BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
for
Infineon Technologies AG OPTIGA™ Trusted
Platform Module SLB9672_2.0, v15.20.15686.00,
v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00, and
v15.23.17664.00
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.52
BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025 (*)
Trusted Platform Module
Infineon Technologies AG OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module
SLB9672_2.0, v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00, and
v15.23.17664.00
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4
valid until: 5 July 2028
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the
Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC
18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bonn, 26 August 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Fabian Hoduschek L.S.
Head of Section
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................11
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................17
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................17
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................17
13. Definitions................................................................................................................17
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................21
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 22
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licensing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 4
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz – BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs – Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) – dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Technologies AG OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_2.0,
v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00, and v15.23.17664.00, has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-1113-V5-2023. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V5-
2023 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Technologies AG OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform
Module SLB9672_2.0, v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00, and
v15.23.17664.00, was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 21 August 2025. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. Therefore the BSI reserves the right to revoke
the certificate, especially if a exploitable vulnerability of the certified product gets to known.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 26 August
2025 is valid until 5 July 2028. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon Technologies AG OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_2.0,
v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00, and v15.23.17664.00, has been
included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly in the listing found
at the BSI Website https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/Zertifizierung-Gesamtlisten. Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Melli-Beese-Str. 9
86159 Augsburg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_2.0 v15 (or
SLB9672_2.0 in short), version v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00 and
v15.23.17664.00, including related guidance documentation as described in the Security
Target [6].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_v2.0, called TOE or SLB9672_v2.0 in
the following text, is an integrated circuit and software platform that gives users the
possibility to update the product OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_v2.0
v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00, and v15.23.17664.00 to a new
product version.
The security functionality of the TOE is reduced to the FieldUpgrade process. The
SLB9672_2.0 uses the Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) for the integration into existing PC
mainboards.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_CRY Cryptographic Support
SF_G&T General and Test
SF_OBH Object Hierarchy
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Technologies AG OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_2.0,
v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00, and v15.23.17664.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
1. HW/SW OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module
SLI9672_2.0
v15.20.15686.00
and
v15.21.16430.00
and
v15.22.16832.00
and
v15.23.17664.00
Packaged module
2. DOC OPTIGA™ TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0,
Databook
(for v15.20.15686.00)
Revision 1.1,
2021-02-10
PDF-file
3. DOC OPTIGA™ TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0,
Databook
(for v15.21.16430.00)
Revision 1.4,
2021-06-30
PDF-file
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
4. DOC OPTIGA™ TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0,
Databook
(for v15.22.16832.00)
Revision 1.6,
2022-03-09
PDF-file
5. DOC OPTIGA™ TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0,
Databook
(for v15.23.17664.00)
Revision 1.8,
2023-04-27
PDF-file
6. DOC OPTIGA™ TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0,
Application Note User Guidance
Revision 1.02,
2021-06-08
PDF-file
7. DOC OPTIGA™ TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0
FW15.xx, Errata and Updates
Revision 1.7,
2023-03-21
PDF-file
8. DOC Trusted Platform Module Library, Part
1: Architecture, Family ”2.0” Level 00
Revision 01.59
Revision 01.59,
2019-11-08
Public document, downloadable
from
https://www.trustedcomputinggr
oup.org
9. DOC Trusted Platform Module Library, Part
2: Structures, Family ”2.0” Level 00
Revision 01.59
Revision 01.59,
2019-11-08
Public document, downloadable
from
https://www.trustedcomputinggr
oup.org
10. DOC Trusted Platform Module Library, Part
3: Commands, Family ”2.0” Level 00
Revision 01.59
Revision 01.59,
2019-11-08
Public document, downloadable
from
https://www.trustedcomputinggr
oup.org
11. DOC Trusted Platform Module Library, Part
4: Supporting Routines, Family ”2.0”
Level 00 Revision 01.59
Revision 01.59,
2019-11-08
Public document, downloadable
from
https://www.trustedcomputinggr
oup.org
12. DOC TCG PC Client Platform TPM Profile
Specification for TPM 2.0
Version 01.05,
Revision 14,
2020-09-04
Public document, downloadable
from
https://www.trustedcomputinggr
oup.org
13. DOC Errata for TCG Trusted Platform
Module Library, Family “2.0” Level 00
Revision 1.59 November 8, 2019
Version 1.1,
2020-06-18
Public document, downloadable
from
https://www.trustedcomputinggr
oup.org
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
TOE Identification
The TOE hardware and firmware is identified by name and version number as listed in the
following table:
Type Name Version number
Security IC with integrated
firmware
OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_2.0 v15.20.15686.00 and
v15.21.16430.00 and
v15.22.16832.00 and
v15.23.17664.00
Table 3: Identifiers of the TOE
The fabricated modules are physically labelled with the TOE reference by printing. The
labelling consists of four lines:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025 Certification Report
Line Label Remark
0 Infineon Logo and name of producer
1 SLB9672 –
2 VU20 yy or XU20 yy The <yy> is an internal FW indication (only at
manufacturing due to field upgrade option)
3 <Lot number> H <datecode> –
Table 4: Labelling of TOE module
The version information of the TOE can be read out electronically with the command
TPM2_GetCapability. The vendor specific return values for the TOE are defined as listed in
the following table:
Property Vendor specific value
TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER “IFX”
TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_1 “SLB9”
TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_2 “672”
TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_3 NULL
TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_4 NULL
TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1 Major and minor version, e.g. 0x000F0014 indicates v15.20,
0x000F0015 indicates v15.21, 0x000F0016 indicates v15.22, and
0x000F0017 indicates v15.23.
TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2 Build number (for instance, 0x00450000 or 0x00450002)
Byte 1: reserved for future use (0x00)
Byte 2 and 3: Build number (for instance, 0x4500)
Byte 4: Common Criteria certification state:
0x00 = TPM operational mode/TPM is CC certified,
0x02 = TPM operational mode/TPM is not certified,
0x60 = Manually entered TPM firmware recovery mode
(triggered externally for testing purposes)
0x61 = TPM firmware recovery mode (triggered by code integrity
failure detection)
0x62 = TPM firmware update mode
TPM_PT_MODES Bit 0 (FIPS_140_2) = 1
Bits 1...31 = 0
Table 5: Vendor specific properties of TPM2_GetCapability
TOE Delivery
As the TOE is a security IC product it can be delivered only in form complete mounted
IC`s. Only TOEs, which have undergone and passed all the production tests are delivered
in the state user mode.
The production of the TOE wafers will be performed at TSMC Tainan (Fab14A), Taiwan
(see [6], 2.2.5).
The delivery from Infineon Technologies (the TOE Manufacturer) to the Platform
manufacturer is an external delivery process and done from the site IFX Munich.
The TOE is delivered via the logistics sites: DHL Singapore, KWE Shanghai, and K&N
Großostheim.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The
identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the
chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus
assigned to the entire development and production process.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain
security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the user’s site including the
necessary intermediate delivery procedures.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional
Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Cryptographic Support: destruction of cryptographic keys, the generation of
SHA256 and SHA512 hash values, AES256 encryption and decryption in CTR
mode, key derivation using AES CTR and CMAC mode, key unwrapping in
KWP_AD, and ECDSA signature verification with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P521.
● General and Test: provision and enforcement of the TPM role model, startup- and
self tests, preservation of secure state in case of failures or shutdown, and
resistance to physical manipulation or probing.
● Object Hierarchy: state control on all subjects, objects and operations.
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in chapter
8 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager.
The following Security Objectives for the Operational Environment are given in [6], 5.2:
● OE.FieldUpgradeInfo: The developer via AGD documentation will instruct the admin
doing the upgrade how to do the upgrade and that the admin should inform the end
user regarding the Field Upgrade process, its result, whether the installed firmware
is certified or not, and the version of the certified TPM.
5. Architectural Information
The SLB9672_2.0 consists of hardware and firmware components.
The hardware of the TOE consists of the following parts: Security Peripherals (filters,
sensors), Core System, Memories, Coprocessors, Random number generator (RNG),
Checksum module (CRC), Interrupt module (INT), Timer (TIM), Buses (BUS), Serial
Peripheral Interface (SPI), GPIO interface and the Tick Counter.
The firmware of the TOE includes an operating system that provides the functionality
specified by the Trusted Platform Module Library specification. The chip initialisation
routine with security checks and identification mode as well as test routines for production
testing are located in a separate test ROM. The firmware also provides the mechanism for
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025 Certification Report
updating the protected capabilities once the TOE is in the field as defined in the Field
Upgrade procedure.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The tests performed by the developer according to ATE_FUN were divided into six
categories: Simulation Tests (design verification), Qualification Tests, Verification Tests,
Security Evaluation Tests, Production Tests, and Software Tests.
The evaluator has checked the simulation tests, qualification tests, and security evaluation
tests of the developer by sampling. The evaluator’s sample of developer tests performed
covers all portions of the TSF (security features) and related interfaces.
Overall the TSF have been tested against the functional specification, the TOE design and
the security architecture description. The tests demonstrate that the TSF performs as
specified.
7.2. Evaluator Tests – Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The evaluator’s testing effort according to ATE_IND is described as follows, outlining the
testing approach, configuration, depth and results.
The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the TOE as
described in [6], and to verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests
and additionally add independent tests. In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the
following classes of tests were carried out: Module tests, Simulation tests, Emulation tests,
Tests in user mode, Tests in test mode, Hardware tests, and Software tests. With this kind
of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN:
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of the evaluation body. All configurations of the TOE
being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were tested. The overall test result
is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results;
moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Moderate was actually successful.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_2.0 in version v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00,
v15.22.16832.00 and v15.23.17664.00 as described in the ST [6] and Databook [10].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology
of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of Common Criteria to Integrated Circuits.
(ii) For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see
[4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V5-2023, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible.
The current evaluation is the fifth re-certification with scope reduction under the ID BSI-
DSZ-CC-1113-V6.
Recently acquired new knowledge requires reducing the scope of security functionality of
the TOE. Therefore, the current evaluation is a re-evaluation with scope reduction of
OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_2.0 v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00,
v15.22.16832.00, and v15.23.17664.00. The evaluation scope was reduced by removing
the conformance claim to the Protection Profile PC Client Specific TPM, TPM Library
Specification Family “2.0” Level 0 Revision 1.59 [8] and reducing the TSF to the Field
Upgrade functionality only. By performing a firmware update to FW 15.24 the CC
Certificate with Cert ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1244 immediately becomes active. Therefore,
compared to the previously certified product, the developer uses a reduced security
problem definition, reduced security objectives for the TOE and operational environment,
and reduced security functional requirements. Compared to the previously certificated
product, the user guidance was not updated.
The TOE hardware, firmware and software are identical compared to BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-
V5-2023.
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4
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For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The table 7 in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
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CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation – The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile – A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension – The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal – Expressed in natural language.
Object – A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Package – named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile – A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target – An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Subject – An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation – An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality – Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025, Version 1.7, Aug 21, 2025, “Security
Target OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module SLB9672_2.0 v15”, Infineon
Technologies AG (public document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4, Aug 21, 2025, ”Evaluation Technical Report
Summary”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] None
[9] “Eckpunkte der Bundesregierung zu Trusted Computing”, by the German Federal
Government, April 2017
[10] OPTIGATM
TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0, Databook (for v15.20.15686.00), Revision 1.1,
February 10, 2021, Infineon Technologies AG; and
OPTIGATM
TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0, Databook (for v15.21.16430.00), Revision 1.4,
June 30, 2021, Infineon Technologies AG
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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OPTIGATM
TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0, Databook (for v15.22.16832.00), Revision 1.6,
March 09, 2022, Infineon Technologies AG
OPTIGA™ TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0, Databook (for v15.23.17664.00), Revision 1.8,
April 27, 2023, Infineon Technologies AG
[11] OPTIGA™ TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0 FW15.xx, Errata and Updates, Revision 1.7,
March 21, 2023
[12] OPTIGA™ TPM, SLB 9672 TPM2.0, Application Note User Guidance Revision 1.02,
June 8, 2021, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential developer document)
[13] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision
01.59, 2019-11-08, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
[14] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision
01.59, 2019-11-08, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
[15] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 3: Commands, Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision
01.59, 2019-11-08, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
[16] Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines, Family “2.0”, Level 00
Revision 01.59, 2019-11-08, Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Technologies AG OPTIGA™ Trusted Platform Module
SLB9672_2.0, v15.20.15686.00, v15.21.16430.00, v15.22.16832.00, and v15.23.17664.00,
(Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 26 August 2025, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites.
Besides the production and development sites, the relevant TOE distribution centers are
as listed below:
Site ID Company name and address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
K&N
Großostheim
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
Table 6: List of relevant TOE distribution sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1113-V6-2025
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Comments
1. EC signature
verification
ECDSA
[FIPS186-4] |k| = 521
ECC_NIST_P
521
TPM-FieldUpgrade
SHA-512 [FIPS180-4]
2. Integrity XMSS with
XMSS-SHA2_10_256
[N8208] None TPM-FieldUpgrade
3. Key Agreement [N808] TPM-FieldUpgrade
AES [ISO_18033-3] |k| = 256
CTR [ISO_10116]
CMAC [ISO_9797-1]
4. Integrity TPM-FieldUpgrade
SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] None
SHA-512 [FIPS180-4] None
5. Decryption TPM-FieldUpgrade
AES [ISO_18033-3] |k| = 256
CTR [ISO_10116]
6. Key Unwrapping TPM-FieldUpgrade
AES [ISO_18033-3] |k| = 256
KWP-AD [N383F]
Table 7: TOE cryptographic functionality
Note: End of report
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