Security Target lite -
Machine Readable Travel Document
with ICAO Application and Basic Access Control
MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / ST19NR66
MASKTECH INTERNATIONAL
Document number: BSI-DSZ-CC-0492, ST lite, Version 1.0
Created by: Matthias Brüstle
Date: 2008-10-27
Signature:
Released by Management
Date:
Signature:
Change history
Version Date Reason Remarks
1.0 2008-10-27 First Version of ST-lite based on ST
Table of Contents
1 Introduction.............................................................................................6
1.1 ST identification........................................................................................6
1.2 ST Overview.............................................................................................6
1.3 CC Conformance......................................................................................6
2 TOE Description......................................................................................7
2.1 System Type.............................................................................................7
2.1.1 Machine Readable Travel Documents.....................................7
2.1.2 Use of TOE............................................................................10
2.2 Limits of the TOE....................................................................................11
2.2.1 Architecture...........................................................................11
3 Security Environment...........................................................................11
3.1 Introduction.............................................................................................11
3.2 Assumptions...........................................................................................13
3.3 Threats....................................................................................................13
3.4 Organizational Security Policies..............................................................15
4 Security Objectives...............................................................................16
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE..............................................................16
4.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment
................................................................................................................18
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..............................19
5 Security Requirements.........................................................................20
5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE.......................................20
5.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit......................................................21
5.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)......................................21
5.1.1.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)................22
5.1.1.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)........23
5.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication...........................23
5.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection...........................................26
5.1.3.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)...................26
5.1.3.2 Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1).......................................................26
5.1.3.3 Inter-TSF-Transfer...............................................28
5.1.4 Class FMT Security Management..........................................29
5.1.5 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions....................32
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE......................................34
5.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment........................................34
5.3.1 Passive Authentication..........................................................35
5.3.2 Basic Inspection Systems......................................................35
5.3.3 Personalization Terminals.....................................................38
6 TOE Summary Specification................................................................39
6.1 TOE Security Functions..........................................................................39
6.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC).........................40
6.1.1.1 SF_ALEAS_A: Unpredictable Number Generation
Support................................................................40
6.1.1.2 SF_SKCS_A: Symmetric Key Cryptography
Support................................................................40
6.1.1.3 SF_ADMINIS_A: Security violation administrator.41
6.1.1.4 SF_PHT_A: Physical tampering security function 41
6.1.1.5 SF_OBS_A: Unobservability................................42
6.1.1.6 SF_TEST_A: Test of the TOE..............................42
6.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES).......42
6.1.2.1 F.Access_Control.................................................42
6.1.2.2 F.Deactivate_Non_TSF........................................43
6.1.2.3 F.Identification_Authentication.............................43
6.1.2.4 F.Initialization_Prepersonalization........................44
6.1.2.5 F.Personalization.................................................44
6.1.2.6 F.Retry_Counter...................................................44
6.1.2.7 F.Secure_Messaging...........................................45
6.1.2.8 F.Verification........................................................45
6.2 Assurance Measures..............................................................................46
7 PP Claims..............................................................................................46
7.1 PP Reference.........................................................................................46
7.2 PP Refinements......................................................................................46
7.3 PP Additions...........................................................................................47
8 Rationale................................................................................................47
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale.................................................................47
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale............................................................49
8.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale.........................49
8.2.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale..................................55
8.2.3 Strength of Function Level Rationale.....................................59
9 Glossary and Acronyms.......................................................................59
10 Literature...............................................................................................64
Security Target lite — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application (MRTD-ST)
1 Introduction
1.1 ST identification
Title: Security Target lite — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application and Basic Access Control (MRTD-ST)
Version: 1.0, 2008-10-27
Editors: Matthias Brüstle, MaskTech International GmbH
Compliant to: Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel
Document with ''ICAO Application'', Basic Access Control, version 1.0,
BSI-PP-0017
CC Version: 2.3
Assurance Level: The assurance level for this ST is EAL4 augmented.
General Status:Submitted for evaluation
Hardware: ST Microelectronics ST19NR66 rev. B
TOE version: MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO
Keywords: ICAO, machine readable travel document
1.2 ST Overview
1 The aim of this document is to describe the Security Target for the Machine Readable
Travel Document (MRTD) chip with the ICAO Application and Basic Access Control on
the MaskTech MTCOS Standard operating system.
2 The Security Target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless
chip based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control
in the Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
3 MTCOS Standard is a fully interoperable multi-application smart card operating system
compliant to ISO/IEC 7816. It provides secret key cryptography and supports also other
applications like e-purses, health insurance cards and access control.
4 The operating system software is implemented on the ST ST19NR66 rev. B secure
dual-interface controller, which is certified according to CC EAL5 augmented (SSI
certification report 2006/27). This means, that the TOE consists of software and
hardware.
5 The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4 augmented.
6 The minimum strength level (SOF) for the TOE security functions is high.
1.3 CC Conformance
7 This security target claims conformance to
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, August 2005, version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-001
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- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
function requirements, August 2005, version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-002
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, August 2005, version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-001
as follows
- Part 2 extended,
- Part 3 conformant,
- Package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
2 TOE Description
2.1 System Type
2.1.1 Machine Readable Travel Documents
8 (This description is taken from the corresponding Protection Profile [16] and should be
used as a general introduction to MRTDs.)
9 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) [6] and providing the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO
document [7].
10 The TOE comprises of
- the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the
contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors,
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
- the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
- the MRTD application and
- the associated guidance documentation.
11 TOE usage and security features for operational use
12 State or organisation issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The
traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The
MRTD in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical
data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and
machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data
elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The
authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD
personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data
page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State
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or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving
State trust a genuine MRTD of a issuing State or Organization.
13 For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport
book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical
Data Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents over the logical interface of APDUs contactless readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (DG2),
(3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3) or iris image(s)
(DG4) or both
(4) the other data according to LDS (DG5 to DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
14 The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the passport book
and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
15 The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on
paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and
organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)
[8]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport
book.
16 The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security
features of the MRTD’s chip.
17 The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the
optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active
Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption
of additional biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Technical report [7].
The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed
completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
18 This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-
only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic
Access Control Mechanism. This security target does not address the Active
Authentication and the Extended Access Control as optional security mechanisms.
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19 The Basic Access Control is a security feature which shall be mandatory supported by
the TOE but may be disabled by the Issuing State or Organization. The inspection
system (i) reads the printed data in the MRZ, (ii) authenticates themselves as inspection
system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful authentication of the
inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means
of private communication (Secure Messaging) with this inspection system [7], Annex E,
and [6].
20 TOE life cycle
21 The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases similar to the PP.
The phase 2 is split into multiple steps.
22 The operational phase according to the Common Criteria starts with phase 2b. It should
neither be confused with the operational mode of the embedded software nor with the
operational use of the MRTD.
Phase 1 “Development”
23 The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the
IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
24 The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and
the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and
develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
25 The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the
Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely
delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
programmable memories, the MRTD application and the guidance documentation is
securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
26 In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-
volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC
Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely
delivered from the IC manufacture to the MRTD manufacturer.
27 The MRTD manufacturer (i) adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-
volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM) if necessary, (ii) creates the
MRTD application, and (iii) equips MRTD’s chip with Pre-personalization Data and (iv)
packs the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport book.
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28 The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
29 For easier handling this phase is split into:
a) IC manufacturing: Manufacturing of the chip incl. Identification Data by the IC
manufacturer.
b) Initialization: The MRTD manufacturer configures the TOE like in a software
installation procedure.
c) Pre-personalization: The MRTD manufacturer prepares the TOE for the
personalization, e.g. creation of data files.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
30 The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder
biographical data, (ii) the enrollment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e.
the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the
visual readable data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and
TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) the writing the TSF Data into the logical MRTD
and configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the
Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ
data (DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (DG2), and (iii) the Document security object.
31 The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [7] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD
(together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
MRTD holder for operational use.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
32 The term “Operational Use” is not used here and afterwards in the sense of the
Common Criteria, but just to describe that here the MRTD is really used by the end-
user.
33 The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of
the Issuing State or Organization and used according to the security policy of the
Issuing State but they can never be modified.
2.1.2 Use of TOE
34 The TOE is implemented as a smart card IC, which supports the communication via a
contactless interface according to ISO/IEC 14443. It is based on ISO/IEC 7816
commands and is intended to be used inside a MRTD as storage of the digital data and
supports Basic Access Control.
35 Because of the support of ISO/IEC 7816 the TOE can be also used as multi-application
smart card with applications of health care, e-purse or loyalty.
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2.2 Limits of the TOE
2.2.1 Architecture
36 The TOE is an RFID device according to ICAO technical reports [6] and [7] supporting
Basic Access Control. It is implemented as an embedded software on a smart card chip,
in this case the CC EAL 5+ certified ST ST19NR66. The TOE is the MTCOS Standard
smart card operating system stored in the ROM of the IC, the file system including
application data, any configurable and non-volatile parameters and perhaps parts of the
operating system stored in EEPROM and the IC itself.
37 The TOE provides following services for MRTDs:
1. Storage of the MRTD data, e.g. data groups and signature.
2. Organization of the data in a file system as dedicated and elementary files.
3. Mutual Authenticate and Secure Messaging as specified in TrPKI [7] for Basic
Access Control.
4. Contactless communication according to ISO/IEC 14443.
5. Protection of data against modification.
6. Protection of the privacy of the passport holder with functions like random UID and
Basic Access Control.
38 The TOE life cycle is as defined in the preceding subsection with the addition, that the
operating system distinguishes in phase 2 between initialization mode and operational
mode. In initialization mode the operating system can be configured with Secure
Messaging protected commands. In this phase also the file system is created. The pre-
personalization is done in phase 2 after switching the OS to operational mode. The
operating system is in the operational mode until end of life.
3 Security Environment
3.1 Introduction
39 Assets
40 The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
41 Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the data groups DG1 to DG16 and the Document
security object according to LDS [6]. These data are User Data of the TOE. The data
groups DG1 to DG14 and DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Active
Authentication Public Key Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for Active
Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection
system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
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42 An additional asset is the following more general one.
43 Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization
for the MRTD’s holder is used by the traveller to authenticate himself as possessing a
genuine MRTD.
44 Subjects
45 This security target considers the following subjects:
46 Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default
user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish
between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
47 MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
48 Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
49 Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organisation to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity
the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data
of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as
defined for global, international and national interoperability and (iv) signing the
Document Security Object defined in [6].
50 Inspection system
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveller as MRTD holder. The Primary Inspection System (PIS) (i) contains a terminal
for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip and (ii) does not implement the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism. The Primary Inspection System
can read the logical MRTD only if the Basic Access Control is disabled. The Basic
Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with
the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control
Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic
Access Control by optical reading the printed data in the MRZ or other parts of the
passport book providing this information. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in
addition to the Basic Inspection System (i) implements the Active Authentication
Mechanism, (ii) supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism and (iii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization to
read the optional biometric reference data.
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51 Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
52 Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement the MRTD’s chip remotely
(i.e. without knowing or reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the
logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
3.2 Assumptions
53 The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used.
54 A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with
respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Active
Authentication Public Key Info (DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the
Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The
Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent
bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by
symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
55 A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Primary Inspection System for global
interoperability contains the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization [7]. The Primary Inspection System
performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD if the logical MRTD is
not protected by Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System in addition to the
Primary Inspection System implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control
and reads the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control.
3.3 Threats
56 This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use
in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
57 The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified
below.
58 T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the
MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening a communication through the contactless
communication interface. The attacker can not read and does not know in advance the
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page.
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59 T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker can not read and
does not know in advance the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page.
60 T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
An attacker is listening to the communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses
the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know this data
in advance.
Note in case of T.Skimming the attacker is establishing a communication with the
MRTD’s chip not knowing the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page and without a
help of the inspection system which knows these data. In case of T.Eavesdropping the
attacker uses the communication of the inspection system.
61 T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to impose on an inspection system by means
of the changed MRTD holders identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may
alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the
printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim an other identity of the traveller. The
attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication
mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to
defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The
attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTD’s to create a new forged
MRTD, e.g. the attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference
data of finger read from the logical MRTD of a traveller into an other MTRD’s chip
leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The
attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD in another contactless
chip.
62 The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
63 T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational
phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass,
deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to
manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
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64 T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in
the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
65 Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O charac-
teristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage
may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to
measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measure-
ments of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to
the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific
operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
(DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try
actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
66 T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An
attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) to modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the discloser or manipulation of
TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF
Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the
TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct
interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC fail-
ure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that hardware
security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of
software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-
requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function.
Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
67 T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security
features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent or deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misuse of
administration function. To exploit this an attacker needs information about the
functional operation.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
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68 The TOE shall comply to the following organisation security policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its
operations (see CC part 1, sec. 3.2).
69 P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of
the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the
IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which
contain at least the Personalization Agent Key.
70 P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data,
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other
data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the
MRTD for the holder is performed by authorized agents of the issuing State or
Organization only.
71 P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the
MRTD’s chip (DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (DG4)
and data according to LDS (DG5 to DG14, DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are
personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only
with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is
presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control
to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based
on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [7]. The issuing State
or Organization decides (i) to enable the Basic Access Control for the protection of the
MRTD holder personal data or (ii) to disable the Basic Access Control to allow Primary
Inspection Systems of the receiving States and all other terminals to read the logical
MRTD.
4 Security Objectives
72 This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives
for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are
separated into security objectives for the development and production environment and
security objectives for the operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
73 This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
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74 OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [6] and the TSF Data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents. The logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 and the TSF
data can be written only once and cannot be changed after personalization. The
Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data
in the data groups DG 3 to DG16 are added. Only the Personalization Agent shall be
allowed to enable or to disable the TSF Basic Access Control.
75 OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. If the TOE is configured for the
use with Basic Inspection Terminals only the TOE must ensure that the inspection
system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
76 OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
If the TOE is configured for the use with Basic Inspection Systems the TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 by granting
read access to terminals successfully authenticated by (i) as Personalization Agent or
as (ii) Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate
themselves by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the
Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical
MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.
If the TOE is configured for the use with Primary Inspection Systems no protection in
confidentiality of the logical MRTD is required.
77 OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory.
The IC Identification Data must provide an unique identification of the IC during Phase
2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. If the TOE is
configured for use with Basic Inspection Terminals only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
the TOE shall identify themselves only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection
System or Personalization Agent.
78 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE
Delivery can be abused in order (i) to disclose critical User Data, (ii) to manipulate
critical User Data of the Smartcard Embedded Software, (iii) to manipulate Soft-coded
Smartcard Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security
features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified
here.
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79 The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s
chip independent on the TOE environment.
80 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF Data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
81 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with high attack potential by means of
- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
- manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
82 OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation
outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not
been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may
include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock
frequency, or temperature.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment
83 OD.Assurance Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment
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The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated so
that it requires a combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be
able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to
compromise security through attack. This includes the use of the Initialization Data for
unique identification of the TOE and the pre-personalization of the TOE including the
writing of the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s). The developer provides
necessary evaluation evidence that the TOE fulfils its security objectives and is
resistant against obvious penetration attacks with low attack potential and against
direct attacks with high attack potential against security function that uses probabilistic
or permutational mechanisms.
84 OD.Material Control over MRTD Material
The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent must
control all materials, equipment and information to produce, to initialize, to pre-
personalize genuine MRTD materials and to personalize authentic MRTD in order to
prevent counterfeit of MRTD using MRTD materials.
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
85 Issuing State or Organization
86 The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
87 OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting
on the behalf of the issuing State or Organisation (i) establish the correct identity of the
holder and create biographic data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data
of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded
iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined
physical and logical security measures (including the digital signature in the Document
Security Object). The Personalization Agents enable or disable the Basic Access
Control function of the TOE according to the decision of the issuing State or
Organization. If the Basic Access Control function is enabled the Personalization
Agents generate the Document Basic Access Keys and store them in the MRTD’s
chip.
88 OE.Pass_Auth_SignAuthentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The Issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing Private Key and sign
Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Country Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations
maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The Issuing State or organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the secrecy
of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine
MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the
Document Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations. The digital
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signature in the Document Security Object include all data in the data groups DG1 to
DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [6].
89 Receiving State or organization
90 The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of
the TOE environment.
91 OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to
detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD.
92 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify
the traveller as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified
the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the
logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and organizations must
manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signing Public Key
maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
93 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data of the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD
being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the Secure Messaging with fresh
generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems). The receiving State examining the logical MRTD with Primary Inspection
Systems will prevent eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system.
94 MRTD Holder
95 OE.Secure_Handling Secure handling of the MRTD by MRTD holder
The holder of a MRTD configured for use with Primary Inspection Systems (i.e. MTRD
with disabled Basic Access Control) will prevent unauthorized communication of the
MRTD’s chip with terminals through the contactless interface.
5 Security Requirements
All SFRs contained in the PP are included in this ST. Refinements of the PP SFRs are
marked by double underlining.
5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
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96 This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into subsections
following the main security functionality.
5.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
97 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
98 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
99 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by
the TOE.
100 FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document
Basic Access Keys by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
BAC_MRTD
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic
Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [7], Annex E.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
101 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
102 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion
of key value that meets the following: FIPS PUB 140-2 [11].
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Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.1.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
103 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
104 FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by
MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_MRTD
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes
none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
105 FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption
Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
TDES_MRTD
The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [12] and [7]; Annex E.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
106 FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC_MRTD
The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Retail MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES,
Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.1.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
107 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
108 FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet P2 class of BSI-AIS31.
.
109 Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the
TOE environment
(terminal)
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [7], Annex E,
and [17]
Basic Access
Control
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/BAC_T,
FIA_UAU.6/T
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys,
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys
Symmetric
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personaliza-
tion Agents
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD FIA_API.1/PT Triple-DES with 112 bit
keys
Table 1: Overview on authentication SFR
110 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
111 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic
Inspection Systems only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
(4) to read the logical MRTD if the TOE is configured for use
with Primary Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational
Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
112 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
113 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic
Inspection Systems only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
(4) to read the logical MRTD if the TOE is configured for use with
Primary Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
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Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
114 The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
115 FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
116 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
117 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the following rules:
1. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as
Personalization Agent by one of the following mechanisms
(a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
the Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the
Personalization Agent Key
2. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic
Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys .
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
118 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
119 FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to TOE after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection
5.1.3.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
120 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The instantiations of FDP_ACC.1 are caused by the
TSF management according to FMT_MOF.1.
121 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Primary Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP on
terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data
groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
122 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on
terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data
groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
5.1.3.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
123 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The instantiations of
FDP_ACC.1 address different SFP.
124 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control – Primary Access Control
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1/
PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Terminals,
2. Objects: data in the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
3. security attributes
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1
b. authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: in the TOE configuration for use with Primary Inspection
Systems
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to write the data of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
2. the Terminals are allowed to read the data of the groups DG1
to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
PRIM
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
PRIM
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the rule: the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the
data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
125 FDP_ACF.1/Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1/
BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
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b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects: data in the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD
3. Security attributes
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1
b. authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: in the TOE configuration for use with Basic Inspection
Systems only
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to write and to read the data of the data groups DG1
to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is
allowed to read data of the groups DG1 to DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
BASIC
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
BASIC
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the rule: the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the
data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
5.1.3.3 Inter-TSF-Transfer
126 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
127 FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
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Dependencies: FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
128 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
129 FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
MRTD
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of User Data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
5.1.4 Class FMT Security Management
130 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
131 FMT_MOF.1 Management of functions in TSF
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable and disable the functions
TSF Basic Access Control to Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
132 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
133 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
a) Initialization,
b) Personalization
c) Configuration.
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Dependencies: No Dependencies
134 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
135 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Primary Inspection System,
4. Basic Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
136 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
137 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
138 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
139 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
140 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management
functions and different TSF data.
141 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
142 FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to
the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
143 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.
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Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
144 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic
Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys to none.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
5.1.5 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
145 The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and
TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent
leakage. With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination
with the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to
physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP
(FPT_RVM.1)” and “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” together with “Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical
attack (FPT_PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security
features or misuse of TOE functions.
146 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)” as
specified below:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption
and command execution time in excess of non-useful information
enabling access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and
none.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
Personalization Agent Authentication Key and none.
Dependencies: No other components.
147 The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced
illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.
148 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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149 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
(1) exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction
could occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
Dependencies: ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
150 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
151 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and
at the conditions “request of random numbers” to demonstrate
the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Dependencies: FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing.
152 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
153 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
154 The following security functional requirements protect the TSF against bypassing and
support the separation of TOE parts.
155 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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156 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked
and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to
proceed.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
157 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
158 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that
protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of
subjects in the TSC.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
159 The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are
those taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
and augmented by taking the following components:
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
160 The minimum strength of function is SOF-high.
161 This security target does not contain any security functional requirement for which an
explicit stated strength of function claim is required.
5.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment
162 This section describes the security functional requirements for the IT environment using
the CC part 2 components.
163 Due to CCIMB Final Interpretation #58 these components are editorial changed to
express the security requirements for the components in the IT environment where the
original components are directed for TOE security functions. The editorial changes are
indicated in bold.
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5.3.1 Passive Authentication
164 The ICAO, the Issuing States or Organizations and the Receiving States or Organization
run a public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication. This public key
infrastructure distributes and protects the Country Signing CA Keys and the Document
Signing Keys to support the signing of the User Data (DG1 to DG16) by means of the
Document Security Object. The Technical Report [7] describes the requirements to the
public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication.
165 The Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement
“Basic data authentication (FDP_DAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
166 FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_DAU.1.1/
DS
The Document Signer shall provide a capability to generate
evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of logical
the MRTD (DG1 to DG16) and the Document Security Object.
FDP_DAU.1.2/
DS
The Document Signer shall provide Inspection Systems of
Receiving States or Organization with the ability to verify evidence
of the validity of the indicated information.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.3.2 Basic Inspection Systems
167 This section describes common security functional requirements to the Basic Inspection
Systems and the Personalization Agent if it uses the Basic Access Control Mechanism
with the Personalization Agent Authentication Keys. Both are called “Basic Terminals”
(BT) in this section.
168 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
169 FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document
Basic Access Keys by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
BAC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall generate cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and
specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following:
[7], Annex E.
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Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
170 FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction - BT
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall destroy cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction
method physical deletion of key value that meets the following:
FIPS PUB 140-2 [11].
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
171 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the Basic Terminal.
172 FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by the Basic
Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithms SHA-1 and cryptographic key
sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
173 FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Encryption /
Decryption by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
ENC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform Secure Messaging –
encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: FIPS 46-
3, ISO 11568-2, ISO 9797-1 (padding mode 2).
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Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
174 FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Message
Authentication Code by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform Secure Messaging –
Message Authentication Code in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Retail-MAC and cryptographic key sizes
112 bit that meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 9797 (MAC
algorithm 3, block cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding mode
2).
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
175 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
176 FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall provide a mechanism to generate
random numbers that meets BSI AIS20 or AIS31 or has an
entropy of at least 7.95 bit in each byte.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
177 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication
mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
178 FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms – Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall prevent reuse of authentication data
related to Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
179 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Re-authentication (FIA_UAU.6)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
180 FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall re-authenticate the user under the
conditions each command sent to TOE after successful
authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
181 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
182 FDP_UCT.1/BT Basic data exchange confidentiality - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/B
T
The Basic Terminal shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to
be able to transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
Dependencies: FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
183 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
184 FDP_UIT.1/BT Data exchange integrity - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP
to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected
from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/BT The Basic Terminal shall be able to determine on receipt of user
data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has
occurred.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
5.3.3 Personalization Terminals
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185 The TOE supports different authentication and access control mechanisms which may
be used for the Personalization Agent depending on the personalization scheme of the
Issuing State or Organization:
(1) The Basic Access Control Mechanism which may be used by the Personalization
Agent with a Personalization Agent Secret Key Pair. The Basic Access Control
Mechanism establishes strong cryptographic keys for the Secure Messaging to
ensure the confidentiality by Triple-DES and integrity by Retail-MAC of the
transmitted data. This approach may be used in a personalization environment
where the communication between the MRTD’s chip and the personalization
terminal may be listen or manipulated.
(2) In a centralized personalization scheme the major issue is high productivity of
personalization in a high secure environment. In this case the Personalization
Agent may wish to reduce the protocol to symmetric authentication of the terminal
without Secure Messaging. Therefore the TOE and the Personalization Terminal
support a simple protocol as requested by the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
186 The Personalization Terminal shall meet the requirement “Authentication Prove of
Identity (FIA_API)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
187 FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity - Personalization Terminal
Authentication with Symmetric Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/
SYM_PT
The Personalization Terminal shall provide a Authentication
Mechanism based on Triple-DES to prove the identity of the
Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6 TOE Summary Specification
188 This chapter describes the TOE Security Functions and the Assurance Measures
covering the requirements of the previous chapter.
6.1 TOE Security Functions
189 This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions
composing the TSF.
190 In the following table all TOE Security Functions with a SOF claim are listed. The
assessment of cryptographic algorithms is not part of this CC evaluation.
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TOE Security Function SOF claim Description
SF_ALEAS_A high Random numbers can be analyzed with
probabilistic methods.
SF_SKCS_A high The quality can be analyzed with probabilistic
methods on side-channels.
F.Identifcation_Authentication high The mechanism for identification/authentication
of the roles is probabilistic.
F.Secure_Messaging high The mechanism for identification/authentication
and confidentiality of communication is
probabilistic.
6.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC)
191 Unused parts of SFs are printed italics. Some have additional information appended.
6.1.1.1 SF_ALEAS_A: Unpredictable Number Generation Support
192 In all configurations, this security function provides two unpredictable and unrelated 8
bits numbers.
193 In ISSUER and USER configurations, this security function supports the prevention of
information leakage.
194 This security function ensures the generation of unpredictable numbers of 1088 bits, in
USER configuration.
195 This security function can be qualified, with :
- the test metrics required by the NIST FIPS PUB-140-2:1999 standard for a Security
Level 3 cryptographic module (statistical test upon demand),
- the test metrics required by the BSI-AIS31 standard for a P2 class device.
196 Addition:
197 These random numbers are used in:
● the anticollision phase of the chip in phase 4 to create communication
identification data and
● the creation of a session key and authentication nonces.
6.1.1.2 SF_SKCS_A: Symmetric Key Cryptography Support
198 In USER configuration, this security function implements the following standard
symmetric key cryptography algorithms:
- Data Encryption Standard (DES) with 64 bits long keys (56 effective bits).
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This functionality supports the following standard modes of operation, both for
encryption and for decryption:
- DES by itself,
- Triple DES, chaining two DES encryption and one DES decryption.
Each of these modes of operation can be chained in the standard Cipher Block
Chaining mode (CBC). In the encryption operation mode, this function can compute
either a 64 bits long Message Authentication Code (MAC) or the encrypted data.
This functionality implements the following standard symmetric key cryptography
algorithms:
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128 bits long keys, 128 bits long blocks,
10 rounds, providing cipher, inverse cipher and key expansion operations.
199 Addition:
200 This SF is used in all cases where DES/3DES is used.
6.1.1.3 SF_ADMINIS_A: Security violation administrator
201 In TEST, ISSUER and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the management
of security violations attempts.
202 The security violations attempts which are managed are:
– access to unavailable or reserved memory locations,
– unauthorized access to user memories,
– unauthorized access to STM memories,
– bad CPU usage,
– bad NVM use,
– EEPROM single bit fails,
– clock and voltage supply operating changes,
– TOE physical integrity abuse.
6.1.1.4 SF_PHT_A: Physical tampering security function
203 In TEST, ISSUER and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the following:
- the TOE detects clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment,
- the TOE detects attempts to violate its physical integrity,
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- the TOE is always clocked with shape and timing within specified operating
conditions.
6.1.1.5 SF_OBS_A: Unobservability
In ISSUER and USER configurations, this security function addresses the Unobservability
(FPR_UNO.1), the Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1) and the Basic internal TSF
data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) security functional requirements expressed in this
document.
6.1.1.6 SF_TEST_A: Test of the TOE
204 This functionality is responsible for restricting access of the TOE TEST functionality to
the TEST administrator in TEST configuration.
205 This functionality is responsible for restricting access of the TOE ISSUER functionality to
the ISSUER administrator in ISSUER configuration.
206 In USER configuration, this functionality ensures that neither TOE TEST nor TOE
ISSUER functionality can be accessed.
207 In TEST configuration, this functionality ensures the test of TOE functionality with
respect to the IC specification.
208 In ISSUER and USER configurations, it ensures that critical test functionality is disabled.
209 In TEST configuration, this functionality provides commands to store data and/or pre
personalisation data and/or supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software
(personalization). In ISSUER configuration, these commands are still available but in a
more restricted operation mode.
6.1.1.7 SF_INT_A: TOE logical integrity
210 This functionality is responsible for the following operations, performed according to
actual TOE configuration:
● NVM, USR_ROM and ST_ROM integrity content verifications in TEST and ISSUER
configurations,
● valid CPU usage and stack overflow verification in TEST, ISSUER and USER
configurations.
● for correcting single bit fails upon a read operation,
● other actions are not described here.
211 This functionality is responsible for reporting to SF_ADMINIS_A detected errors on CPU
usage, stack overflow and EEPROM.
6.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES)
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6.1.2.1 F.Access_Control
212 This TSF regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are
only executed after this TSF allowed access. This function consists of following
elements:
1. Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects and attributes.
2. No access control policy allows reading of any key.
3. Access Control in phase 2a – IC manufacturing: IC manufacturer is able to write to
all persistent data areas, incl. the IC identification data to the OTP area.
4. Access Control in phase 2b - initialization - enforces initialization policy:
Configuration and initialization of the TOE only by the manufacturer or on behalve
of him. (See F.Initialization_Prepersonalization.)
5. Access Control in phase 2c – pre-personalization – enforces pre-personalization
policy: Creation of the ICAO file structure, configuring of access control policy,
doing key management and reading of initialization data only by the pre-
personalization agent. (See F.Initialization_Prepersonalization.)
6. Access Control in phase 3 – personalization – enforces personalization policy:
Writing of user data, doing key management, e.g. BAC key, and reading of
initialization data only by the personalization agent. (See F.Personalization.)
7. Access Control in phase 4 – operation – enforces operational use policy: Read
only. Depending on configuration made in phase 2 enforcement of PIS or BIS
policy.
6.1.2.2 F.Deactivate_Non_TSF
213 This security function limits the available commands in the different life cycles. This is
done by different command interpreters:
• Phase 2b: Command interpreter for initialization providing test and initialization
commands.
• Phase 2c and 3: Command interpreter for pre- and personalization providing
commands for that purpose but e.g. not test commands from phase 2b.
• Phase 4: Command interpreter for operational phase providing commands for that
purpose but e.g. not test commands from phase 2b, no commands returning chip
initialization data nor any command suitable to modify data inside files.
214 This function thereby allows to disable test commands of phase 2 in later phases and
reduces overall attackable functionality of the TOE in each phase.
6.1.2.3 F.Identification_Authentication
215 This function provides identification/authentication of user roles:
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• Pre-personalization agent
• Personalization agent
• BIS
216 Each of these roles is identified/authenticated with at least one specific key.
217 It uses for this the Basic Access Control [18] authentication method which has following
properties:
1. Requires a challenge fetched directly before this function from the TOE.
2. The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC.
3. The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC.
4. The cryptographic method for key derivation is SHA-1. The SHA-1 algorithm is
compliant to FIPS 180-2. [13]
218 Keys in transient memory are overwritten after usage.
219 On error (wrong MAC, wrong challenge) the user role is not identified/authenticated.
220 On success the generated session key is stored for F.Secure_Messaging.
6.1.2.4 F.Initialization_Prepersonalization
221 This function is performed by the pre-personalization agent in phases 2b (initialization)
and 2c (pre-personalization).
222 In phase 2b the agent does the initialization.
223 In phase 2c the agent configures the file layout including security attributes and limits
the personalization on its choice of access control policy. The layout done at this step
determines if BIS or PIS policy is enforced in phase 4 and that the parameters given in
F.Access_Control for phases 3 and 4 are enforced. The agent can at this step do also
key management and other administrative tasks.
6.1.2.5 F.Personalization
224 This function is performed by the personalization agent in phase 3.
225 The agent does for this function the following steps:
• Formatting of all data to be stored on the TOE according to ICAO requirements
which are outside the scope of the TOE. The data to be formated includes the index
file EF.COM, the data groups – e.g. DG1 with the MRZ – and the passive
authentication data with a signature over all data.
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• If BIS policy: Deriving of the Basic Access Control key from the Machine Readable
Zone data as specified in TrPKI [18] and writing it to the TOE.
• Writing of all the required data to the appropriate files as specified in TrLDS [17].
• Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4.
226 Operations on the TOE are regulated according to F.Access_Control.
6.1.2.6 F.Retry_Counter
227 The retry counter (RTC) reacts to failed authentication procedures whereby it limits the
number of consecutively failed authentication procedures to a specified maximum.
When this limit is reached the respective key is blocked against further usage.
228 Reasons for authentication failures are e.g.:
• Wrong MAC
• Wrong challenge
229 All administrative keys used in phases 2c and 3 use this SF to limit the consecutively
failed authentication procedures to three.
230 The MRZ derived key used for BIS policy must not be protected with this SF as this
could introduce practical problems, i.e. accidentally blocked and hence unusable
passports.
6.1.2.7 F.Secure_Messaging
231 This security function implements a secure communication channel with following
parameters:
1. The Secure Messaging is as specified in Basic Access Control.
2. In phases 3 – 4 a session key is used.
3. The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC.
4. The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC.
5. In a Secure Messaging protected command the method for confidentiality and the
method for authenticity must be present.
6. The initialization vector is changed after each command according to [7].
7. Any non Secure Messaging protected command overwrites the session key and
requires new authentication via F.Identification_Authentication.
8. Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage.
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6.1.2.8 F.Verification
232 This function ensures correct operation.
6.2 Assurance Measures
233 The assurance measures fulfilling the requirements of EAL4 augmented with
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2 are:
Assurance Measure Description
ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation
ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_SCP.2 Problem tracking CM coverage
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation and startup
ADV_FSP.2 Fully defined external interfaces
ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_LLD.1 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Descriptive low-level design
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis
7 PP Claims
7.1 PP Reference
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234 The conformance of this ST to the Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine
Readable Travel Document with ''ICAO Application'', Basic Access Control, version 1.0,
BSI-PP-0017 is claimed.
7.2 PP Refinements
235 None.
7.3 PP Additions
236 None.
8 Rationale
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale
237 The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Malfuntion
OD.Assurance
OD.Material
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Secure_Handling
T.Chip-ID x x
T.Skimming x x
T.Eavesdropping x x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Information_Leakage x
T.Phys-tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.Manufact x x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Personal_Data x x
A.Pers_Agent x
A.Insp_Sys x x
Table 1: Security Objective Rationale
238 The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires the quality and
integrity of the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2
Manufacturing including unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data
and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data. The security objective for the TOE
environment OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment” address these obligations of the IC Manufacturer and
MRTD Manufacturer.
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239 The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrollment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for
the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note, the manufacturer equips the TOE
with the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s) according to OD.Assurance
“Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment”. The
security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and the
management of TSF (enabling and disabling of the TSF Basic Access Control) to the
Personalization Agent.
240 The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to
support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic
Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing
State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int
“Integrity of personal data“ which describes the unconditional protection of the integrity
of the stored data and the configurable integrity protection during the transmission. The
security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the
protection of the confidentiality as configured by the Personalization Agent acting in
charge of the issuing State or Organization.
241 The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. In case of TOE configuration for use with Basic Inspection
Terminals only this threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification by Basic Access Control. If the TOE is configured for use with
Primary Inspection Systems this threat shall be averted by the TOE environment as
described by OE.Secure_Handling.
242 The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection
system” address the reading of the logical MRTD through the contactless interface or
listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. In case of TOE
configuration for use with Basic Inspection Terminals only this threat is countered by the
security objective OT.Data_Conf through Basic Access Control. If the TOE is configured
for use with Primary Inspection Systems the threat T.Skimming shall be averted by the
TOE environment according to OE.Secure_Handling “Secure handling of the MRTD by
MRTD holder” and the threat T.Eavesdropping shall be averted by
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD”.
243 The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to
limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of
the presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the
MRTD passport book” shall ensure that the passport book does not contain an
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additional contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD.
The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of
logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
244 The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s
chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to
manipulate the logical MRTD. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed
by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func. The security objective
for the TOE environment OD.Material “Control over MRTD Material” ensures the control
of the MRTD material. The security objectives for the TOE environment OD.Assurance
“Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment” and
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” ensure that the TOE security
functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security
functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according
to the intended use of the TOE.
245 The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct
attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats are
addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection
against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
246 The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” including the enrollment, the protection with digital signature and the
storage of the MRTD holder personal data and the enabling of security features of the
TOE according to the decision of the Issuing State or Organization concerning the Basic
Access Control.
247 The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for
the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. If
the Issuing State of Organization decides to protect confidentiality of the logical MRTD
than the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
“Protection of data of the logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to
implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the
transmission and the internal handling. If the Issuing State of Organization decides to
configure the TOE for use with Primary Inspection Systems, no protection of the logical
MRTD data is required by the inspection system.
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale
8.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
248 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
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FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD (x) x (x)
FCS_CKM.4 (x) x
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD x x (x)
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD x x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD x x x
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (x) x x
FIA_UID.1 x x
FIA_UAU.1 x x
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD x x x
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD x x x
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD x x x
FDP_ACC.1/PRIM x x
FDP_ACF.1/PRIM x x
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC x x x
FDP_ACF.1/BASIC x x x
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD x x x
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD x x x
FMT_MOF.1 x x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x
FMT_SMR.1 x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE x x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FPT_RVM.1 x
FPT_FLS.1 x x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
FPT_SEP.1 x x
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Table 2: Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
249 The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing of the logical MRTD and the
management of the TSF for Basic Access Control. The write access to the logical MRTD
data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/PRIM, FDP_ACC.1/BASIC, FDP_ACF.1/PRIM
and FDP_ACF.1/BASIC in the same way: only the successfully authenticated
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Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups DG1 to DG16 of the
logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_UAU.5/MRTD. In case the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism was used, the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD describes
the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD the protection of
the transmitted data by means of Secure Messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD, FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) because
the Personalization Agent handles the configuration of the TSF Basic Access Control
according to the SFR FMT_MOF.1 and the Document Basic Access Keys according to
the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data if Basic Access
Control is enabled. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the
secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR
FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
250 The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/PRIM, FDP_ACC.1/BASIC, FDP_ACF.1/PRIM and
FDP_ACF.1/BASIC in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write
the data of the groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and
terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization).
If the TOE is configured for the use with Basic Inspection Terminals only by means of
FMT_MOF.1 the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires
the TOE to ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization
Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD, FDP_UCT.1
and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of Secure
Messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRD, FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for key
generation), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the
ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization
Agent to establish the Document Basic Access Keys.
251 The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the
TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 if the
TOE is configured for the use with Basic Inspection Systems by means of FMT_MOF.1.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification
respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. The read access to the
logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1/BASIC and FDP_ACF.1.2/BASIC: only
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the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent and the successfully authenticated
Basic Inspection System are allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD. The SFR
FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection
System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover,
the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD requests Secure Messaging after successful
authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of
the cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD).
(for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for
the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD and FCS_RND.1/MRTD establish the key management for
the Secure Messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key
management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic
Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
requires the Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism or Secure Sessaging. If the TOE is configured for the use with Primary
Inspection Systems, no protection in confidentiality of the logical MRTD is needed to
ensure.
252 The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”
addresses the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip
in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensure by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, if the TOE is configured for use with Basic Inspection Terminals the TOE
shall identify themself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the
Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if
their use in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective
OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any
data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of the Basic
Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication
attempt.
253 The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”
is ensured by (i) the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test
functionality of the TOE or other which may not be used after TOE Delivery, (ii) the SFR
FPT_RVM.1 which prevents by monitoring the bypass and deactivation of security
features or functions of the TOE, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1 which prevents change
or explore security features or functions of the TOE by means of separation the other
TOE functions.
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254 The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip against disclosure
- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1
and FPT_TST.1, and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_PHP.3.
255 The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”
is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
256 The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is
covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct
operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code,
(ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or
operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1
limiting the effects of malfunctions due to TSF domain separation.
257 The following table provides an overview how security functional requirements for the IT
environment cover security objectives for the TOE environment. The protection profile
describes only those SFR of the IT environment directly related to the SFR for the TOE.
It does not state any SFR for the IT environment supporting the security objectives
OD.Assurance and OD.Material. The OE.Exam_MRTD uses only security function of the
IT environment, i.e. the passive authentication. The security objective
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD is directed to Basic Inspection Systems only which cooperate
with the TOE in protection of the logical MRTD.
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O
D.Assurance
OD.Material
O
E.Personalization
O
E.Exam_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Docum
ent Signer
FDP_DAU.1/DS x x x
Term
inal
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT (x) x
FCS_CKM.4/BT (x) x
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT (x) x
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT (x) x
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT (x) x
FCS_RND.1/BT (x) x
FIA_UAU.4/BT (x) x
FIA_UAU.6/BT (x) x
FDP_UCT.1/BT (x) x
FDP_UIT.1/BT (x) x
Personalization Agent
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT (x)
Table 3: Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFR
258 The security objective OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”
requires the inspection system to verify the passport, the security objective
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” requires the issuer
to provide Passive Authentication infrastructure and the security objective
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication” requires the inspection
system to verify the digital signature and data. The document signer provides the
security function Passive Authentication according to FDP_DAU.1/DS to support the
inspection system to verify the logical MRTD.
259 The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD“
address the protection of the logical MRTD during the transmission and internal
handling. The SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT and FIA_UAU.6/BT address the terminal part of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and FDP_UCT.1/BT and
FDP_UIT.1/BT the secure messaging established by this mechanism. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT, FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT and FCS_RND.1/BT are necessary to implement this
mechanism. The BIS shall destroy the Document Access Control Key and the Secure
Messaging key after inspection of the MRTD because they are not needed any more
(FCS_CKM.4/BT).
260 The OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the personalization
terminal to authenticate themselves to the MRTD’s chip to get the write authorization.
This implies to implement the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (SFRs
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT, FCS_CKM.4/BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT, FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT,
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FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT, FCS_RND.1/BT, FIA_UAU.4/BT, FIA_UAU.6/BT,
FDP_UCT.1/BT, FDP_UIT.1/BT) with the Personalization Agent Authentication Keys or
support the symmetric authentication protocol according to the SFR
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
261 For dependency rationale (SFR/SAR) see PP 7.2.2.
8.2.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
262 This shows the coverage of the SFRs by TSFs.
SF_ALEAS_A
SF_SKCS_A
SF_ADMINIS_A
SF_PHT_A
SF_OBS_A
SF_TEST_A
SF_INT_A
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD x
FCS_CKM.4 x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD x
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD x x
FCS_RND.1/MRTD x
FIA_UID.1 x
FIA_UAU.1 x
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD x x
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD x
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD x
FDP_ACC.1/PRIM x
FDP_ACF.1/PRIM x
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC x
FDP_ACF.1/BASIC x
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD x
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD x
FMT_MOF.1 x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x
FMT_SMR.1 x
FMT_LIM.1 x x
FMT_LIM.2 x x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x x
FPT_FLS.1 x
FPT_TST.1 x x x
FPT_PHP.3 x
FPT_RVM.1 x
FPT_SEP.1 x x
F.Access_Control
F.Deactivate_Non_TSF
F.Identification_Authentication
F.Initialization_Prepersonalization
F.Personalization
F.Retry_Counter
F.Secure_Messaging
F.Verification
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Table 4: Coverage of SFRs for the TOE by TSFs.
263 The SFR FAU_SAS.1 requires the storage of the chip identification data by the
Manufacturer who is allowed to do this by F.Access_Control.
264 The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD requires the generation of the document Basic
Access Control key which is done by the personalization agent in F.Personalization (“If
BIS policy: Deriving of the Basic Access Control key ...”).
265 The SFR FCS_CKM.4 requires the destroying of cryptographic keys. This is done in
F.Identification_Authentication (“Keys in transient memory are overwritten after
usage.”) and F.Secure_Messaging (“Overwrites keys in transient memory after
usage”).
266 The SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD requires the SHA-1 algorithm which is provided by
F.Identification_Authentication (Item 4).
267 The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD requires Triple-DES in CBC mode for data
confidentiality. F.Secure_Messaging (Item 3) uses Triple-DES/CBC as specified in the
Basic Access Control specification. [7] Triple-DES is used from SF_SKCS_A.
268 The SFR FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD requires Triple-DES in retail-MAC mode for data
authenticity. F.Secure_Messaging (Item 4) uses Triple-DES/retail-MAC as specified in
the Basic Access Control specification. [7] DES and Triple-DES are used from
SF_SKCS_A.
269 The SFR FCS_RND.1/MRTD requires the generation of random numbers which is
provided by SF_ALEAS_A that produces cryptographically strong random numbers.
SF_ALEAS_A can be qualified with test metrics required by NIST FIPS PUB-140-
2:1999 or BSI-AIS31 standard.
270 The SFR FIA_UID.1 requires timing of identification. It is handled by F.Access_Control
which enforces identification of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after
this TSF allowed access.”). Also all policies there besides PIS in phase 4 prevent
reading sensitive or user dependent data without user identification.
271 The SFR FIA_UAU.1 requires timing of authentication. It is handled by
F.Access_Control which enforces authentication of a role before access is granted
(“...only executed after this TSF allowed access.”). Also all policies there besides PIS in
phase 4 prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without user authentication.
272 The SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD requires the prevention of authentication data reuse. This is
fulfilled by using random data from SF_ALEAS_A (“... used in ... the creation of a
session key and authentication nonces.”) and by using changing initialization vectors in
F.Secure_Messaging (Item 6) as specified in the Basic Access Control specification.
[7]
273 The SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires Basic Access Control authentication mechanism and
authentication mechanism using Triple-DES. This is provided by
F.Identification_Authentication (“It uses for this the Basic Access Control
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authentication method...” and items 2 and 3) as specified in the Basic Access Control
specification. [7] The SFR FIA_UAU.5 also requires the role to be identified with role
specific keys. This is done in F.Identification_Authentication (“Each of these roles it
identified/authenticated with at least one specific key.”).
274 The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD requires re-authentication of each command. This is
ensured by the enforced method for authenticity in F.Secure_Messaging (Item 5).
275 The SFR FDP_ACC.1/PRIM requires the enforcement of the PIS access control policy
which is done by F.Access_Control (Item 6: “Access Control in phase 4 ... enforcement
of PIS ...”).
276 The SFR FDP_ACF.1/PRIM requires the enforcement of accesses to objects based on
subjects, objects and attributes, which is enforced by F.Access_Control (Item 1). The
SFR FDP_ACF.1/PRIM also requires the enforcement of the rules of the PIS access
control policy which are there formulated in detail. This is enforced by
F.Access_Control (Item 6: “Access Control in phase 4 ... enforcement of PIS ...”).
277 The SFR FDP_ACC.1/BASIC requires the enforcement of the BIS access control policy
which is done by F.Access_Control (Item 6: “Access Control in phase 4 ... enforcement
of BIS ...”).
278 The SFR FDP_ACF.1/BASIC requires the enforcement of accesses to objects based on
subjects, objects and attributes, which is enforced by F.Access_Control (Item 1). The
SFR FDP_ACF.1/BASIC also requires the enforcement of the rules of the BIS access
control policy which are there formulated in detail. This is enforced by
F.Access_Control (Item 6: “Access Control in phase 4 ... enforcement of BIS ...”).
279 The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD requires a TSF for confidentiality in communication
provided by the encrypted communication channel in F.Secure_Messaging. It does this
by enforcing to use a cryptographic method for confidentiality when used. (Item 5)
280 The SFR FDP_UIT.1/MRTD requires a TSF for protecting communication against
modification provided by the protected communication channel in
F.Secure_Messaging. It does this by using unique initialization vectors (Item 6) and the
cryptographic method for authenticity (Item 4). The send sequence counter makes each
command unique while the authenticity method makes it possible to detect any of the
listed modifications.
281 The SFR FMT_MOF.1 requires the restriction of the selection of Basic Access Control to
the personalization agent in F.Personalization. In fact the choice is already made in
F.Initialization_Prepersonalization, when the file layout is generated. (“The layout
done at this step determines if BIS or PIS policy is enforced in phase 4 ...”) Later - esp.
in phase 4 - this cannot be changed anymore. Hence the purpose of the SFR is
satisfied.
282 The SFR FMT_SMF.1 requires management functions to be present which are provided
by F.Initialization_Prepersonalization (The whole function does the initialization and
configuration: “... does the initialization ...”/”... the TOE is configured ...”/”... the agent
configures ...”) and F.Personalization (The whole SF is the personalization function.).
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283 The SFR FMT_SMR.1 requires the maintenance of user roles. These are managed by
F.Identification_Authentication. The first list gives the user roles 1, 2 and 4 listed in
FMT_SMR.1. The role 3 is implicit as it requires no identification/authentication.
284 The SFR FMT_LIM.1 requires limited capabilities of test functions, which is provided by
F.Deactivate_Non_TSF which controls what commands can be executed thereby
preventing external usable test functions to do harm. Also the test functions of the
hardware part are disabled when the embedded software is running. (SF_TEST_A)
285 The SFR FMT_LIM.2 requires limited availability of test functions, which is provided by
F.Deactivate_Non_TSF which controls what commands can be executed thereby
preventing their availability. Also the test functions of the hardware part are disabled
when the embedded software is running. (SF_TEST_A)
286 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA requires writing of initialization data and pre-
personalization data to the manufacturer. Writing of pre-personalization and installation
data only by the manufacturer is enforced by F.Access_Control, which limits these
operations to phase 2b and 2c (“Access Control in phase 2b/2c ... ”). Independent of
F.Access_Control writing of the initialization data is only possible in phase 2a because
of SF_TEST_A which restricts the access to these data in ISSUER configuration.
287 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires only the personalization agent to be able to
disable reading of the initialization data. In F.Deactivate_Non_TSF the read access to
the initialization data is disabled in phase 4. In F.Personalization the TOE is changed
by the personalization agent to phase 4. Because of F.Deactivate_Non_TSF disabling
the mode change in phase 4 this is not possible after phase 3. It could be done in earlier
phases, e.g. 2c where the pre-personalization agent is in possession of the
personalization key for key management. This is no threat as the result would be a read-
only passport chip without any user data on it.
288 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the personalization agent to be able to
write the Document Basic Access Control keys. This is provided by F.Access_Control
(“Access Control in phase 3 ... doing key management, e.g. BAC key ...”) allowing the
personalization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data. It could be done in earlier
phases, e.g. 2c where the pre-personalization agent is in possession of the
personalization key for key management. This is no threat as the personalization agent
still can change the key in phase 3.
289 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires the Document Basic Access Control keys to
never be readable. This is enforced by F.Access_Control, which does not allow reading
of any key to any role (Item 2).
290 The SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 requires limiting of emanations. This is provided by
SF_OBS_A by the hardware. Additional F.Retry_Counter limits the number of possible
tries to use management keys which reduces the availability of analyzable data.
291 Note: SF_OBS_A provides the protection required by FPR_UNI.1, FDP_ITT.1,
FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1 (besides the other hardware SFs, which not
related to the requirements of FPT_EMSEC.1). When looking at BSI-PP-0002-2001 the
thread T.Leak-Inherent is the thread of DPA and other emanation attacks. The
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corresponding objective is O.Leak-Inherent. O.Leak-Inherent is covered therein by
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_IFC.1. The rationale given for this is:
292 “The refinements of the security functional requirements FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1
together with the policy statement in FDP_IFC.1 explicitly require the prevention of
disclosure of secret data (TSF data as well as User Data) when transmitted between
separate parts of the TOE or while being processed. This includes that attackers cannot
reveal such data by measurements of emanations, power consumption or other
behaviour of the TOE while data are transmitted between or processed by TOE parts.”
293 This means FTP_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FDP_IFC.1 cover the emanation protection
against disclosure of key data (which is data of S_SKCS_A and User Data) while being
transferred to and from the DES unit and while being processed therein, i. e. while DES
calculations are performed.
294 The SFR FPT_FLS.1 requires failure detection and preservation of a secure state.
SF_ADMINIS_A is directly designed for this SFR. It ensures the management of
security violation attempts.
295 The SFR FPT_TST.1 requires testing for (a) correct operation, (b) integrity of data and
(c) integrity of executable code. F.Verification does this testing. SF_PHT_A detects
attempts to violate the physical integrity and SF_INT_A checks the logical integrity.
296 The SFR FPT_PHP.3 requires resistance to physical attacks. This is provided by
SF_PHT_A which is provided by the hardware to resist attacks.
297 The SFR FPT_RVM.1 requires enforcement functions to succeed. This is provided by
F.Access_Control which enforces first the TSP and then allows execution of the
protected functions only on success. (“... which are only executed after this TSF allowed
access.”)
298 The SFR FPT_SEP.1 requires separation of TSF and Non-TSF data. This is done by
disabling Non-TSF functions with F.Deactivate_Non_TSF (“... limits the available
commands in the different life cycles.”). Also SF_TEST_A does protect the embedded
software against test functions of the hardware (“... In USER configuration, ...”).
299 The summary specification rationale obviously shows that the set of IT security functions
work together to form a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole satisfying
the TOE security functional requirements.
8.2.3 Strength of Function Level Rationale
Due to the requirements of the PP the level for the strength of the TOE´s security functional
requirements is claimed as SOF-high. The TOE is considered as a product with critical
security mechanisms which only have to be defeated by attackers possessing a high level of
expertise, opportunity and resources, and whereby successful attack is judged beyond
normal practicability.
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9 Glossary and Acronyms
Term Definition
Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [7] option by which means the MTRD’s
chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and
authenticity of the MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a
known State of organization.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTD’s chip to store
the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip
were created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access
Control
Security mechanism defined in [7] by which means the MTRD’s chip
proves and the inspection system protect their communication by
means of Secure Messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminal’s part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the
MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form
printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata).
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as
text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data
page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa. [8]
biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference
data.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document
made by whatever means. [8]
Country Signing
CA Certificate
(CCSCA)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with
encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data
transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [7]. It
is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an
entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document
Security Object
(SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document
Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is
stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS). [7]
Eavesdropper A threat agent with moderate attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to
gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrollment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [9]
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [7] by which means the MTRD’s chip
(i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to
read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to
the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data
during their transmission to the inspection system by secure
messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism
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Term Definition
to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication
Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and
TSF data.
Extended
Inspection System
(EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition
to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or
Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [8]
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process
data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in
inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability
is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of
both eye-readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [9]
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used
to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false
name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the
purpose of using that person’s document. [8]
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d)
no travel document or visa, if required. [9]
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-
volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveller
(the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [9]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip
have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or
Organization
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [6]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [6]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [6]. The capacity expansion technology
used is the MRTD’s chip.
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Term Definition
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit.
It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (DG2),
(3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3) or iris image(s)
(DG4) or both and
(4) the other data according to LDS (DG5 to DG16).
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document
of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data
and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use,
reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read. [6]
Machine readable
visa (MRV):
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications
contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance
security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye readable)
data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being
machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa
page in a passport. [6]
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data
Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing
mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods.
[6]
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
form that can be read and verified by machine. [8]
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system
on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [6],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data
itself (i.e. content of DG1 to DG14 and DG 16) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but
except the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic
Access Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by Secure Messaging between
the inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information
as key seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip
according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or
Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAOT, [10], p. 14.
MRTD’s chip Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the
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Term Definition
Embedded
Software
IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in
Phase 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE
life-cycle.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris
image(s) (DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission
decided to use only finger print and not to use iris images as optional
biometric reference data.
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object
and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are
applied to the document. [8]
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on
the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Key
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to
prove his identity and get access to the logical MRTD according to the
SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and (ii) by
the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as
Personalization Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Pre-
personalization
Agent
A part of the manufacturer role acting on the behalf of the issuing State
or organisation to configure the TOE before phase 3.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-
personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by
the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized
MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases
2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active Authentication Key
Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with an unique identifier and an unique
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Primary
Inspection System
(PIS)
A inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
Receiving State The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [6]
reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
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Term Definition
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [8]
Secure
Messaging in
encrypted mode
Secure Messaging using encryption and Message Authentication Code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of
it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without
knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or
organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international
travel. [9]
traveller Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the
identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE (CC part 1 [1]).
unpersonalized
MRTD
MRTD material prepared to produce an personalized MRTD containing
an initialised and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
User Data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of
the TSF (CC part 1 [1]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is
being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [9]
verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove its
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
Acronyms
Acronym Term
SFR Security Functional Requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
SAR Security Assurance Requirements
TSF TOE security functions
CC Common Criteria
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PIS Primary Inspection System
BIS Basic Inspection System
PT Personalization Terminal
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10 Literature
Common Criteria
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and general model; Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation CEM-99/045
Part 2: Evaluation methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[5] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS32: Übernahme
international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema,
Version 1, 02.07.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
ICAO
[6] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical
Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[7] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01,
2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization
[8] ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable
Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
[9] BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
TECHNICAL REPORT Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable
Biometric Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine
Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.9, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 19 May 2003
[10] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL)
DIVISION, twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
Cryptography
[11] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB
140-2, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES, Issued
2001 May 25, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards
and Technology
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[12] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB
46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[13] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH
STANDARD (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
Protection Profiles
[14] PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001;
registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
[15] Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th, 2002
[16] Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel Document with ''ICAO Application'',
Basic Access Control, Version 1.0, BSI-PP-0017, 2005-08-18
Sonstige
[17] Technical Report Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 0.8 (final), BSI
[18] ISO/IEC 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4:
Organization, security and commands for interchange, FDIS 2004
[19] ISO/IEC 14443-3:2001, Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards –
Proximity cards, Part 3: Initialization and anticollision, 2001
[20] ST19NR66 Security Target , v1.00, June 2006
2008-10-27 MaskTech International GmbH page 66 of 66