Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program
Certification Report
HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet
Access (VIA) Client version 4.7
Version 1.0, 20 August 2026
Document reference: AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0
(Certification expires five years from certification report date)
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 ii
Table of contents
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 2
Overview 2
Purpose 2
Identification 2
Target of Evaluation 4
Overview 4
Description of the TOE 4
TOE Functionality 4
TOE Physical Boundary 4
Architecture 5
Clarification of Scope 6
Security Policy 6
Secure Delivery 6
Version Verification 7
Documentation and Guidance 7
Secure Usage 7
Evaluation 9
Overview 9
Evaluation Procedures 9
Functional Testing 9
Entropy Testing 9
Penetration Testing 9
Software Bill of Material (SBOM) assessment 9
Certification 11
Overview 11
Assurance 11
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 iii
Certification Result 11
Recommendations 11
Annex – References and Abbreviations 13
References 13
Abbreviations 14
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 1
Executive Summary
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA)
Client version 4.7 developed by HPE Aruba Networking against Common Criteria approved Protection Profiles (PPs).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the HPE Aruba Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 4.7. The TOE is a software
application with IPsec VPN client capability.
This report concludes that the TOE has complied with the following PPs [4]:
 Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.4, 07 October 2021 (PP_APP_V1.4)
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.4, 31 March 2022 (MOD_VPNC_V2.4)
Additionally, the above PPs can be grouped together using certified PP-Configuration. This evaluation used the
following PP-Configuration [4]:
 PP-Configuration for Application Software and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.3, 07 April 2023
(CFG_APP-VPNC_V1.3)
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australian
Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs with the final
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) submitted on 10 July 2026.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australian Certification Authority recommends that:
 Potential users of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
 The users should make themselves familiar with the guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all
security warnings.
 The system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.
This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information
regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended
that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target [8] and read this Certification Report prior to deciding
whether to purchase the product.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 2
Introduction
Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the TOE.
Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
 report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the
Common Criteria [1,2,3] and Protection Profiles [4]
 provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target [8] which provides a full description of the
security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.
Identification
The TOE is the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 4.7 developed by HPE Aruba
Networking.
Description Version
Evaluation scheme Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 4.7
Software version 4.7
Security Target HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client Version 4.7
Security Target, Version 1.0.1, 09 July 2026
Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report 1.0, dated 10 July 2026
Document reference EFT-T050-ETR 1.0
Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Extended, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev 5
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017
Version 3.1 Rev 5
Conformance  Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.4, 07 October
2021 (PP_APP_V1.4)
 PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, version 2.4, 31
March 2022 (MOD_VPNC_V2.4)
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 3
 PP-Configuration for Application Software and Virtual Private
Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.3, 07 April 2023 (CFG_APP-
VPNC_V1.3)
Developer HPE Aruba Networking
11445 Compaq Centre Drive West
Houston 77070 TX
USA
Evaluation facility Teron Labs
Level 2, 14 Moore St,
Canberra ACT 2601
Australia
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 4
Target of Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality
provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage.
Description of the TOE
The TOE is the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 4.7, a non-distributed VPN client
application that enables remote and mobile users to securely access enterprise network resources over untrusted
networks. Installed on end-user devices, the TOE authenticates users through a Mobility Controller-hosted gateway,
retrieves connection policies and configuration profiles, and establishes a secure IPsec VPN tunnel to enterprise
resources. The TOE uses HTTPS to communicate with the gateway for authentication and configuration download, and
IPsec/IKE over UDP port 4500 to provide protected communications. By enforcing secure remote connectivity and
policy-based access to enterprise networks, the TOE supports trusted access to organisational resources from external
locations.
TOE Functionality
The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.4 of the Security Target [8].
TOE Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE includes the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 4.7
software application, the supported operating system platforms on which it executes, the evaluated hardware
platforms used during testing, and the associated security guidance documentation. The TOE is a software-only VPN
client that operates on general-purpose computing and mobile device hardware. The components included within the
TOE physical boundary are detailed in Table 1.
Part of the TOE Identification Description
TOE Software
(Windows)
Aruba-VIA-4.7.6.0.2603183-64.msi VIA Client v4.7 VPN client software running on
Microsoft Windows 11 (64-bit).
TOE Software
(Linux)
cc-via_4.7.6.2603081-deb_amd64.deb VIA Client v4.7 VPN client software running on
Ubuntu 24.04.
TOE Software
(Android)
HPE-VIA-4.7.5.2603170.apk VIA Client v4.7 VPN client software running on
Android 14.
Security
Guidance
Guidance Document, Aruba Virtual
Intranet Access (VIA) 4.x Client Common
Criteria Guidance, Version 2.5
The Common Criteria Guidance supplement for the
TOE. The security guidance is distributed as a
document in PDF format.
Product
Documentation
https://arubanetworking.hpe.com/techdo
cs/VIA/HPE-Aruba-VIA/Content/home.htm
Supporting product documentation available from
the HPE Aruba Networking documentation portal.
Table 1 – Parts included in the Physical Scope of the TOE
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 5
Architecture
The TOE provides secure connectivity for users when accessing an enterprise or corporate resource (example:
workstation, server) from an untrusted or trusted network connection. By default, the TOE automatically launches and
establishes a remote connection when the user logs in to their system from an untrusted network.
The TOE runs on an end-user device and communicates with a gateway located on a Mobility Controller. The server
component is used to manage the client and ensure policies are enforced. The Mobility Controller maintains certain
VIA configuration profiles, such as the VIA authentication profile, the VIA connection profile, and the VIA web
authentication profile. Each profile plays an important role in authenticating the users and establishing a secure
connection. When multiple authentication profiles are available, the VIA client prompts the user to select an
authentication profile.
The first time a connection is established, a user opens the VIA client and enters the gateway name, username, and
password. VIA then connects to the gateway over an HTTPS channel and attempts to authenticate using the user
supplied credentials. The TSF relies on the underlying OS platform for establishment of the HTTPS channel; it is not
part of the TOE itself. This connection is used to retrieve configuration settings for the IPsec connection and any site-
specific branding (e.g. logo graphics).
If the VIA web authentication list has more than one VIA authentication profile, the user can choose a VIA
authentication profile from the available ones. After successful authentication, the VIA client downloads the
appropriate VIA connection profile and establishes the IPsec connection if the user is connected to an untrusted
network.
At a protocol level, VIA operates over UDP port 4500, which is defined for IKE/IPsec traversal of NATs in RFC 3947. VIA
uses HTTPS over TCP port 443 in order to contact the authentication server and download configuration profile
updates before establishing each IKE/IPsec connection. The VIA topography is shown in the Figure 1 below.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 6
Clarification of Scope
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies.
The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [8].
Evaluated Functionality
Functional tests performed during the evaluation were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12] and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were combined
for ease of execution.
Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE is solely the IPsec VPN client. Yet, it does require following external components to operate securely and as
evaluated. These items are outside the TOE boundary and must be present and correctly configured in the operational
environment.
 An OCSP server is required for the TOE to be able to perform certificate validation.
 The Mobility Controller is required in the operational environment because the TOE uses it as its VPN gateway.
The VIA client can work in the evaluated configuration with the Mobility Controller running ArubaOS 8.13 from
8.13.1 and later, but has only been tested with ArubaOS 8.13.1.
 An EAP server (such as a RADIUS server) may or may not be used for authentication.
 The HP ProBook 440 G11 with Intel Core Ultra 7 155U platform was used by the evaluator for testing the
Windows and Linux supported platform of the TOE, and the Samsung Galaxy S24 was used by the evaluator for
testing the Android supported platform of the TOE. This hardware and hosting operating system is not part of
the TOE.
Non-evaluated Functionality and Services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the
evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services
outside of the evaluated configuration.
Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5] for policy
relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration.
Security Policy
The TOE Security Policy is a set of rules that defines the required security behaviour of the TOE; how information
within the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target [8] contains a summary of the functionality that is
evaluated.
Secure Delivery
The TOE delivery and installation procedures are described in the Configuration Guidance [6]. The guidance document
outlines the required procedures for obtaining and installing the TOE. The TOE software is delivered electronically
through the HPE Aruba Networking Support Portal.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 7
The Linux and Windows versions of the TOE can be downloaded by registered customers from the HPE Networking
Support Portal; per-platform instructions are present in the Configuration Guidance [6]. The Android version can be
installed using the Google Play Store. These mechanisms are also used for the deployment of security updates.
Installation of the TOE
The Configuration Guides [6] contains all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.
Version Verification
The TOE may be installed by the platform administrator on each supported platform. For the Linux and Windows
versions of the TOE, the TOE verification is performed automatically by their respective installers using an RSA 2048
digital signature with SHA-1, signed by HPE Aruba Networking. A successful installation process indicates that this
check succeeded. The Android version of the TOE is verified by the Android platform when it is installed through the
Google Play Store, using an RSA 2048 bit with SHA-256 digital signature.
Documentation and Guidance
It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The
following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased by the consumer, and it titled as:
 Guidance Document, Aruba Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) 4.x Client Common Criteria Guidance, Version 2.5
All Common Criteria guidance material is available at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Australian Government Information Security Manual is available at https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism [5].
Secure Usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These
assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met.
The application software is assumed to be physically secured within its operational environment, protected from
physical attacks that could compromise its security or interfere with its physical connections and correct operation.
This level of protection is expected to be sufficient to safeguard the device and the sensitive data it handles.
The TOE is designed to provide Virtual Private Network (VPN) client functionality. It must not be used as a
general‑purpose computing platform, nor should it support activities such as executing compilers, running arbitrary
user applications, or performing functions unrelated to its defined networking and security role. Restricting the TOE to
its intended purpose ensures that its operational behaviour remains predictable and that its security controls cannot
be undermined by unauthorised or non‑security‑related functionality.
The administrator(s) are assumed to be trustworthy, acting in the best interests of the organisation’s security. This
includes being well-trained, adhering to established policies, and following all guidance documentation.
Administrators are responsible for ensuring that passwords and credentials used within the TOE are strong and
secure. The TOE is not expected to protect against a malicious administrator who deliberately seeks to bypass or
compromise its security features.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the
TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 8
The TOE is assumed to be connected to distinct networks in a way that ensures its security policies are enforced on all
relevant network traffic flowing between these networks.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 9
Evaluation
Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as
part of the evaluation and the certification result.
Evaluation Procedures
The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are contained in the relevant Protection
Profiles [4] and Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3
[1, 2].
Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version
3.1 Revision 5 [3] and relevant Supporting Documents [12].
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australian Information Security
Evaluation Program [10].
In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field
of Information Technology Security [9] and the document CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based
SFRs, Optional SFRs [13] were also upheld.
Functional Testing
All functional tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the Protection Profiles [4] and Supporting
Documents [12]. The tests were designed to provide the required testing coverage for the security functions claimed
by the TOE.
Entropy Testing
The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented in a separate
report [11].
Penetration Testing
The evaluators performed the evaluation activities for vulnerability assessment specified by the Protection Profile for
Application Software [4.a].
The evaluators conducted a review of public vulnerability databases and technical community sources to determine
potential flaw hypotheses using searches that include TOE device name and components, protocols supported by the
TOE and terms relating to the device type of the TOE. These searches were conducted up to the 02 June 2026
coinciding with the conclusion of the evaluation.
Software Bill of Material (SBOM) assessment
As part of the requirements outlined in the NIAP Policy Letter #30, the evaluator also submitted the TOE’s Software
Bill of Materials (SBOM). The SBOM provides a comprehensive inventory of all software components, third‑party
libraries, and dependencies included within the evaluated TOE. Submission of this information enables supply‑chain
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 10
integrity verification, supports systematic vulnerability correlation across all embedded components, and ensures that
no undeclared software elements are present within the TOE. The SBOM Analysis report [14] contains the minimum
elements as adapted from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and serves as an
essential artefact informing the vulnerability assessment activities and contributes materially to the assurance gained
through the evaluation process.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 11
Certification
Overview
This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and
recommendations made by the certifiers.
Assurance
This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profiles that cover the
technology area of application software with added security functionality including VPN Client functions.
Organisations can have confidence that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD-approved Protection Profile covers
the necessary security functionality expected of the evaluated product and known threats will have been addressed.
The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the PP Supporting Documents and Protection Profile Module
activities, SBOM assessment, and a vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic
attack potential. Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure delivery procedures.
The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product evaluations performed
in line with the Protection Profiles (PPs) [4]. PPs provide assurance by providing a full Security Target [8], and an
analysis of the Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target, guidance documentation, and a basic
description of the architecture of the TOE.
Certification Result
Teron Labs has determined that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [8] and has met the
requirements of the Protection Profiles PP_APP_V1.4 [4.a], MOD_VPNC_V2.4 [4.b] and PP configuration for
Application Software and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients [4.c].
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical
Report [7], the Australian Certification Authority certifies the evaluation of the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet
Access (VIA) Client version 4.7 performed by the Australian Information Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs.
The Australian Certification Authority certifies that the Security Target [8] have met the requirements of the
Application Software and VPN Client Protection Profiles [4].
Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian Government users. For further
guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5].
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance
document is followed, the Australian Certification Authority also recommends:
 Potential users of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are
comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
 The users should make themselves familiar with the guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all
security warnings.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 12
 The system auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 13
Annex – References and Abbreviations
References
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April
2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5
3. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017,
Version 3.1 Revision 5
4. Protection Profiles:
a) Protection Profile for Application Software: v1.4, 7 October 2021 (PP_APP_V1.4)
b) Protection Profile Module for VPN Client: v2.4, 31 March, 2022 (MOD_VPNC_V2.4)
c) PP-Configuration for Application Software and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.3, 07
April 2023 (CFG_APP-VPNC_V1.3)
5. Australian Government Information Security Manual: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism
6. Aruba Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) 4.x Client Common Criteria Guidance, Version 2.5, dated July 2026
7. Evaluation Technical Report, HPE Aruba Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client version 4.7, Version 1.0, dated 10
July 2026 (Document reference EFT-T050-ETR 1.0)
8. Security Target, HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client Version 4.7, Version 1.0.1, 09 July
2026.
9. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology
Security, 02 July 2014
10. AISEP Policy Manual (APM): https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-
03/2022_AUG_REL_AISEP_Policy_Manual_6.3.pdf
11. Entropy Documentation:
a) Entropy Assessment Report, HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client Version 4.7
Version 1.0, Dated 09 July 2026 (Document reference EFT-T050-EAR 1.0)
12. Protection Profile Supporting Documents
a) Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document for PP-Module for Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 31 March 2022
13. CC and CEM Addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs, Version 2.0, 30 September
2021, CCDB-013-v2.0
14. SBOM Analysis report, HPE Aruba Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) Client Version 4.7, Version 1.0, dated 06
August 2026
AISEP-CC-CR-2026-EFT-T050-CR-v1.0 14
Abbreviations
AISEP Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
CA Certificate Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange Version 2
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
LAN Local Area Network
NAT Network Address Translation
NGC Northrop Grumman Corporation
OCSP Online Certification Status Protocol
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
SBOM Software Bill of Materials
SSH Secure Shell
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TLS Transport Layer Security
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VIA Virtual Intranet Access
VPN Virtual Private Network
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
Disclaimer
The material in this guide is of a general nature and should not be regarded as legal advice or relied on for assistance
in any particular circumstance or emergency situation. In any important matter, you should seek appropriate
independent professional advice in relation to your own circumstances.
The Commonwealth accepts no responsibility or liability for any damage, loss or expense incurred as a result of the
reliance on information contained in this guide.
Copyright
© Commonwealth of Australia 2026
With the exception of the Coat of Arms, the Australian Signals Directorate logo and where otherwise stated, all
material presented in this publication is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence
(www.creativecommons.org/licenses).
For the avoidance of doubt, this means this licence only applies to material as set out in this document.
The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website as is the full legal code
for the CC BY 4.0 licence (www.creativecommons.org/licenses).
Use of the Coat of Arms
The terms under which the Coat of Arms can be used are detailed on the Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet website (www.pmc.gov.au/government/commonwealth-coat-arms).
For more information, or to report a cyber security incident, contact us:
cyber.gov.au | 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371)