TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-06
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Certification Report
TOSMART-GP1 v01.01.00 (Supporting PACE and BAC PP-
0500)
Sponsor and developer: Toshiba Infrastructure Systems & Solutions
Corporation
1 Komukai Toshiba-cho
Saiwai-ku, Kawasaki
212-8583, Japan
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300105-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300105-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 01 August 2025
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 claims ’strict’ Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300105-01-CR, dated 01 August 2025
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
TOSMART-GP1 v01.01.00 (Supporting PACE and BAC PP-0500). The developer of the TOSMART-
GP1 v01.01.00 (Supporting PACE and BAC PP-0500) is Toshiba Infrastructure Systems & Solutions
Corporation located in Kawasaki, Japan and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification . A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a composite security IC, consisting of the hardware which is used as the evaluated
underlying platform and the ePassport (OS and application) software, which is built on the hardware
platform. The HW is a secure single chip microcontroller with a RF type communication interface
compliant to ISO-14443 type B. The software that is incorporated in the memory element is capable of
providing security functions for the ePassport.
The ePassport consists of a secure operating system and application on top of the HW. The operating
system contains the embedded software functions used by the ePassport application.
The ePassport application provides Active Authentication, Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment, and facilitates Passive Authentication.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 01 August 2025 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOSMART-GP1 v01.01.00 (Supporting PACE
and BAC PP-0500), the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance
level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the
TOSMART-GP1 v01.01.00 (Supporting PACE and BAC PP-0500) are advised to verify that their own
environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments,
observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300105-01-CR, dated 01 August 2025
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the TOSMART-GP1 v01.01.00 (Supporting PACE
and BAC PP-0500) from Toshiba Infrastructure Systems & Solutions Corporation located in Kawasaki,
Japan.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
IFX_CCI_000005H (Common criteria certification identifier)
0013H 0016H 0000H (Chip Type)
FW-Identifier
80.100.17.0
CL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T Cl52-
LIB-base-XSMALL- HUGE.lib
v2.06.003
CL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T Cl52-
LIB-ecc-XSMALL- HUGE.lib
v2.06.003
CL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T Cl52-
LIB-toolbox- XSMALL-HUGE.lib
v2.06.003
Hardware Support Library for SLCx2 HSL-01.22.4346-
SLCx2_C65.lib
v1.22.4346
Software ePassport application +OS Ver.01.01.02
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the TOSMART-GP1
v01.01.00 (Supporting PACE and BAC PP-0500). For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this
report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 2.3.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The main security functions of the TOE are to protect data stored in the TOE from unauthorized
reading or writing. The operation of the security functions applied to contactless communication with
the terminal shall comply with the BAC, PACE, and Active Authentication Standards specifications
defined in Part 11 of Doc 9303.
The TOE provides the main security functions
• BAC function (mutual authentication and Secure Messaging)
• PACE function (mutual authentication and Secure Messaging)
• Active Authentication support function (prevention of copying the IC chip)
• Disabling function of BAC function(prohibition of operating BAC after issuing a passport)
• Write protection function (protection of writing data after issuing a passport)
• Protection function in transport (protection against attacks during transport before issuing the
TOE(i.e. transport key lock))
• Tamper resistance (protection against confidential information leak due to physical attacks)
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
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2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalised must perform proper and safe personalisation
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE architecture can be depicted as follows:
The TOE is an ePassport formed of a composite security IC, the underlying hardware platform, and
the ePassport software.
The underlying hardware platform is a secure single chip microcontroller with a RF type
communication interface compliant to ISO-14443 type B. It consists of a central processing unit (CPU),
memory elements (RAM, Flash memory), and circuitry for the RF external interface that have been
integrated with consideration given to tamper resistance.
The ePassport software consists of a secure operating system and an application on top of the
underlying hardware platform. The operating system contains the embedded software functions used
by the ePassport application.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Guidance Document for Personalization agent (USR), dated
September 27, 2023
MC-SM1911
/ Version 01.01.01
Preparative guidance, dated 29 March, 2023 MC-SM1905
/ Version 01.01.00
Application Specification, dated 07 January 2025 MC-SM1917
/ Version 1.1.3
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Authentication Manual using VERIFY command, dated 07 January
2025
MC-SJ0131
/ Version 01.01.03
Personalization Specification), dated 07 January 2025 MC-SM1895
/ Version 1.1.2
Procedural Request of Security Product Delivery and Receipt, 07
January 2025
MB-ICCARD-W471 /
Version 1.0.4
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis approach was as follows:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in
[JIL-AP]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report [ETRfC-HW] of
the underlying platform.
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
Following the JIL attack methods [JIL_AM], in case that attack scenarios are identified, then a
hypothetical rating of minimum attack effort would have been made for the identified attack scenarios.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 4 weeks. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE used for testing was:
• TOSMART-GP1 version 01.01.00
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2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused by
composition.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number TOSMART-GP1 v01.01.00 (Supporting
PACE and BAC PP-0500).
2.9 claims ’strict’ Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. This document provides details of the TOE
evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the TOSMART-GP1 v01.01.00
(Supporting PACE and BAC PP-0500), to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to
meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2. This implies that the product satisfies
the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_c500].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The TOSMART-GP1with Supplemental Access Control (BAC+PACE) and Active Authentication
Security Target v01.01.11, Dated July 09, 2025 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
BAC Basic Access Control
CA Chip Authentication
eMRTD electronic MRTD
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
TA Terminal Authentication
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[Doc 9303] Machine Readable Travel Documents Seventh Edition — 2015 Doc 9303,
Part 11, Security Mechanisms for MRTDs, Seventh edition, 2015
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “TOSMART-GP1 v01.01.00” – EAL4+, R4-RPT-
074, Version 11.0, Dated 14 July 2025
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V7-2024 for Infineon Security Controller
IFX_CCI_000003h, 000005h, 000008h, 00000Ch, 000013h, 000014h,
000015h, 00001Ch, 00001Dh, 000021h, 000022h in the design step H13
from Infineon Technologies AG, 30 September 2024.
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report For Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) for the
IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ch, IFX_CCI_000013h, IFX_CCI_000014h,
IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch, IFX_CCI_00001Dh,
IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h H13. Cert-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V6,
Version 3, 2023-12-01, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH.
[ETRfC_ADD] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation Addendum (ETR
COMP_ADD) for the IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h,
IFX_CCI_000008h, IFX_CCI_00000Ch, IFX_CCI_000013h,
IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch,
IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h H13. Cert-ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V7, Version 3, 2024-09-20, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH.
[HW-ST] Public Security Target IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h,
IFX_CCI_000008h, IFX_CCI_00000Ch, IFX_CCI_000013h,
IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch,
IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h H13, Including
optional Software Libraries Flash Loader – 4x ACL – 4x HSL – 3x SCL –
HCL -NRG – CCL, Revision: 5.1, 2024-09-11, Infineon Technologies AG.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February
2024
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_c500] Protection Profile for ePassport IC with SAC (BAC+PACE) and Active
Authentication, version 1.0, registered under the JISEC reference C0500
[ST] TOSMART-GP1with Supplemental Access Control (BAC+PACE) and Active
Authentication Security Target v01.01.11, Dated July 09, 2025
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(This is the end of this report.)