use this functionality.
Evaluation scope:
The ITSEF tested the TOE in those configurations, in which the TOE is delivered, and
which are stated above (and in the ST [6] and [9]).
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance (mostly) specific for the technology was used:
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1, Durchführung
der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 2017-
10-11,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach
CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23,
Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 25, Anwendungen der
CC auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10, 2017-07-
03,
● Special Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.4, 2011-06-08,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,
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● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 36,
Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation
results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47, Regelungen zu
Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04
are considered.
Additionally the CC Supporting Mandatory Technical Documents
● Joint Interpretation Library – The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0,
February 2009,
● Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2,
2022-11 and
● Joint Interpretation Library – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.1, August 2015
are considered.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top of it.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only:
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES in modes
ECB, CBC, CFB and
CTR
(confidentiality)
CMAC
(integrity)
[NIST SP 800-67]
[NIST SP 800-38A]
[NIST SP 800-38B]
All modes:
|k| = 112, 168
CBC, CFB, CTR,
CMAC:
168: Yes, 112: No
ECB:
168, 112: No
AES in modes
ECB, CBC, CFB and
CTR
(confidentiality)
CMAC
(integrity)
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP 800-38A]
[NIST SP 800-38B]
All modes:
|k| = 128, 192, 256
CBC, CFB, CTR,
CMAC:
128, 192, 256: Yes
ECB:
128, 192, 256: No
Physical True RNG
PTG.2
Corresponding to
[AIS31] (proprietary)
N/A N/A
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The Flash Loader's and the ICS’ (internal ciphering system, see [6] and [9]) cryptographic
strength was not assessed by BSI. However, the evaluation according to the TOE's
Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any implementation weaknesses.
Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 100-Bit-
Level assessment was given. Consequently, the targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has
been achieved for those functionalities as well.
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Detailed results on conformance have been compiled into the report [19].
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation for
the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, November
2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST SP 800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for Authentication,
2005-05, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), November 2001,
U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
ETR for composite evaluation [10].
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At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [12]-[14] and [16]-[18] (also listed
in Table 2) have to be considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [15] have to be considered.
In addition the following hints resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect
has to be considered:
● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let
them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory) or to the Composite Product
Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
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IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023, “IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h,
IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h, IFX_CCI_0037h T31 and M31
Security Target”, Version 4.5, 2023-02-20, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, 2023-05-26, “EVALUATION TECHNICAL
REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target Lite for BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023, “IFX_CCI_000Dh,
IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h,
IFX_CCI_0037h T31 and M31 Security Target Lite”, Version 4.5, 2023-02-20,
Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023,
Version 1, 2023-05-26, “EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE
EVALUATION (ETR COMP)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, “Configuration Management Scope M5270 T31 and
M31”, Version 1.0, 2019-07-10, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[12] See table 2 in section B.2
[13] See table 2 in section B.2
[14] See table 2 in section B.2
[15] See table 2 in section B.2
[16] See table 2 in section B.2
[17] See table 2 in section B.2
[18] See table 2 in section B.2
[19] “Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification”, Version 1, 2019-07-09, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
7
See section 9.1 for specific AIS.
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1126-V3-2023
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h,
IFX_CCI_0034h, IFX_CCI_0037h design step T31 and M31 with optional HSL v2.62.7626,
optional SCL version v2.04.003, UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with specific IC-dedicated
firmware identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 7 July 2023, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE.
The relevant delivery sites are as follows:
Site ID Company name and address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Ptd
Tampinese LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
K&N Großostheim Infineon Technology AG
Distribution Center Europe (DCE)
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Table 4: TOE Delivery / Distribution Sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
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and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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