KECS-CR-20-30
D’Guard v3.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1016-2020
2020. 05. 20
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2020.05.20 -
Certification report for D’Guard v3.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for D’Guard v3.0 for INEB Inc.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................9
3. Security Policy ...................................................................................................10
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................... 11
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................12
5.1 Physical Scope of TOE...........................................................................12
5.2 Logical Scope of TOE.............................................................................14
6. Documentation...................................................................................................16
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................18
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................18
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................19
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................19
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..............................................................20
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................20
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................21
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................21
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................22
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................23
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................23
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................25
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the evaluation result drawn by the evaluation facility on the results
of the EAL1+ evaluation of D’Guard v3.0(“TOE” hereinafter) with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1].
It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is database encryption software that encrypts and
decrypts the user data in a column of a database to be protected.
The TOE types defined in this ST are grouped into the ‘plug-in type’ and ‘API type’,
depending on the TOE operation type. The TOE supports both types. The plug-in type is
a method that performs encryption on the DB Server and operates dependent on the
database. Since TOE module(the plug-in type) is installed in the protected DB server to
perform encryption/decryption, the DBMS is limited to Oracle 12.2. The API type
performs encryption in the application server (hereinafter ‘AP’) and is classified into Java
API and C API according to application work environment.
The TOE consists of D’Guard KMS, D’Guard Java API, D’Guard C API, and D’Guard
Plug-In v3.0.4. Components of the TOE are the management server that manages
policies and keys (hereinafter referred to as D’Guard KMS), agents that perform
encryption in the C work environment (hereinafter referred to as D’Guard C API), and
agents that perform encryption in the Java work environment (hereinafter referred to ad
D’Guard Java API). And it consists of agent (D’Guard Plug-In) which performs encryption
in DB Server. The D’Guard KMS provides services that perform key distribution roles,
perform policy management roles and collect agent logs. The TOE administrator
accesses the D’Guard KMS through a web browser and performs management roles. It
also plays an administrative role in the console environment for initialization and
operation.
The TOE includes cryptographic modules(MagicCrypto V2.0.0.0, INISAFE Crypto for C
V5.3) validated under the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
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The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on May 13, 2020. This report grounds on the evaluation
technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST) [6].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Data
Encryption V1.0 [3]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based
only upon assurance component in CC Part 3. The ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part
3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs
in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The operational environment of the TOE is shown in [Figure 1] TOE Operational
Environment. The operational environment of the TOE includes all the two types(API
type, plug-in type) defined in the PP [3]. In the Plug-in type, the DBMS is limited to Oracle
12.2.
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE(plug-in)
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[Figure 2] shows the general operational environment of the API type. The application,
which is installed in the application server and provides application services, is
developed using the D’Guard Java API or D’Guard C API provided by API module in
order to use the cryptographic function of the TOE. The D’Guard Java API or D’Guard C
API module is installed in the application server and performs encryption/decryption of
the user data in accordance with the policies configured by authorized administrator. The
user data entered by the application service user is encrypted by D’Guard Java API or
D’Guard C API module, which is installed in the application server, and sent to the
database server. The encrypted user data received from the database server is
decrypted by the D’Guard Java API or D’Guard C API module, which is installed in the
application server, and sent to the application service user.
[Figure 2] Operational environment of the TOE(API)
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[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for installation
and operation of the TOE.
Category Contents
D’Guard KMS CPU Intel i5 3.3 GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 1GB or higher necessary for installing the TOE
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1 port or higher
OS CentOS 7.7 (Linux kernel version: 3.10.0-1062)
Required S/W
PostgreSQL 10.12
Apache Tomcat 8.5.51
JRE (Java Runtime Environment) 8.0
D’Guard Plug-In CPU IBM POWER 3.0 GHz or higher
RAM 16GB or higher
HDD 30MB or higher necessary for installing the TOE
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1 port or higher
OS AIX 7.1 TL5 (64 bit)
Required S/W Oracle 12.2
D’Guard Java API CPU Intel i5 3.3 GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 30MB or higher necessary for installing the TOE
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1 port or higher
OS CentOS 7.7 (Linux Kernel 3.10.0-1062))
Required S/W JRE (Java Runtime Environment) 8.0
D’Guard C API CPU Intel i5 3.3 GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 30MB or higher necessary for installing the TOE
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1 port or higher
OS CentOS 7.7 (Linux Kernel 3.10.0-1062)
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
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[Table 2] shows minimum requirements necessary for the administrator’s PC to access
D’Guard KMS.
Category Contents
Software Web Browser Chrome 80.0 (64bit)
[Table 2] The minimum requirements for the administrator’s PC
2. Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
TOE D’Guard v3.0
Detail Version v3.0.4
TOE Components
D’Guard KMS v3.0.4
(D'Guard_KMS_v3.0.4.zip)
D’Guard Plugin v3.0.4
(D'Guard_Plug-In_v3.0.4.zip)
D’Guard C API v3.0.4
(D'Guard_C_API_v3.0.4.zip)
D’Guard Java API v3.0.4
(D'Guard_Java_API_v3.0.4.zip)
Guidance
Documents
D’Guard v3.0 KMS Document_v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_KMS_Document_v1.4.pdf)
D’Guard v3.0 Java API Document_v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_Java_API_Document_v1.4.pdf)
D’Guard v3.0 Plug-In Document v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_Plug-In_Document_v1.4.pdf)
D’Guard v3.0 C API Document v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_C_API_Document_v1.4.pdf)
D’Guard v3.0 Admin Document v1.3
(D’Guard_v3.0_Admin_Document_v1.3.pdf)
[Table 3] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
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[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 24, 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(September 12, 2017)[4]
TOE D’Guard v3.0
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Protection Profile Korean National PP for Database Encryption V1.1, KECS-
PP- 0820a-2017, December 11, 2019
EAL EAL1+
(augmented by ATE_FUN.1)
Developer INEB Inc.
Sponsor INEB Inc.
Evaluation Facility Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
May 13, 2020
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST by security objectives and security
requirements. The TOE provides following security features as follows. For more details
refer to the ST [7].
TSF Explanation
Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events such
as the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation,
self-test failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
Cryptographic
Support
The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as
encryption/decryption, and cryptographic key management such as
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TSF Explanation
key generation/distribution/destruction using MagicJCrypto
V2.0.0.0, INISAFE Crypto for C V5.3
User data
protection
The TOE provides encryption / decryption function for each column
of Database to protect user data.
Identification
and
Authentication
The TOE identifies and authenticates the administrators(super
administrator, security user) based on ID/PW.
Mutual authentication between TOE components.
Security
Management
Only the authorized administrator who can access the management
interface provided by TOE can performs security management of
the TOE.
Protection of
the TSF
The TOE provides secure communications amongst TOE
components to protect confidentiality and integrity of the
transmitted data between them. The TOE also protects TSF data
against unauthorized exposure and modification through
encryption.
TOE Access
The TOE manages the authorized administrator’s or end user’s
access to itself by terminating interactive sessions after defined
time interval of their inactivity. The TSF restrict the maximum
number of concurrent session, and management access session of
the administrator based on Access IP, and same administrator right.
[Table 5] Security Functions
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no explicit Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the Low
Assurance ST. The followings are procedural method supported from operational
environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality accurately.
 The place where TOE components are installed and operated shall be equipped
with access control and protection facilities so that only authorized administrator
can access.
 The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users, have
appropriately trained for the TOE management functions and accurately fulfill
the duties in accordance with administrator guidances.
 The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and
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authentication function in operational environment of the business system shall
ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied in accordance
with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
 The authorized administrator shall periodically checks a spare space of audit
data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup
(external log server or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent audit data loss.
 The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security
of the operating system by performing the reinforcement on the latest
vulnerabilities of the operating system in which the TOE is installed and operated.
 Security policies and audit records are stored in the trusted database. Without
the request of the TOE, the database is not created, modified or deleted.
 The TOE shall accurately record the security related events using the reliable
time stamp from the TOE operational environment.
 A secure path shall be ensured by the security policy of WAS in case of TOE
administrator’s UI access and use via a web browser on an authorized
administrator’s PC.
5. Architectural Information
5.1 Physical Scope of TOE
The physical scope and boundaries of the TOE are shown in the following figure.
[Figure 3] Physical scope of the TOE (Plug-In type)
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[Figure 4] Physical scope of the TOE (API type)
[Table 6] shows the physical scope of the TOE including softwares and documentations.
The physical scope of the TOE is divided into the D’Guard KMS, D’Guard Plug-In,
D’Guard Java API, D’Guard C API and documentation. Verified Cryptographic
Module(MagicCrypto V2.0.0.0, INISAFE Crypto for C V5.3) is embedded in the TOE
components. Hardware, operating system, DBMS, WAS, JRE which are operating
environments of the TOE are excluded from the physical scope of the TOE.
Type Identification
S/W
TOE
Component
D’Guard KMS v3.0.4
(D’Guard_kMS_v3.0.4.zip)
D’Guard Java API v3.0.4
(D’Guard_Java_API_v3.0.4.zip)
D’Guard C API v3.0.4
(D’Guard_C_API_v3.0.4.zip)
D’Guard Plug-In v3.0.4
(D’Guard_Plug-In_v3.0.4.zip)
Doc
(PDF)
Guidance
document
D’Guard v3.0 KMS Document_v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_KMS_Document_v1.4.pdf)
D’Guard v3.0 Java API Document_v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_Java_API_Document_v1.4.pdf)
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D’Guard v3.0 Plug-In Document v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_Plug-In_Document_v1.4.pdf)
D’Guard v3.0 C API Document v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_C_API_Document_v1.4.pdf)
D’Guard v3.0 Admin Document v1.3
(D’Guard_v3.0_Admin_Document_v1.3.pdf)
[Table 6] Physical scope of the TOE
5.2 Logical Scope of TOE
[Figure 5] Logical scope of the TOE
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
D'Guard KMS provides security features such as administrator identification and
authentication, password key management and security management for TOE and TSF
data.
 D'Guard KMS provides a Web-based management interface to authorized
administrators.
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 D'Guard KMS provides an authorized administrator with a CLI-based
management interface.
 The D'Guard KMS can send security policy and user data encryption keys to the
D'Guard Plug-In, D'Guard Java API and D'Guard C API according to the security
policy set by the administrator.
 D'Guard Plug-In, D'Guard Java API and D'Guard C API encrypt and decrypt user
data in database column.
Note that all the four components perform the same functionalities of audit data
generation, cryptographic key management, cryptographic operations, protection of TSF
data, and mutual authentication between the components.
The following functions are excluded from the evaluation scope.
[D’Guard KMS]
Access control policy management
The D’Guard KMS provides access control policy management function by the
authorized administrator when encrypting user data according to date, time, and day of
the week based on database account, IP address, MAC address, and application. This
function is a security function of the TOE that is excluded from evaluation. The access
control policy management function according to the date, time, and day of the week is
not a security requirement required by the National Database Encryption Protection
Profile (PP), and does not perform/support the security function.
[D’Guard Plug-In]
Access control function
The D’Guard Plug-In performs access control policy management function by an
authorized administrator when encrypting user data according to date, time, and day of
the week based on database account, IP address, MAC address, and application. This
function is a security function of the TOE that is excluded from evaluation. The access
control policy management function according to the date, time, and day of the week is
not a security requirement required by the National Database Encryption Protection
Profile (PP), and does not perform/ support the security function.
Unstructured File Encryption
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The TOE administrator provides a function to encrypt/decrypt user data or log files in the
form of files using encryption programs (the Dgsam, the Dgfile). The unstructured file
encryption function is not a security requirement required by the National Database
Encryption Protection Profile (PP), and does not perform/support the security function.
[D’Guard C API]
Unstructured File Encryption
The TOE administrator provides the ability to encrypt and decrypt unstructured files
containing user data using encryption programs (dgsam, dgfile). The unstructured file
encryption function is not a security requirement required by the National Database
Encryption Protection Profile (PP), and does not perform/support the security function.
For the detailed description on the architectural information, refer to the ST [6], chapter
1.4.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
D’Guard v3.0 KMS Document v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_KMS_Document_v1.4.pdf)
V1.4 April. 7, 2020
D’Guard v3.0 Java API Document_v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_Java_API_Document_v1.4.pdf)
V1.4 April. 7, 2020
D’Guard v3.0 Plug-In Document v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_Plug-In_Document_v1.4.pdf)
V1.4 April. 7, 2020
D’Guard v3.0 C API Document v1.4
(D’Guard_v3.0_C_API_Document_v1.4.pdf)
V1.4 April. 7, 2020
D’Guard v3.0 Admin Document v1.3
(D’Guard_v3.0_Admin_Document_v1.3.pdf)
V1.3 April. 7, 2020
[Table 6] Documentation
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7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test
case includes the following information:
 Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected
and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator has installed the product using the same evaluation configuration and
tools as the developer’s test and performed all tests provided by the developer. The
evaluator has confirmed that, for all tests, the expected results had been consistent
with the actual results. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent
search for potential vulnerabilities. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach,
configuration, depth, and results are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is D’Guard v3.0(3.0.4) and software consisting of the following
components:
 D’Guard KMS v3.0.4
 D’Guard Plug-In v3.0.4
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 D’Guard C API v3.0.4
 D’Guard Java API v3.0.4
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using
the product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report
chapter 6, [Table 4] were evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation
Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE
in a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and
TOE description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
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The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are
internally consistent. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes
the TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1.
Also the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in
device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
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The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the
secure use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation,
facilitates prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or
unreasonable. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the
TOE in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various
types of users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE)
whose incorrect actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their
own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specifies a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test
documentation. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
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9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development
and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses),
don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 1] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The administrator should install and operate the TOE and DBMS in a physically
secure environment accessible only by the authorized administrator, and should
not allow remote management from the outside.
 Developers who link the encryption function to the application or DBMS should
ensure that the security functions of the TOE are applied safely in accordance
with the requirements of the manual.
 The authorized administrator should manage the encryption key, security policy
to prevent leakage and grant the policy appropriate to the application service
user authority.
 The authorized administrator should periodically perform encryption key backup
in case of loss of encryption key information.
 The authorized administrator should set only necessary policies, and delete
unused policies to prevent potential vulnerabilities.
 It is necessary to maintain a secure state, such as periodically changing the
administrator's password when operating the product.
 The authorized administrator shall maintain the secure state, such as applying
the latest security patches to the operating system and DBMS, and removing
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unnecessary services, when operating the product.
 The authorized administrator shall periodically check the free space of the audit
data storage in preparation for the loss of the audit records and perform the
backup of the audit records so that the audit records are not deleted.
 The authorized administrator must register the e-mail address of the
administrator in the product so that warning e-mail can be normally sent out
when a potential security violation event occurs after installation of the product.
 An authorized administrator should install and operate an IT security product (eg,
an intrusion prevention system) in front of the DB to respond to network threats.
11. Security Target
The D’Guard v3.0 Security Target V1.5, May 12, 2020 [7] is included in this report by
reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Decryption The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext
using the decryption key
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Encryption The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext
using the cryptographic key
Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
Column A set of data values of a particular simple type, one for
each row of the table in a relational database
Database A set of data that is compiled according to a certain
structure in order to receive, save, and provide data in
response to the demand of multiple users to support
multiple application duties at the same time. The
database related to encryption by column, which is
required by this ST, refers to the relational database.
DBMS (Database
Management System)
A software system composed to configure and apply the
database. The DBMS related to encryption by column,
which is required by this ST, refers to the database
management system based on the relational database
model.
dgfile A program that encrypts and decrypts all unstructured files
dgsam This is a program that encrypts and decrypts the value of a
specific item by separating the values of each item from the
unstructured file by a separator or a fixed length.
Certification Report Page 25
13. Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1, KECS-PP-
0820a-2017, December 11, 2019
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security(September 12,
2017)
[5] TTA-CCE-17-017 D’Guard v3.0 Evaluation Technical Report V1.3, May 13,
2020
[6] D’Guard v3.0 Security Target V1.5, May 12, 2020 (Sanitized Version)