HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
1
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet
Access (VIA) Client Version 4.7 Security
Target
ST Version: 1.0.1
Date: 09-July-2026
Prepared by:
www.teronlabs.com
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
2
Contents
1 Security Target Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Security Target Reference.................................................................................................................................................6
1.2 TOE Reference......................................................................................................................................................................6
1.3 TOE Overview ........................................................................................................................................................................7
1.3.1 Intended Method of Use ...............................................................................................................................................7
1.3.2 Major Security Features................................................................................................................................................7
1.3.3 TOE Type............................................................................................................................................................................8
1.3.4 Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware .....................................................................................................8
1.4 TOE Description ....................................................................................................................................................................8
1.4.1 TOE Architecture..............................................................................................................................................................8
1.4.2 Physical Scope.................................................................................................................................................................9
1.4.3 Logical Boundary............................................................................................................................................................10
2 Conformance Claims.....................................................................................................................................................................12
2.1 Statement of Conformance Claims .............................................................................................................................12
2.2 Conformance Claim Rationale.......................................................................................................................................12
2.2.1 TOE Type Consistency Rationale...........................................................................................................................12
2.2.2 Security Problem Definition Consistency ............................................................................................................13
2.2.3 Security Objective Consistency...............................................................................................................................13
2.2.4 Security Requirements Consistency .....................................................................................................................13
2.3 Technical Decisions............................................................................................................................................................13
2.4 Conventions...........................................................................................................................................................................14
2.5 Acronyms................................................................................................................................................................................16
3 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................................................................................17
3.1 Threats.....................................................................................................................................................................................17
3.2 Assumptions..........................................................................................................................................................................19
4 Security Objectives........................................................................................................................................................................20
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE...................................................................................................................................20
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..........................................................................................22
5 Security Requirements ................................................................................................................................................................23
5.1 Extended Requirements..................................................................................................................................................23
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements...................................................................................................................23
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
3
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) ..................................................................................................................................25
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)......................................................................................................................................29
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) .................................................................................................................30
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT).....................................................................................................................................31
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR) .................................................................................................................................................................32
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)......................................................................................................................................32
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)..................................................................................................................................33
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements....................................................................................................................34
6 TOE Summary Specification .....................................................................................................................................................35
6.1 Cryptographic Support.....................................................................................................................................................35
6.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/AK: Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation.................................................................... 37
6.1.2 FCS_CKM.1/SK: Cryptographic Symmetric Key Generation...................................................................... 37
6.1.3 FCS_CKM.1/VPN: Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE)..............................................................................38
6.1.4 FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment..............................................................................................38
6.1.5 FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation Services .................................................................................38
6.1.6 FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Cryptographic Key Storage................................................................................................38
6.1.7 FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction.........................................................................................40
6.1.8 FCS_COP.1/SKC: Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption ....................................................40
6.1.9 FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation - Hashing................................................................................40
6.1.10 FCS_COP.1/Sig: Cryptographic Operation - Signing .....................................................................................40
6.1.11 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication .........41
6.1.12 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: IPsec........................................................................................................................................41
6.1.13 FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation, FCS_RBG_EXT.2: Random Bit Generation from
Application.........................................................................................................................................................................................42
6.1.14 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials ...........................................................................................................43
6.2 User Data Protection (FDP) ...........................................................................................................................................43
6.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Encryption of Sensitive Application Data......................................................................43
6.2.2 FDP_DEC_EXT.1: Access to Platform Resources..........................................................................................43
6.2.3 FDP_NET_EXT.1: Network Communications ..................................................................................................43
6.2.4 FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection ............................................................................................43
6.3 Identification and Authentication...................................................................................................................................44
6.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1: X.509 Certificate Validation .................................................................................................44
6.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication ........................................................................................44
6.4 Security Management ......................................................................................................................................................44
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
4
6.4.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1: Secure by Default Configuration ......................................................................................44
6.4.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1: Supported Configuration Mechanism ..........................................................................45
6.4.3 FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions ..................................................................................45
6.4.4 FMT_SMF.1/VPN: Specification of Management Functions (VPN)..........................................................45
6.5 Privacy....................................................................................................................................................................................45
6.5.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1: User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information............45
6.6 Protection of the TSF ........................................................................................................................................................45
6.6.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Anti-Exploitation Capabilities ............................................................................................45
6.6.2 FPT_API_EXT.1: Use of Supported Services and APIs................................................................................46
6.6.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1: Software Identification and Versions.................................................................................46
6.6.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1: Use of Third-Party Libraries ...................................................................................................46
6.6.5 FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN(1): TSF Self-Test (VPN Client) (Windows and Linux) and
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN(2): TSF Self-Test (VPN Client) (Android)..............................................................................46
6.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.1(1) (Android): Trusted Update, FPT_TUD_EXT.1(2) (Windows and Linux):
Trusted Update FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Integrity for Installation and Update ................................................................47
6.7 Trusted Path/Channels ....................................................................................................................................................48
6.7.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1: Protection of Data in Transit..................................................................................................48
6.8 ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates............................................................................................................48
7 Protection Profile Claims .............................................................................................................................................................49
8 TOE Summary Specification Rationale...................................................................................................................................51
Appendix A: Windows Platform APIs ................................................................................................................................................53
Appendix B: Android Platform APIs...................................................................................................................................................55
Appendix C: Linux Platform APIs........................................................................................................................................................ 75
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
5
List of Tables
Table 1 Physical Scope.............................................................................................................................................................................9
Table 2: Acronyms.....................................................................................................................................................................................16
Table 3 Threats drawn from the Base-PP.......................................................................................................................................17
Table 4 Threats drawn from the PP-Module ..................................................................................................................................17
Table 5 Assumptions Drawn from the Base-PP............................................................................................................................19
Table 6 Assumptions Drawn from the PP-Module.......................................................................................................................19
Table 7: Security Objectives for the TOE .......................................................................................................................................20
Table 8: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .............................................................................................22
Table 9: TOE Security Functional Components ..........................................................................................................................23
Table 10: Assurance Components ....................................................................................................................................................34
Table 11: CAVP Certificate References ..........................................................................................................................................35
Table 12: Key Purpose/Key Storage/Key Destruction ..............................................................................................................38
Table 13: SFR Protection Profile Sources .....................................................................................................................................49
Table 14: Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping........................................................................................................51
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
6
1 Security Target Introduction
This section introduces the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and provides the Security Target (ST) and TOE
identification, ST and TOE conformance claims, ST conventions, glossary and list of abbreviations.
The TOE is the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 4.7. The TOE is a VPN
client application that remote workers and mobile users can install on their computers or mobile devices to
securely connect to their enterprise network from remote locations using IPsec.
The focus of this evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims in the Protection Profile for
Application Software, version 1.4 ([PP_APP_v1.4]) and PP-Module for VPN Clients, version 2.4
([MOD_VPNC_V2.4]). The security functionality specified in [PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
includes protection of communications between the TOE and external IT entities, ability to verify the source
and integrity of updates to the TOE, and use of NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms.
The Security Target (ST) includes the following additional sections:
 TOE Description (Section 2)—provides an overview of the TOE and describes the physical and
logical boundaries of the TOE
 Security Problem Definition (Section 3)—describes the threats and assumptions that define the
security problem to be addressed by the TOE and its environment
 Security Objectives (Section 4)—describes the security objectives for the TOE and its operational
environment necessary to counter the threats and satisfy the assumptions that define the security
problem
 IT Security Requirements (Section 5)—specifies the security functional requirements (SFRs) and
security assurance requirements (SARs) to be met by the TOE
 TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)—describes the security functions of the TOE and how they
satisfy the SFRs
 Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)—provides rationale supporting the claims for conformance of
the ST and the TOE to [PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
TOE Summary Specification Rationale (Section 8)—provides mappings and rationale for the security
problem definition, security objectives, security requirements, and security functions to justify their
completeness, consistency, and suitability.
1.1 Security Target Reference
ST Title HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client Version 4.7 Security
Target
ST Version 1.0.1
ST Date: 9-July-2026
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client
version 4.7
TOE Developer HPE Aruba Networking
Evaluation Sponsor HPE Aruba Networking
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
7
1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 4.7.
The TOE is a software application with IPsec VPN client capability.
1.3.1 Intended Method of Use
VIA is a part of the HPE Aruba Networking remote networks solution intended for teleworkers and mobile
users. VIA detects the network environment (trusted and untrusted) of the user and connects the users to the
enterprise network. A trusted network refers to a protected office network that allows users to access the
corporate intranet directly. Untrusted networks are public Wi-Fi hotspots, such as airports, cafes, or home
networks.
The VIA solution includes VIA Client and the Mobility Controller. The Mobility Controller running ArubaOS
delivers network services that always on network with controller clustering, maximize Wi-Fi performance,
ensure seamless roaming, and extends secure VPN access for Remote APs, Instant APs and VIA VPN
clients. Note that the Mobility Controller is not part of the Common Criteria evaluation. The product relies on a
platform-provided mechanism to establish HTTPS connectivity with the Mobility Controller to acquire VPN
configuration settings. This is an environmental mechanism and is therefore not within the TOE boundary.
1.3.2 Major Security Features
With respect to the security functionality of the TOE, the TSF is limited to the relevant functionality that is
defined in the claimed [PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]. The logical boundary of the TOE is
summarized in section 2.3.2. However, the following general capabilities are considered to be within the
scope of the TOE:
 Cryptographic Support: The TOE implements NIST CAVP approved cryptographic algorithms. The
TOE protects communication between itself and an HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller over
an unprotected network using IPsec and uses various mechanisms to protect credential data at rest.
 User Data Protection: The TOE leverages platform-provided functionality to encrypt sensitive data
(as part of HTTPS) and implements secure VPN communications between the TOE and a VPN
Gateway.
 Identification and Authentication: The TOE provides the ability to use, store, and protect X.509
certificates that are used for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections. The TOE performs
peer authentication using certificates.
 Security Management: The TOE and its IPsec VPN are fully configurable by a combination of
functions provided directly by the TOE and those available to the associated VPN gateway.
 Privacy: The TOE does not transmit PII over a network.
 Protection of the TSF: The TOE performs self-tests that cover the TOE as well as the functions
necessary to securely update the TOE. The TOE includes the use only documented platform APIs.
 Trusted Path/Channel: The TOE implements IPsec to establish a trusted channel to an external
VPN gateway.
This ST focuses on the security functionality of application software and IPsec VPN capabilities of the TOE.
The TOE provides secure remote network connectivity for Android, Linux, and Windows mobile devices and
workstations. The TOE has two primary purposes:
 to provide secure corporate access to employee workstations and smartphones from anywhere
 to provide ease-of-use for the end users and network administrators
The IPsec VPN capabilities are the primary function of the TOE. IPsec is used by the TOE to protect
communication between itself and an HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller over an unprotected
network.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
8
VIA can be downloaded directly from an HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller, pushed out using
enterprise management tools, installed manually, or install the Android version from the Google Play Store.
An HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller is required to terminate connections from a VIA client – VIA is
not a general-purpose VPN client that works with third-party VPN gateways.
1.3.3 TOE Type
The TOE is a software application with IPsec VPN client capability implementing the security features
required for strict conformance with the Base-PP and the PP-Module. The PP and the PP-Module are used in
accordance with the PP-Configuration. The TOE runs on an end-user device and communicates with a
gateway located on a Mobility Controller. The TOE is not in distributed form.
1.3.4 Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware
The TOE is solely the IPsec VPN client. Yet, it does require external IT devices to be properly operated.
Specifically, the TOE requires the following items in the network environment:
 An OCSP server is required for the TOE to be able to perform certificate validation.
 The Mobility Controller is required in the operational environment because the TOE uses it as its
VPN gateway. The VIA client can work in the evaluated configuration with the Mobility Controller
running ArubaOS 8.13 from 8.13.1 and later, but has only been tested with ArubaOS 8.13.1
 An EAP server (such as a RADIUS server) may or may not be used for authentication.
1.4 TOE Description
1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides secure connectivity for users when accessing an enterprise or corporate resource
(example: workstation, server) from an untrusted or trusted network connection. By default, the TOE
automatically launches and establishes a remote connection when the user logs in to their system from an
untrusted network.
The TOE runs on an end-user device and communicates with a gateway located on a Mobility Controller. The
server component is used to manage the client and ensure policies are enforced. The Mobility Controller
maintains certain VIA configuration profiles, such as the VIA authentication profile, the VIA connection profile,
and the VIA web authentication profile. Each profile plays an important role in authenticating the users and
establishing a secure connection. When multiple authentication profiles are available, the VIA client prompts
the user to select an authentication profile.
The first time a connection is established, a user opens the VIA client and enters the gateway name,
username, and password. VIA then connects to the gateway over an HTTPS channel and attempts to
authenticate using the user supplied credentials. The TSF relies on the underlying OS platform for
establishment of the HTTPS channel; it is not part of the TOE itself. This connection is used to retrieve
configuration settings for the IPsec connection and any site-specific branding (e.g. logo graphics).
If the VIA web authentication list has more than one VIA authentication profile, the user can choose a VIA
authentication profile from the available ones. After successful authentication, the VIA client downloads the
appropriate VIA connection profile and establishes the IPsec connection if the user is connected to an
untrusted network.
At a protocol level, VIA operates over UDP port 4500, which is defined for IKE/IPsec traversal of NATs in
RFC 3947. VIA uses HTTPS over TCP port 443 in order to contact the authentication server and download
configuration profile updates before establishing each IKE/IPsec connection. The VIA topography is shown in
the figure below.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
9
Figure 1: VIA Topography
The OCSP server is required for the TOE to be able to perform certificate validation in accordance with the
claim of FIA_X509_EXT.1 (see section 5.2.3.2). The Mobility Controller is required in the operational
environment because the TOE uses it as its VPN gateway. The RADIUS (EAP Server) component is shown
on the diagram because the Mobility Controller also functions as a wireless access system that uses EAP for
client authentication. However, this functionality is separate from the VPN Client functionality and is outside
the scope of the TOE and its operational environment; it is just included because a typical Mobility Controller
deployment will have one present for its other functions.
1.4.2 Physical Scope
The TOE is the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 4.7, a software application
running on general-purpose personal computing and mobile device hardware. The TOE software, supported
platforms, their software requirements, and tested hardware configurations are as follows:
Table 1 Physical Scope
Platform TOE Software OS Tested Hardware
Windows
Aruba-VIA-4.7.6.0.2603183-
64.msi
Windows 11
64-bit1
HP Probook 440 G11 with Intel Core Ultra 7
155U
1
Windows clients using Secure Boot on a Windows Enterprise platform require the Long-Term Servicing
Channel (LTSC) version of Windows 11
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
10
Linux
cc-via_4.7.6.2603081-
deb_amd64.deb
Ubuntu 24.04
HP Probook 440 G11 with Intel Core Ultra 7
155U
Android HPE-VIA-4.7.5.2603170.apk Android 14 Samsung Galaxy S24
Different platform versions of the TOE rely on their underlying OS platforms to varying extents. Where
platform-specific differences exist within an individual SFR, the SFRs are iterated to indicate which claims
apply to which platform. In all cases, the TSF relies on the OS platform to establish HTTPS connectivity to
the VPN gateway for acquisition of IPsec configuration settings; this is outside the TOE boundary and
therefore no SFRs apply to it.
The physical scope of the TOE also includes the following administrative guides:
 Aruba Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) 4.x Client Common Criteria Guidance, Version 2.5
 https://arubanetworking.hpe.com/techdocs/VIA/HPE-Aruba-VIA/Content/home.htm
1.4.3 Logical Boundary
This section summarizes the security functions provided by HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access
(VIA) client:
 Cryptographic support
 User data protection
 Identification and authentication
 Security management
 Privacy
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted path/channel
1.4.3.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements NIST CAVP approved cryptographic algorithms.
The TOE does not store keys unencrypted in persistent storage. While the TOE manipulates keys, on all
platforms, the TOE platform’s key storage is used. The TOE also uses various mechanisms to protect
credential data at rest.
The IPsec implementation is the primary function of the TOE. IPsec is used by the TOE to protect
communication between itself and an HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller over an unprotected
network.
The TOE implements IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 7296 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in
section 2.23), RFC 8784, RFC 8247 in tunnel mode only. The TOE does not offer transport mode as a
configuration option. The TOE implements peer authentication using RSA certificates or ECDSA certificates
that conform to RFC 4945. If certificates are used, the TOE ensures that the distinguished name (DN)
contained in a certificate matches the expected DN for the entity attempting to establish a connection and
ensures that the certificate has not been revoked (using the Online Certificate Status Protocol [OCSP] in
accordance with RFC 6960).
The TOE implements the IPsec protocol as specified in RFC 4301; however, the TOE relies upon the VPN
Gateway to ensure that the cryptographic algorithms and key sizes negotiated during the IKEv2 negotiation
ensure that the security strength of the IKE_SA is greater than or equal to that of the CHILD_SA
The IKEv2 SA lifetimes are configured by the VPN Gateway based upon the length of time. Length of time
includes 24 hours or less for Phase 1 and 8 hours or less for Phase 2.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
11
1.4.3.2 User Data Protection
The TOE uses the platform’s permission mechanism to get a user’s approval for access as part of the
installation process. The TOE leverages platform-provided functionality to encrypt sensitive data and allows
network communications to be initiated by the user in order to connect to the VPN Gateway. The TOE can
also provide always-on functionality for application-initiated network communication.
The TOE ensures that residual information is protected from potential reuse in accessible objects such as
network packets.
1.4.3.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides the ability to use, store, and protect X.509 certificates that are used for IPsec Virtual
Private Network (VPN) connections. The TOE performs peer authentication using certificates.
1.4.3.4 Security Management
The TOE and its IPsec VPN are fully configurable by a combination of functions provided directly by the TOE
and those available to the associated VPN gateway. The TOE is not provided with any default. All external
configuration comes from the Mobility Controller. The configuration options for the TOE consists of the URL
of the gateway and the credentials used for the connection. The configuration options are stored and set
using the mechanisms supported by the platform.
1.4.3.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit PII over a network.
1.4.3.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE performs self-tests that cover the TOE as well as the functions necessary to securely update the
TOE.
The TOE includes the use of only the documented platform APIs.
For each platform, the application does not allocate any memory region with both write and execute
permissions nor does the TOE request to map memory to an explicit address. The TOE does not write user-
modifiable files to directories that contain executable files. The application is built with stack-based buffer
overflow protection enabled.
HPE Aruba Networking provides a version control system for its software components. The TOE has a
unique software versioning that identifies major versions and their subsequent maintenance releases.
The Abouttab on the TOE displays the current system image version number for the TOE. The TOE
platforms support loading updates by the administrator. For Windows and Linux platforms, the administrator
obtains the update in the form of an installer through the HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller or the
HPE Networking Support Portal. The update is verified using an RSA 2048 with SHA-256 digital signature.
For Android versions, the application and signature are provided to and verified by the Google Play Store.
The TOE does not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code. The application is packaged
such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of configuration
settings and output files.
1.4.3.7 Trusted Path/Channel
TOE connects to the server over an HTTPS connection and attempts to authenticate using the user supplied
credentials. The cryptography for the initial HTTPS connection is provided by the platform and is therefore
outside the scope of the TOE. The IKE/IPsec transversal is secured using the TOE cryptography.
The TOE acts as a VPN client using IPsec to established secure channels to corresponding VPN gateways.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
12
2 Conformance Claims
This section states the Conformance Claims for the ST and the TOE. This includes a statement of the
Conformance Claims, a statement of the Conformance Claim Rationale, and the Identification of the
Technical Decisions applicable to the TOE.
2.1 Statement of Conformance Claims
The ST and the TOE claim conformance to Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5, Part 1 through to Part 3
identified in the following:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general
model, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional
components, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance
components, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
The ST claims CC Part 2 conformance as CC Part 2 Extended.
The ST claims CC Part 3 conformance as CC Part 3 Extended.
The TOE does not claim conformance to any packages.
The ST claims conformance to the following Protection Profile, and the Protection Profile Module:
 Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 2021-10-07 [PP_APP_v1.4]
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 2022-03-31 [MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
Conformance to the Base-PP and the PP-Module is claimed in accordance with the PP-Configuration:
 PP-Configuration for Application Software and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients,
Version 1.3, 2023-04-07 [CFG-APP-VPNC_V1.3]
The ST claims no conformance to any Evaluation Assurance Level or any other security assurance
requirement package. Instead, the security assurance requirements applicable to the TOE are those drawn
from the Base-PP as required by Sect. 2.2 of CFG_APP-VPNC_V1.3.
The ST claims conformance to the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, released 18-
October-2021 (PP_APP_v1.4) as PP-conformant.
The ST claims conformance to the PP-Configuration for Application and Software and Virtual Private
Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.3, released 7-April-2023 (CFG-APP-VPNC_V1.3) as PP-configuration-
conformant.
The ST claims exact conformance to the Base-PP, exact conformance to the PP-Module, and exact
conformance to the PP-configuration.
2.2 Conformance Claim Rationale
2.2.1 TOE Type Consistency Rationale
The TOE is a software application with IPsec VPN client capability implementing the security features
required for strict conformance with the Base-PP and the PP-Module. The PP and the PP-Module are used in
accordance with the PP-Configuration. These are exactly the PP, the PP-Module, and the PP-configuration
claimed in Sect. 2.1. The PP and PP-Module are exactly as identified in Sect. 1.3 of the PP-Configuration.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
13
This ensures that the TOE Type is consistent with the TOE Type in the Base-PP, PP-Module, and PP-
Configuration.
2.2.2 Security Problem Definition Consistency
The statement in the Security Problem Definition in this ST is reproduced exactly from the Base-PP and PP-
Module. The resulting Security Objectives statement is a union of the Security Objectives of the Base-PP and
the PP-Module. This ensures that the statement of the Security Objectives is consistent with the PP-
Configuration.
2.2.3 Security Objective Consistency
The statement of the Security Objectives in this ST is reproduced exactly from the Base-PP and PP-Module.
The resulting Security Objectives Statement is a union of the Security Objectives of the Base-PP and the PP-
Module. This ensures that the statement of the Security Objectives is consistent with the PP-configuration.
2.2.4 Security Requirements Consistency
The security functional requirements are drawn exactly from the Base-PP and the PP-Module. The statement
of the security functional requirements includes all mandatory and relevant selection-based requirements,
and an optional requirement.
The security assurance requirements are drawn from the Base-PP only. This is consistent with Sect. 2.2 of
the PP-Configuration. This ensures the consistency of the Security Assurance Requirements.
2.3 Technical Decisions
The following NIAP Technical Decisions for [PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] apply to the materials to
which the TOE conforms, the TOE evidence, or how the TOE is evaluated:
 TD0964: Clarifications to FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Windows Test (supersedes TD0893)
 TD0711: FMT_SMF.1 direction when using MDF 3.3
 TD0945: Adding FIPS 186-5 in PP_APP_V1.4 (supersedes TD0860)
 TD0931: Clarification when CTR_DRBG is Selected for FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2 in PP_APP_V1.4
 TD0897: RFC 8784 Optional in VPNC 2.4
 TD0876: Updating FIPS 186-4 to 186-5 in MOD_VPNC_V2.4 (supersedes TD0697)
 TD0865: Consistency of Cryptographic Key Sizes
 TD0844: Addition of Assurance Package for Flaw Remediation V1.0 Conformance Claim
 TD0823: Update to Microsoft Windows Exploit Protection link in FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
 TD0822: Correction to Windows Manifest File for FDP_DEC_EXT.1
 TD0815: Addition of Conditional TSS Activity for FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
 TD0798: Static Memory Mapping Exceptions
 TD0788: Terminology Change in MOD_VPNC: Extended to Functional Package
 TD0780: FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Clarification
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
14
 TD0756: Update for platform-provided full disk encryption
 TD0753: MOD_VPNC FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Alignment for App PP 1.4
 TD0747: Configuration Storage Option for Android
 TD0743: FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection exclusivity
 TD0725: Correction to FCS_CKM_EXT.2/4 selections
 TD0719: ECD for PP APP V1.3 and 1.4
 TD0717: Format changes for PP_APP_V1.4
 TD0690: Missing EAs for FDP_VPN_EXT.1
 TD0672: VPN Client PP-Module updated to allow for new PP and PP-Module Versions
 TD0664: Testing activity for FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
 TD0662: Changes to Testing IPsec NAT Transversal and XAUTH in MOD_VPNC 2.4
 TD0650: Conformance claim sections updated to allow for MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
 TD0647: Table 2 Applicability
 TD0628: Addition of Container Image to Package Format
Technical Decisions not applicable to the evaluation:
 TD0736: Number of elements for iterations of FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
o The TD is not applicable since FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 is not included in the evaluation.
 TD0711: FMT_SMF.1 direction when using MDF 3.3
o The TD is not applicable since MDF 3.3 is not included in the evaluation.
2.4 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
 Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations
that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and
refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In
the ST, iteration is indicated either by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g.
“FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN”) or by using a bracketed number (e.g. FCS_COP.1(1)).
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are
indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that
an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded
bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are
indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
15
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for
additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big
things
…”). Note that ‘cases’ that are not applicable in a given SFR have simply been removed
without any explicit identification.
 Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special
interest, such as captions.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
16
2.5 Acronyms
Table 2: Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CA Certificate Authority
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CM Configuration Management
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DH Diffie-Hellman
ECC Elliptic-curve cryptography
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPD Security Policy Database
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
VIA HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
17
3 Security Problem Definition
This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition from the [PP_APP_v1.4] and
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4]. The Security Problem Definition consists of threats that a conformant TOE is expected to
address and assumptions about the operational environment of the TOE.
In general, the [PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] have presented a Security Problem Definition
appropriate for application software that provides a Virtual Private Network used to establish a secure IPsec
connection between a host platform and a remote system. As such, the [PP_APP_v1.4] and
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4] Security Problem Definition applies to the TOE.
The following Threats and Assumptions are reproduced in this ST verbatim from the Base-PP and PP-
Module. Both the Base-PP and PP-Module do not define any additional OSPs.
3.1 Threats
Table 3 Threats drawn from the Base-PP
Threat ID Threat Statement
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the
application software or alter communications between the application
software and other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or else on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data
exchanged between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing
platform on which the application executes. Attackers may provide
maliciously formatted input to the application in the form of files or other local
communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
Table 4 Threats drawn from the PP-Module
Threat ID Threat Statement
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS
This PP-Module does not include requirements that can protect against an
insider threat. Authorized users are not considered hostile or malicious and
are trusted to follow appropriate guidance. Only authorized personnel
should have access to the system or device that contains the IPsec VPN
client. Therefore, the primary threat agents are the unauthorized entities
that try to gain access to the protected network (in cases where tunnel
mode is used) or to plaintext data that traverses the public network
(regardless of whether transport mode or tunnel mode is used).
The endpoint of the network communication can be both geographically
and logically distant from the TOE, and can pass through a variety of other
systems. These intermediate systems may be under the control of the
adversary, and offer an opportunity for communications over the network to
be compromised.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
18
Plaintext communication over the network may allow critical data (such as
passwords, configuration settings, and user data) to be read or
manipulated directly by a malicious users or process on intermediate
systems, leading to a compromise of the TOE or to the secured
environmental systems that the TOE is being used to facilitate
communications with. IPsec can be used to provide protection for this
communication; however, there are numerous options that can be
implemented for the protocol to be compliant to the protocol specification
listed in the RFC. Some of these options can have negative impacts on the
security of the connection. For instance, using a weak encryption algorithm
(even one that is allowed by the RFC, such as DES) can allow an
adversary to read and even manipulate the data on the encrypted channel,
thus circumventing countermeasures in place to prevent such attacks.
Further, if the protocol is implemented with little-used or non-standard
options, it may be complaint with the protocol specification but will not be
able to interact with other diverse equipment that is typically found in large
enterprises.
Even though the communication path is protected, there is a possibility that
the IPsec peer could be tricked into thinking a malicious third-party user or
system is the TOE. For instance, a middleman could intercept a connection
request to the TOE, and respond to the request as if it were the TOE. In a
similar manner, the TOE could be tricked into thinking it is establishing
communications with a legitimate IPsec peer when in fact it is not. An
attacker could also mount a malicious man-in-the-middle-type of attack, in
which an intermediate system is compromised, and the traffic is proxied,
examined, and modified by this system. This attack can even be mounted
via encrypted communication channels if appropriate countermeasures are
not applied. These attacks are, in part, enabled by a malicious attack
capturing network traffic (for instance, an authentication session) and
“playing back” that traffic in order to fool an endpoint into thinking it was
communicating with a legitimate remote entity.
T.TSF_CONFIGURATION
Configuring VPN tunnels is a complex and time-consuming process, and
prone to errors if the interface for doing so is not well-specified or well-
behaved. The inability or failure of an ignorant or careless administrator to
configure certain aspects of the interface may also lead to the mis-
specification of the desired communications policy of use of cryptography
that mya be desired or required for a particular site. This may result in
unintended weak or plaintext communications while the user thinks that
their data are being protected. Other aspects of configuring the TOE or
using its security mechanisms (for example, the update process) may also
result in a reduction in the trustworthiness of the VPN client.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE
Data traversing the TOE could inadvertently be sent to a different user as a
consequence of a poorly-designed TOE; since these data may be
sensitive, this may cause a compromise that is unacceptable. The specific
threat that must be addressed concerns user data that is retained by the
TOE in the course of processing network traffic that could be inadvertently
re-used in sending network traffic to a user other than that intended by the
sender of the original network traffic.
T.TSF_FAILURE
Security mechanisms of the TOE generally build up from a primitive set of
mechanisms (e.g., memory management, privileged modes of process
execution) to more complex sets of mechanisms. Failure of the primitive
mechanisms could lead to a compromise in more complex mechanisms,
resulting in a compromise of the TSF.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
19
3.2 Assumptions
Table 5 Assumptions Drawn from the Base-PP
Assumption ID Assumption Statement
A.PLATFORM
The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock
for its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER
The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses
the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN
The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise
security policy.
Table 6 Assumptions Drawn from the PP-Module
Assumption ID Assumption Statement
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS
Information cannot flow on the network to which the VPN client’s host is
connected without passing through the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG
Personnel configuring the TOE and its OE will follow the applicable security
configuration guidance.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
20
4 Security Objectives
This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 2021-10-18
[PP_APP_v1.4] and PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 2022-03-31
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
This section reproduces only the corresponding Security Objectives for the TOE and the Security Objectives
of the Operational Environment for reader convenience. The [PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] offer
additional information about the identified security objectives but have not been reproduced here and the
[PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
In general, the [PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] have defined Security Objectives appropriate for a
software application and IPsec VPN client and as such are applicable to the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual
Intranet Access (VIA) Client TOE.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
Table 7: Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Description
[PP_APP_v1.4]
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and
update packages, and also leverage execution environment-
based mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever, shipped without
errors. The ability to deploy patches and updates to fielded
software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security.
Processor manufacturers, compiler developers, execution
environment vendors, and operating system vendors have
developed execution environment-based mitigations that
increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task
of compromising systems.
Application software can often take advantage of these
mechanisms by using APIs provided by the runtime
environment or by enabling the mechanism through compiler
or linker options.
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs
leverage services and APIs provided by the runtime
environment rather than implementing their own versions of
these services and APIs. This is especially important for
cryptographic services and other complex operations such as
file and media parsing. Leveraging this platform behavior
relies upon using only documented and supported APIs.
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise,
conformant TOEs provide consistent and supported interfaces
for their security- relevant configuration and maintenance. This
includes the deployment of applications and application
updates through the use of platform-supported deployment
mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms
for configuration. This also includes providing control to the
user regarding disclosure of any PII.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
21
Objective Description
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in
the event of loss of physical control of the storage medium,
conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest protection. This
involves encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order
to prevent unauthorized access to this data. This also includes
unnecessary network communications whose consequence
may be the loss of data.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet
modification) network attack threats, conformant TOEs will
use a trusted channel for sensitive data. Sensitive data
includes cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data
specific to the application that should not be exposed outside
of the application.
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
O.AUTHENTICATION To address the issues associated with unauthorized
disclosure of information in transit, a compliant TOE’s
authentication ability (IPsec) will allow the TSF to establish
VPN connectivity with a remote VPN gateway or peer and
ensure that any such connection attempt is both authenticated
and authorized.
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS To address the issues associated with unauthorized
disclosure of information in transit, a compliant TOE will
implement cryptographic capabilities. These capabilities are
intended to maintain confidentiality and allow for detection and
modification of data that is transmitted outside of the TOE.
O.KNOWN_STATE The TOE will provide sufficient measures to ensure it is
operating in a known state. At minimum this includes
management functionality to allow the security functionality to
be configured and self-test functionality that allows it to assert
its own integrity. It may also include auditing functionality that
can be used to determine the operational behavior of the
TOE.
O.NONDISCLOSURE To address the issues associated with unauthorized
disclosure of information at rest, a compliant TOE will ensure
that non-persistent data is purged when no longer needed.
The TSF may also implement measures to protect against the
disclosure of stored cryptographic keys and data through
implementation of protected storage and secure erasure
methods. The TOE may optionally also enforce split-tunneling
prevention to ensure that data in transit cannot be disclosed
inadvertently outside of the IPsec tunnel and prohibit
transmission of packets through a connection until certain
conditions are met.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
22
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Table 8: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Objective Description
[PP_APP_v1.4]
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its
execution. This includes the underlying operating system and
any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent
or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the
applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless,
willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software
within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN
client’s
host is connected without passing through the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE
and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the
environment.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its OE will follow the
applicable security configuration guidance.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
23
5 Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the TOE and to scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the [PP_APP_v1.4] and the [MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
As a result, any selection, assignment, or refinement operations already performed by that Protection Profile
(PP) on the claimed SFRs are not identified here (i.e., they are not formatted in accordance with the
conventions specified in section 1.3 of this ST). Formatting conventions are only applied on SFR text that
was chosen at the ST author’s discretion.
The TOE and ST claim the following additional requirements beyond the minimum that is required by the
claimed PP-Configuration. Note per the claim of Exact Conformance that these additional requirements are
drawn exclusively from those specified in the PP and PP-Module from the PP-Configuration as optional and
selection-based requirements:
 From [PP_APP_V1.4]: FCS_CKM.1/AK, FCS_CKM.1/SK, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1(1),
FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/Sig, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS_RBG_EXT.2,
FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, and FPT_TUD_EXT.2.
5.1 Extended Requirements
The ST references several extended components. Each one is taken verbatim from the Base-PP (as per
TD0719) or the PP-Module. Only the operations allowed in the statement of the extended components are
implemented in the ST. There are no additional or modified extended components included in the ST.
Therefore, the statement of the extended components is exactly as in the Base-PP and the PP-Module. They
are not repeated here.
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
Table 9 identifies the SFRs satisfied by the TOE.
Table 9: TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1/AK: Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1/SK: Cryptographic Symmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1/VPN: Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE)
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
24
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS_COP.1/Sig: Cryptographic Operation - Signing
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: IPsec
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.2: Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_STO_EXT.1: Storage of Credentials
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DEC_EXT.1: Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1: Network Communications
FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509: Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_CFG_EXT.1: Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1: Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1/VPN: Specification of Management Functions (VPN)
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1: User Consent for Transmission of Personally
Identifiable Information
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_API_EXT.1: Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1: Software Identification and Versions
FPT_LIB_EXT.1: Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN(1): TSF Self-Test (VPN Client) (Windows and
Linux)
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN(2): TSF Self-Test (VPN Client) (Android)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1(1): Trusted Update (Android)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1(2): Trusted Update (Windows and Linux)
FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Integrity for Installation and Update
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
FTP_DIT_EXT.1: Protection of Data in Transit
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
25
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.1.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM.1.1 The application shall [
 implement asymmetric key generation
].
5.2.1.2 FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/AK2 The application shall [
 implement functionality
] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm
 [ECC schemes] using [“NIST curves” P-384 and [P-256]] that meet the
following: [FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix
B.4]; and,
[
 [FFC schemes] using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following:
RFC 3526, Section 3
].
5.2.1.3 FCS_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Symmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/SK The application shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random
Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key
sizes [
 128 bit,
 256 bit
].
5.2.1.4 FCS_CKM.1/VPN Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE)
FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN3 The TSF shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to generate
asymmetric cryptographic keys used for IKE peer authentication in
accordance with: [
 FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for
RSA
schemes;
 FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for
ECDSA schemes and implementing “NIST curves”, P-256, P-384 and [no
other curves]]
2
TD0945, TD0876 and TD0717 applied.
3
TD0876 applied.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
26
and specified cryptographic keysizes [equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key
strength of 112 bits].
5.2.1.5 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key
establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment
method:
 [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following:
[NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”]; and
[
 [Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14] that meets
the following: RFC 3526, Section 3
].
5.2.1.6 FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_CKM_EXT.2.14
The [TOE] shall store persistent secrets and private keys when not in use in
platform-provided key storage.
5.2.1.7 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.15
The [TOE, TOE platform] shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private
cryptographic keys and CSPs when no longer required.
5.2.1.8 FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SKC6
The application shall perform [ encryption/decryption] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm
 AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
 AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)
mode
and [
 no other modes
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].
5.2.1.9 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash7
The application shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [
4
Applied TD0725.
5
Applied TD0725.
6
Applied TD0717.
7
Applied TD0717.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
27
 SHA-1,
 SHA-256,
 SHA-384
] and message digest sizes [
 160,
 256,
 384
] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
5.2.1.10 FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation - Signing
FCS_COP.1.1/Sig8
The application shall perform [cryptographic signature services (generation and
verification)] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
 RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater] that
meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 5],
 ECDSA schemes using [“NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other
curves]] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Section 6]
].
5.2.1.11 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash9
The application shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
 [HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384]
and [
 no other algorithms
] with key sizes [160, 256, 384 bits] and message digest sizes [256 , 384] and
[160] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code’ and FIPS Pub 180-4 ‘Secure Hash Standard’].
5.2.1.12 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement [tunnel mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is
otherwise unmatched, and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the
cryptographic algorithms [AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106,
8
TD0717 applied.
9
TD0717 applied.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
28
[AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602) together with a
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.510
The TSF shall implement the protocol: [
 IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 7296 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal
as specified in section 2.23), RFC 8247, and [no other RFCs for hash
functions]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv2] protocol uses the
cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379
and [no other algorithm].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [
 IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by [a VPN Gateway] based on
[length of time],
]. If length of time is used, it must include at least one option that is 24 hours or
less for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours or less for Phase 2 SAs.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups
 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP) according to RFC
5114 and
[
 [14 (2048-bit MODP] according to RFC 3526
 [no other DH Groups] according to RFC 5114
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE DH key exchange (“x” in
gx mod p) using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having
a length of at least [224, 256, 384] bits.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall generate nonces used in IKE exchanges in a manner such that the
probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec
SA is less than 1 in 2^[112, 128, 192].
Application Note: The probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life of a specific
IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2^112 for DH Group 14, 2^128 for DH Group 19, or 2^192
for DH Group 20.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication using [RSA,
ECDSA] that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and [no other
method].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TSF shall not establish an SA if the [[Distinguished Name (DN)] and [no other
reference identifier type]] contained in a certificate does not match the expected
value(s) for the entity attempting to establish a connection.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TSF shall not establish an SA if the presented identifier does not match the
configured reference identifier of the peer.
10
TD0897 applied.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
29
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The [VPN Gateway] shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the
symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect
the [IKEv2 IKE_SA] connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the
symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect
the [IKEv2 CHILD_SA] connection.
5.2.1.13 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
 implement DRBG functionality
] for its cryptographic operations.
5.2.1.14 FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1 The application shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG)
services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR_DRBG
(AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.211
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates
entropy from a platform-based DRBG and [
 no other noise source
] with a minimum of [
 384 bits
] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP
800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.2.1.15 FCS_STO_EXT.1(1) Storage of Credentials for Windows and Android
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1(1)12
The application shall [
 invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely
store [RSA/ECDSA Certificates (IKEv2)],
] to non-volatile memory.
5.2.1.16 FCS_STO_EXT.1(2) Storage of Credentials for Linux
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1(2)13
The application shall [
 implement functionality to securely store [RSA/ECDSA Certificates
(IKEv2)] according to FCS_COP.1/SKC],
] to non-volatile memory.
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
11
TD0931 applied.
12
TD0865 applied.
13
TD0865 applied.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
30
5.2.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
 protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1
] in non-volatile memory.
5.2.2.2 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [
network connectivity
].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [
 no sensitive information repositories
].
5.2.2.3 FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [
 user-initiated communication for [connection to the VPN Gateway],
].
5.2.2.4 FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP.2.1 The [TOE] shall enforce that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.2.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to validate certificates in
accordance with the following rules:
 RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
 The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
 The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA
certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
 The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning
purpose in the key usage field
 The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using
[OCSP as specified in RFC 6960]
 The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to
the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity
verification shall have the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
31
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall
have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in
the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP
Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration
Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the
EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The application shall treat a certificate as a CAcertificate only if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.2.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.114
The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for IPsec and [no other protocols].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the TSF shall [not accept the certificate].
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
5.2.4.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when
configured with default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the
application binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
5.2.4.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform
vendor for storing and setting configuration options].
5.2.4.3 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
 [management functions defined in FMT_SMF.1/VPN]].
5.2.4.4 FMT_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management Functions (VPN)
FMT_SMF.1.1/VPN The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[
• Specify VPN gateways to use for connections,
• Specify client credentials to be used for connections
14
TD0788 applied.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
32
]
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR)
5.2.5.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
 not transmit PII over a network
].
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.6.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no
exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [
 not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions
].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the
platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain
executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection
enabled.
5.2.6.2 FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
5.2.6.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1 The application shall be versioned with [[HPE internal versioning scheme]].
5.2.6.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1(1) Use of Third-Party Libraries (Windows)
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1(1) The application shall be packaged with only [openssl (libeay32.dll, ssleay32.dll),
System.Windows.Interactivity, PageAnimator.dll].
5.2.6.5 FPT_LIB_EXT.1(2) Use of Third-Party Libraries (Linux)
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1(2) The application shall be packaged with only [libanmocana.so, opensc-pkcs11.so,
pkcs11-engine.so].
5.2.6.6 FPT_LIB_EXT.1(3) Use of Third-Party Libraries (Android)
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1(3) The application shall be packaged with only [no third-party library].
5.2.6.7 FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN(1) TSF Self-Test (Windows and Linux)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1/VPN(1) The [TOE] shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
33
FPT_TST_EXT.1.2/VPN(1) The [TOE] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF
executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the [TOE
cryptographic known-answer tests].
5.2.6.8 FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN(2) TSF Self-Test (Android)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1/VPN(2) The [TOE] shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.2/VPN(2) The [TOE platform] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored
TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the [TOE
cryptographic known-answer tests during startup of the cryptographic
module for Windows and Linux, integrity tests on the entire application at
startup for Android].
5.2.6.9 FPT_TUD_EXT.1(1) Integrity for Installation and Update (Android)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1(1) The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to
the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2(1) The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the
application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3(1) The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4(1) Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5(1) The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
5.2.6.10 FPT_TUD_EXT.1(2) Integrity for Installation and Update (Windows and Linux)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1(2) The application shall [provide the ability] to check for updates and patches to the
application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2(2) The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the
application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3(2) The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4(2) Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5(2) The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
5.2.6.11 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-supported
package manager.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all
traces of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and
audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
34
5.2.7.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.115
The application shall encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] using IPsec as specified
in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 and [no other protocols] between itself and another trusted
IT product.
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference according to TD0600:
Conformance claim sections updated to allow for MOD_VPNC_V2.4. These SARs are consistent with those
specified in PP-Configuration for Application Software and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.0,
2021-08-13.
Table 10: Assurance Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
These assurance requirements imply the following requirements from CC class ASE: Security Target
Evaluation.
 ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
 ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
 ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
 ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives
 ASE_REQ.1 Derived security requirements
 ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
 ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
Consequently, the evaluation activities specified in PP-Configuration for Application Software and Virtual
Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.3, 2023-04-07 apply to the TOE evaluation.
15
Applied TD0753 and TD0743.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
35
6 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the following security functions:
 Cryptographic support
 User data protection
 Identification and authentication
 Security management
 Privacy
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted path/channel
6.1 Cryptographic Support
For Windows and Android, the TSF relies on the OS platforms for AES encryption of credential data as well
as full-stack implementation of HTTPS for initial connectivity to the VPN gateway to acquire configuration
settings for IPsec. For Linux, the TSF implements AES encryption of credential data and relies on the OS
platform for the full-stack implementation of HTTPS for initial connectivity to the VPN gateway to acquire
configuration settings for IPsec.
The following table lists the CAVP certificates obtained for the cryptographic algorithms claimed in this ST. It
should be noted that the testing requirements for FIPS PUB 186-4 and FIPS PUB 186-5 are identical for the
algorithms relevant to this ST. Therefore, although the CAVP certificates listed in the table reference FIPS
PUB 186-4, the claims for these algorithms are equally applicable to FIPS PUB 186-5.
Table 11: CAVP Certificate References
Requirements Functions
CAVP Certificates
Windows Android Linux
Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1/AK ECC schemes using “NIST curves”
P- 256, P-384 that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Appendix B.4
A6942 A6942 A6942
FFC schemes] using Diffie-Hellman
group 14 that meet the following:
RFC 3526, Section 3
A6942 A6942 A6942
Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE)
FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for
RSA schemes;
A6942 A6942 A6942
FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for
ECDSA schemes and implementing
“NIST curves”, P-256 and P-384
A6942 A6942 A6942
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
36
Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 Elliptic curve-based key
establishment schemes] that meets
the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”
A6942 A6942 A6942
Key establishment scheme using
Diffie- Hellman group 14 that meets
the following: RFC 3526, Section 3
A6942 A6942 A6942
Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1(1) AES-CBC (128-bit, 256-bit) as
defined in NIST SP 800-38A
AES-GCM (128-bit, 256-bit) as
defined in NIST SP 800-38D
A6942 A6942 A6942
Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1/Has
h
SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384 as
FIPS Pub 180-4
A6942 A6942 A6942
Cryptographic Operation - Signing
FCS_COP.1.1/Sig RSA schemes using cryptographic
key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that
meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-
5, “Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Section 4
A6942 A6942 A6942
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
37
Requirements Functions Certificate
Windows Android Linux
ECDSA schemes using “NIST
curves” P- 256, P-384 that meet
FIPS PUB 186-5,
“Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 5
A6942 A6942 A6942
Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1/Key
edHash
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-
256 HMAC-
SHA-384
That meets the following: FIPS
Pub 198-1 and FIPS Pub 180-4
A6942 A6942 A6942
Random Bit Generation Services
Random Bit Generation from
Application
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_RBG_EXT.2
256-bits
NIST Special Publication 800-90A
using CTR_DRBG (AES)
A6942 A6942 A6942
6.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/AK: Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
The TOE generates asymmetric keys using the following key generation algorithms:
 Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) using NIST curves P-256 (256-bits) and P-384 (384-bits) key pairs
for key establishment that meet FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4
for IPsec (DH groups 19 and 20, respectively).
 Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) using Diffie-Hellman group 14 (2048-bits) that meets RFC 3526,
Section 3 for IPsec.
The TOE invokes cryptographic key generation using the Aruba Common Cryptographic Module (ACCM).
6.1.2 FCS_CKM.1/SK: Cryptographic Symmetric Key Generation
The TOE generates symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit Generator as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 with 128 bit and 256 bit cryptographic key sizes.
The TOE includes an AES-256 CTR_DRBG (irrespective of the underlying Platform) that seeds itself with
384-bits of entropy (composed of a 256-bit entropy input and a 128-bit nonce) drawn from a Platform function
intended to provide cryptographically secure randomness. The following list describes the mechanism by
which VIA obtains its seeding.
 Android- /dev/random
 Windows - BCryptGenRandom()
 Linux - getrandom() and that it uses a flag of GRND_RANDOM and behaves exactly as
/dev/random.
Based on NIAP’s “Clarification to the Entropy Documentation and Assessment Annex”, HPE Aruba
Networking assumes a minimum entropy of 0.67 bits of entropy per bit of data from platform provided
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
38
sources. This minimum-entropy estimate along with knowledge that the seed is 384-bits means that the TOE
seeds itself with at least 256-bits of entropy.
6.1.3 FCS_CKM.1/VPN: Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE)
The TOE supports RSA (2048 bits) and ECDSA (for curves P-256 and P-384) key pairs for use with IKE peer
authentication. The TOE delegates generation of the asymmetric keys to the underlying platform. In Linux key
generation is invoked via the openssl CLI command. In Windows key generation is invoke ia the "Certificates
- Current User" Windows MMC snap-in as a "Custom Request". In Android, the application invokes the
Android Keystore provider for key generation.
6.1.4 FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
The TOE implements the following key establishment schemes for IPsec:
 Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets NIST Special Publication 800-56A,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography” for Diffie-Hellman groups 19 and 20.
 Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets RFC 3526, Section 3.
6.1.5 FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation Services
The TOE implements asymmetric key generation. The cryptographic functions (including key generation) are
implemented by the Aruba Common Cryptographic Module. Table 12: Key Purpose/Key Storage/Key
Destruction describes the keys and secrets used by the TOE.
6.1.6 FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Cryptographic Key Storage
Table 12 identifies the purpose of each key used by the TOE, the key storage location, and the key
destruction method when the key is no longer required. Note: All keys are for IKE/IPsec and are zeroised
(overwritten with zeroies) when no longer in used by the IKE/IPsec function.
Table 12: Key Purpose/Key Storage/Key Destruction
Key Name: Origin/Purpose: Storage Location: Key Destruction:
DH Private
Components
Used to derive the
secret session key
during DH key
agreement protocol
Group 14 (384 bits) `
Temporarily
in volatile
RAM
An application
program which uses
the API may destroy
the key. The TOE
zeroizes (zero
overwrite) this CSP.
DRNG Seed Key DRBGs
for key generation
Temporarily
in volatile
RAM
An application program
which uses the API may
destroy the key. The
DRBG Seed: SP800-
90a
DRBG (384 bits)
DRBG Key: SP800-90a
(256 bits)
TOE zeroizes (zero
overwrite) this CSP.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
39
Key Name: Origin/Purpose: Storage Location: Key Destruction:
RSA Private Key Used to create
RSA digital
signatures key
size: 2048 bits
Temporarily in
volatile RAM (while
in use), persistently
in platform key
storage (while not
in use)
An application
program which uses
the API may destroy
the key. The TOE
zeroizes (zero
overwrite) this CSP
when residing in
memory; when
persistently stored in
platform key storage,
it is destroyed by the
platform. The TOE
has no mechanism to
initiate the destruction
of persistently stored
certificates.
ECDSA
Private Key
Used to create DSA
digital signatures
NIST curves: P-
256, P- 384
Temporarily in
volatile RAM (while
in use), persistently
in platform key
storage (while not
in use)
An application
program which uses
the API may destroy
the key. The TOE
zeroizes (zero
overwrite) this CSP
when residing in
memory; when
persistently stored in
platform key storage,
it is destroyed by the
platform. The TOE
has no mechanism to
initiate the destruction
of persistently stored
certificates.
AES Keys Used during AES
encryption,
decryption
Key sizes: 128 bits, 256
bits
Temporarily
in volatile
RAM
An application
program which uses
the API may destroy
the key. The TOE
zeroizes (zero
overwrite) this CSP.
HMAC Keys Used during
HMAC-SHA-
1,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-
384 operations
Key sizes: 160 bits, 256
bits, 384 bits
Temporarily
in volatile
RAM
An application
program which uses
the API may destroy
the key. The TOE
zeroizes (zero
overwrite) this CSP.
DH Public
Component
Used to derive the
secret session
key during DH
key agreement
protocol DH
Groups:
Group 14 (2048 bits)
Temporarily
in volatile
RAM
No longer needed by
trusted channel
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
40
Key Name: Origin/Purpose: Storage Location: Key Destruction:
ECDH
Public
Componen
t
Used to derive the
secret session key
during ECDH key
agreement protocol
Group 19 (P-256),
Group
20 (P-384)
Temporarily
in volatile
RAM
N/A
RSA
Public
Keys
Used to verify RSA
Signatures
key size: 2048 bits
Temporarily
in volatile
RAM
N/A
ECDSA
Public Keys
Used to verify ECDSA
Signatures
NIST Curves:
P-256, P-384
Temporarily
in volatile
RAM
N/A
Table 12 lists all the keys manipulated by the TOE. The TOE does not store these keys unencrypted into
persistent storage. While the TOE manipulates keys, on Windows and Android, the TOE platform’s key
storage is used: Windows Certificate Store and Android Keystore, respectively. In Linux, the TOE encrypts the
credentials as per FCS_COP.1/SKC. The key storage repositories for each platform are as follows:
6.1.7 FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction
The TOE and its platform collectively zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs
when no longer required. The cryptographic keys are destroyed when they are no longer in use by the
system. Section 6.1.6, Table 12, details how each key is destroyed. The details apply to all platforms.
6.1.8 FCS_COP.1/SKC: Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
The TOE implements the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the cryptographic algorithms
AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106, and AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 both specified
by RFC 3602.
6.1.9 FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
The TOE uses the hash function with other application cryptographic functions. Specifically, SHA-1 and SHA-
256 are used as the hash algorithms for the HMAC-SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-256 message authentication
function for ESP. Similarly, SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384 are used as hash algorithms for the
corresponding HMAC algorithms used as message authentication for IKE. Users not wishing to rely on SHA-
1 for the security of ESP and IKE should refer to the guidance provided in Section 6.1.11.
The TOE also uses SHA-256 and SHA-384 hashing for public key authentication for IKE peer authentication.
Additionally, TOE software updates are verified using a 2048-bit RSA digital signature with SHA-256.
6.1.10 FCS_COP.1/Sig: Cryptographic Operation - Signing
The TOE performs cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with the
following cryptographic algorithms:
 RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bits that meets FIPS PUB 186-5,
“Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 4 is used for IPsec authentication and TOE update
verification.
 ECDSA schemes using “NIST curves” P-256 and P-384 that meet FIPS PUB 186-5, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5 is used for IPsec authentication.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
41
6.1.11 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication
The TOE provides the HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384 algorithms. Refer to Table 11 for
the corresponding CAVP certificate demonstrating compliance with these algorithms. These keyed-hash
functions can be defined for use in an IPsec connection. The HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-
SHA-384 algorithms are used with key sizes and block sizes of 160, 256 and 384-bits respectively, producing
output MAC lengths equal to the block size.
HMAC-SHA-1 can be selected for message authentication in ESP in combination with AES-CBC-128 or AES-
CBC-256. Users not wishing to rely on SHA-1 for authentication in ESP, could select HMAC-SHA-256
instead, or choose the authenticated encryption algorithm AES-GCM.
HMAC-SHA-1 can be used for message authentication in IKE in combination with AES-CBC-128 or AES-
CBC-256. Users not wishing to rely on SHA-1 for authentication in IKE, should choose instead HMAC-SHA-
256, or HMAC-SHA-384.
6.1.12 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: IPsec
The TOE implements its own cryptography via the Aruba Common Crypto Module (ACCM). The
cryptographic functionality is implemented by the application itself as a separate executable that is bundled
with the platform. The TOE interacts with the network stack of the platforms using sockets through the
respective platform APIs.
The TOE implements the IPsec protocol as specified in RFC 4301; however, the TOE relies upon the VPN
Gateway to ensure that the cryptographic algorithms and key sizes negotiated during the IKEv2 negotiation
ensure that the security strength of the IKE_SA is greater than or equal to that of the CHILD_SA16.
The IKEv2 SA lifetimes are configured by the VPN Gateway based upon the length of time. Length of time
includes 24 hours or less for Phase 1 and 8 hours or less for Phase 2.
The TOE implements IKEv2, in tunnel mode only. The TOE does not offer transport mode as a configuration
option. IKEv2 is implemented as defined in RFCs 7296 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as
specified in section 2.23), RFC 8784, RFC 8247.
The TOE implements peer authentication using RSA certificates or ECDSA certificates that conform to RFC
4945. If certificates are used, the TOE ensures that the distinguished name (DN) contained in a certificate
matches the expected DN for the entity attempting to establish a connection and ensures that the certificate
has not been revoked (using the Online Certificate Status Protocol [OCSP] in accordance with RFC 6960).
During the Peer Authentication stage of IPsec, the TOE will verify the authenticity of the VPN gateway’s
X.509v3 certificate by validating the certificate, the certificate path, the certificates revocation status using
OCSP, the certificate path terminates in a trusted CA certificate, and that the CA certificate has the
basicConstraints extension present and the CA flag set to true.
The SHA hash algorithm (all claimed key sizes) is used as part of HMAC but is also used independently as
part of digital signature creation and verification. The TOE generates RSA and ECDSA signatures during
IKEv2 peer authentication. The TOE verifies RSA & ECDSA signatures during IKEv2 peer authentication and
trusted updates.
16
Note that the algorithm negotiated will be AES because that is the only available algorithm, so strength is based
solely upon key size where more bits are stronger.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
42
The TOE implements various HMAC algorithms (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256) to be used for
authentication in ESP in combination with AES-CBC-128 or AES-CBC-256. The specific algorithms used
depend upon the ciphersuite being used. The TOE implements the authenticated encryption methods:
 AES-GCM-128
 AES-GCM- 256
 AES-CBC-128 or AES-CBC-256 in combination with HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA-256 as the
authentication algorithm.
As configured on the VPN Gateway, the TOE supports the following Diffie-Hellman (DH) groups for use in SA
negotiation:
 14 (2048-bit MODP),
 19 (256-bit Random ECP), and
 20 (384-bit Random ECP).
Only one DH group can be configured for a specific policy so there is no negotiation. Different policies can
have different groups. Implementation is the same for both versions of IKE.
The TOE generates the secret value x used in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange ('x' in gx mod p) using the
CAVP tested RBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and having possible lengths of 224 for group 14, 256 for
group 19, or 384 bits for group 20. When a random number is needed for a nonce, the probability that a
specific nonce value will be repeated during the life of a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2112, 2128, or 2192.
The TOE implements minimal SPD rules that are defined implicitly through the configuration and connection
of a VPN session. The TOE does not support direct editing of SPD rules. As part of initial configuration the
administrator must manually configure the SPD such that if no “rules” are found to match, a final rule exists
that causes the network packet to be discarded. The PROTECT and BYPASS rules are implicit and are
implemented by configuring a split tunnel. The administrator may configure PROTECT and BYPASS rules by
enabling or disabling split-tunnel mode in the VIA connection profile on the VPN Gateway.
All traffic originating from the client operating system is passed through the tunnel established by the VIA client
to the VPN Gateway. When split-tunneling is enabled, the VPN Gateway pushes routes configured with the
tunnel address command in the VIA connection profile on the VPN Gateway to the VIA client. Traffic
matching the routes is forwarded through the IPsec tunnel. The DISCARD rule is not supported by the TOE
and must be provided by firewall rules configured on the VPN Gateway and the Platform.
6.1.13 FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation, FCS_RBG_EXT.2: Random Bit
Generation from Application
The application implements the DRBG functionality. Therefore FCS_RBG_EXT.2 is included in the security
target. The TOE implements SP 800-90A using CTR_DRBG (AES) for all deterministic random bit generation
services.
The TOE includes an AES-256 CTR_DRBG (irrespective of the underlying Platform) that seeds itself with 384
bits of entropy (composed of a 256 bit entropy input and a 128 bit nonce) drawn from a platform function
intended to provide cryptographically secure randomness (and conditioned using SHA-1). The following list
describes the mechanism by which VIA obtains its seeding.
 Android - /dev/random
 Windows - BCryptGenRandom()
 Linux - getrandom() and that it uses a flag of GRND_RANDOM and behaves exactly as
/dev/random.
Based on NIAP’s “Clarification to the Entropy Documentation and Assessment Annex”, HPE Aruba
Networking assumes a minimum entropy of 0.67 bits of entropy per bit of data from platform provided
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
43
sources. This minimum- entropy estimate along with knowledge that the seed is 384 bits means that the TOE
seeds itself with at least 256 bits of entropy.
6.1.14 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
The TOE maintains one type of credentials: certificates. For certificates, platform storage mechanisms are
used for Windows and Android. Specifically, the Windows version of the TOE uses the Windows Certificate
Store while the Android version of the TOE uses the Android keystore. The Linux version of the TOE encrypts
directly the certificates, which it stores in its own credential repository.
6.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
The TOE does not implement functionality that allows to store in-non-volatile memory sensitive application data
except for the private keys of X509 certificates which are protected by FCS_STO_EXT.1.
6.2.2 FDP_DEC_EXT.1: Access to Platform Resources
Sensitive information repositories are defined as those collections of sensitive data that could be expected to
be shared among some applications, users, or user roles, but to which not all of these would ordinarily require
access.
The TOE restricts its access to using network connectivity when it is needed to communicate to the VPN
Gateway.
6.2.3 FDP_NET_EXT.1: Network Communications
The TOE allows network communications to be initiated by the user in order to connect to the VPN Gateway.
The TOE can also provide always-on functionality for application-initiated network communication. The
Windows and Linux TOE platforms provide always-on functionality for application- initiated network
communication. However, this functionality must be enabled by an administrator. The Android TOE platform
provides always-on functionality available by default.
6.2.4 FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection
The TOE ensures that no residual information exists in network packets. When the TOE allocates a new
buffer for either an incoming or outgoing a network packet, the new packet data will be used to overwrite any
previous data in the buffer. If an allocated buffer exceeds the size of the packet, additional space will be
overwritten (padded) with zeros before the packet is forwarded (to the external network or delivered to the
appropriate, internal application).
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
44
The clearing of residual information is processed the same on the Android, Windows, and Linux platforms.
6.3 Identification and Authentication
6.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1: X.509 Certificate Validation
The TOE can use X.509 certificates for authentication. The TOE uses a user specified certificate when
attempting to establish the VPN connection. The Android, Linux, and Windows versions of the TOE validate
authentication certificates (including the full path) and checks their revocation status using OCSP.
The TOE processes a VPN connection to a server by first comparing the Identification (ID) Payload received
from the server against the certificate sent by the server, and if the DN of the certificate does not match the
ID, then the TOE does not establish the connection. Assuming the server’s certificate matches the ID, the
TOE then validates that it can construct a certificate path from the server’s certificate through any
intermediary CAs to the CA certificate specified by the user in the VPN configuration. If the TOE can
successfully build the certificate path, then the TOE will next check the validity of the certificates (e.g.,
checking its validity dates and that the CA flag is present in the basic constraints section for all CA certs).
Assuming the certificates are valid, the TOE finally checks the revocation status of all certificates (starting with
the server’s certificate and working up the chain). Configuration settings applied by the HPE Aruba
Networking Mobility Controller will determine if a certificate is accepted or rejected if the connection to the
OCSP server cannot be established; in the evaluated configuration, a configuration will be applied to the TOE
that rejects the certificate in these cases.
The TOE implements X.509 certificate validation functionality for the following:
 IPsec – Windows, Android, Linux.
6.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
A certificate is assigned to each VPN profile by an administrator. The VPN profile is downloaded from the
server to the client. The VPN Profile tab displays the following information about each downloaded VPN
profile:
 Profile: Name of the VPN profile, and the date and time that the profile was added.
 Authentication: IKE protocol version and authentication type.
 Server: IP address of the VPN server.
 Auth Profile: Web authentication profile.
 Certificate: VPN connection certificate (only for certificate-based authentication).
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates for authentication as defined in RFC 5280 in IPsec exchanges and rejects
any certificates that cannot be validated as described above. The certificate will not be accepted when the
connection to OCSP server cannot be reached.
6.4 Security Management
6.4.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1: Secure by Default Configuration
The TOE is not provided with any default credentials. All external configuration comes from the Mobility
Controller. The configuration options for the TOE consists of the URL of the gateway, entering credentials,
and the profile prior to establishing a connection.
The TOE requires the following permissions:
 Windows: no end user modification is permitted,
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
45
 Linux and Android: all require root permission.
6.4.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1: Supported Configuration Mechanism17
The TOE configuration options come from the HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller and deploy platform-
specific options. The configuration options are stored and set using the mechanisms supported by the
following platforms.
 Windows: Registry (HKCU\SOFTWARE\ARUBANETWORKS), C:\ProgramData, and an XML
file in %USERPROFILE%.
 Android: /data/data/com.aruba.via/files/ - controller IP address and credential information is
stored using SharedPreferences.
 Linux: XML file on disk in user profile.
The configuration options for the TOE consists of entering the URL of the gateway, entering credentials, and
downloading profile prior to establishing a connection.
6.4.3 FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
The TOE does not support any management functionality as described in the [PP_APP_v1.4]. The TOE
supports the management functionality as defined in [MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
6.4.4 FMT_SMF.1/VPN: Specification of Management Functions (VPN)
The following security management functions are provided by the TOE:
 Specify VPN gateways to use for connections,
 Specify client credentials to be used for connections.
The first time a connection is established, a user opens the VIA client and enters the server name, username,
and password. If the VIA web authentication list has more than one VIA authentication profile, the user can
choose a VIA authentication profile from the available ones. After successful authentication, the VIA client
downloads the appropriate VIA connection profile and establishes the IPsec connection if the user is
connected to an untrusted network.
6.5 Privacy
6.5.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1: User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable
Information
The TOE does not transmit personally identifiable information over a network.
6.6 Protection of the TSF
6.6.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
For each platform, the application does not allocate any memory region with both write and execute
permissions nor does the TOE request to map memory to an explicit address. The TOE does not write user-
modifiable files to directories that contain executable files. The application is built with stack-based buffer
overflow protection enabled. The details of each specific platform is identified below.
 The Windows VPN client application does not allocate any memory region with both write and
execute permissions nor does the TOE request to map memory to an explicit address. By
default, /DYNAMICBASE is enabled to support ASLR. The TOE does not write user-modifiable
17
Modified per TD0543 (Windows 10)
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
46
files to directories that contain executable files. No files are downloaded to Program Files. The
application is built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled using the /GS flag for
Windows. The Windows VPN client application is compatible with security features provided by
the platform vendor.
 The Android VPN Client application does not allocate any memory region with both write and
execute permissions nor does the TOE request to map memory to an explicit address. The – fpic
flag is set to support ASLR. The TOE does not write user-modifiable files to directories that
contain executable files. No files are downloaded to /data/data/package. The application is built
with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled using –fstack-protector- strong. The Android
VPN client application is compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
 The Linux VPN Client application does not allocate any memory region with both write and
execute permissions nor does the TOE request to map memory to an explicit address. ASLR is
supported by default. By default, the TOE does not write user-modifiable files to directories that
contain executable files. The application is built with stack-based buffer overflow protection
enabled using -fpic. The Linux VPN client application is compatible with security features with
SELinux.
6.6.2 FPT_API_EXT.1: Use of Supported Services and APIs
The TOE includes the use only documented platform APIs. The Platform APIs are documented below.
 Windows: See Appendix A.
 Android: See Appendix B.
 Linux: See Appendix C.
6.6.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1: Software Identification and Versions
HPE Aruba Networking provides a version control system for its software components. The TOE has a
unique software versioning that identifies major versions and their subsequent maintenance releases in the
following form: <major>.<minor>.<patch>.<build>. Major and minor releases introduce new major and minor
features for the product, and patch and build releases identify bug and security patches and the build
number.
6.6.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1: Use of Third-Party Libraries
The TOE is packaged with the following third-party libraries.
 Windows: openssl (libeay32.dll, ssleay32.dll), System.Windows.Interactivity, PageAnimator.dll
 Linux: libanmocana.so, opensc-pkcs11.so, pkcs11-engine.so
6.6.5 FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN(1): TSF Self-Test (VPN Client) (Windows and Linux) and
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN(2): TSF Self-Test (VPN Client) (Android)
The TOE performs known answer power on self-tests (POST) on its cryptographic algorithms to ensure that
they are functioning correctly. The TOE utilizes the Aruba Common Cryptographic Module (ACCM) library
which implements known answer tests on its cryptographic algorithms to ensure they are working correctly.
These known answer tests involve using the ACCM library functions to encrypt blocks of data and comparing
the resulting encrypted block of data to a block that is known to be correct. The result of encrypting a block of
data is the same every time if the encryption library operates properly. These tests cover the following
algorithms, known answer tests, and pairwise consistency tests:
 AES-GCM – 128 bits, 256 bits,
 AES-CBC – 128 bits, 256 bits,
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
47
 SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 384,
 HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384,
 RSA Pairwise Consistency Test,
 RSA Encrypt/Decrypt Known Answer Test,
 DSA Pairwise Consistency Test,
 ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test,
 ECDH Pairwise Consistency Test,
 DH Pairwise Consistency Test, and
 DRBG Known Answer Test.
The TOE invokes these self-tests of the ACCM library at start to ensure that those cryptographic algorithms are
working correctly.
A self-test is additionally performed on the cryptographic executable code. For Windows and Linux platforms,
the cryptographic module is signed by HPE Aruba Networking using 2048-bit RSA. For Android, the entire
application is signed by Google as part of its distribution on the Google Play store. This signature uses 4096-
bit RSA.
If any self-test fails, the TOE will not start. Successful execution of self-testing is implicit through the
application starting without error. For troubleshooting purposes, a debug log can be enabled that writes the
outcome of the self-test to a local file that shows the results of the self-test. Since the success or failure of the
self-test is implicit in whether or not the application starts successfully, the debug log is only used to confirm
the reason behind any anomalous behavior for reporting to HPE Aruba Networking Support.
 Windows:
o Success: “FIPS Powerup Self Finished Successfully”
o Failure: “FIPS_powerupSelfTest() failed error <code>”
 Android:
o Success: “Finished Mocana initialization...”
o failure: “Mocana initialization error <code>”
 Linux:
o Success: “Power up self test passed...”
o Failure: “!!ERROR!! :Power up self test failed: <error code>”
The entire purpose of the TSF is to establish IPsec connectivity. Any tampering of the IPsec functionality,
either as a whole or through corruption of individual cryptographic algorithms, would be detected through a
failure of the software integrity test or of the individual cryptographic known-answer/pairwise consistency
tests. Therefore, the testing provided by the TOE (and its underlying platform in the case of Android) is
sufficient to ensure that the application cannot be modified without detection in a way that would compromise
the behavior of the TSF.
6.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.1(1) (Android): Trusted Update, FPT_TUD_EXT.1(2) (Windows and
Linux): Trusted Update FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Integrity for Installation and Update
The Abouttab on the TOE shows the current system image version number.
The TOE platforms support loading updates by the administrator. For Android version, the application and
signature are provided and verified by the Google Play Store. The Android version is signed through the app
store using RSA 2048 bit with SHA-256 digital signature. The TOE platform checks the signature against the
downloaded application when the update is obtained by the TOE platform.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
48
For Windows and Linux platforms, the administrator obtains the update in the form of an installer through the
HPE Aruba Networking Mobility Controller or the Aruba Support Portal. Regardless of its origin, the update is
verified using an RSA 2048 digital signature with SHA-1, signed by HPE Aruba Networking. The installer
automatically verifies the digital signature on the update during the installation. An unverified update cannot
be installed.
The authorized source for the Windows and Linux updates is from the HPE Networking Support Portal. The
Google Play Store is the authorized source for the Android update.
The TOE application package is delivered in the following platform-supported formats:
 Windows: .msi
 Android: .apk, playstore
 Linux: .deb, .rpm
The TOE does not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code. The application is packaged
such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of configuration
settings and output files.
6.7 Trusted Path/Channels
6.7.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1: Protection of Data in Transit
The application encrypts all transmitted sensitive data with IPsec between itself and another trusted IT
product. The purpose of the application is to enable a secure IPsec connection between its underlying host
OS platform and a remote system that is protected by a VPN gateway. Therefore, any data that traverses the
IPsec tunnel is network traffic generated by the underlying OS platform or other applications running on it.
6.8 ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
HPE Aruba Networking has a Security Incident Response Team (SIRT) that security information can be
provided to at https://www.arubanetworks.com/support-services/sirt/. Findings can be submitted over email
using a PGP key or by opening a ticket on support site (HTTPS). HPE Aruba Networking does not disclose any
identified vulnerability until a patch is available. If vulnerability is disclosed on a side channel (e.g. a published
CVE), high or critical findings are addressed as a priority. High vulnerabilities are addressed within 30 days,
moderate vulnerabilities within 90 days, and low vulnerabilities within 180 days. Historically, all findings have
been addressed within 30 days regardless of severity.
The VIA client can automatically update to newer versions of the VIA client software when the update is
made available by the administrator. Note that VIA software for Android devices is managed by the Google
application stores and can’t be pushed using the VIA automatic update feature. This feature is enabled by
default and can be disabled by unselecting the Allow client to auto-upgrade option in the VIA connection
profile.
Windows Clients can be auto upgraded using installation files uploaded on the controller or using an or
external downloadable URL. Linux clients can be auto upgraded using external downloadable URL only.
Linux and Windows clients can automatically upgrade their VIA software from a URL defined in
the VIA external download URL field in the VIA Connection profile. This option is available for Linux and
Windows clients.
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
49
7 Protection Profile Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
 Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 2021-10-18 [PP_APP_v1.4] with the
optional requirements: FCS_CKM.1/SK, and the selection-based requirements:
FCS_CKM.1/AK, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/Sig,
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS_RBG_EXT.2, FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, and
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 2022-03-31
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
 PP-Configuration for Application Software and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version
1.3, 2023-04-07
As explained in Section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of the
[PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] have been copied verbatim into this ST.
As explained in Section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of this ST is conformant to
[PP_APP_v1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] have been copied verbatim into this ST.
The following table identifies all the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in this ST. Each SFR is drawn
from the [PP_APP_v1.4] and the [MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
Table 13: SFR Protection Profile Sources
Requirement Class Requirement Component Source
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1/AK: Cryptographic Asymmetric Key
Generation
PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_CKM.1/SK: Cryptographic Symmetric Key
Generation
PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_CKM.1/VPN: Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE) MOD_VPNC_V2.4
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation Services PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Cryptographic Key Storage MOD_VPNC_V2.4
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction MOD_VPNC_V2.4
FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic Operation –
Encryption/Decryption
PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_COP.1/Sig: Cryptographic Operation - Signing PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation - Hashing PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation -
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_COP.1/SKC: Cryptographic Operation –
Encryption/Decryption
PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: IPsec MOD_VPNC_V2.4
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
50
Requirement Class Requirement Component Source
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation Services PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_RBG_EXT.2: Random Bit Generation from
Application
PP_APP_v1.4
FCS_STO_EXT.1: Storage of Credentials (iterated by
ST author)
PP_APP_v1.4
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_DEC_EXT.1: Access to Platform Resources PP_APP_v1.4
FDP_NET_EXT.1: Network Communications PP_APP_v1.4
FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Encryption Of Sensitive Application
Data
PP_APP_v1.4
FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection MOD_VPNC_V2.4
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1: X.509 Certificate Validation PP_APP_v1.4
FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication PP_APP_v1.4
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_CFG_EXT.1: Secure by Default Configuration PP_APP_v1.4
FMT_MEC_EXT.1: Supported Configuration
Mechanism
PP_APP_v1.4
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions PP_APP_v1.4
FMT_SMF.1/VPN: Specification of Management
Functions (VPN)
MOD_VPNC_V2.4
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1: User Consent for Transmission of
Personally Identifiable Information
PP_APP_v1.4
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
FPT_API_EXT.1: Use of Supported Services and APIs PP_APP_v1.4
FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Anti-Exploitation Capabilities PP_APP_v1.4
FPT_IDV_EXT.1: Software Identification and Versions PP_APP_v1.4
FPT_LIB_EXT.1: Use of Third Party Libraries PP_APP_v1.4
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update (iterated by ST
author)
PP_APP_v1.4
FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Integrity for Installation and Update PP_APP_v1.4
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN: TSF Self-Test (VPN Client)
(iterated by ST author)
MOD_VPNC_V2.4
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
FTP_DIT_EXT.1: Protection of Data in Transit MOD_VPNC_V2.4
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
51
8 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE.
Each description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of
the corresponding security function. The set of security functions work together to satisfy all of the
security functions and assurance requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary
in order for the TSF to provide the required security functionality.
This Section in conjunction with Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the
security functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions
works together to provide all the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE
summary specification are all necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. Table 14:
Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping demonstrates the relationship between security
requirements and security functions.
Table 14: Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping
Cryptographic
support
User
Data
Protection
Identification
and
authentication
Security
management
Privacy
Protection
of
the
TSF
Trusted
path/channels
FCS_CKM.1 X
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 X
FCS_CKM.1/AK X
FCS_CKM.1/SK X
FCS_CKM.1/VPN X
FCS_CKM.2 X
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 X
FCS_COP.1(1) X
FCS_COP.1/Hash X
FCS_COP.1/Sig X
FCS_COP.1/Keyed
Hash
X
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 X
FCS_STO_EXT.1 X
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 X
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 X
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 X
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 X
FDP_RIP.2 X
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
52
Cryptographic
support
User
Data
Protection
Identification
and
authentication
Security
management
Privacy
Protection
of
the
TSF
Trusted
path/channels
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 X
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMF.1/VPN X
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 X
FPT_API_EXT.1 X
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 X
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 X
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 X
FPT_TUD_EXT.1(1
)
X
FPT_TUD_EXT.1(2
)
X
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 X
FPT_TST_EXT.1/V
PN
X
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 X
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
53
Appendix A: Windows Platform APIs
ntdll.dll
KERNEL32.DLL
KERNELBASE.dll
WS2_32.dll
ucrtbase.dll
RPCRT4.dll
USER32.dll
win32u.dll
GDI32.dll
gdi32full.dll
msvcp_win.dll
ADVAPI32.dll
msvcrt.dll
sechost.dll
SHELL32.dll
wintypes.dll
combase.dll
ole32.dll
OLEAUT32.dll
CRYPT32.dll
bcrypt.dll
WTSAPI32.dll
MSVCP140.dll
VCRUNTIME140.dll
VCRUNTIME140_1.dll
dbghelp.dll
IPHLPAPI.DLL
VERSION.dll
SspiCli.dll
WININET.dll
dbgcore.DLL
CRYPTSP.dll
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
54
rsaenh.dll
CRYPTBASE.dll
bcryptPrimitives.dll
windows.storage.dll
SHCORE.dll
shlwapi.dll
profapi.dll
ntmarta.dll
WINSTA.dll
DPAPI.dll
kernel.appcore.dll
clbcatq.dll
mswsock.dll
NSI.dll
Wintrust.DLL
MSASN1.dll
imagehlp.dll
gpapi.dll
cryptnet.dll
WINNSI.DLL
ncrypt.dll
NTASN1.dll
DNSAPI.dll
fwpuclnt.dll
rasadhlp.dll
WINHTTP.dll
dhcpcsvc6.DLL
dhcpcsvc.DLL
webio.dll
Cabinet.dll
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
55
Appendix B: Android Platform APIs
android.animation.Animator
android.annotation.SuppressLint
android.annotation.SuppressLint
android.annotation.TargetApi
android.app.Activity
android.app.Activity
android.app.AlertDialog
android.app.Application
android.app.Application
android.app.Dialog
android.app.KeyguardManager
android.app.KeyguardManager
android.app.ListActivity
android.app.ListActivity
android.app.PendingIntent
android.app.PendingIntent
android.app.ProgressDialog
android.app.Service
android.app.Service
android.content.ActivityNotFoundException
android.content.BroadcastReceiver
android.content.ComponentName
android.content.ComponentName
android.content.ContentResolver
android.content.Context
android.content.Context
android.content.DialogInterface.OnCancelListener;
android.content.DialogInterface.OnClickListener
android.content.DialogInterface
android.content.DialogInterface
android.content.Intent
android.content.Intent
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
56
android.content.IntentFilter
android.content.IntentFilter
android.content.pm.PackageInfo
android.content.pm.PackageInfo
android.content.pm.PackageManager.NameNotFoundException
android.content.pm.PackageManager.NameNotFoundException
android.content.pm.PackageManager
android.content.pm.PackageManager
android.content.res.Configuration
android.content.res.Resources
android.content.RestrictionsManager
android.content.ServiceConnection
android.content.ServiceConnection
android.content.SharedPreferences.Editor
android.content.SharedPreferences
android.database.Cursor
android.graphics.Bitmap
android.graphics.Bitmap
android.graphics.BitmapFactory
android.graphics.BitmapFactory
android.graphics.Canvas
android.graphics.Color
android.graphics.ColorFilter
android.graphics.drawable.Drawable
android.graphics.drawable.LayerDrawable
android.graphics.Paint
android.graphics.Path
android.graphics.PixelFormat
android.graphics.Rect
android.graphics.RectF
android.graphics.Typeface
android.net.ConnectivityManager
android.net.ConnectivityManager
android.net.http.SslError
android.net.NetworkInfo
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
57
android.net.NetworkInfo
android.net.Uri
android.net.VpnService
android.net.VpnService
android.net.wifi.ScanResult
android.net.wifi.SupplicantState
android.net.wifi.WifiConfiguration.KeyMgmt
android.net.wifi.WifiConfiguration
android.net.wifi.WifiInfo
android.net.wifi.WifiManager
android.net.wifi.WifiManager
android.os.AsyncTask
android.os.AsyncTask
android.os.Binder
android.os.Binder
android.os.Build
android.os.Build
android.os.Bundle
android.os.Bundle
android.os.Environment
android.os.Environment
android.os.Handler
android.os.Handler
android.os.IBinder
android.os.IBinder
android.os.Looper
android.os.Looper
android.os.Message
android.os.Message
android.os.Messenger
android.os.Messenger
android.os.ParcelFileDescriptor
android.os.ParcelFileDescriptor
android.os.PersistableBundle
android.os.RemoteException
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
58
android.os.RemoteException
android.os.SystemClock
android.os.SystemClock
android.provider.MediaStore
android.provider.Settings.Secure
android.security.KeyChain
android.security.KeyChain
android.security.KeyChainAliasCallback
android.security.KeyChainAliasCallback
android.security.KeyChainException
android.security.KeyChainException
android.security.keystore.KeyInfo
android.support.annotation.AnimRes
android.support.annotation.AnimRes
android.support.annotation.LayoutRes
android.support.annotation.Nullable
android.support.annotation.RequiresApi
android.support.annotation.RequiresApi
android.support.annotation.StringRes
android.support.annotation.StringRes
android.support.design.widget.TabLayout
android.support.v4.app.ActivityCompat
android.support.v4.app.Fragment
android.support.v4.app.FragmentManager
android.support.v4.app.FragmentPagerAdapter
android.support.v4.app.FragmentTransaction
android.support.v4.content.ContextCompat
android.support.v4.content.FileProvider
android.support.v4.view.ViewPager
android.support.v7.app.AppCompatActivity
android.support.v7.widget.Toolbar
android.system.ErrnoException
android.system.Os
android.text.Editable
android.text.format.Formatter
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
59
android.text.format.Formatter
android.text.InputType
android.text.method.LinkMovementMethod
android.text.TextUtils
a n d r oid.text.TextUtils
android.text.TextWatcher
android.util.AttributeSet
android.util.DisplayMetrics
android.util.Log
android.util.Log
android.view.animation.Animation
android.view.animation.Animation
android.view.animation.AnimationUtils
android.view.animation.AnimationUtils
android.view.animation.RotateAnimation
android.view.inputmethod.InputMethodManager
android.view.inputmethod.InputMethodManager
android.view.KeyEvent
android.view.LayoutInflater
android.view.Menu
android.view.MotionEvent
android.view.View.OnClickListener
android.view.View.OnClickListener
android.view.View
android.view.View
android.view.ViewGroup
android.view.ViewGroup
android.webkit.CookieManager
android.webkit.SslErrorHandler
android.webkit.WebResourceError
android.webkit.WebResourceRequest
android.webkit.WebResourceResponse
android.webkit.WebView
android.webkit.WebViewClient
android.widget.AdapterView.OnItemClickListener
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
60
android.widget.AdapterView
android.widget.ArrayAdapter
android.widget.BaseAdapter
android.widget.Button
android.widget.Button
android.widget.CheckBox
android.widget.CheckBox
android.widget.CheckedTextView
android.widget.CompoundButton.OnCheckedChangeListener
android.widget.CompoundButton.OnCheckedChangeListener
android.widget.CompoundButton
android.widget.CompoundButton
android.widget.EditText
android.widget.EditText
android.widget.FrameLayout
android.widget.ImageView
android.widget.LinearLayout
android.widget.ListView
android.widget.ListView
android.widget.RadioButton
android.widget.RadioGroup
android.widget.RelativeLayout
android.widget.ScrollView
android.widget.ScrollView
android.widget.Switch
android.widget.Switch
android.widget.TextView
android.widget.TextView
android.widget.Toast
android.widget.Toast
android.widget.ViewSwitcher
com.sec.enterprise.mdm.services.vpn.knoxvpn.IKnoxVpnService
com.sec.vpn.knox.GenericVpnContext
com.sec.vpn.knox.GenericVpnContext
java.awt.datatransfer.DataFlavor
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
61
java.io.*
java.io.BufferedInputStream
java.io.BufferedInputStream
java.io.BufferedOutputStream
java.io.BufferedOutputStream
java.io.BufferedReader
java.io.BufferedWriter
java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
java.io.DataInputStream
java.io.DataOutputStream
java.io.DataOutputStream
java.io.EOFException
java.io.File
java.io.File
java.io.FileFilter
java.io.FileInputStream
java.io.FileInputStream
java.io.FileNotFoundException
java.io.FileNotFoundException
java.io.FileOutputStream
java.io.FileOutputStream
java.io.FilterInputStream
java.io.FilterOutputStream
java.io.InputStream
java.io.InputStream
java.io.InputStreamReader
java.io.InputStreamReader
java.io.IOException
java.io.IOException
java.io.LineNumberReader
java.io.ObjectInputStream
java.io.ObjectInputStream
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
62
java.io.ObjectOutput
java.io.ObjectOutputStream
java.io.ObjectOutputStream
java.io.OutputStream
java.io.OutputStream
java.io.OutputStreamWriter
java.io.PipedInputStream
java.io.PipedOutputStream
java.io.PrintStream
java.io.PushbackInputStream
java.io.Reader
java.io.Serializable
java.io.StreamCorruptedException
java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException
java.io.Writer
java.lang.reflect.Constructor
java.math.*
java.math.BigInteger
java.math.BigInteger
java.net.ConnectException
java.net.CookieStore
java.net.CookieStore
java.net.HttpCookie
java.net.HttpCookie
java.net.HttpURLConnection
java.net.Inet4Address
java.net.InetAddress
java.net.InetAddress
java.net.InetSocketAddress
java.net.InetSocketAddress
java.net.NetworkInterface
java.net.NetworkInterface
java.net.ServerSocket
java.net.Socket
java.net.Socket
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
63
java.net.SocketAddress
java.net.SocketAddress
java.net.SocketException
java.net.SocketException
java.net.UnknownHostException
java.net.UnknownHostException
java.net.URI
java.net.URISyntaxException
java.net.URL
java.net.URL
java.net.URLClassLoader
java.nio.BufferUnderflowException
java.nio.ByteBuffer
java.nio.ByteOrder
java.nio.charset.Charset
java.nio.file.FileAlreadyExistsException
java.nio.file.Files
java.nio.file.Paths
java.security.*
java.security.AccessController
java.security.AlgorithmParameterGenerator
java.security.AlgorithmParameterGeneratorSpi
java.security.AlgorithmParameters
java.security.AlgorithmParametersSpi
java.security.BasicPermission
java.security.cert.*
java.security.cert.Certificate
java.security.cert.Certificate
java.security.cert.CertificateEncodingException
java.security.cert.CertificateEncodingException
java.security.cert.CertificateException
java.security.cert.CertificateException
java.security.cert.CertificateExpiredException
java.security.cert.CertificateExpiredException
java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
64
java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
java.security.cert.CertificateFactorySpi
java.security.cert.CertificateNotYetValidException
java.security.cert.CertificateNotYetValidException
java.security.cert.CertificateParsingException
java.security.cert.CertPath
java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder
java.security.cert.CertPathBuilderException
java.security.cert.CertPathBuilderResult
java.security.cert.CertPathBuilderSpi
java.security.cert.CertPathParameters
java.security.cert.CertPathValidator
java.security.cert.CertPathValidatorException
java.security.cert.CertPathValidatorResult
java.security.cert.CertPathValidatorSpi
java.security.cert.CertSelector
java.security.cert.CertStore
java.security.cert.CertStoreException
java.security.cert.CertStoreParameters
java.security.cert.CertStoreSpi
java.security.cert.CollectionCertStoreParameters
java.security.cert.CRL
java.security.cert.CRLException
java.security.cert.CRLSelector
java.security.cert.LDAPCertStoreParameters
java.security.cert.PKIXBuilderParameters
java.security.cert.PKIXCertPathBuilderResult
java.security.cert.PKIXCertPathChecker
java.security.cert.PKIXCertPathValidatorResult
java.security.cert.PKIXParameters
java.security.cert.PolicyNode
java.security.cert.PolicyQualifierInfo
java.security.cert.TrustAnchor
java.security.cert.X509Certificate
java.security.cert.X509Certificate
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
65
java.security.cert.X509CertSelector
java.security.cert.X509CRL
java.security.cert.X509CRLEntry
java.security.cert.X509CRLSelector
java.security.cert.X509Extension
java.security.DigestInputStream
java.security.DigestOutputStream
java.security.GeneralSecurityException
java.security.GeneralSecurityException
java.security.interfaces.DSAKey
java.security.interfaces.DSAParams
java.security.interfaces.DSAPrivateKey
java.security.interfaces.DSAPublicKey
java.security.interfaces.ECKey
java.security.interfaces.ECPrivateKey
java.security.interfaces.ECPublicKey
java.security.interfaces.ECPublicKey
java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateCrtKey
java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateKey
java.security.interfaces.RSAPublicKey
java.security.interfaces.RSAPublicKey
java.security.InvalidAlgorithmParameterException
java.security.InvalidKeyException
java.security.InvalidKeyException
java.security.InvalidParameterException
java.security.InvalidParameterException
java.security.Key
java.security.Key
java.security.KeyFactory
java.security.KeyFactory
java.security.KeyFactorySpi
java.security.KeyManagementException
java.security.KeyManagementException
java.security.KeyPair
java.security.KeyPairGenerator
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
66
java.security.KeyStore.LoadStoreParameter
java.security.KeyStore.ProtectionParameter
java.security.KeyStore
java.security.KeyStore
java.security.KeyStoreException
java.security.KeyStoreException
java.security.KeyStoreSpi
java.security.MessageDigest
java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException
java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException
java.security.NoSuchProviderException
java.security.NoSuchProviderException
java.security.Permission
java.security.Principal
java.security.Principal
java.security.PrivateKey
java.security.PrivateKey
java.security.PrivilegedAction
java.security.Provider
java.security.ProviderException
java.security.PublicKey
java.security.PublicKey
java.security.SecureRandom
java.security.SecureRandom
java.security.Security
java.security.Security
java.security.Signature
java.security.Signature
java.security.SignatureException
java.security.SignatureException
java.security.SignatureSpi
java.security.spec.AlgorithmParameterSpec
java.security.spec.DSAParameterSpec
java.security.spec.DSAPrivateKeySpec
java.security.spec.DSAPublicKeySpec
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
67
java.security.spec.ECField
java.security.spec.ECFieldF2m
java.security.spec.ECFieldFp
java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
java.security.spec.ECParameterSpec
java.security.spec.ECPoint
java.security.spec.ECPrivateKeySpec
java.security.spec.ECPublicKeySpec
java.security.spec.EllipticCurve
java.security.spec.EllipticCurve
java.security.spec.InvalidKeySpecException
java.security.spec.InvalidKeySpecException
java.security.spec.InvalidParameterSpecException
java.security.spec.KeySpec
java.security.spec.MGF1ParameterSpec
java.security.spec.PKCS8EncodedKeySpec
java.security.spec.PSSParameterSpec
java.security.spec.RSAKeyGenParameterSpec
java.security.spec.RSAPrivateCrtKeySpec
java.security.spec.RSAPrivateKeySpec
java.security.spec.RSAPublicKeySpec
java.security.spec.X509EncodedKeySpec
java.security.UnrecoverableKeyException
java.security.UnrecoverableKeyException
java.sql.Date
java.text.DateFormat
java.text.DateFormat
java.text.DecimalFormat
java.text.Format
java.text.MessageFormat
java.text.ParseException
java.text.ParseException
java.text.SimpleDateFormat
java.text.SimpleDateFormat
java.util.*
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
68
java.util.ArrayList
java.util.ArrayList
java.util.Arrays
java.util.Arrays
java.util.Calendar
java.util.Calendar
java.util.Collection
java.util.Collections
java.util.Collections
java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean
java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
java.util.concurrent.Executors
java.util.concurrent.Executors
java.util.concurrent.ScheduledExecutorService
java.util.concurrent.ScheduledExecutorService
java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit
java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit
java.util.Date
java.util.Date
java.util.Enumeration
java.util.Enumeration
java.util.HashMap
java.util.HashMap
java.util.HashSet
java.util.HashSet
java.util.Hashtable
java.util.Iterator
java.util.Iterator
java.util.LinkedHashSet
java.util.LinkedList
java.util.List
java.util.List
java.util.ListIterator
java.util.ListIterator
java.util.Locale
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
69
java.util.Map
java.util.Map
java.util.MissingResourceException
java.util.Properties
java.util.Random
java.util.regex.Matcher
java.util.regex.Matcher
java.util.regex.Pattern
java.util.regex.Pattern
java.util.ResourceBundle
java.util.Scanner
java.util.Scanner
java.util.Set
java.util.Set
java.util.SimpleTimeZone
java.util.StringTokenizer
java.util.StringTokenizer
java.util.Timer
java.util.Timer
java.util.TimerTask
java.util.TimerTask
java.util.TimeZone
java.util.TimeZone
java.util.Vector
java.util.Vector
java.util.zip.Deflater
java.util.zip.DeflaterOutputStream
java.util.zip.Inflater
java.util.zip.InflaterInputStream
java.util.zip.ZipEntry
java.util.zip.ZipOutputStream
javax.activation.ActivationDataFlavor
javax.activation.CommandMap
javax.activation.DataContentHandler
javax.activation.DataHandler
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
70
javax.activation.DataSource
javax.activation.FileDataSource
javax.activation.MailcapCommandMap
javax.crypto.BadPaddingException
javax.crypto.Cipher
javax.crypto.Cipher
javax.crypto.CipherInputStream
javax.crypto.CipherOutputStream
javax.crypto.CipherSpi
javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException
javax.crypto.interfaces.DHKey
javax.crypto.interfaces.DHPrivateKey
javax.crypto.interfaces.DHPublicKey
javax.crypto.interfaces.PBEKey
javax.crypto.KeyAgreement
javax.crypto.KeyAgreementSpi
javax.crypto.KeyGenerator
javax.crypto.KeyGenerator
javax.crypto.KeyGeneratorSpi
javax.crypto.Mac
javax.crypto.MacSpi
javax.crypto.NoSuchPaddingException
javax.crypto.SecretKey
javax.crypto.SecretKeyFactory
javax.crypto.SecretKeyFactory
javax.crypto.SecretKeyFactorySpi
javax.crypto.ShortBufferException
javax.crypto.spec.DESedeKeySpec
javax.crypto.spec.DESedeKeySpec
javax.crypto.spec.DESKeySpec
javax.crypto.spec.DHGenParameterSpec
javax.crypto.spec.DHParameterSpec
javax.crypto.spec.DHPrivateKeySpec
javax.crypto.spec.DHPublicKeySpec
javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
71
javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec
javax.crypto.spec.OAEPParameterSpec
javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec
javax.crypto.spec.PBEParameterSpec
javax.crypto.spec.PSource
javax.crypto.spec.RC2ParameterSpec
javax.crypto.spec.RC5ParameterSpec
javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
javax.mail.Address
javax.mail.BodyPart
javax.mail.Header
javax.mail.internet.ContentType
javax.mail.internet.InternetAddress
javax.mail.internet.InternetHeaders
javax.mail.internet.MimeBodyPart
javax.mail.internet.MimeMessage
javax.mail.internet.MimeMultipart
javax.mail.internet.MimePart
javax.mail.internet.SharedInputStream
javax.mail.Message
javax.mail.MessagingException
javax.mail.Multipart
javax.mail.Part
javax.mail.Session
javax.mail.Transport
javax.naming.Context
javax.naming.directory.Attribute
javax.naming.directory.DirContext
javax.naming.directory.InitialDirContext
javax.naming.directory.SearchControls
javax.naming.directory.SearchResult
javax.naming.NamingEnumeration
javax.naming.NamingException
javax.net.ssl.HostnameVerifier
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
72
javax.net.ssl.HostnameVerifier
javax.net.ssl.HttpsURLConnection
javax.net.ssl.HttpsURLConnection
javax.net.ssl.KeyManager
javax.net.ssl.KeyManager
javax.net.ssl.SSLContext
javax.net.ssl.SSLContext
javax.net.ssl.SSLException
javax.net.ssl.SSLException
javax.net.ssl.SSLSession
javax.net.ssl.SSLSession
javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket
javax.net.ssl.TrustManager
javax.net.ssl.TrustManager
javax.net.ssl.TrustManagerFactory
javax.net.ssl.TrustManagerFactory
javax.net.ssl.X509ExtendedKeyManager
javax.net.ssl.X509ExtendedKeyManager
javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager
javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager
javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal
javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal
javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder
javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder
javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory
javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory
org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils
org.apache.http.client.CookieStore
org.apache.http.client.entity.UrlEncodedFormEntity
org.apache.http.client.entity.UrlEncodedFormEntity
org.apache.http.client.HttpClient
org.apache.http.client.HttpClient
org.apache.http.client.methods.HttpGet
org.apache.http.client.methods.HttpGet
org.apache.http.client.methods.HttpPost
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
73
org.apache.http.client.methods.HttpPost
org.apache.http.client.protocol.ClientContext
org.apache.http.client.protocol.ClientContext
org.apache.http.client.utils.URIUtils
org.apache.http.client.utils.URIUtils
org.apache.http.conn.scheme.PlainSocketFactory
org.apache.http.conn.scheme.PlainSocketFactory
org.apache.http.conn.scheme.Scheme
org.apache.http.conn.scheme.Scheme
org.apache.http.conn.scheme.SchemeRegistry
org.apache.http.conn.scheme.SchemeRegistry
org.apache.http.conn.ssl.SSLSocketFactory
org.apache.http.conn.ssl.SSLSocketFactory
org.apache.http.cookie.Cookie
org.apache.http.cookie.Cookie
org.apache.http.Header
org.apache.http.HttpEntity
org.apache.http.HttpEntity
org.apache.http.HttpResponse
org.apache.http.HttpResponse
org.apache.http.HttpStatus
org.apache.http.HttpStatus
org.apache.http.impl.client.DefaultHttpClient
org.apache.http.impl.client.DefaultHttpClient
org.apache.http.impl.conn.tsccm.ThreadSafeClientConnManager
org.apache.http.impl.conn.tsccm.ThreadSafeClientConnManager
org.apache.http.impl.cookie.BasicClientCookie
org.apache.http.message.BasicNameValuePair
org.apache.http.message.BasicNameValuePair
org.apache.http.NameValuePair
org.apache.http.NameValuePair
org.apache.http.params.BasicHttpParams
org.apache.http.params.BasicHttpParams
org.apache.http.params.HttpConnectionParams
org.apache.http.params.HttpConnectionParams
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
74
org.apache.http.params.HttpParams
org.apache.http.params.HttpParams
org.apache.http.protocol.BasicHttpContext
org.apache.http.protocol.BasicHttpContext
org.apache.http.protocol.HttpContext
org.apache.http.protocol.HttpContext
org.json.JSONException
org.json.JSONException
org.json.JSONObject
org.json.JSONObject
org.w3c.dom.Document
org.w3c.dom.Document
org.w3c.dom.Element
org.w3c.dom.Element
org.w3c.dom.Node
org.w3c.dom.Node
org.w3c.dom.NodeList
org.w3c.dom.NodeList
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
75
Appendix C: Linux Platform APIs
libdl.so
libxml2.so
libproxy.so
libdbus-1.so
libQt5Widgets.so
libQt5Gui.so
libQt5Network.so
libQt5Core.so
libpthread.so
libstdc++.so
libgcc_s.so
libc.so
ld-linux-x86-64.so
librt.so
libz.so
libicuuc.so
liblzma.so
libm.so
libsystemd.so
libgobject-2.0.so
libglib-2.0.so
libX11.so
libpng12.so
libharfbuzz.so
libGL.so
libicui18n.so
libpcre16.so
libicudata.so
libselinux.so
libgcrypt.so
libffi.so
libpcre.so
libxcb.so
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version
4.7 Security Target
Version 1.0.1
1.0.1
76
libfreetype.so
libgraphite2.so
libexpat.so
libxcb-dri3.so
libxcb-present.so
libxcb-sync.so
libxshmfence.so
libglapi.so
libXext.so
libXdamage.so
libXfixes.so
libX11-xcb.so
libxcb-glx.so
libxcb-dri2.so
libXxf86vm.so
libdrm.so
libgpg-error.so
libXau.so
libXdmcp.so