BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023
for
DERMALOG Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/F1
ZF1, Part No. 9014-0005-02
F1, Part No. 9024-0002-01
DermalogBPZF1Plugin, V 1.11.3.2306
DermalogFakeFingerDetectionZF1Plugin, V 1.7.1.2250,
DermalogAuditLogger, V 1.1.3.1827
from
DERMALOG Identification Systems GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023 (*)
Presentation Attack Detection System
DERMALOG Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/F1
Hardware: ZF1, Part No. 9014-0005-02, F1, Part No. 9024-0002-01,
Software: DermalogBPZF1Plugin: 1.11.3.2306,
DermalogFakeFingerDetectionZF1Plugin: 1.7.1.2250,
DermalogAuditLogger: 1.1.3.1827
from DERMALOG Identification Systems GmbH
PP Conformance: Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on
Organisational Security Policies (FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7,
27 November 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
ADV _ARC.1, ADV _FSP.2, ADV _ TDS.1, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.2, ALC_CMS.2, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_FLR.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1,
ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE IND.2
valid until: 20 December 2028
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and TOE type specific methodology as listed in the
Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of
the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 21 December 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Matthias Intemann L.S.
Head of Section
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks...................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure..............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements.............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification...............................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result................................................................................8
6. Publication..................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.....................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary..................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy..........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information...........................................................................................14
6. Documentation..........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.....................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation..........................................................................................15
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE....................................................16
11. Security Target........................................................................................................17
12. Definitions...............................................................................................................17
13. Bibliography............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria............................................................................................20
D. Annexes.......................................................................................................................21
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023 Certification Report
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized under CCRA-2014 for all assurance components selected.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product DERMALOG Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/F1 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-2018. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-2018 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product DERMALOG Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/F1 was conducted by
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 19 July 2023. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: DERMALOG Identification
Systems GmbH.
The product was developed by: DERMALOG Identification Systems GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the
certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products
resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has
been limited. The certificate issued on 21 December 2023 is valid until 20 December 2028.
Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product DERMALOG Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/F1 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
DERMALOG Identification Systems GmbH
Mittelweg 120
20148 Hamburg
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the DERMALOG Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/F1 consisting
of fingerprint sensors (ZF1, Part-No. 9014-0005-02; F1, Part-No. 9024-0002-01) and PC
software (DermalogBPZF1Plugin, V 1.11.3.2306, DermalogFakeFingerDetectionZF1Plugin
V 1.7.1.2250, DermalogAuditLogger, V 1.1.3.1827).
Its core functionality is classifying whether a finger that is presented to the sensor, is
actually a real finger presented by a genuine user or whether an artefact is presented (a
so-called artefact presentation or presentation attack).
The TOE exists in two different HW configurations: one uses the ZF1 as the sensor device;
the other uses the F1 as the sensor device. Both sensors utilize exactly the same internal
technology and only differ by the case and one LED for user interaction. Furthermore both
sensors use the same TOE SW parts.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on Organisational Security Policies
(FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7, 27 November 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_TDS.1,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.2, ALC_CMS.2, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_FLR.1,
ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1,
ASE_TSS.1, ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2. This explicit defined assurance
package is based on EAL 2, but the AVA_VAN component is completely omitted. It was
defined in the PP to focus on application cases, for which it is sufficient to determine
whether the Security Functionality claimed by a TOE is working correctly without
performing a dedicated vulnerability assessment.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and one of
them is newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.AUDIT Security Audit
SF.RIP Residual Information Protection
SF.SM Security Management
SF.PAD Presentation Attack Detection (PAD)
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions and
Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.3 and
4.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
DERMALOG Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/F1
It consists of
● fingerprint sensors: ZF1, Part-No. 9014-0005-02;
F1, Part-No. 9024-0002-01
● PC software: DermalogBPZF1Plugin, V 1.11.3.2306,
DermalogFakeFingerDetectionZF1Plugin, V 1.7.1.2250,
DermalogAuditLogger, V 1.1.3.1827.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release/Version Form of Delivery
1 HW ZF1 hardware Part No.
9014-0005-02
Parcel mail
2 HW F1 hardware Part No.
9024-0002-01
Parcel mail
3 SW DermalogBPZF1Plugin 1.11.3.2306 Download from
support portal
4 SW DermalogFakeFingerDetectionZF1
Plugin
1.7.1.2250 Download from
support portal
5 SW DermalogAuditLogger 1.1.3.1827 Download from
support portal
6 DOC DERMALOG Guidance Addendum
Dermalog Fingerprint PAD Kit [13]
3.8 Download from
support portal
7 DOC DERMALOG Live Scanner ZF1
Family Instructions for Use [14]
2.5 Download from
support portal
8 DOC DermalogBPZF1Plugin.chm [15] SHA-256:
7bd5 d65d a722 6d49 e0ea 05fd
73c7 d8fb 9773 d4d6 5ddb 24eb
fd4c 6558 ffac 4cb5
or
cd24 67d5 6981 e9f0 3866 e66b
ad52 dfa6 e968 acba 2833 c9d0
00ac b96c 35d7 9e1d7
Download from
support portal
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
7
Notice at the hash of the file differs depending whether the x64 or x86 installer is used. The relevant content
is equal in both files.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023 Certification Report
The hardware part (fingerprint sensor) is delivered via parcel mail with tracking
information. The delivery process starts at the premises of the manufacturer and is
directed directly to the end customer.
As soon as the parcel arrives at the premises of the customer, the administrator of the
device (who received the guidance documentation via an independent channel, namely
the support portal) is advised to perform an integrity check of the sensor, which includes
an inspection of the body of the sensor for any visible manipulations and a check of the
seal that is placed on the bottom of the device.
The TOE software parts and the guidance documentation can be downloaded from the
access controlled support portal of the developer via https connection. The binaries of the
TOE are delivered as part of the installer of the DERMALOGMultiScannerSDK. The
integrity check of the software is performed using hash values of the SDK that have been
provided along with the SDK.
The TOE software offers a function that allows checking the version information of the TOE
components. This function is called FFDGetVersionA and its use is described in the
guidance documentation [13].
The sensor components carry on their back side a sticker declaring the component’s
version information. It is important that this version information (in form of the Part No.) is
checked to match the values listed in table 2 above.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: security audit, residual information
protection, security management and presentation attack detection.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Well trained and trustworthy TOE administrators, physical protection of the
TOE, supporting mechanisms provided by the underlying platform and invocation of the
TOE’s Security Functionality by the protected biometric system. Details can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023
5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of a HW-subsystem (Sensor) and three SW-subsystems (Scanner
Control API, Supportive API, Presentation Attack Detection API).
All four subsystems together implement the TOE Security Functionality.
The Sensor subsystem provides the interface to the user and captures the fingerprint of
the user.
The Presentation Attack Detection API subsystem implements the core functionality of the
TOE, i.e. the presentation attack detection. This subsystem analyses images of
fingerprints and returns information on how likely these images show a presentation
attack.
The Scanner Control API subsystem implements all functionality that invokes sensor
communication and provides the interface between the TOE SW parts and the sensor.
This subsystem is also responsible for the final decision on PAD, i.e. it compares the
calculated value by the Presentation Attack Detection API subsystem with the threshold
setting and converts it into a binary value.
The Supportive API subsystems implements parts of the TOE’s audit functionality and
provides the interface to the external audit storage.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Functional Developer Testing
All developer tests in the context of the evaluation have been conducted using the final
version of the TOE.
The TOE has been configured using a PAD threshold of 50 and FDD_mode of 0 for all
tests. The tests of the audit and management functionality were performed with log level
verbose.
The developer used two simple test tools to test the management, audit and residual
information protection functionality.
The testing of the PAD functionality was conducted by creating fake fingers from different
materials according to the requirements from the Toolbox documentation [10]. In total, the
developer created 104 fakes and applied each one at least 20 times to the TOE. The test
results demonstrated that no fake finger was detected as a real finger in each attempt.
All in all, the developer tested the TOE systematically at the level of TSFI as given in the
Functional Specification. The developer thereby followed the strategy to cover all TSFI.
All tests were passed successfully.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023 Certification Report
7.2. Independent Evaluator Testing
The evaluator repeated all developer tests, except the test of the presentation attack
detection, in order to verify the adequateness of the tests conducted with the developer
test tools.
The evaluator further developed a set of own manual test cases for functional testing.
Thereby he had chosen the approach to cover the functional areas presentation attack
detection, audit and management. This approach extends the one used for the repetition
of the developer tests. Full TSFI coverage is provided in both approaches. The evaluator
devised and performed two functional tests and two additional tests.
For testing the presentation attack detection, the evaluator created and tested 65 fakes of
various materials according to the requirements of the Toolbox documentation [10]. The
evaluator carried out more than 2400 attempts to spoof the TOE with these fakes.
All tests were passed successfully.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers two HW configurations of the TOE:
● Hardware ZF1, Part No. 9014-0005-02 and
● Hardware F1, Part No. 9024-0002-01.
The SW part of the TOE (cmp. table 2) is identical for both HW configurations.
The TOE has been evaluated using FFD_Threshold 50 and FFD_Mode 0.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used extended by guidance specific for the
technology of the product.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Fingerprint Spoof Detection Evaluation Guidance [9]
● Toolbox documentation [10]
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components claimed in the Security Target [6], chapter 7.2 and defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-2018, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The re-certification mainly has been conducted due to the expired
validity of the aforementioned certificate. No specific changes have been implemented in
the TOE. However, over the past years the performance of the TOE has been further
improved by the developer leading to a new version. These changes affect all binaries of
the TOE. For this reason, it is to be assumed that the security functionality of the TOE may
be affected by these changes.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on
Organisational Security Policies (FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7, 27
November 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
ADV _ARC.1, ADV _FSP.2, ADV _ TDS.1, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.2, ALC_CMS.2, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_FLR.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1, ATE_COV.1,
ATE_FUN.1, ATE IND.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023 Certification Report
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PAD Presentation Attack Detection
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SDK Software Development Kit
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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12.2. Glossary
Artefact - an inanimate object carrying a copy of a human or human-like biometric
characteristic made to present to a biometric sensor with aim of spoofing the biometric
system into accepting it as the biometric characteristic of a human subject.
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3
Fake - Synonym for artefact
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts
Informal - Expressed in natural language
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations
Package - Named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Presentation Attack - Presenting an artefact to the biometric data capture subsystem in
order to interfere with the operation of the biometric system so that the artefact is wrongly
accepted as the biometric characteristic of a human subject
Presentation Attack Detection - Automated process of detecting a presentation attack,
i.e. the confirmation of having presented an artefact
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
Spoof Detection - Synonym for presentation attack detection
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an evaluation
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1043-V2-2023, Version 6.4, 30 June 2023, Security
Target Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/F1, DERMALOG Identification Systems GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 5 July 2023, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Fingerprint Spoof Detection Protection Profile based on Organisational Security
Policies (FSDPP_OSP), Version 1.7, 27 November 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0062-2010
[9] Fingerprint Spoof Detection Evaluation Guidance, Version 2.1, 18 December 2009,
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
[10] Toolbox022017, February 2017, BSI
[11] Configuration list for the TOE: Life Cycle Documentation DERMALOG Fingerprint
PAD Kit VF1/ZF1/F1/LF10, Chapter 3, Version 2.0, 19 January 2023, DERMALOG
Identification Systems GmbH (confidential document)
[12] List of references DERMALOG Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/VF1, Version 3.8, 03 July
2023, DERMALOG Identification Systems GmbH (confidential document)
[13] Guidance Addendum DERMALOG Fingerprint PAD Kit ZF1/F1, Version 3.8, 30 June
2023, DERMALOG Identification Systems GmbH
[14] DERMALOG Live Scanner ZF1 Family Instructions for Use, Version 2.5,
DERMALOG Identification Systems GmbH
[15] DermalogBPZF1Plugin.chm (identified via hashsum, cmp. table 2) DERMALOG
Identification Systems GmbH
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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