SERTIT, Postboks 814, 1306 Sandvika, NORWAY
Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no
Sertifiseringsmyndigheten for IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SERTIT-061 CR Certification Report
Issue 1.0 4 June 2015
Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router V800R006 build C00SPC200
CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009 VERSION 2.1 11.11.2011
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ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN
THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Arrangement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Arrangement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate
indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of the CCRA May 23 r d
2000. The recognition under the CCRA is limited to EAL 4 and ALC_FLR CC part 3
components.
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
EVALUATION CERTIFICATES (SOGIS MRA)
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Agreement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Agreement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Agreement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian evaluation facility (EV IT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party. **
** Mutual Recognition under the SOGIS MRA recognition agreement applies to EAL 3
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Contents
1 Certification Statement 5
2 Abbreviations 6
3 References 8
4 Executive Summary 9
4.1 Introduction 9
4.2 Evaluated Product 9
4.3 TOE scope 9
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance 9
4.5 Assurance Level 10
4.6 Security Policy 10
4.7 Security Claims 10
4.8 Threats Countered 10
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment 11
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered 11
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies 11
4.12 IT Security Objectives 11
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives 12
4.14 Security Functional Requirements 12
4.15 Security Function Policy 13
4.16 Evaluation Conduct 14
4.17 General Points 14
5 Evaluation Findings 15
5.1 Introduction 16
5.2 Delivery 16
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation 16
5.4 Misuse 16
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis 16
5.6 Developer’s Tests 17
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests 17
6 Evaluation Outcome 18
6.1 Certification Result 18
6.2 Recommendations 18
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration 19
TOE Identification 19
TOE Documentation 21
TOE Configuration 21
Environmental Configuration 21
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Certifi'cation Statement
Huawei Technologies Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router is a core router developed
to meet the requirement of carrier-class reliability.
Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router version V800R006 build COOSPC200 has been
evaluated under the terms of the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security and
has met the Common Criteria Part 3 (ISO/IEC 15408) conformant requirements of
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3 augmented with ALC_CMC.4 for the specified
Common Criteria Part 2 (ISO/IEC 15408) conformant functionality in the specified
environment when running on the platforms specified in Annex A.
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SERTIT-061 CR Issue 1.0 Page 5 of 22
4June2015
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2 Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(ISO/IEC 15408)
CCC Cluster Central Chassis
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the
Field of Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CF Compact Flash
CLC Cluster Line-card Chassis
CLI Command Line Interface
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EOR Evaluation Observation Report
ETH Ethernet
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT
Security
EWP Evaluation Work Plan
GUI Graphical User Interface
IS-IS Intermediate System to Intermediate System
LMT Local Maintenance Terminal
LPU Line Process Unit
MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm 5
MPU Main Process Unit
NE NetEngine
NMS Network Management Sub-system
OFC Optical Flexible Card
POC Point of Contact
PP Protection Profile
QP Qualified Participant
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RMT Remote Maintenance Terminal
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SFE Switch Fabric Extend unit
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SFU Switching Fabric Unit
SPM Security Policy Model
SPU Service Process Unit
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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3 References
[1] Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router V800R006 Security Target, version
1.6, 28 August 2014.
[2] Common Criteria Part 1, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[3] Common Criteria Part 2, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[4] Common Criteria Part 3, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[5] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 8.0, 20 August 2010 .
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report Common Criteria EAL3+ Evaluation of the
Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router V800R006, version 1.1, 25 August
2014
[8] NE5000E V800R006C00 Product Manual, v1.0, 15th
April, 2014
[9] Common Criteria Security Evaluation – Certified Configuration, v1.3, 5th
June 2014
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4 Executive Summary
4.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security
evaluation of Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router version V800R006 build
C00SPC200 to the Sponsor, Huawei Technologies, and is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security of the product
for their particular requirements.
Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1] which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance
evaluation requirements.
4.2 Evaluated Product
The version of the product evaluated was Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router and
version V800R006 build C00SPC200.
This product is also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The
developer was Huawei Technologies.
Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router V800R006, which has large capacity and high
performance, is developed to meet the requirement of carrier -class reliability. Based
on the powerful versatile routing platform (VRP), the NE5000E provides strong
switching capabilities, dense ports, and high reliability. NE5000Es mainly serve as
super-core nodes on carriers' backbone networks, core nodes on metropolitan area
networks (MANs), egresses in large-scale Internet data centres (IDCs), or core nodes
on large-scale enterprise networks. NE5000E clusters are positioned as super-core
nodes on backbone networks, supporting Layer 3 routing and Multiprotocol Label
Switching (MPLS) forwarding. The TOE consists of both hardware and software.
At the core of each chassis is the Versatile Routing Platform (VRP), the software for
managing and running the router’s networking functionality. VRP provides extensive
security features. These features include assigning different privileges to
administration users with different privilege levels; en forcing authentications prior
to establishment of administrative sessions with the TOE; auditing of security -
relevant management activities; as well as the correct enforcement of routing
decisions to ensure that network traffic gets forwarded to the correc t interfaces.
Details of the evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s supporting guidance
documentation, are given in Annex A.
4.3 TOE scope
The TOE scope is described in the ST[1], chapter 1.4.2 and 1.4.3.
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance
The Security Target[1] did not claim conformance to any protection profile.
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4.5 Assurance Level
The assurance incorporated predefined evaluation assurance level EAL 3, augmented
by ALC_CMC.4. Common Criteria Part 3[4] describes the scale of assurance given by
predefined assurance levels EAL1 to EAL7. An overview of CC is given in CC Part 1 [2].
4.6 Security Policy
There are no Organizational Security Policies or rules with which the TOE must
comply.
4.7 Security Claims
The Security Target[1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the threats which
these objectives meet and security functional requirements and security functions to
elaborate the objectives. All of the SFR’s are taken from CC Part 2[3]; use of this
standard facilitates comparison with other evaluated products.
4.8 Threats Countered
T.UnwantedNetworkTraffic
Unwanted network traffic sent to the TOE will not only consume the TOE’s
processing capacity for incoming network traffic thus fails to process traffic
expected to be processed, but an internal traffic jam might happen when those
traffic are sent to MPU from LPU within the TOE. This may cause denial of
service of TOE.
This may further cause the TOE fails to respond to system control and security
management operations.
Routing information exchanged between the TOE and peer routes may also be
affected due to the traffic overload.
T.UnwantedNetworkTraffic
A user who is not a user of the TOE gains access to the TOE.
T.UnauthorizedAccess
A user of the TOE authorized to perform certain actions and access certain
information gains access to commands or information he is not authorized for.
This threat also includes data leakage to non-intended person or device
T.Eavesdrop
An eavesdropper (remote attacker) in the management network served by the
TOE is able to intercept, and potentially modify or re-use information assets
that are exchanged between TOE and LMT/RMT.
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4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment
There are no threats countered by the TOE’s environment.
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered
No threats or attacks that are not countered are described.
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies
It is assumed that the TOE (including any console attached, access of CF card) is
protected against unauthorized physical access.
The environment is supposed to provide supporting mechanism to the TOE:
A Radius server or TACACS+ server for external authentication/authorization
decisions;
NMS, logging server and alarm server used for administration of the TOE
In addition, it is assumed the Radius server, and TACACS+ server, and the NMS are all
trusted and will not be used to attack the TOE.
Peer router(s) for the exchange of dynamic routing information;
A remote entities (PCs) used for administration of the TOE.
It is assumed that the ETH interface on MPU in the TOE will be accessed only through
sub-network where the TOE hosts. The sub-network is separate from the application
(or, public) networks where the interfaces on LPU in the TOE are accessible.
The authorized users will be competent, and not careless or willfully negligent or
hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE
documentation.
4.12 IT Security Objectives
The following objectives must be met by the TOE:
O.DeviceAvail
The TOE shall ensure its own availability.
O.UserAvail
The TOE shall ensure authorized users can access network resources through
the TOE.
O.DataFilter
The TOE shall ensure that only allowed traffic goes through the TOE.
O.Communication
The TOE must implement logical protection measures for network
communication between the TOE and LMT/RMT from the operational
environment.
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O.Authorization
The TOE shall implement different authorization levels that can be assigned to
administrators in order to restrict the functionality that is available to
individual administrators.
O.Authentication
The TOE must authenticate users of its user access.
O.Audit
The TOE shall provide functionality to generate audit records for security -
relevant administrator actions.
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives
OE.NetworkElements The operational environment shall provide securely and
correctly working network devices as resources that the TOE needs to
cooperate with. Behaviors of such network devices provided by operation al
environment shall be also secure and correct. For example, other routers for
the exchange of routing information, PCs used for TOE administration, and
Radius and TACACS+ servers for obtaining authentication and authorization
decisions.
OE.Physical The TOE (i.e., the complete system including attached
peripherals, such as a console, and CF card inserted in the MPU) shall be
protected against unauthorized physical access.
OE.NetworkSegregation The operational environment shall provide
segregation by deploying the Ethernet interface on MPU in TOE into a local
sub-network, compared to the interfaces on LPU in TOE serving the application
(or public) network.
OE.Person Personnel working as authorized administrators shall be carefully
selected for trustworthiness and trained for proper operation of the TOE.
4.14 Security Functional Requirements
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/MD5 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/HMAC-MD5 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/DHKeyExchange Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/DSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1/AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1/3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation
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FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_MD5 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1/DHKey Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1/DSA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4/3DES-AES Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4/RSA Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4/HMAC_MD5 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4/DHKey Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4/DSA Cryptographic key destruction
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
FDP_IFC.1(1) Subset information flow control- CPU-defend
FDP_IFC.1(2) Subset information flow control- Data plane traffic control
FDP_IFF.1(1) Simple security attributes - CPU-defend
FDP_IFF.1(2) Simple security attributes – Data plane traffic control
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication –Administrator Authentication
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification – Administrator Identification
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
FTP_ITC.1 Trusted channel
4.15 Security Function Policy
At the core of each chassis is the Versatile Routing Platform (VRP), the software for
managing and running the router’s networking functionality. VRP provides extensive
security features. These features include assigning different privileges to
administration users with different privilege levels; enforcing authentications prior
to establishment of administrative sessions with the TOE; auditing of security -
relevant management activities; as well as the correct enforcement of routing
decisions to ensure that network traffic gets forwarded to the correct interfaces.
The Main Processing Units (MPU) integrate the main control unit and the system
maintenance unit. The MPU controls and manages the system in a centralized way
and is responsible for data exchange.
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The Line Processing Units (LPU) are the actual hardware providing network traffic
processing capacity. Network traffic is processed and forwarded according to routing
decisions downloaded from VRP.
Besides the MPUs and LPUs, there are other types of boards on TOE, such as Switch
Fabric Unit (SFU), Switch Fabric Extend unit (SFE), ICU, ECU and OFC. Only MPU and
LPU are security relevant.
4.16 Evaluation Conduct
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT Document
SD001[5]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT
Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this Certification Report, SERTIT is a
member of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in
the Field of Information Technology Security (CCRA), and the Senior Officials Group
Information Systems Security (SOGIS) and the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness of
the TOE in meeting its Security Target[1], which prospective consumers are advised to
read. To ensure that the Security Target[1] gave an appropriate baseline for a CC
evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against this
baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in accordance with CC Part
3[4] and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)[6]. [Note any significant use of
Interpretations[7]].
SERTIT monitored the evaluation which was carried out by the Brightsight B.V.
Commercial Evaluation Facility (CLEF/EVIT). The evaluation was completed when the
EVIT submitted the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)[7] to SERTIT in 25 August 2014.
SERTIT then produced this Certification Report.
4.17 General Points
The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in the Security Target [1]
with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by the Security
Target[1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in Annex A. Prospective
consumers are advised to check that this matches their identified requirements and
give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of this report.
Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security
vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only reflect
the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the responsibility of
users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any security vulnerabilities
have been discovered since the date shown in this report. This Certification Report is
not an endorsement of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report, and no warranty of the IT
product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
Certification Report is either expressed or implied.
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5 Evaluation Findings
The evaluators examined the following assurance classes and components taken from
CC Part 3[4]. These classes comprise the EAL 3 assurance package augmented with
ALC_CMC.4.
Assurance class Assurance components
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.3 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
All assurance classes were found to be satisfactory and were awarded an overall
“pass” verdict.
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5.1 Introduction
The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security Target [1]. The
results of this work were reported in the ETR[7] under the CC Part 3[4] headings. The
following sections note considerations that are of particular relevance to either
consumers or those involved with subsequent assurance maintenance and re -
evaluation of the TOE.
5.2 Delivery
On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the evaluated
version has been supplied, and to check that the security of the TOE has not been
compromised in delivery.
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation
Installation of the TOE must be performed completely in accordance with the
guidance listed in the ST[1] chapter 1.4.2 and Preparative Procedures documents [8]
provided by the developer. The Common Criteria Security Evaluation – Certified
Configuration [9] describes all necessary steps to configure the TOE in the certified
configuration.
These documents are a collection of all security relevant operations and settings that
must be observed to ensure that the TOE operates in a secure manner.
5.4 Misuse
There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that could
possibly compromise confidential information. The user should always follow the
guidance for the TOE in order to ensure that the TOE operates in a secure manner.
The guidance documents adequately describe the mode of operation of the TOE, all
assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements for external
security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consumer to effectively use the TOE’s
security functions.
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis
The Evaluators’ vulnerability analysis was based on both public domain sou rces and
the visibility of the TOE given by the evaluation process.
The evaluators assessed which potential vulnerabilities were already tested by the
developer and assessed the results.
The remaining potential vulnerabilities were tested by Brightsight on the final
version of the TOE.
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5.6 Developer’s Tests
The Developer Test Plan consists of 12 different categories of tests of 1 -25 tests. The
categories are based on major groupings of security functionality, and, in
combination cover all SFRs and TSFIs.
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests
Since the evaluator has evaluated similar devices from the same developer three
times before under supervision of SERTIT, the test plan of the developer has
considerably improved and covered all SFRs/TSFIs, and also included all the
penetration tests the evaluator has performed form the previous TOEs. As a result,
the limited number of the general security functionality tests (such as
authentication, authorization, managing) has been sampled, and several penetration
tests also has been sampled to ensure the developer performed them correctly. The
evaluator also analysed the Developer Test Plan to see where additional ATE tests
could be performed, and selected 3 additional tests.
All of these tests were performed at the Huawei premises in Beijing in end May 2014.
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6 Evaluation Outcome
6.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the ETR[7], produced by the Evaluators, and the conduct
of the evaluation, as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has determined that Huawei
NetEngine5000E Core Router version V800R006 build C00SPC200 meets the Common
Criteria Part 3 conformant requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented with ALC_CMC.4 for the specified Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
functionality, in the specified environment, when running on platforms specified in
Annex A.
6.2 Recommendations
Prospective consumers of Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router version V800R006
build C00SPC200 should understand the specific scope of the certification by reading
this report in conjunction with the Security Target[1]. The TOE should be used in
accordance with a number of environmental considerations as specified in the
Security Target.
Only the evaluated TOE configuration should be installed. This is specified in Annex A
with further relevant information given above under Section 4.3 “TOE Scope” and
Section 5 “Evaluation Findings”.
The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance documentation
included in the evaluated configuration.
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Annex A: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Identification
The TOE consists of:
Hardware:
Product
Name
Board Name for Order Description
NE5000E
CLC
CR52K-BKPC-36U-8KW Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR52-MPUB Main Processing Unit B
CR5DSFEBA06B Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
NE5000E
CCC
CR55C-BKPA/CR55C-BKPB Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5D0MPUA450 Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR55C-MPUA Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5DSFUIA050 Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR55C-ICUA Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5DECUFA050 Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5D0OFCA060 Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
NE5000E
CCC-A
CR5D0MPUB550 Main Processing Unit B550
CR5D00ICUB50 Internal Communication Unit B50
CR5DSFUFK050 Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5M0OFCK050 Optical Flexible Card
CR5B0BKPCD50 NE5000E-CCC-A Integrated Chassis
Components DC
CR5B0BKPCA50 NE5000E-CCC-A Integrated Chassis
Components DC
Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router
Version V800R006 build C00SPC200
EAL 3 +
Page 20 of 22 SERTIT-061 CR Issue 1.0
4 June 2015
NE5000E-
X16
CR5B0BKP1660 Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5D0MPUB461 Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5DSFUFA06B Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5D0SFUK06B Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
NE5000E-
X16A
CR5B0BKP166A Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5B0BKP166B Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5D0MPUB560 Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5DSFUFA06C Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5DSFUIK06A Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5DSFUIK06B 400G Switch Fabric Unit A for
Cluster Chassis Access
NE5000E-
X16B
CR5BBKP6BD60 NE5000E-X16B Integrated Chassis
Components DC
CR5BBKP6BA60 NE5000E-X16B Integrated Chassis
Components AC
CR5D0MPUB560 Feil! Hyperkoblingsreferansen er
ugyldig.
CR5DSFUIT060 1T Switch Fabric Unit A for Single
Chassis
CR5D00EFMB60 1T 24*40Gbps QSFP+ Interface Board
CR5D00E8NC60 1T 8*100Gbps CFP2 Interface Board
Software:
Type Name Version
Software
Product software V800R006 build C00SPC200
VRP Version 8 Release8 build C00SPC200
Linux Version:
WRlinux4.1.0.0(CR5D0MPUA450,
Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router
Version V800R006 build C00SPC200
EAL 3 +
SERTIT-061 CR Issue 1.0
4 June 2015
Page 21 of 22
CR5D0MPUB550,CR5D0MPUB461,
CR5D0MPUB560)
/WRlinux3.0.3.0(CR52-MPUB,
CR55C-MPUA)
TOE Documentation
The supporting guidance documents evaluated were:
[a] NE5000E V800R006C00 Product Manual, V1.0
[b] Common Criteria Security Evaluation – Certified Configuration, V1.3
Further discussion of the supporting guidance material is given in Section 5.3
“Installation and Guidance Documentation”.
TOE Configuration
ITEM IDENTIFIER
HARDWARE
NE5000E-X16A
NE5000E-X16
NE5000E CCC-2 with 2 CCCs and four CLCs
The LPU used are
 48-port 10GBase LAN/WAN – SFP Integrated Line Process Unit
(NE5000E LPUI – 480)
 10-port 10GBase LAN/WAN – XFP Integrated Line Processing
Unit (NE5000E LPUI – 100)
SOFTWARE NE5000E V800R006C00SPC200T1 and other software (VRP, Linux) listed in
section “TOE Identification” configured according to [b].
MANUAL The appropriate guidance document in section “TOE Documentation”
Environmental Configuration
The following configuration was used for testing:
The TOE is tested mainly in the following test set-up:
1 The suffix “T” indicates it is the testing version. “T” is removed and the final release version is “V800R006C00SPC200”
Huawei NetEngine5000E Core Router
Version V800R006 build C00SPC200
EAL 3 +
Page 22 of 22 SERTIT-061 CR Issue 1.0
4 June 2015
The tester is the Spirent Test centre.
Certificate
Product Manufacturer: Huawei Technologies
Product Name: NetEngine 5000E Core Router
Type of Product: Router
Build: COOSPC200
Assurance Package: EAL 3 augmented with ALC_ CMCA
Quality Assurance
SERTIT
NOlweglan Certificotion Autho,I,y ro, ITSccufIly