Page 1 of 40
Samsung 5G gNB AU, DU v19.A
Security Target
Version 1.4
November 2020
Document prepared by
www.lightshipsec.com
Samsung Security Target
Page 2 of 40
Document History
Version Date Author Description
1.0 29 Sep 2020 L Turner Release for certification.
1.1 2 Oct 2020 L Turner TSS consistency update.
1.2 15 Oct 2020 L Turner Update SSHC.
1.3 20 Oct 2020 G Nickel Update CC Guide version
1.4 10 Nov 2020 G Nickel Update AGD version reference
Samsung Security Target
Page 3 of 40
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................ 5
1.2 Identification ................................................................................................................... 5
1.3 Conformance Claims...................................................................................................... 5
1.4 Terminology.................................................................................................................... 6
2 TOE Description.................................................................................................................... 7
2.1 Type ............................................................................................................................... 7
2.2 Usage ............................................................................................................................. 7
2.3 Security Functions / Logical Scope................................................................................ 8
2.4 Physical Scope............................................................................................................... 9
3 Security Problem Definition............................................................................................... 11
3.1 Threats ......................................................................................................................... 11
3.2 Assumptions................................................................................................................. 12
3.3 Organizational Security Policies................................................................................... 13
4 Security Objectives............................................................................................................. 14
5 Security Requirements....................................................................................................... 15
5.1 Conventions ................................................................................................................. 15
5.2 Extended Components Definition................................................................................. 15
5.3 Functional Requirements ............................................................................................. 15
5.4 Assurance Requirements............................................................................................. 28
6 TOE Summary Specification.............................................................................................. 29
6.1 Security Audit ............................................................................................................... 29
6.2 Cryptographic Support ................................................................................................. 29
6.3 Identification and Authentication .................................................................................. 32
6.4 Security Management .................................................................................................. 33
6.5 Protection of the TSF ................................................................................................... 34
6.6 TOE Access ................................................................................................................. 35
6.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................ 36
7 Rationale.............................................................................................................................. 37
7.1 Conformance Claim Rationale ..................................................................................... 37
7.2 Security Objectives Rationale ...................................................................................... 37
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................. 37
Annex A: Extended Components Definition............................................................................. 40
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation identifiers ......................................................................................................... 5
Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions ................................................................................................. 5
Table 3: Terminology....................................................................................................................... 6
Table 4: CAVP Certificates.............................................................................................................. 9
Table 5: TOE models....................................................................................................................... 9
Table 6: Threats............................................................................................................................. 11
Table 7: Assumptions .................................................................................................................... 12
Table 8: Organizational Security Policies...................................................................................... 13
Table 9: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ..................................................... 14
Table 10: Summary of SFRs ......................................................................................................... 15
Table 11: Audit Events .................................................................................................................. 17
Samsung Security Target
Page 4 of 40
Table 12: Assurance Requirements .............................................................................................. 28
Table 13: Key Agreement Mapping............................................................................................... 30
Table 14: HMAC Characteristics ................................................................................................... 31
Table 15: Keys............................................................................................................................... 34
Table 16: Passwords ..................................................................................................................... 34
Table 17: NDcPP SFR Rationale .................................................................................................. 37
Samsung Security Target
Page 5 of 40
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
1 This Security Target (ST) defines the Samsung 5G gNB AU, DU v19.A Target of
Evaluation (TOE) for the purposes of Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.
2 The 5G gNB AU and DU devices are components of Samsung’s 5G Next Generation
NodeB (gNB) base station that provides various functions such as signal processing
and resource management.
1.2 Identification
Table 1: Evaluation identifiers
Target of Evaluation Samsung 5G gNB AU, DU v19.A
Build: Per Table 5
Security Target Samsung 5G gNB AU, DU v19.A Security Target, v1.4
1.3 Conformance Claims
3 This ST supports the following conformance claims:
a) CC version 3.1 revision 5
b) CC Part 2 extended
c) CC Part 3 conformant
d) collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, v2.2e
e) NIAP Technical Decisions per Table 2
Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions
TD # Name Rationale if n/a
TD0527 Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing
(FIA_X509_EXT.1)
X509 not claimed.
TD0528 NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs for
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4
TD0536 NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification
Inconsistency
TD0537 NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3
TLSC not claimed.
TD0538 NIT Technical Decision for Outdated link to allowed-with
list
Samsung Security Target
Page 6 of 40
1.4 Terminology
Table 3: Terminology
Term Definition
5G Fifth Generation (mobile network)
AU Access Unit
Cell Site A Cellular-enabled mobile device site where antennae and
electronic communications equipment are placed.
CC Common Criteria
CO Central Office (i.e. the location where the communication
devices are located)
ConfD ConfD is an on-device management framework that provides a
set of interfaces to manage a device. ConfD implements the
full NETCONF specification.
DU Digital Unit
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
gNB Next Generation NodeB (i.e. 5G base station)
NDcPP collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
Netconf Network Configuration Protocol defined by RFC6241.
PP Protection Profile
RAN Radio Access Network
RU Radio Unit
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
USM Unified System Manager - provides management functions
within a Samsung 5G gNB system.
vRAN Virtualized Radio Access Network
Samsung Security Target
Page 7 of 40
2 TOE Description
2.1 Type
4 The TOE is a network device performing an infrastructure role at the edge of next
generation 5G cellular networks.
2.2 Usage
2.2.1 Deployment
5 The TOE, which may be either a DU device, or an AU device, is deployed within a
gNB system at the edge of 5G cellular networks. The AU incorporates a Radio Unit
(RU), whilst the DU requires a separate RU.
6 The TOE security functionality is focused on the management interfaces of the
AU/DU devices, which may be accessed via local console or remotely over an IP
network.
7 Figure 1 depicts an example deployment of the TOE devices (enclosed in red).
Figure 1: Example TOE deployment
Samsung Security Target
Page 8 of 40
2.2.2 Interfaces
8 The TOE management interfaces are shown in Figure 2 (DU is depicted).
Figure 2: TOE interfaces
9 The TOE interfaces are as follows:
a) CLI. Administrative CLI via direct serial connection.
b) Bash CLI. Administrative CLI via SSH.
c) NetconfD CLI. ConfD CLI via SSH.
d) Netconf API. Administrative API via SSH.
e) Logs. Forwarding of logs to the Unified System Manager (USM) via SSH
(SFTP).
f) NTP. The TOE synchronizes time via NTP.
2.3 Security Functions / Logical Scope
10 The TOE provides the following security functions:
a) Protected Communications. The TOE protects the integrity and
confidentiality of communications as noted in section 2.2.2 above.
b) Secure Administration. The TOE enables secure management of its security
functions, including:
i) Administrator authentication with passwords
ii) Configurable password policies
iii) Role Based Access Control
iv) Access banners
v) Management of critical security functions and data
vi) Protection of cryptographic keys and passwords
c) Trusted Update. The TOE ensures the authenticity and integrity of software
updates through digital signatures.
d) System Monitoring. The TOE generates logs of security relevant events. The
TOE stores logs locally and is capable of sending log events to a remote audit
server.
Samsung Security Target
Page 9 of 40
e) Self-Test. The TOE performs a suite of self-tests to ensure the correct
operation and enforcement of its security functions.
f) Cryptographic Operations. The TOE implements a cryptographic module.
Relevant Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates are
shown in Table 4.
Table 4: CAVP Certificates
Algorithm Capability Certificate
AES-CTR C1875
ECDSA Key Gen (186-4)
ECDSA Sig Gen (186-4)
ECDSA Sig Ver (186-4)
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512
KAS-ECC
DRBG
2.4 Physical Scope
11 The physical boundary of the TOE includes all software and hardware shown in
Table 5. The TOE is delivered via commercial courier.
Table 5: TOE models
Type Model CPU Software Build Differences
DU Cabinet DU Cavium CN9670 19.A.0 r-02 AU incorporates RU.
AU comes with
different power
supply options.
AU AT1K01-A00 (AC) Cavium CN8370 19.A.0 r-0200
AT1K01-A10 (DC) Cavium CN8370
2.4.1 Guidance Documents
12 The TOE includes the following guidance documents (PDF):
a) Samsung 5G gNB AU, DU v19.A Common Criteria Guide, v1.3
b) Samsung 5G NR DU Command Reference for SVR 19A, v1.0
c) Samsung 5G NR AU Command Reference for SVR 19A, v1.0
d) Samsung CONFD CLI User Guide, v1.1
2.4.2 Non-TOE Components
13 The TOE operates with the following components in the environment:
Samsung Security Target
Page 10 of 40
a) Audit Server (USM). The TOE periodically sends audit events to the USM.
b) NTP Server. The TOE synchronizes time via NTP.
2.4.3 Security Functions not included in the TOE Evaluation
14 The evaluation is limited to those security functions identified in section 2.3.
15 The 5G related functions are outside of the scope of the security functions of the
TOE.
Samsung Security Target
Page 11 of 40
3 Security Problem Definition
16 The Security Problem Definition is reproduced from section 4 of the NDcPP.
3.1 Threats
Table 6: Threats
Identifier Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_
ADMINISTRATOR_
ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the
Network Device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an
Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an
Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or
selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which
would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions
between Network Devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access
allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of
the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_
CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a
cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen
encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow
attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key
space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read,
manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_
COMMUNICATION_
CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use
standardized secure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network
traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or
poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle
attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of
confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially
could lead to a compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_
AUTHENTICATION_
ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak
methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g. a shared password that
is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the
same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade
as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert
themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle
attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there
could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the
Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_
COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the
software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the
device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure
or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to
surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_
ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the
security functionality of the Network Device without Administrator
awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g.,
misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and
Samsung Security Target
Page 12 of 40
Identifier Description
the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
T.SECURITY_
FUNCTIONALITY_
COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling
continued access to the Network Device and its critical data. The
compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with
an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining
the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_
CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative
passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged
access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the
network traffic, and may allow them to take advantage of any trust
relationships with other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_
FUNCTIONALITY_
FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or
compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently
use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access,
change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security
functionality of the device.
3.2 Assumptions
Table 7: Assumptions
Identifier Description
A.PHYSICAL_
PROTECTION
The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to
be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result,
the cPP does not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device
that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls,
or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies
to the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_
FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core
function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed
as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not
provide a computing platform for general purpose applications
(unrelated to networking functionality).
In the case of vNDs, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only
one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception
being where components of the distributed TOE run inside more than
one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There are no other guest
VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device
functionality.
Samsung Security Target
Page 13 of 40
Identifier Description
A.NO_THRU_
TRAFFIC_
PROTECTION
A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the
Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that
is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity,
is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network
Devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_
ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to
be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and
adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to
ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and
to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network
Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious
Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security
of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the
Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline
verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA
certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka ‘root store’, ‘ trusted
CA Key Store’, or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
A.REGULAR_
UPDATES
The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated
by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_
CREDENTIALS_
SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_
INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access
possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys,
keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when
the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
Table 8: Organizational Security Policies
Identifier Description
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use,
legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users
consent by accessing the TOE.
Samsung Security Target
Page 14 of 40
4 Security Objectives
17 The security objectives are reproduced from section 5 of the NDcPP.
Table 9: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Identifier Description
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE
There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers
or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services
necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_
TRAFFIC_
PROTECTION
The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It
is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other
security and assurance measures in the operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance
documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS
Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that implement ND
functionality.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the
Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status
of all certificates in the TOE’s trust store and to remove any certificate
from the TOE’s trust store in case such certificate can no longer be
trusted.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an Administrator on a
regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to
known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_
CREDENTIALS_
SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the TOE
must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.
OE.RESIDUAL_
INFORMATION
The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized
access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic
keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment
when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
Samsung Security Target
Page 15 of 40
5 Security Requirements
5.1 Conventions
18 This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined
by the CC:
a) Assignment. Indicated with italicized text.
b) Refinement. Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs.
c) Selection. Indicated with underlined text.
d) Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with italicized and underlined text.
e) Iteration. Indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g.
“FCS_COP.1/Hash”).
19 Note: Operations performed within the Security Target are denoted within brackets
[]. Operations shown without brackets are reproduced from the NDcPP.
5.2 Extended Components Definition
20 Refer to Annex A: Extended Components Definition.
5.3 Functional Requirements
Table 10: Summary of SFRs
Requirement Title
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_NTP_EXT.1 NTP Protocol
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
Samsung Security Target
Page 16 of 40
Requirement Title
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of Security Functions Behaviour
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric
and private keys)
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path
5.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Samsung Security Target
Page 17 of 40
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit;
c) All administrative actions comprising:
o Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall
be logged if individual user accounts are required for
Administrators).
o Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in
addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be
logged what has been changed).
o Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic
keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or
key reference shall be logged).
o Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be
logged).
o [no other actions];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 2 Table 11.
Table 11: Audit Events
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None.
FCS_NTP_EXT.1 Configuration of a new time
server
Removal of configured time
server
Identity if new/removed time
server
Samsung Security Target
Page 18 of 40
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH
session
Reason for failure
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH
session
Reason for failure
FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts
limit is met or exceeded.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Provided user identity, origin
of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a
manual update
None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None. None.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys None. None.
FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of
TSF data.
None.
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of
the update attempt (success
or failure)
None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to
time - either Administrator
actuated or changed via an
automated process. (Note
that no continuous changes
to time need to be logged.
For discontinuous changes
to time: The old and new
values for the time. Origin of
the attempt to change time
for success and failure (e.g.,
IP address).
Samsung Security Target
Page 19 of 40
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
See also application note on
FPT_STM_EXT.1)
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if
“terminate the session” is
selected)
The termination of a local
session by the session
locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote
session by the session
locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an
interactive session.
None.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted
channel.
Termination of the trusted
channel.
Failure of the trusted channel
functions.
Identification of the initiator
and target of failed trusted
channels establishment
attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path.
Termination of the trusted
path.
Failure of the trusted path
functions.
None.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the cPP/ST, information
specified in column three of Table 2 Table 11.
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall
be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user
that caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external
IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
Samsung Security Target
Page 20 of 40
FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In
addition [
• The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores
audit data locally]
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the
following rule: [overwrite oldest record first], [no other action]] when the
local storage space for audit data is full.
5.3.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [
• ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Appendix B.4;
• FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following:
“NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography” and [RFC 3526]
]and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key
sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the
following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;
• FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following:
‘NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography” and [RFC 3526];
] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [
• For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be
executed by a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];
Samsung Security Target
Page 21 of 40
• For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be
executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the
TSF that [
o instructs a part of the TSF to destroy the abstraction that
represents the key
] that meets the following: No Standard.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CTR] mode and
cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES
as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CTR as specified in ISO 10116].
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and
Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and
verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes
[256 bits or greater],
] that meet the following: [
• For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [P-
256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4]
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512]
and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and
message digest sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [160,
256, 512] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that meet the
following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
FCS_NTP_EXT.1 NTP Protocol
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall use only the following NTP version(s) [NTP v4 (RFC
5905)].
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall update its system time using [
Samsung Security Target
Page 22 of 40
• Authentication using [SHA1] as the message digest algorithm(s)]
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall not update NTP timestamp from broadcast and/or
multicast addresses.
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall support configuration of at least three (3) NTP time
sources.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source
that accumulates entropy from [[one] platform-based noise source] with a
minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security
strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength
Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client Protocol
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with: RFC(s)
4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [4344, 5656, 6668, 8268, 8308 section 3.1,
8332].
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the
following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-
based, [password-based].
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater
than [256 kilo]bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the
following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption
algorithms: [aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr].
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication
implementation uses [ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other
public key algorithms.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses
[hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its data integrity MAC
algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-
nistp256] and [diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-
sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-
nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH
protocol.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session
keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each
Samsung Security Target
Page 23 of 40
encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data.
After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH client authenticates the identity of the
SSH server using a local database associating each host name with its
corresponding public key and [no other methods] as described in RFC
4251 section 4.1.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with: RFC(s)
4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [4344, 5656, 6668, 8268, 8308 section 3.1,
8332].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the
following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-
based, [password based].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater
than [256 kilo]bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the
following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption
algorithms: [aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication
implementation uses [ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other
public key algorithms.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses
[hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s)
and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-
nistp256] and [diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-
sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-
nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH
protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session
keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each
encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data.
After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.
5.3.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer
within [1-1000] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password.
Samsung Security Target
Page 24 of 40
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met, the TSF shall [prevent the offending Administrator from
successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication
method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time
period has elapsed].
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities
for administrative passwords:
a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of
upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special
characters: [ “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”];
b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [9] and
[15] characters.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE
entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:
• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
• [[no other actions]]
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully
identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that administrative user.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based, SSH public key-based]
authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user
authentication.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user
while the authentication is in progress at the local console.
5.3.4 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to
perform manual updates to Security Administrators.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to
Security Administrators.
Samsung Security Target
Page 25 of 40
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic
keys to Security Administrators.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session
termination or locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital
signature] capability prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for
FIA_AFL.1;
• [
o Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
o Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
o Ability to configure NTP;]
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE
locally;
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE
remotely
are satisfied.
5.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared,
symmetric and private keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys,
and private keys.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
Samsung Security Target
Page 26 of 40
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative
passwords.FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up
(on power on)] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [
• BIOS tests
• Boot loader image verification
• Cryptographic module tests].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the
currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other
TOE firmware/software version].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually
initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update
mechanism].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates
to the TOE using a [digital signature] prior to installing those updates.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [synchronize time with an NTP server].
5.3.6 TOE Access (FTA)
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [
• terminate the session]
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security
Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1 Refinement: The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of
the Administrator’s own interactive session.
Samsung Security Target
Page 27 of 40
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall
display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and
consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.
5.3.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a trusted
communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities
supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [no other
capabilities] that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the
channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [audit
server].
FTP_TRP.1 /Admin Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a communication
path between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is
logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data
from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the
channel data.
FTP_TRP.1.2 /Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication
via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 /Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator
authentication and all remote administration actions.
Samsung Security Target
Page 28 of 40
5.4 Assurance Requirements
21 The TOE security assurance requirements are summarized in Table 12.
Table 12: Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Components Description
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance Claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security Objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative User Guidance
Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing - conformance
Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Analysis
22 In accordance with section 7.1 of the NDcPP, the following refinement is made to
ASE:
a) ASE_TSS.1.1C Refinement: The TOE summary specification shall describe
how the TOE meets each SFR. In the case of entropy analysis, the TSS is
used in conjunction with required supplementary information on
Entropy.
Samsung Security Target
Page 29 of 40
6 TOE Summary Specification
23 The following describes how the TOE fulfils each SFR included in section 5.3.
6.1 Security Audit
6.1.1 FAU_GEN.1
24 The TOE generates the audit records specified at FAU_GEN.1 containing fields that
include the timestamp, IP address (if applicable), action, user (if applicable) and a
contextual message indicating success or failure of the action.
25 The following information is logged as a result of the Security Administrator
generating/importing or deleting cryptographic keys:
a) Generate SSH key-pair. Action and key reference.
6.1.2 FAU_GEN.2
26 The TOE includes the user identity in audit events resulting from actions of identified
users.
6.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1
27 Log files are transferred via SFTP (see FCS_SSHC_EXT.1) to the USM periodically
at 30 minutes after the hour, every hour.
28 Logs are stored locally in rotating log files as follows (oldest records are overwritten
first):
a) /var/log log files. Up to 1MB of data is kept in each of the log files before they
are rotated. Up to one previous log file is kept of each log file and one live log.
b) auditd log file. up to 8MB of log data is kept until they are rotated. A total of 5
previous logs are kept (plus the live log).
29 Only authorized administrators may view audit records and no capability to modify
the audit records is provided.
6.2 Cryptographic Support
6.2.1 FCS_CKM.1
30 The TOE supports key generation for the following asymmetric schemes:
a) ECC P-256/P-384/P-521. Used in SSH authentication and key exchange.
b) FFC Safe Primes. Used in SSH key exchange.
6.2.2 FCS_CKM.2
31 The TOE supports the following key establishment schemes:
a) ECC schemes. Used in SSH key exchange. TOE is both sender and receiver.
b) FFC schemes using safe primes. Used in SSH key exchange. TOE is both
sender and receiver. The following Diffie Helman groups are supported:
i) Group 14 per RFC 3526 section 3
ii) Group 16 per RFC 3526 section 5
Samsung Security Target
Page 30 of 40
iii) Group 18 per RFC 3526 section 7
32 Table 13 below identifies the scheme being used by each service.
Table 13: Key Agreement Mapping
Scheme SFR Service
ECC FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Administration
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 Audit Server
FFC Safe Primes FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Administration
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 Audit Server
6.2.3 FCS_CKM.4
33 Table 15 shows the origin, storage location and destruction details for cryptographic
keys. Unless otherwise stated, the keys are generated by the TOE.
6.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
34 The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using 128 and
256 bit AES in CTR mode. AES is implemented in SSH.
35 The relevant NIST CAVP certificate numbers are listed Table 4.
6.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen
36 The TOE provides cryptographic signature generation and verification services
using:
a) Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with NIST curves P-256, P-384 and
P-521
37 The ECDSA signature verification services are used in for the SSH protocol and
TOE firmware integrity checks.
38 The relevant NIST CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 4.
6.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash
39 The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-
512.
40 SHA is implemented in the following parts of the TSF:
a) SSH;
b) NTP;
c) Digital signature verification as part of trusted update validation; and
d) Hashing of passwords in non-volatile storage.
41 The relevant NIST CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 4.
6.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
42 The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-
SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, and HMAC-SHA-512.
Samsung Security Target
Page 31 of 40
43 HMAC is implemented in SSH.
44 The characteristics of the HMACs used in the TOE are given in Table 14.
Table 14: HMAC Characteristics
Algorithm Block Size Key Size Digest Size
HMAC-SHA-1 512 bits 160 bits 160 bits
HMAC-SHA-256 512 bits 256 bits 256 bits
HMAC-SHA-512 1024 bits 512 bits 512 bits
45 The relevant NIST CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 4.
6.2.8 FCS_NTP_EXT.1
46 The TOE supports NTPv4 using SHA-1 authentication. The TOE allows
configuration of up to 3 NTP servers.
6.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1
47 The TOE contains a CTR_DRBG that is seeded from a CPU provided entropy
source. Entropy from the noise is conditioned and used to seed the DRBG with 256
bits of full entropy.
48 Additional detail is provided the proprietary Entropy Description.
6.2.10 FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
49 The TOE implements an SSH client for SFTP transmission of audit logs to the USM.
50 The TOE implements SSH in compliance with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4344,
5656, 6668, 8268, 8308 section 3.1, and 8332.
51 The TOE SSH client supports passwords and public key authentication using ecdsa-
sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521.
52 The TOE examines the size of each received SSH packet. If the packet is greater
than 256KB, it is automatically dropped.
53 The TOE utilizes AES-CTR-128 and AES-CTR-256 for SSH encryption.
54 The TOE provides data integrity for SSH connections via hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-
256, hmac-sha2-512.
55 The TOE supports diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, diffie-hellman-
group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp52 for SSH key exchanges.
56 The TOE will re-key SSH connections after 1 hour or after an aggregate of 1 gig of
data has been exchanged (whichever occurs first).
57 The TOE authenticates the identity of the SSH server using a local database
associating each host name with its corresponding public key.
6.2.11 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
58 The TOE implements SSH in compliance with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4344,
5656, 6668, 8268, 8308 section 3.1 and 8332.
Samsung Security Target
Page 32 of 40
59 The TOE supports password-based or public key authentication (ecdsa-sha2-
nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521). In the case of public keys, the
TOE authenticates the identity of the SSH client using a local database associating
authorized hosts with its corresponding public key.
60 The TOE examines the size of each received SSH packet. If the packet is greater
than 256 KB, it is automatically dropped.
61 The TOE utilises AES-CTR-128 and AES-CTR-256 for SSH encryption.
62 The TOE provides data integrity for SSH connections via HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-
SHA2-256 and HMAC-SHA2-512.
63 The TOE supports diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, diffie-hellman-
group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
ecdh-sha2-nistp384 and ecdh-sha2-nistp52 for SSH key exchanges.
64 The TOE will re-key SSH connections after 1 hour of after an aggregate of 1 gig of
data has been exchanged (whichever occurs first).
6.3 Identification and Authentication
6.3.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1
65 The TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords. The
passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and special characters “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”.
66 The minimum password length is settable by the Administrator and can range from 9
to 15 characters.
6.3.2 FIA_UIA_EXT.1
67 The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated. The TOE
warning banner is displayed prior to authentication. No other actions may be
performed on behalf of the administrative user prior to authentication.
68 Administrative access to the TOE is facilitated through several interfaces:
a) CLI. Administrative CLI via direct serial connection.
b) Bash CLI. Administrative CLI via SSH.
c) NetconfD CLI. ConfD CLI via SSH.
d) Netconf API. Administrative API via SSH.
6.3.3 FIA_UAU_EXT.2
69 Regardless of the interface at which the administrator interacts, the TOE prompts the
user for a credential. Only after the administrative user presents the correct
authentication credentials will they be granted access to the TOE administrative
functionality. No TOE administrative access is permitted until an administrator is
successfully identified and authenticated.
70 The TOE provides a local password-based authentication mechanism and also
supports SSH public key authentication.
71 The process for authentication is the same for administrative access whether
administration is occurring via direct connection or remotely. At initial login, the
administrative user is prompted to provide a username. After the user provides the
username, the user is prompted to provide the administrative credential associated
Samsung Security Target
Page 33 of 40
with the user account (e.g. password or SSH public/private key response). The TOE
then either grants administrative access (if the combination of username and
credential is correct) or indicates that the login was unsuccessful. The TOE does not
provide a reason for failure in the cases of a login failure.
6.3.4 FIA_UAU.7
72 For all authentication at the local CLI the TOE provides no feedback when the
administrative password is entered so that the password is obscured.
6.3.5 FIA_AFL.1
73 The TOE is capable of tracking authentication failures of remote administrators.
74 When a user account has sequentially failed authentication the configured number of
times the account will be locked for a Security Administrator defined time period.
75 The local console does not implement the lockout mechanism.
6.4 Security Management
6.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate
76 The TOE restricts the ability to perform software updates to Security Administrators.
6.4.2 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData
77 Users are required to login before being provided with access to any administrative
functions.
6.4.3 FMT_SMR.2
78 The following user accounts are available, which are all Security Administrators:
a) lteuser. This account is used to access the CLI and Bash CLI.
b) nrcliuser. This account is used to access the NetconfD CLI and Nedtconf
API.
79 Management of TSF data is restricted to Security Administrators.
6.4.4 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys
80 The TOE restricts the ability to generate and delete SSH keys to Security
Administrators.
6.4.5 FMT_SMF.1
81 The TOE provides the following management capabilities:
a) Ability to administer the TOE locally (serial) and remotely (SSH)
b) Ability to configure the access banner via CLI or Bash CLI
c) Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination
i) The CLI / Bash CLI timeout value is set via the CLI or Bash CLI
ii) The NetconfD CLI / Netconf API timeout value is via the NetconfD CLI
or Netconf API
d) Ability to update the TOE and to verify the updates via CLI or Bash CLI
Samsung Security Target
Page 34 of 40
e) Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters via CLI or Bash CLI
f) Ability to manage the cryptographic keys (SSH keys) via CLI or Bash CLI
g) Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality (SSH configuration) via CLI
or Bash CLI
h) Ability to configure NTP via the NetconfD CLI or Netconf API
6.5 Protection of the TSF
6.5.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1
82 Keys are protected as described in Table 15. Plaintext keys stored in flash (non-
volatile memory) are protected via Unix permissions and cannot be viewed by TOE
users.
Table 15: Keys
Key Algorithm Storage Zeroization
SSH Private
Keys
ECDSA Flash -
plaintext
Keys are destroyed when generating new
keys by deleting the previous file and
creating a new file. Initiated via CLI
command by the Security Administrator.
SSH Ephemeral
Keys
AES / DH /
ECDH
RAM –
plaintext
OpenSSL ensures that keys (including re-
keyed keys) are overwritten with zeroes
when no longer required.
NTP Key
(User inputted
40 digit
hexadecimal)
n/a Flash -
plaintext
Keys are destroyed when generating new
keys by deleting the previous file and
creating a new file. Initiated via CLI
command by the Security Administrator.
6.5.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1
83 Passwords are protected as describe in Table 16.
Table 16: Passwords
Key/Password Generation/ Algorithm Storage
Locally stored administrator
passwords
User generated Flash - SHA-512 hash
6.5.3 FPT_TST_EXT.1
84 At startup, the TOE undergoes the following tests:
a) Central Processing Unit (CPU) and Memory Basic Input/Output System
(BIOS) self-tests – CPU and memory are initialized by exercising a set of
known answer tests and the BIOS is compared against a known checksum of
the image. The memory is zeroized and then a random pattern is written to
and read from the memory.
Samsung Security Target
Page 35 of 40
b) Boot loader image verification – the boot loader compares the image of the
TOE to a known checksum of the image prior to booting.
c) OpenSSL cryptographic module self-tests
85 These tests ensure the correct operation of the cryptographic functionality of the
TOE, the CPU and BIOS and verify that the correct TOE image is being used. The
cryptographic functionality will not be available if the tests fail, and any operation of
the TOE supported by this functionality will not be available. If the CPU, or BIOS
tests fail, the device will not complete the boot up operation. If the boot loader image
verification fails, the boot up operation will fail. When the device completes the boot
up operation, this is evidence that the self-tests have passed, and that the TOE, and
the cryptographic functions are operating correctly.
6.5.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.1
86 The current firmware version may be queried using any administrative interface.
87 The Security Administrator manually initiates TOE updates from the Bash CLI. TOE
update files must first be copied to the TOE via SCP.
88 TOE update files are digitally signed (ECDSA) and the signature is verified using a
hardcoded public key prior to installation of the update. If verification fails, the update
is aborted, and an error message is displayed.
6.5.5 FPT_STM_EXT.1
89 The TOE makes use of NTP to maintain date and time.
90 The TOE makes use of time for the following:
a) Audit record timestamps
b) Session timeouts (lockout enforcement)
6.6 TOE Access
6.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1
91 The Security Administrator may configure the TOE to terminate an inactive local
interactive session following a specified period of time. This is applicable to the local
CLI.
6.6.2 FTA_SSL.3
92 The Security Administrator may configure the TOE to terminate an inactive remote
interactive session following a specified period of time. This is applicable to the Bash
CLI, NetcongfD CLI and Netconf API.
6.6.3 FTA_SSL.4
93 Administrative users may terminate their own sessions at any time by issuing the exit
command at any CLI or a close-session message at the NetConf API.
6.6.4 FTA_TAB.1
94 The TOE displays an administrator configurable message to users prior to login at
the CLI, Bash CLI, NetcongfD CLI and Netconf API.
Samsung Security Target
Page 36 of 40
6.7 Trusted Path/Channels
6.7.1 FTP_ITC.1
95 The TOE supports secure communication with the following IT entities:
a) Audit server per FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
6.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin
96 The TOE provides the following trusted paths for remote administration:
a) Bash CLI. Administrative CLI via SSH per FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.
b) NetconfD CLI. ConfD CLI via SSH per FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.
c) Netconf API. Administrative API via SSH per FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.
Samsung Security Target
Page 37 of 40
7 Rationale
7.1 Conformance Claim Rationale
97 The following rationale is presented with regard to the PP conformance claims:
a) TOE type. As identified in section 2.1, the TOE is network device, consistent
with the NDcPP.
b) Security problem definition. As shown in section 3, the threats, OSPs and
assumptions are reproduced directly from the NDcPP.
c) Security objectives. As shown in section 4, the security objectives are
reproduced directly from the NDcPP.
d) Security requirements. As shown in section 5, the security requirements are
reproduced directly from the NDcPP. No additional requirements have been
specified.
7.2 Security Objectives Rationale
98 All security objectives are drawn directly from the NDcPP.
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale
99 All security requirements are drawn directly from the NDcPP. Table 17 presents a
mapping between threats and SFRs as presented in the NDcPP.
Table 17: NDcPP SFR Rationale
Identifier SFR Rationale
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINIS
TRATOR_ACCESS
• The Administrator role is defined in FMT_SMR.2 and the
relevant administration capabilities are defined in
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_MTD.1/CoreData, with optional
additional capabilities in FMT_MOF.1/Services and
FMT_MOF.1/Functions
• The actions allowed before authentication of an
Administrator are constrained by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, and
include the advisory notice and consent warning message
displayed according to FTA_TAB.1
• The requirement for the Administrator authentication
process is described in FIA_UAU_EXT.2
• Locking of Administrator sessions is ensured by
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (for local sessions), FTA_SSL.3 (for
remote sessions), and FTA_SSL.4 (for all interactive
sessions)
• The secure channel used for remote Administrator
connections is specified in FTP_TRP.1/Admin
• (Malicious actions carried out from an Administrator session
are separately addressed by T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY)
Samsung Security Target
Page 38 of 40
Identifier SFR Rationale
• (Protection of the Administrator credentials is separately
addressed by T.PASSWORD_CRACKING).
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
• Requirements for key generation and key distribution are
set in FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.2 respectively
• Requirements for use of cryptographic schemes are set in
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS_COP.1/SigGen,
FCS_COP.1/Hash, and FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
• Requirements for random bit generation to support key
generation and secure protocols (see SFRs resulting from
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS) are set
in FCS_RBG_EXT.1
• Management of cryptographic functions is specified in
FMT_SMF.1
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNI
CATION_CHANNELS
• The general use of secure protocols for identified
communication channels is described at the top level in
FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRP.1/Admin; for distributed TOEs the
requirements for inter-component communications are
addressed by the requirements in FPT_ITT.1
• Requirements for the use of secure communication
protocols are set for all the allowed protocols in
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1, FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2,
FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1, FCS_DTLSS_EXT.2,
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1,
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1,
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
• Optional and selection-based requirements for use of public
key certificates to support secure protocols are defined in
FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FIA_X509_EXT.3
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATIO
N_ENDPOINTS
• The use of appropriate secure protocols to provide
authentication of endpoints (as in the SFRs addressing
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS) are
ensured by the requirements in FTP_ITC.1 and
FTP_TRP.1/Admin; for distributed TOEs the authentication
requirements for endpoints in inter-component
communications are addressed by the requirements in
FPT_ITT.1
• Additional possible special cases of secure authentication
during registration of distributed TOE components are
addressed by FCO_CPC_EXT.1 and FTP_TRP.1/Join.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE • Requirements for protection of updates are set in
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
• Additional optional use of certificate-based protection of
signatures can be specified using FPT_TUD_EXT.2,
supported by the X.509 certificate processing requirements
in FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2 and
FIA_X509_EXT.3
Samsung Security Target
Page 39 of 40
Identifier SFR Rationale
• Requirements for management of updates are defined in
FMT_SMF.1 and (for manual updates) in
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate, with optional requirements for
automatic updates in FMT_MOF.1/AutoUpdate
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY • Requirements for basic auditing capabilities are specified in
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2, with timestamps provided
according to FPT_STM_EXT.1 and if applicable, protection
of NTP channels in FCS_NTP_EXT.1
• Requirements for protecting audit records stored on the
TOE are specified in FAU_STG.1
• Requirements for secure transmission of local audit records
to an external IT entity via a secure channel are specified in
FAU_STG_EXT.1
• Optional additional requirements for dealing with potential
loss of locally stored audit records are specified in
FAU_STG_EXT.2/LocSpace, and
FAU_STG_EXT.3/LocSpace
• If (optionally) configuration of the audit functionality is
provided by the TOE then this is specified in FMT_SMF.1,
and confining this functionality to Security Administrators is
required by FMT_MOF.1/Functions.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONAL
ITY_COMPROMISE
• Protection of secret/private keys against compromise is
specified in FPT_SKP_EXT.1
• Secure destruction of keys is specified in FCS_CKM.4
• If (optionally) management of keys is provided by the TOE
then this is specified in FMT_SMF.1, and confining this
functionality to Security Administrators is required by
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys
• (Protection of passwords is separately covered under
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING)
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING • Requirements for password lengths and available
characters are set in FIA_PMG_EXT.1
• Protection of password entry by providing only obscured
feedback is specified in FIA_UAU.7
• Actions on reaching a threshold number of consecutive
password failures are specified in FIA_AFL.1
• Requirements for secure storage of passwords are set in
FPT_APW_EXT.1.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONAL
ITY_FAILURE
• Requirements for running self-test(s) are defined in
FPT_TST_EXT.1
P.ACCESS_BANNER • An advisory notice and consent warning message is
required to be displayed by FTA_TAB.1
Samsung Security Target
Page 40 of 40
Annex A: Extended Components Definition
100 See appended PDF extract of NDcPP extended components definition.