Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 15FMV5784-48:1
Dokument ID FMVID-297-1232
Template:
CSEC_mall_doc,
7.0
HEMLIG/
enligt Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen
(2009:400)
2016-03-11
Country of origin: Sweden
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- Lexmark MFP wHD
Issue: 1.0, 2016-mar-11
Authorisation: Dag Ströman, Head of CSEC , CSEC
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- Lexmark MFP wHD
15FMV5784-48:1 1.0 2016-03-11
FMVID-297-1232 2 (22)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Usage Assumptions 8
4.2 Environmental Assumptions 8
4.3 Clarification of Scope 8
5 Architectural Information 10
5.1 TOE Design 10
6 Documentation 13
7 IT Product Testing 14
7.1 Developer Tests 14
7.2 Independent Evaluator Tests 14
7.3 Penetration Tests 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 16
8.1 Dependencies to Other Hardware, Firmware and Software 16
8.2 Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration 16
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 18
11 Glossary 19
12 Bibliography 21
Appendix A QMS Consistency 22
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- Lexmark MFP wHD
15FMV5784-48:1 1.0 2016-03-11
FMVID-297-1232 3 (22)
1 Executive Summary
The TOE is the firmware of Lexmark’s Multi Function Printers MX511h, MX611h,
MX710h, MX711h, MX810, MX811, MX812, MX910, MX911, MX912, XM7155,
XM7163, XM7170, XM9145, XM9155, XM9165, CX510h and XC2132. All
equipped with hard disk.
Firmware versions:
 LW50.SB4.P555: MX511h
 LW50.SB7.P555: MX611h
 LW50.TU.P555: MX710h, MX711h, MX810, MX811, MX812, XM7155,
XM7163, XM7170
 LW50.MG.P555: MX910, MX911, MX912, XM9145, XM9155, XM9165
 LW50.GM7.P555: CX510h and XC2132
Conformance is claimed to PP Identification: 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy
Devices, Operational Environment A, version 1.0, dated January 2009 PP Conform-
ance:
 PP Conformance:
 “2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment
A,” “2600.1-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operation-
al Environment A,”
 “2600.1-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational
Environment A,”
 “2600.1-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational
Environment A,” “
 2600.1-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational En-
vironment A,” and
 “2600.1-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Func-
tions, Operational Environment A”
This Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to the Security Problem Defi-
nition (APE_SPD), Security Objectives (APE_OBJ), Extended Components Defini-
tions (APE_ECD), and the Common Security Functional Requirements (APE_REQ)
of the referenced PP.
This TOE performs the functions F.PRT, F.SCN, F.CPY, F.FAX, and F.SMI as de-
fined in the referenced PP and claims demonstrable conformance to the augmented
SFR packages defined for each of these functions.
The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB and EWA-Canada. The evalua-
tion was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version
3.1, release 4, and the Common Methodology for IT security Evaluation, version 3.1,
release 4. The evaluation was performed at the evaluation assurance level EAL3,
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also
accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025
for Common Criteria evaluation.
EWA-Canada operates as a Forign location for Combitech AB within scope of the
Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme.
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The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for evaluation assurance level:
EAL 3 + ALC_FLR.2.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
The invocation of cryptographic primitives has been included in the scope of this
evaluation, while correctness of implementation of cryptographic primitives been
excluded from the TOE. Correctness of implementation is done by vendor affirma-
tion through CAVP certification referred to in the Security Target. Users of this
product is advised to consider their acceptance of this affirmation.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2015006
Name and version of the
certified IT product
Firmware for Multi-Function Devices (Printers)
Lexmark
MX511h, MX611h, MX710h, MX711h, MX810,
MX811, MX812, MX910, MX911, MX912,
XM7155, XM7163, XM7170, XM9145, XM9155,
XM9165, CX510h and XC2132
Firmware versions:
 LW50.SB4.P555: MX511h
 LW50.SB7.P555: MX611h
 LW50.TU.P555: MX710h, MX711h, MX810,
MX811, MX812, XM7155, XM7163, XM7170
 LW50.MG.P555: MX910, MX911, MX912,
XM9145, XM9155, XM9165
 LW50.GM7.P555: CX510h and XC2132
Security Target Identification Lexmark MX511h, MX611h, MX710h, MX711h,
MX810, MX811, MX812, MX910, MX911,
MX912, XM7155, XM7163, XM7170, XM9145,
XM9155, XM9165, CX510h and XC2132 Multi-
Function Printers Security Target [ST].
EAL EAL3+ ALC_FLR.2.
CCRA recognition for components up to EAL 2 and
ALC_FLR only
Sponsor Lexmark International Technologies S.A.
Developer Lexmark International Technologies S.A.
ITSEF Combitech AB
Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 4
CEM version 3.1, revision 4
Certification completion date 2016-03-11
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3 Security Policy
The TOE consists of ten security functions. Below is a short description of each of
them. For more information, see Security Target [ST]
Audit Generation The TOE generates audit event records for security-relevant
events. A severity level is associated with each type of audita-
ble event; only events at or below the severity level configured
by an administrator are generated.
Identification and
Authentication
Users are required to successfully complete the I&A process
before they are permitted to access any restricted functionality.
The set of restricted user functionality is under the control of
the administrators, with the exception of submission of net-
work print jobs which is always allowed. Users are permitted
to access any TOE functionality that has a corresponding ac-
cess configured for “no security”.
Access Control Access control validates the user access request against the
authorizations configured by administrators for specific func-
tions. On a per-item basis, authorization may be configured as
“disabled” (no access), “no security” (open to all users), or
restricted (via security templates) (some items do not support
all three options).
Management The TOE provides the ability for authorized administrators to
manage TSF data from remote IT systems via a browser ses-
sion or locally via the touch panel. Authorization is granular,
enabling different administrators to be granted access to dif-
ferent TSF data. When an administrator modifies TSF data, an
audit record is generated.
Operator Panel
Lockout
The Operator Panel Lockout function enables the touch panel
to be “locked” to prevent anyone from using it until it is “un-
locked” by an authorized user. This function is enabled when a
security template is associated with the Operator Panel Lock
access control described above. When enabled, an icon is dis-
played on the Home page to lock the panel.
Fax Separation The Fax Separation security function assures that the infor-
mation on the TOE, and the information on the network to
which the TOE is attached, is not exposed through the phone
line that provides connectivity for the fax function. This func-
tion assures that only printable documents are accepted via
incoming fax connections, and that the only thing transmitted
over an outgoing fax connection (in the evaluated configura-
tion) is a document that was scanned for faxing.
Hard Disk Encryp-
tion
All user data saved on the Hard Disk is encrypted using 256-
bit AES. The types of data saved on the Hard Disk (and there-
fore encrypted) include buffered job data, held jobs, images
referenced by other jobs, and macros. The contents of each file
are automatically encrypted as they are written to the Hard
Disk and automatically decrypted when the contents are read.
This security function is intended to protect against data dis-
closure if a malicious agent is able to gain physical possession
of the Hard Disk. This security function operates transparently
to users and is always enabled in the evaluated configuration.
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Disk Wiping In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is configured to per-
form automatic disk wiping with a multi-pass method. Files
containing user data are stored on the internal hard drive until
they are no longer needed. At that time, they are logically
deleted and marked as needing to be wiped. Until the wiping
occurs, the disk blocks containing the files are not available
for use by any user. Every 5 seconds, the TOE checks to see if
any “deleted” files are present and begins the disk wiping
process.
Secure Communica-
tions
IPSec with ESP is required for all network datagram exchang-
es with remote IT systems. IPSec provide confidentiality, in-
tegrity and authentication of the endpoints. Supported encryp-
tion options for ESP are TDES and AES. SHA is supported
for HMACs.
Self Test During initial start-up, the TOE performs self tests on the
hardware. The integrity of the security templates and building
blocks is verified by ensuring that all the security templates
specified in access controls exist and that all building blocks
referenced by security templates exist. The integrity of the
stored TSF executable code by calculating a hash of the exe-
cutable code and comparing it to a saved value.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The following assumption about the usage are made:
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and proce-
dures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s
guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accord-
ance with those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for mali-
cious purposes.
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of
their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and proce-
dures.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following assumption about the environment are made:
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment
that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
A.IPSEC IPSec with ESP is used between the TOE and all remote IT systems with
which it communicates over the network using IPv4 and/or IPv6.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
Four categories of threat agents are defined:
 Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE.
 Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE func-
tions for which they are not authorized.
 Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in
ways for which they are not authorized.
 Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the
TOE to unanticipated threats.
The identified threats against the TOE are listed below:
 T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
 T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
 T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
Four Organisational Security Policies are defined.
 P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security, records
that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created,
maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be
reviewed by authorized personnel
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 P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external in-
terfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE
and its IT environment.
 P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in
the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
 P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security,
Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner
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5 Architectural Information
5.1 TOE Design
The following TOE model is adapted from the Protection Profile, ref. [PP].
Figure 1, TOE model
The TOE is comprised of the following subsystems:
Operating System
The Operating System subsystem provides standard operating system services such as
file system, process management, timers and memory management. The memory
management functionality zeroizes buffers in memory upon deallocation.
The Operating System subsystem executes a series of self-tests of the MFP upon each
start-up of the system. This subsystem also maintains the system time, which is used
to insert timestamps into audit records when they are generated.
GUI Manager
The GUI Manager subsystem handles all interactions with local users via the touch
screen and keypad. This subsystem retrieves (from the Object Store subsystem) and
displays the appropriate information on the touch screen and processes input from the
touch screen and keypad. When configuration changes are made, the updated infor-
mation is sent to the Object Store subsystem to be saved and acted on.
User Authentication
The User Authentication subsystem handles all validation of user credentials and au-
thorizations, whether the validation is performed locally or remotely. When creden-
tials or authorization checks are received from the GUI Manager or Web Server sub-
systems, User Authentication retrieves information from Object Store to determine if
local, remote, or PKI validation should be performed.
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Object Store
The Object Store subsystem is responsible for managing the storage of configuration
parameters, forwarding audit records between the generating subsystem and the Audit
subsystem, and forwarding user jobs between the receiving subsystem and the destina-
tion subsystem. This subsystem also maintains a list of pending user jobs.
Audit
The Audit subsystem is responsible for formatting audit information into the standard
Syslog format, inserting a timestamp, and forwarding the audit records to the config-
ured Syslog server. If NTP is configured, this subsystem also interacts with the con-
figured NTP server(s) to maintain the system time.
Network Interface
The Network Interface subsystem is responsible for all interactions with the Network
Interface Card and provides all the processing of network protocol layers that are
common to multiple software subsystems (e.g. TCP, IP, IPSec). This subsystem inter-
acts with remote IT systems via the network protocols. Since cryptography is required
for several of the network protocols to establish trusted channels, this subsystem par-
ticipates in key management functions and invokes the Crypto Library subsystem to
perform cryptographic operations. All communication with remote IT systems is re-
quired to use IPSec.
Print
The Print subsystem processes received print jobs from the network interface, scanner
and fax line (via the Object Store subsystem). Received network print jobs are queued
to be deleted after the print job expiration timeout if they do not contain a PJL SET
USERNAME statement. Audit information is generated as jobs are received, indicat-
ing the job is created. The user jobs are converted to raster images and queued for
printing. The list of user jobs waiting to be printed is communicated to the Object
Store subsystem. Audit information is generated as jobs are completed.
Scan Manager
The Scan Manager subsystem is responsible for controlling the operation of the scan-
ner hardware and formatting the scanned images into an appropriate format. This sub-
system invokes the Operating System subsystem to save the user data on the hard
drive in encrypted form. The format may be an email message with an attachment for
scan-to-email operations or scan-to-fax operations (when fax server is configured), or
raster image for copy operations or scan-to-fax operations (when analog fax is config-
ured). The currently logged in user on the touch screen is the user associated with the
job. Once formatted, the user job is sent to the Object Store subsystem for delivery to
the destination subsystem.
Email
The Email subsystem is responsible for forwarding user jobs to a remote IT system via
SMTP. In the evaluated configuration, the user jobs may have originated from a scan-
to-email operation or a scan-to-fax operation with the fax server configured. The Op-
erating System subsystem is invoked to open the file containing the user data and de-
crypt it. When the user job has been forwarded, the Operating System subsystem is in-
voked to delete the file containing the user data and wipe the area of the hard disk on
which the data was stored. Audit information is generated upon job completion and
forwarded to the Audit subsystem via the Object Store subsystem.
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Web Server
The Web Server subsystem is responsible for providing user access to TOE functions
from remote IT systems via browser sessions. This subsystem retrieves (from the Ob-
ject Store subsystem) and presents the appropriate information for display. When con-
figuration changes are made, the updated information is sent to the Object Store sub-
system to be saved and acted on.
Fax
The Fax subsystem is responsible for controlling the operation of the fax modem
hardware. For incoming faxes, this subsystem invokes the Operating System subsys-
tem to save the user data as a raster image on the hard drive in encrypted form. Unpro-
cessed data is never accepted by this subsystem and the evaluated configuration does
not permit unprocessed data received via the fax line to be forwarded out the Network
Interface Card. The touch screen user that releases the held faxes is the user associated
with the job. Once complete, the user job is sent to the Object Store subsystem for de-
livery to the Print subsystem.
Crypto Library
The Crypto Library subsystem provides cryptographic algorithm support used by other
subsystems to perform cryptographic operations. The operations supported include en-
cryption, decryption, hashing, message authentication coding, digital signatures and
random number generation.
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6 Documentation
The physical scope of the TOE also includes the following guidance documentation:
1. Lexmark Common Criteria Installation Supplement and Administrator Guide
2. Lexmark Embedded Web Server – Security Administrator's Guide
3. Lexmark MX410 and MX510 Series User's Guide
4. Lexmark MX610 Series User's Guide
5. Lexmark MX710 Series User's Guide
6. Lexmark MX810 Series User's Guide
7. Lexmark XM7100 Series User's Guide
8. Lexmark CX510 Series User's Guide
9. Lexmark XC2132 User's Guide
10. Lexmark MX910 Series User's Guide
11. Lexmark XM9100 Series User's Guide
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Tests
The developer performed manual tests. The developer’s testing covers the security
functional behaviour of all TSFIs and SFRs as well as the interactions of the subsys-
tems.
7.2 Independent Evaluator Tests
The evaluator’s independent tests were chosen to complement the developer’s manual
tests in covering as much of the security functional behavior of the TSFIs and SFRs.
The evaluator repeated all of the developer’s test cases and performed the individual
and penetration test cases. The tests included:
 TOE Installation
 Identification and Authentication
 Access Control and Management
 Touch Panel Lockout
 Hard Disk Encryption and Disk Wiping
 Trusted Channel
 Repetition of Developer’s Testing
The evaluator used a similar test configuration as the developer consisting of :
 TOE: MX611de without Smart Card reader
 Workstation: Windows client used to send print jobs to the TOE, open browser
sessions to manage the TOE, and to exchange email with the Email Server.
 Primary Domain Controller: Windows server providing Active Directory, DNS,
Kerberos, GSSAPI, PKI and NTP services
 Email Server: SMTP server capable of receiving email from the TOE and for-
warding it to a user on Workstation
 Syslog Server: Capable of receiving and diaplaying Syslog messages from the
TOE
 Network Monitor: Used to display and analyse network traffic
 Fax: Analog fax machine
 IP Network
 Phone network
The tests were run manually from the MFP’s touch screen, the Embedded Web Server,
and the workstation.
Repetition of the developer’s test cases was done at the developer’s site in Lexington,
USA.
The actual results of all test cases were consistent with the expected test results and all
tests were judged to pass.
7.3 Penetration Tests
Four types of vulnerability tests were performed:
 Port scan
 Vulnerability scan
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 Communication protocol compliance
 Hard disk encryption verification
Port scans were run after installation and configuration had been done according the
guidance documentation. The purpose was to check that no unexpected ports were
opened unfiltered and no unexpected services available. The Nmap (www.nmap.org)
port scan tool was used. Four different modes were used: TCP Connect, TCP SYN,
UDP, and IP protocol scans. All possible 65535 ports were scanned for TCP/UDP.
Nessus (www.tenable.com) basic network vulnerability scans were run. No high se-
verity issues were found.
It was verified that all traffic to and from the Primary Domain Controller was using
IPSec in ESP mode. It was also verified that no down negotiating to weaker algo-
rithms than specified for the trusted channel is possible.
The hard disk was examined to verify that all user data stored for held printing, scan-
ning, and incoming fax is encrypted.
Search in public sources revealed 15 vulnerabilities with CVE ids remaining in the
TOE. The vulnerabilities were however deemed not to be exploitable through source
code analysis and tests.
All penetration testing had negative outcome, i.e. no exploitable vulnerabilities were
found.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Dependencies to Other Hardware, Firmware and Soft-
ware
The TOE is the firmware of an MFP. The MFP hardware must be one of the models
supported for the firmware versions specified for the TOE. To be fully operational,
any combination of the following items may be connected to the MFP:
 A LAN for network connectivity. The TOE supports IPv4 and IPv6.
 A telephone line for fax capability.
 IT systems that submit print jobs to the MFP via the network using standard print
protocols.
 IT systems that send and/or receive faxes via the telephone line.
 An IT system acting as the remote syslog recipient of audit event records sent
from the TOE.
 LDAP server to support Identification and Authentication (I&A). This component
is optional depending on the type(s) of I&A mechanisms used.
 Card reader and cards to support Smart Card authentication using Common Ac-
cess Card (CAC) or Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards. This component is
optional depending on the type(s) of I&A mechanisms used. The supported card
readers are:
 Omnikey 3121 SmartCard Reader,
 Any other Omnikey SmartCard Readers that share the same USB Vendor IDs
and Product IDs with the above readers (example Omnikey 3021),
 SCM SCR 331,
 SCM SCR 3310v2.
8.2 Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration
The following features of the TOE are outside of or not allowed in the evaluated con-
figuration.
 Support for
 Optional network interfaces.
 Optional parallel or serial interfaces.
 USB ports on the MFPs that perform document processing functions.
 Support for AppleTalk.
 Other I&A mechanisms than Internal Accounts, LDAP+GSSAPI on a per-user ba-
sis, the Backup Password mechanism, and Smart Card authentication.
 Other eSF, Java applications, than “eSF Security Manager”, “Smart Card Authen-
tication”, “Secure Held Print Jobs”, “Smart Card Authentication Client”, “PIV
Smart Card Driver (if PIV cards are used)”, “CAC Smart Card Driver (if CAC
cards are used)”, and “Background and Idle Screen”.
 Fax forwarding.
 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
 Internet Printing Protocol (IPP).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance
Family Name
Short name (including component
identifier for assurance families)
Verdict
Security Target Evaluation ASE Pass
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 Pass
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 Pass
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 Pass
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 Pass
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 Pass
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Pass
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 Pass
Life-cycle support ALC Pass
Authrisation controls ALC_CMC.3 Pass
Implementation representation CM
coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Pass
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 Pass
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 Pass
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 Pass
Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 Pass
Development ADV Pass
Security Architecure description ADV_ARC.1 Pass
Functional specification with com-
plete summary
ADV_FSP.3 Pass
Architecual design ADV_TDS.2 Pass
Guidance documents AGD Pass
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 Pass
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 Pass
Tests ATE Pass
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 Pass
Testing: Basic design ATE_DPT.1 Pass
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 Pass
Independent testing - Sampling ATE_IND.2 Pass
Vulnerability assessment AVA Pass
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 Pass
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
Software components with known vulnerabilities are included in the TOE. It is not
known if the software in the TOE environment is vulnerable to these vulnerabilities.
The developer attests that they have used public information and testing to attempt to
exploit the potential vulnerabilities, but have been unable to launch successful attacks.
The evaluator has reviewed the developer’s analysis and test results. The evaluator has
also repeated developer tests and performed own testing. to confirm the results. The
calculated attack potential for these vulnerabilities is out of the range specified for
EAL3 evaluations. Therefore, it is acceptable for these vulnerabilities to be present in
the TOE and they are classified as residual vulnerabilities.
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11 Glossary
AD Active Directory
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIO All In One
BSD Berkeley Software Distribution
CAC Common Access Card
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, docu-
ment describing the methodology used in Common Criteria evalua-
tions
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GSSAPI Generic Security Services Application Program Interface
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
I&A Identification & Authentication
IPP Internet Printing Protocol
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6. Internet Protocol version 6
ISO International Standards Orgaization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to operate
within a evaluation and certification scheme
KDC Key Distribution Center
KDF Key Derivation Function
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MB MegaByte
MFD Multi-Finction Device
MFP Multi-Function Printer
NTP Network Time Protocol
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PIV Personal Identity Verification
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PJL Printer Job Language
PP Protection Profile
RFC Request For Comments
SASL Simple Authentication and Security Layer
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
ST Security Target
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
UI User Interface
URL Uniform Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
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12 Bibliography
[CCp1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, Part 1, version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-001
[CCp2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, Part 2, version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-002
[CCp3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, Part 3:, version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 4, September 2012, CCMB-
2012-09-004
[ST] Lexmark MX511h, MX611h, MX710h, MX711h, MX810,
MX811, MX812, MX910, MX911, MX912, XM7155,
XM7163, XM7170, XM9145, XM9155, XM9165, CX510h
and XC2132 Multi-Function Printers Security Target, 2015-
12-15, document version 1.5
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Appendix A QMS Consistency
During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management sys-
tem (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was received
2015-06-17:
QMS 1.17.3 valid from 2015-01-29
QMS 1.18 valid from 2015-06-18
QMS 1.18.1 valid from 2015-08-21
QMS 1.19 valid from 2016-02-05
In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex-
amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista QMS 1.19”.
The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.17.3 to the current QMS 1.19, there are no
changes with impact on the result of the certification.