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KTC-AB-SGR ST 902390D.docx 8633 902-390
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Fördelning/To För kännedom/For information
Security Target Lite
for
Kapsch SAM 5000
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CONTENT
1 ST INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 7
1.1 ST Reference.............................................................................................................................................. 7
1.2 TOE Reference .......................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 Document Overview.................................................................................................................................. 7
1.4 TOE Overview........................................................................................................................................... 8
1.4.1 TOE Type and Usage .......................................................................................................................... 8
1.4.2 Major Security Features ...................................................................................................................... 8
1.4.3 Required non-TOE Software / Hardware / Firmware ......................................................................... 8
1.5 TOE Description........................................................................................................................................ 8
1.5.1 System Overview ................................................................................................................................ 8
1.5.2 Physical Scope .................................................................................................................................... 9
1.5.3 Logical Scope...................................................................................................................................... 9
1.5.3.1 Interfaces......................................................................................................................................... 9
1.5.3.2 TOE Commands............................................................................................................................ 10
1.5.3.3 Not Included Functionality............................................................................................................ 10
1.5.3.4 File System.................................................................................................................................... 10
1.5.4 Configuration and Modes.................................................................................................................. 10
1.5.4.1 Global Access Conditions ............................................................................................................. 11
1.5.4.2 Re-authentication .......................................................................................................................... 11
1.5.4.3 Modes............................................................................................................................................ 11
1.5.5 Chain of Trust ................................................................................................................................... 12
1.5.6 Cryptographic Operations and Keys ................................................................................................. 13
1.5.6.1 Asymmetric Keys.......................................................................................................................... 14
1.5.6.2 Symmetric Keys............................................................................................................................ 15
1.5.7 TOE Life Cycle................................................................................................................................. 16
1.5.8 Roles.................................................................................................................................................. 17
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ................................................................................ 18
2.1 CC Conformance Claim ......................................................................................................................... 18
2.2 PP Conformance Claims......................................................................................................................... 18
2.3 Package Conformance Claims ............................................................................................................... 18
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................. 19
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 19
3.2 Threats ..................................................................................................................................................... 19
3.2.1 Assets ................................................................................................................................................ 19
3.2.2 Threat Agents.................................................................................................................................... 19
3.2.2.1 M-SAM ......................................................................................................................................... 20
3.2.2.2 CS-SAM and P-SAM.................................................................................................................... 20
3.2.2.3 CP-SAM........................................................................................................................................ 20
3.2.2.4 TR-SAM........................................................................................................................................ 21
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3.2.3 Threats............................................................................................................................................... 22
3.3 Organisational Security Policies ............................................................................................................ 24
3.4 Assumptions............................................................................................................................................. 25
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.................................................................................. 26
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 26
4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................................................ 26
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ........................................................................ 27
4.4 Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................................................ 28
4.4.1 Security Objectives Coverage ........................................................................................................... 28
4.4.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency ........................................................................................................ 28
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ........................................................ 35
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS............................................................................ 36
6.1 TOE Security Functionality ................................................................................................................... 36
6.2 Security Functional Policies ................................................................................................................... 36
6.3 Security Functional Requirements ........................................................................................................ 36
6.3.1 Cryptographic Support – FCS........................................................................................................... 36
6.3.1.1 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1a (AES) ................................................................. 36
6.3.1.2 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1b (DES)................................................................. 36
6.3.1.3 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1c (RSA) ................................................................. 36
6.3.1.4 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1d (ECC)................................................................. 36
6.3.1.5 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1e (EC DH)............................................................. 36
6.3.1.6 Cryptographic key access – FCS_CKM.3..................................................................................... 37
6.3.1.7 Cryptographic key destruction – FCS_CKM.4 ............................................................................. 37
6.3.1.8 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1a (AES encrypt/decrypt) ................................................. 37
6.3.1.9 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1b (DES encrypt/decrypt)................................................. 37
6.3.1.10 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1c (AES key derivation) ............................................... 37
6.3.1.11 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1d (DES key derivation) ............................................... 37
6.3.1.12 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1e (Key encrypt/decrypt) .............................................. 38
6.3.1.13 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1f (RSA encrypt/decrypt).............................................. 38
6.3.1.14 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1g (AES MAC)............................................................. 38
6.3.1.15 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1h (DES MAC)............................................................. 38
6.3.1.16 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1i (SHA) ....................................................................... 38
6.3.1.17 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1j (RSA digital signatures) ........................................... 39
6.3.1.18 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1k (ECC digital signatures) .......................................... 39
6.3.1.19 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1l (RNG)....................................................................... 39
6.3.2 User Data Protection - FDP............................................................................................................... 39
6.3.2.1 Subset access control – FDP_ACC.1 ............................................................................................ 39
6.3.2.2 Security attribute based access control – FDP_ACF.1.................................................................. 40
6.3.2.3 Subset information flow control – FDP_IFC.1 ............................................................................. 41
6.3.2.4 Simple security attributes – FDP_IFF.1 ........................................................................................ 42
6.3.2.5 Export of user data with security attributes – FDP_ETC.2 ........................................................... 43
6.3.2.6 Import of user data with security attributes – FDP_ITC.2 ............................................................ 43
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6.3.3 Identification and Authentication – FIA............................................................................................ 44
6.3.3.1 Authentication failure handling – FIA_AFL.1a (PIN) .................................................................. 44
6.3.3.2 Authentication failure handling – FIA_AFL.1b (Unblocking)...................................................... 44
6.3.3.3 Verification of secrets – FIA_SOS.1............................................................................................. 45
6.3.3.4 Timing of authentication – FIA_UAU.1 ....................................................................................... 45
6.3.3.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms – FIA_UAU.5..................................................................... 45
6.3.3.6 Re-authenticating – FIA_UAU.6 .................................................................................................. 45
6.3.4 Security Management – FMT............................................................................................................ 46
6.3.4.1 Static attribute initialisation – FMT_MSA.3................................................................................. 46
6.3.4.2 Specification of Management Functions – FMT_SMF.1.............................................................. 46
6.3.5 Protection of the TSF – FPT ............................................................................................................. 48
6.3.5.1 Replay Detection – FPT_RPL.1.................................................................................................... 48
6.3.5.2 Testing of External Entities – FPT_TEE.1.................................................................................... 48
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements......................................................................................................... 49
6.5 Security Requirements Rationale .......................................................................................................... 50
6.5.1 Security Functional Requirements Dependencies ............................................................................. 50
6.5.2 Security Assurance Dependencies Analysis...................................................................................... 53
6.5.3 Security Functional Requirements Coverage .................................................................................... 54
6.5.4 Security Functional Requirements Sufficiency................................................................................. 55
6.5.5 Justification of the Chosen Evaluation Assurance Level .................................................................. 57
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .................................................................... 58
7.1 TOE Security Functions ......................................................................................................................... 58
7.2 Cryptographic Support........................................................................................................................... 59
7.3 User Data Protection............................................................................................................................... 59
7.4 Identification and Authentication.......................................................................................................... 59
7.5 Security Management ............................................................................................................................. 60
7.6 Protection of the TSF.............................................................................................................................. 60
8 STATEMENT OF COMPATIBILITY................................................................... 61
8.1 TSF ........................................................................................................................................................... 61
8.2 Security Assurance Requirements......................................................................................................... 63
8.3 Security Objectives.................................................................................................................................. 65
8.3.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ....................................................................................................... 65
8.3.2 Security Objectives for the Environment .......................................................................................... 67
8.4 Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................... 68
8.4.1 Threats............................................................................................................................................... 68
8.4.2 Organizational Security Policies ....................................................................................................... 68
8.4.3 Assumptions on the Environment ..................................................................................................... 68
APPENDIX A – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS............................................ 70
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APPENDIX B - REFERENCED DOCUMENTS........................................................ 72
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DOCUMENT HISTORY
Version Issue date Revision description Edited by
A 2017-10-24 This is a Lite version of 8633 902-149 G Stefan Grännö
B 2018-02-08 Appendix B - Referenced Documents: Update of
reference to new Crypto Library
Chapter 1.2 PBL reference replaced by table of
actual TOE references
Stefan Grännö
C 2018-03-02 Appendix B Ref 5 corrected Stefan Grännö
D 2018-03-21 Updates based on Evaluator feedback Stefan Grännö
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1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST Reference
Title: Security Target Lite SAM 5000
Version: D
Date: 2018-03-21
Editor: Anders Staaf, Combitech AB
1.2 TOE Reference
Target of Evaluation: SAM 5000
Developer: Kapsch TrafficCom AB
Version:
Part No. Name Product
Version
8633 005-601 SAM 5000 M Smart Card B
8633 005-602 SAM 5000 CS Smart Card B
8633 005-603 SAM 5000 CS VQFN B
8633 005-604 SAM 5000 CP Smart Card B
8633 005-605 SAM 5000 CP VQFN B
8633 005-606 SAM 5000 TR VQFN B
8633 005-608 SAM 5000 P Smart Card B
1.3 Document Overview
This is the Security Target for a high performance low cost Secure Application Module, SAM.
The TOE SW together with its certified platform are below called the TOE as shown in Figure 1. When
TOE is used in referenced document, the part marked as TOE SW in Figure 1 including dependencies
to the certified platform is referred.
Chapter 1 gives a description of the ST and the TOE. This description serves as an aid to understand
the security requirements and the security functions.
Chapter 2 states the conformance claims made.
In chapter 3, the security problem definition of the TOE is described. This includes assumptions about
the environment of the TOE, threats against the TOE, TOE environment and organizational security
policies that are to be employed to ensure the security of the TOE.
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The Security Objectives stated in chapter 4 describes the intent of the Security Functions. The Security
Objectives are divided into two groups of security objects, for the TOE and for the TOE environment.
No extended components are defined so chapter 5 is empty.
In chapter 6 the IT security functional and assurance requirements are stated for the TOE. These
requirements are a selected subset of the requirements of part 2 and 3 of the Common Criteria standard.
A brief description of how the security functional requirements are implemented in the TOE is described
in chapter 7.
1.4 TOE Overview
1.4.1 TOE Type and Usage
The TOE is the Secure Application Module, SAM 5000, a module offering cryptographic functions and
a secure storage of keys. SAM 5000 is designed to be used in several different devices in a road tolling
system.
1.4.2 Major Security Features
Through its command API interface the TOE provides functionality such as:
- User authentication.
- PIN management
- Key management
- File management
- Encryption, decryption of data
- MAC calculation and verification
- Digital signature calculation and verification
- Status and information functionality
1.4.3 Required non-TOE Software / Hardware / Firmware
The TOE SW depends on the certified platform Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) M9900 design step A22 and G11 of the SLE97 family on a smart card or the SLI97 family in
a VQFN chip package and its operating system and cryptographic library for correct operation, firmware
version BOS-V1.
1.5 TOE Description
1.5.1 System Overview
The TOE is to be used for encryption support and secure storage of cryptographic keys in both
stationary and on-board deployments. The TOE exists in 5 different versions with different functionality
ranging from the Communication Point SAM which has basic cryptographic support to the Master SAM
which has extended cryptographic functionality.
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1.5.2 Physical Scope
The TOE SW is a software application executing on the Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) M9900 design step A22 and G11 of the SLE97 family on a smart card or the SLI97 family in
a VQFN chip package. The BOS-V1 firmware version is used.
The Infineon device is Common Criteria certified EAL5, augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2,
ref.[5], compliant to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-PP-035, ref. [8].
The TOE is designed to comply with FIPS 140-2 level 3, ref. [4], requirements.
1.5.3 Logical Scope
The TOE SW executes between a calling application requesting the TOE services through a
programmatic command interface, External API, and the operating system of the underlying processor.
The operating system provides its functionality through the Internal API, consisting of basic functionality
(called Application Note) and a Cryptographic Library.
Figure 1, TOE definition
The Certified Platform consists of
ï‚· CryptoLib
ï‚· Hardware Abstraction Layer
ï‚· HW
The Certification Report for the Certified Platform can be found in [5]
1.5.3.1 Interfaces
The TOE communicates using the T=1 protocol over UART according to ISO7816-3 interface or over
SPI. The commands and responses over the External API are specified in ref. [6].
The TOE SW interfaces the Infineon’s IC chip operating system and cryptographic library through the
Internal API according to ref. [10] and [11].
TOE (Composite TOE)
TOE SW
Calling application
Certified Platform
External API
Internal API
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1.5.3.2 TOE Commands
The TOE provides functionality through its command interface, below this functionality is summarised.
In ref. [6] all commands are listed and their availability in each TOE deployment is indicated.
- Authentication: Support for PIN based authentication and mutual authentication by challenge
response schemes.
- PIN management: Change, block, and unblock PINs.
- Key management: Functionality to generate, load, export, import, delete, etc. keys.
- File management: Functionality to create, delete, read, update, etc. files.
- Encryption, decryption: Symmetric and asymmetric encryption and decryption of data.
- MAC: Calculate and verify MAC codes.
- Digital signature: Calculate and verify digital signatures.
- Additional commands for the Trusted Recorder: Get information from the Trusted Recorder.
- TOE handling: Get current status, set counters, reset, and delete all keys and files.
1.5.3.3 Not Included Functionality
The TOE will utilize cryptographic support implemented in the IC chip hardware and provided by the
operating system. The following cryptographic primitives provided by the certified platform will be used:
- Data Encryption Standard (DES),
- Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES),
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA),
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
- Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1, SHA-256) as part of signature calculation/verification,
- Random Number Generator (RNG), and
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
The interface to the cryptographic primitives is defined in ref. [10].
1.5.3.4 File System
The file system consists several files of which Master File, MF, and Elementary Files are fixed and
created at production. Additional Elementary Files can be created and deleted dynamically. The file
systems for each TOE deployment are described in ref. [6] chapter 4.
The Access Conditions for each file varies between the different TOE deployments, see ref. [6] for a
description. The device operating system has pre-allocated files for the chip serial number, counters,
PIN, etc.
1.5.4 Configuration and Modes
The TOE can be configured by specifying access restrictions to specific objects, rules for re-
authentication, and commands only to be available in a certain mode. Configuration of static objects is
done during initialization (the Personalization phase according to the TOE life-cycle definition described
in section 1.5.7), configuration of dynamically created objects is done at creation time (which may also
include the Operational Usage phase). The configuration options are described below.
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1.5.4.1 Global Access Conditions
Access conditions can be defined for commands accessing files and individual keys. The access
conditions are statically set for the Master File and the static Elementary Files and keys. The access
conditions are set at creation time for dynamically created files and keys. Access conditions can be
combined using AND and OR constructors.
The following access conditions exist. The commands referred in the descriptions are defined in ref. [6]:
ALW - The command is always permitted.
PwdGx - Global Password: VERIFY command with x=PIN1 or PIN2 is required.
AutGSx - Authentication with Global Symmetric key: EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command using
global symmetric key with index x is required.
AutDHx - Authentication with Diffie-Hellman session key: INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE or
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command using a session key created by GENERATE
ADMIN TRANSFER KEYS is required. x is stating if the nonce shall be sent or received
by the TOE.
ProGSx - MAC Protection by Global Symmetric key: A MAC calculated over the message fields
using the symmetric key with index x is required (only used for the SET USAGE
COUNTER command).
NEV - The command is never permitted.
1.5.4.2 Re-authentication
There are two counters, Start-up Usage Counter and Security Critical Commands Usage Counter,
which may be used for re-authentication. The counters may be used in one out of four configuration
options:
- No counters used (default)
- Start-up Usage Counter enabled
- Security Critical Commands Usage Counter enabled
- Both Start-up Usage Counter and Security Critical Commands Usage Counter enabled
The Start-up Usage Counter, if enabled, is decremented at each TOE start-up. When the counter
reaches zero re-authentication to fulfill the AutGS1 access condition is needed.
The Security Critical Commands Usage Counter, if enabled, is decremented at each execution of a
security critical command. The security critical commands are pre-defined and specified in ref. [6].
When the counter reaches zero authentication is mandatory for executing any of the security critical
commands.
If both counters are enabled, decrementing the Start-up Usage Counter will reset the Security Critical
Commands Usage Counter to its initial value if not Start-up Usage Counter has reached zero. The pre-
set initial values of both counters can be changed by a TOE command.
1.5.4.3 Modes
It is possible to configure the TOE commands to only be allowed to be executed in Host Authenticated
Mode. The TOE is in Host Authenticated Mode when
- user authentication has been successful,
- usage counters has not reached zero, and
- applicable command access conditions have been fulfilled.
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1.5.5 Chain of Trust
The Kapsch Key Management System, KMS, is the root certificate authority, CA for handling of Admin
Keys. An intermediate CA, KMS Issuing CA, is used for flexibility reasons. Certificates are not handled
by the TOE but the KMS Root CA’s public key is pre-installed in the TOE. The KMS Issuing CA’s public
key is imported into the TOE in a key container signed using the KMS Root CA’s private key. The
security domain has an asymmetric key pair used for generation of authentication and encryption
session keys. The SD public key is stored in a key container signed using the KMS Issuing CA’s private
key. The following proprietary format is used for the key container.
- Public Key Container ID
- Public Key algorithm ID
- Public Key additional information
- Public Key Value
- Issuing Public Key Container ID, containing the public key used for signing
- Issuing Public Key algorithm ID
- Public Key Signature calculated over the previous fields
The Public Key Signature shall be a NIST-521 bit ECC DSA signature calculated over a SHA256 Hash.
The SD private key is stored in a key file in the file system.
Figure 2, Chain of trust
A pre-installed symmetric Factory Authentication Key is used for authentication of the TOE at
assignment to Security domain, i.e. import of the key containers and at generation of the SD asymmetric
key pair.
The SD specific asymmetric keys described above are dedicated for derivation of keys for import/export
of Admin Keys.
Signed by KMS Issuing CA’s private key
Signed by KMS Root CA’s private key
KMS Root CA
public key
KMS Issuing CA
public key container
SD
public key container
SD
private key
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1.5.6 Cryptographic Operations and Keys
The TOE uses cryptographic primitives according to Table 1 for the specified cryptographic operations.
See section 6.3.1 for a specification of the cryptographic standards used for each primitive and mode.
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Cryptographic operation Primitive/Protocol/
Scheme
Key length Mode/HASH/ Curve
Symmetrical encryption and
decryption
AES 128/256 CBC, ECB
DES 64/128* CBC, ECB
Key derivation DES 64/128* CBC
AES 128/256 CBC
Key encryption and decryption AES 128/256 CBC
Diffie-Hellman key exchange EC DH 128/256 SHA-256,
P-256,
P512/521
MAC calculation and verification DES MAC 64/128* CBC
AES MAC 128/256 CBC, EMAC, CMAC
Asymmetrical encryption and
decryption
RSAES-OAEP 2048 NA
RSAES-PKCS1-
v1_5
2048 NA
Digital signature calculation and
verification
RSASSA-PSS 1024/2048/
4096
SHA-256
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5
1024/2048/
4096
SHA-1/
SHA-256
EC-DSA NIST P-256,
NIST P-521 (only
verification)BrainpoolP256r1
Random number generation According to ref. [11].
Table 1, Used cryptographic primitives, protocols and schemes. *) Effective 56/112 bits
The DES and Triple-DES primitives are required by the following standards for road tolling systems:
- EN 15509
- CEN ISO/TS 12813
- CEN ISO/TS 13141
- EN 16312
The SHA-1 primitive is specified in an agreement between tolling operators in US. The algorithm is
referred to in document ref. [7].
1.5.6.1 Asymmetric Keys
The TOE can store the following asymmetric keys:
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Key Key type Imported/ generated in
phase 1)
Description
KMS Root CA public key RSA 2048 Personalisation Used for verification of
digital signatures of
other keys
KMS Issuing CA public key RSA 2048 Personalisation Used for verification of
digital signatures of
other keys
SD key pair RSA 2048 Personalisation Generation of session
keys
ECC 521 Personalisation ECDH encryption key
creation
RSA keys pairs RSA 1024,
RSA 2048,
RSA 4096
Operational Usage End-customer usage
ECC key pairs ECC 256,
ECC 521
Operational Usage End-customer usage
1) Phases according to section 1.5.7
Table 2 Asymmetric keys
The attributes associated to each asymmetric key pairs are:
- Key identifier (record number in key file)
- Algorithm and key length identifier
- Key access conditions
Since the cryptographic support implemented in the certified platform only can handle RSA keys in
the CRT format (Chinese Remainder Theorem) the private part of the RSA keys is stored in a
proprietary format holding the CRT parameters.
1.5.6.2 Symmetric Keys
The TOE can store the following symmetric keys:
Key Key type Imported/ generated in
phase 1)
Description
Factory Authentication Key 128 AES Personalisation This is categorized as
an Admin key. It is used
when importing public
key containers and
generation of SD key
pair.
Other Admin Keys - Personalisation TOE usage
Non-Admin Keys - Operational Usage End-customer usage
1) Phases according to section 1.5.7
Table 3, Symmetric keys (not all symmetric keys are identified with name in the table)
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The attributes associated to each symmetric key are:
- Key identifier (record number in key file)
- Algorithm identifier
- Key access conditions
- Usage counter for key derivation (only used in P-SAM)
- Key length
- Key Verification Code given by a truncated encrypted 0-vector
1.5.7 TOE Life Cycle
The TOE life-cycle can be separated into several distinct phases as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3, Composite product life cycle
The IC Development, IC Manufacturing, and IC Packaging phases take place at the IC chip
manufacturer and are common for this kind of chip. i.e. not aware of the TOE SW.
At the Composite Production Integration phase, the TOE specific software is integrated into the chip.
IC Embedded
Software
Development
IC Development
IC Manufacturing
IC Packaging
Composite Product
Integration
Personalisation
Operational Usage
IC Chip Manufacturer Kapsch Security Domain
(End-user)
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In the Personalisation phase the backup key and the file system are initialised. Further the KMS Root
CA public key and the Factory Authentication Key will be included. At this stage the IC chip including
the TOE is delivered to the vendor, Kapsch.
Kapsch will in the Personalisation phase generate and load all Admin Keys for a specific Security
Domain, SD.
The End-user customer will in the Operational Usage phase include all Non-admin Keys needed for the
SD, e.g. keys for the Dedicated Short Range Communication, DSRC, between the OBU and the ES.
1.5.8 Roles
No roles are defined for the TOE. The TOE user is required to authenticate according to the access
conditions defined for the object that is accessed. The TOE user is an IT product and no human user
interface is provided.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target is CC Part 2 conformant and CC Part 3 conformant to Common Criteria version
3.1, revision 4
– Part 1: Security Functional Components, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-
2012-09-001
– Part 2: Security Functional Components, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-
2012-09-002
– Part 3: Security Assurance Components, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-
2012-09-003
The guidance from ISO/IEC 15446, Information technology - Security techniques - Guide for the
production of protection profiles and security targets, Second edition 2009-03-01, has been used when
developing this Security Target.
2.2 PP Conformance Claims
This Security Target does not claim strict or demonstrable conformance to any Protection Profile.
The TOE SW is dependent on security functionality in its operational environment, i.e. the certified
platform defined in Infineon Security Target, ref. [9], and the Security IC Platform Protection Profile,
BSI-PP-0035, ref. [8]. Those documents are referenced in this Security Target to get the complete
picture of the security problem.
2.3 Package Conformance Claims
This Security Target claims conformance to assurance requirement package EAL5.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
The security problem definition described below includes threats, organizational security policies and
security usage assumptions.
3.2 Threats
Threats are described by an adverse action performed by defined threat agents on the assets that the
TOE has to protect. The assets and their protection needed, the threat agents and their attack potential,
and the threat adverse actions are described below.
3.2.1 Assets
Asset TOE
deployment
KMS Issuing CA container All
SD container All
SD key pair All
Admin Keys All
Non-admin Keys All
Trusted recorder master key, derived TR key, or internally calculated MAC TR-SAM
Derived keys not explicitly derived for external export All
User data All
PINs All
Table 4 Assets to be protected
3.2.2 Threat Agents
The threat agents that are identified for the different deployments of the TOE are described below. The
description includes the attack potential that is assumed for each threat agent in terms of:
Knowledge: The threat agent’s competence within the technology area and knowledge about the
TOE specific design and construction.
Opportunity: The opportunity for the threat agent to try to mount an attack against the TOE.
Equipment: The tools and equipment that the threat agent has access to.
Motivation: The values that might be gained for the threat agent at a successful attack.
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3.2.2.1 M-SAM
The M-SAM is assumed to be physically protected, during operation and when stored. No attackers
with malicious intents are identified but an Authorized admin may make mistakes.
Authorized admin
The Authorized Admin, who is defining and deploying the TOE configuration, makes mistakes that
override or bypass security features or enable opportunities for others to do so.
Knowledge: Deep knowledge about the technology area and the TOE system
Opportunity: Low, the configuration is reviewed by a second Authorized admin.
Equipment: None
Motivation: None, has no malicious intent, is trained and follows the guidance but is capable of
making errors.
Table 5 Threat agent: Authorized admin
3.2.2.2 CS-SAM and P-SAM
The CS-SAM is assumed to be installed in a server in a server room, physically protected from
unauthorized persons. The P-SAM is also assumed to be used in a physically protected production
environment. The threat agents: Logical remote attacker, Unauthorized user, and Authorized admin
(Table 5) are identified.
Logical remote attacker
Has no physical access, may try to remotely attack the TOE logical interface through the server’s
network interface through the network protection, such as firewalls, etc.
Knowledge: Public knowledge about the technology area and the TOE system
Opportunity: Unlimited in time since remote access to the network
Equipment: Specialized with a value less than the gain from an a successful attack
Motivation: High motivation since large values could be at stake, e.g. for transportation
companies
Table 6 Threat agent: Logical remote attacker
Unauthorized user
Has authorized physical access to the server room but is not authorized to use the TOE functionality.
Knowledge: Public knowledge about the technology area and the TOE system
Opportunity: Very limited, max 30 min undetected, e.g. during a lunch break
Equipment: Specialized that can be brought to the location by hand
Motivation: Moderate, since the risk to be revealed is considered high
Table 7 Threat agent: Unauthorized user
3.2.2.3 CP-SAM
The CP-SAM is installed in a manner that hinders unauthorized physical access. The threat agents:
Physical attacker, Logical local attacker, and Authorized service personnel are identified.
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Physical attacker
Is physically attacking the RSS to reach the CP-SAM. May try to steal the TOE or attack the TOE
physically.
Knowledge: Public knowledge about the technology area and the TOE system
Opportunity: Limited, max 1 hour until detected by alarm system and stopped.
Equipment: Specialized that can be brought to the CP-SAM in the RSS and with a value less than
the gain from an a successful attack
Motivation: High motivation since large values could be at stake, e.g. for transportation
companies
Table 8 Threat agent: Physical attacker
Logical local attacker
Is placed nearby the RSS and has no physical access to the TOE. May try to attack the TOE logical
interface through the RSS network.
Knowledge: Public knowledge about the technology area and the TOE system
Opportunity: Limited, max 1 day undetected
Equipment: Specialized that can be brought to the place and with a value less than the gain from
an a successful attack
Motivation: High motivation since large values could be at stake, e.g. for transportation
companies
Table 9 Threat agent: Logical local attacker
Authorized service personnel
Service personnel, etc, who is performing service on the TOE deployed device, makes mistakes that
override or bypass security features or enable opportunities for others to do so.
Knowledge: Moderate knowledge about the technology area and the TOE system
Opportunity: Low since faulty deployment of the TOE will be detected by the system in the TOE
environment
Equipment: None
Motivation: None, has no malicious intent, is trained and follows the guidance but is capable of
making errors.
Table 10 Threat agent: Authorized service personnel
3.2.2.4 TR-SAM
The TR-SAM is installed in an OBU. The OBU is equipped with tamper protection. The threat agents:
Physical OBU attacker and Logical OBU attacker are identified.
Physical OBU attacker
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Has access to an OBU. Is physically attacking the OBU to reach the TR-SAM for a physical attack,
including manipulation, probing, environmental stress, etc.
Knowledge: Public knowledge about the technology area and the TOE system
Opportunity: Moderate since the OBU is equipped with tamper protection.
Equipment: Specialized with a value less than the gain from an a successful attack
Motivation: High motivation since large values could be at stake, e.g. for transportation
companies
Table 11 Threat agent: Physical OBU attacker
Logical OBU attacker
Has access to an OBU. May try to attack the TOE logical interface through the DSRC interface.
Knowledge: Public knowledge about the technology area and the TOE system
Opportunity: Unlimited
Equipment: Specialized with a value less than the gain from an a successful attack
Motivation: High motivation since large values could be at stake, e.g. for transportation
companies
Table 12 Threat agent: Logical OBU attacker
3.2.3 Threats
The threats against the TOE according to Table 13 are identified.
Name Threat against the TOE Threat agent
T.Logical_Leak Logical Information Leakage
A threat agent may logically attack the TOE in
order to reveal sensitive assets. The
modification may be achieved through
deficiencies in the TOE external communication
protocols or in the TOE internal asset handling.
Logical remote attacker
Logical local attacker
Logical OBU attacker
Unauthorized user
T.Logical_Manipulation Logical Manipulation
A threat agent may logically attack the TOE in
order to modify or remove sensitive assets. The
attack may be achieved through deficiencies in
the TOE external communication protocols or in
the TOE internal assets handling.
Logical remote attacker
Logical local attacker
Logical OBU attacker
Unauthorized user
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping
A threat agent may listen to and successfully
interpret sensitive assets sent or received over
the TOE external interface.
Logical remote attacker
Logical local attacker
Logical OBU attacker
Unauthorized user
T.Spoofing Spoofing Logical remote attacker
Logical local attacker
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Name Threat against the TOE Threat agent
A threat agent may try to disguise as an
authorised user to disclose, manipulate or
remove sensitive assets.
Logical OBU attacker
Unauthorized user
T.Replay Replay
A threat agent may gain access to sensitive
information by replaying TOE external
communication.
Logical remote attacker
Logical local attacker
Logical OBU attacker
Unauthorized user
T.Unint_Corruption Unintentional Corruption
An authorised user may by mistake override or
bypass security features of the TOE or enable
opportunities for others to do so.
Authorized admin
Authorized service
personnel
Table 13, Threats against the TOE
Table 14 lists threats against the TOE certified platform. These threats, that are included to get a
complete coverage of threat agents and threats, are all identified in BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], resp. ST
Infineon, ref. [9], and are all mitigated by security objectives defined in those documents. The threats
against the platform and the TOE SW complement and do not contradict each other. Together they
form the total amount of threats against the TOE.
Name Threat against the TOE certified platform Threat agent
T.Phys-
Manipulation
Physical Manipulation
BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], section 3.2
Unauthorized user
Physical attacker
Physical OBU attacker
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], section 3.2
Unauthorized user
Physical attacker
Physical OBU attacker
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], section 3.2
Unauthorized user
Physical attacker
Physical OBU attacker
Logical OBU attacker
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], section 3.2
Unauthorized user
Physical attacker
Physical OBU attacker
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], section 3.2
Unauthorized user
Physical attacker
Physical OBU attacker
Logical OBU attacker
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], section 3.2
Logical remote attacker
Unauthorized user
Authorized admin
Logical local attacker
Authorized service
personnel
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], section 3.2
Logical remote attacker
Unauthorized user
Logical local attacker
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Name Threat against the TOE certified platform Threat agent
T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
ST Infineon, ref. [9], section 4.1.1
Any
Table 14, Threats against the TOE certified platform
3.3 Organisational Security Policies
Organisational security policies, OSPs, for the TOE are stated according to Table 15.
Name OSP
P.Crypto Cryptographic Mechanisms
The TOE shall provide cryptographic mechanisms according to ref. [6]. This includes
mechanisms to:
- encrypt and decrypt user data,
- calculate and verify message authentication codes over user data,
- calculate and verify digital signatures over user data,
- derive keys,
encrypt and decrypt keys, and
- generate random data for key and challenge generation.
P.Keys Key Mechanisms
The TOE shall provide secure key mechanisms according to ref. [6]. This includes
mechanisms to:
- generate,
- derive,
- import,
- export, and
- backup keys.
The TOE (P-SAM) shall increment a derivation counter monotonically every time a
key is derived. The derivation counter shall start on zero and shall not be possible to
reset after SAM production until the key is deleted.
P.Memory_Test Memory Test
The TOE shall detect memory deficiencies in the operational environment at initial
start-up.
Table 15, Organizational Security Policies for the TOE
Table 16 below, lists OSP’s for the TOE the certified platform. They are included to get a complete
coverage of environmental policies. They are identified in BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], resp. ST Infineon, ref.
[9], and are all met by security objectives defined in those documents. These OSP’s and those for the
TOE SW complement and do not contradict each other. Together they form the total amount of OSPs
for the TOE.
Name OSP
P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
BSI-PP-035, ref. [8], section 3.3
P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality
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Name OSP
ST Infineon, ref. [9], section 4.2
In the ST Infineon, ref. [9], there is a O.Add-Functions defined. It is fulfilled by the
TOE.
Table 16, Organizational Security Policies for the certified platform
3.4 Assumptions
Assumptions on the TOE operational environment are made according to Table 17.
Name Assumptions on the TOE operational environment
A.Deployment Deployment
The TOE operational environment is assumed to react on faulty deployment performed
by the Authorized service personnel.
A.OBU_Protection OBU Tamper Protection
The operational environment of the TOE when deployed as TR-SAM in an OBU is
assumed to be equipped with tamper protection.
A.No_Evil No Evil Authorized Administrators
Authorized admins and service personnel are assumed to be security screened to be
non-hostile, sufficiently trained, and willing to follow their instructions, before
authorized to interact with the TOE.
A.Counter Security Critical Commands Usage Counter
The TOE operational environment is assumed to use the Security Critical Commands
Usage Counter to request a new authentication before e.g. 20000 Triple-Des or AES
operations have been performed.
Table 17, Assumptions on the TOE environment
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Introduction
The statement of security objectives defines the security objectives for the TOE and its environment.
The security objectives intend to address all security environment aspects identified. The security
objectives reflect the stated intent and are suitable to counter all identified threats and cover all identified
organisational security policies and assumptions. The following categories of objectives are identified:
ï‚· The security objectives for the TOE shall be clearly stated and traced back to aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and/or organisational security policies to be met by
the TOE.
ï‚· The security objectives for the environment shall be clearly stated and traced back to aspects of
identified threats countered by the TOE environment, organisational security policies or
assumptions.
ï‚· The security objectives for the IC chip and OS parts of the platform are defined in chapter 4, ref.
[8], and chapter 5, ref. [9].
4.2 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following security objectives for the TOE are defined.
Security Objective Description
O.Authentication The TOE shall provide measures against unauthorised access to sensitive assets.
O.Confidentiality The TOE shall provide measures against disclosure of Admin Keys and Non-admin
Keys at import and export.
O.Crypto The TOE shall provide cryptographic mechanisms according to ref. [6]. This
includes mechanisms to:
- encrypt and decrypt user data,
- calculate and verify message authentication codes over user data,
- calculate and verify digital signatures over user data,
- derive keys,
- encrypt and decrypt keys, and
- generate random data for key and challenge generation.
O.Keys Key Mechanisms
The TOE shall provide secure key mechanisms according to ref. [6]. This includes
mechanisms to:
- generate,
- derive,
- import,
- export, and
- backup keys.
The TOE (P-SAM) shall increment a derivation counter monotonically every time a
key is derived. The derivation counter shall start on zero and shall not be possible
to reset after SAM production until the key is deleted.
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Security Objective Description
O.Integrity The TOE shall provide measures to ensure integrity and authenticity of Admin Keys
and Non-admin Keys at import and export.
The TOE shall provide measures ensure integrity and authenticity of KMS Issuing
CA container and SD container at import.
O.Replay_Detection The TOE shall detect attempts to replay the following TOE commands defined in
ref. [6]:
- Export of Admin Keys,
- Export of Non-admin Keys,
- Export of asymmetric keys,
- Import of Non-admin Keys,
- Import of Admin Keys,
- Reading encrypted binary file content, and
- Update encrypted binary file content.
O.Memory_Test The TOE shall detect memory deficiencies in the operational environment at start-
up.
Table 18, Security objectives for the TOE
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The security objectives for the operational environment identified in Table 19.
Security Objective Description
OE.Config_Review Configuration Review
The configuration performed by an Authorised admin must be reviewed
by a second Authorised admin to minimise unintentional corruption before
applied the TOE.
OE.Deployment Deployment
The TOE operational environment must react on faulty deployment
performed by the Authorised service personnel.
OE.OBU_Protection OBU Protection
The OBU must be equipped with tamper protection.
OE.No_Evil No Evil Authorised Administrators
Authorised admins and service personnel must be security screened to
be non-hostile, sufficiently trained, and willing to follow their instructions,
before authorised to interact with the TOE.
OE.SecurityCounter The TOE operational environment will use the Security Critical
Commands Usage Counter to request a new authentication before e.g.
20000 Triple-Des or AES operations have been performed.
Table 19, Security objectives for the TOE operational environment
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4.4 Security Objectives Rationale
4.4.1 Security Objectives Coverage
This section provides tracings of the security objectives for the TOE to threats, OSPs, and assumptions.
T.Logical_Leak
T.Logical_Manipulation
T.Eavesdropping
T.Spoofing
T.Replay
T.Unint_Corruption
P.Crypto
P.Keys
P.Memory_Test
A.Deployment
A.OBU_Protection
A.No_Evil
O.Authentication X X X
O.Confidentiality X X
O.Crypto X X X X X
O.Integrity X
O.Keys X X X X X
O.Replay_Detection X
O.Memory_Test X
OE.Config_Review X
OE.Deployment X
OE.OBU_Protection X
OE.No_Evil X
Table 20, Security objectives coverage
4.4.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives for the environment are suitable
to cover each individual assumption or threat to the environment, that each security objective for the
environment that traces back to a threat or an assumption about the environment of use.
Threat/OSP/Assumption Objective Rationale
T.Logical_Leak
A threat agent may logically
attack the TOE in order to reveal
sensitive assets. The
modification may be achieved
O.Authentication
The TOE must provide measures
against unauthorised access to
sensitive assets and functionality
of the TOE.
T.Logical_Leak is mitigated by
requirements on authentication
(O.Authentication) and
confidentiality of sensitive assets
in transfer (O.Confidentiality).
The requirements shall be met by
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Threat/OSP/Assumption Objective Rationale
through deficiencies in the TOE
external communication protocols
or in the TOE internal asset
handling.
O.Confidentiality
The TOE shall provide measures
against disclosure of Admin Keys
and Non-admin Keys at import
and export.
cryptographic mechanisms
(O.Crypto) and secure
cryptographic key handling
(O.Keys).
O.Crypto
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms
according to ref. [6]. This
includes mechanisms to:
- encrypt and decrypt user
data,
- calculate and verify message
authentication codes over
user data,
- calculate and verify digital
signatures over user data,
- derive keys,
- encrypt and decrypt keys,
and
- generate random data for key
and challenge generation.
O.Keys
The TOE shall provide secure
key mechanisms according to ref.
[6]. This includes mechanisms to:
- generate,
- derive,
- import,
- export, and
- backup keys.
The TOE (P-SAM) shall
increment a derivation counter
monotonically every time a key is
derived. The derivation counter
shall start on zero and shall not
be possible to reset after SAM
production until the key is
deleted.
T.Logical_Manipulation
A threat agent may logically
attack the TOE in order to modify
O.Authentication
The TOE must provide measures
against unauthorised access to
T.Logical_Manipulation is
mitigated by requirements on
authentication
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Threat/OSP/Assumption Objective Rationale
or remove sensitive assets. The
attack may be achieved through
deficiencies in the TOE external
communication protocols or in
the TOE internal assets handling.
sensitive assets and functionality
of the TOE.
(O.Authentication) and integrity
and authenticity measures of
sensitive assets in transfer
(O.Integrity). The requirements
shall be met by cryptographic
mechanisms (O.Crypto) and
secure cryptographic key
handling (O.Keys).
O.Crypto
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms
according to ref. [6]. This
includes mechanisms to:
- encrypt and decrypt user
data,
- calculate and verify message
authentication codes over
user data,
- calculate and verify digital
signatures over user data,
- derive keys,
- encrypt and decrypt keys,
and
- generate random data for key
and challenge generation.
O.Integrity
The TOE shall provide measures
to ensure integrity and
authenticity of Admin Keys and
Non-admin Keys at import and
export.
The TOE shall provide measures
ensure integrity and authenticity
of KMS Issuing CA container and
SD container at import.
O.Keys
The TOE shall provide secure
key mechanisms according to ref.
[6]. This includes mechanisms to:
- generate,
- derive,
- import,
- export, and
- backup keys.
The TOE (P-SAM) shall
increment a derivation counter
monotonically every time a key is
derived. The derivation counter
shall start on zero and shall not
be possible to reset after SAM
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Threat/OSP/Assumption Objective Rationale
production until the key is
deleted.
T.Eavesdropping
A threat agent may listen to and
successfully interpret sensitive
assets sent or received over the
TOE external interface.
O.Confidentiality
The TOE shall provide measures
against disclosure of Admin Keys
and Non-admin Keys at import
and export.
T.Eavesdropping is mitigated by
requirements on confidentiality of
sensitive assets in transfer
(O.Confidentiality). The
requirements shall be met by
cryptographic mechanisms
(O.Crypto) and secure
cryptographic key handling
(O.Keys).
O.Crypto
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms
according to ref. [6]. This
includes mechanisms to:
- encrypt and decrypt user
data,
- calculate and verify message
authentication codes over
user data,
- calculate and verify digital
signatures over user data,
- derive keys,
- encrypt and decrypt keys,
and
- generate random data for key
and challenge generation.
O.Keys
The TOE shall provide secure
key mechanisms according to ref.
[6]. This includes mechanisms to:
- generate,
- derive,
- import,
- export, and
- backup keys.
The TOE (P-SAM) shall
increment a derivation counter
monotonically every time a key is
derived. The derivation counter
shall start on zero and shall not
be possible to reset after SAM
production until the key is
deleted.
T.Spoofing O.Authentication
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Threat/OSP/Assumption Objective Rationale
A threat agent may try to disguise
as an authorised user to disclose,
manipulate or remove sensitive
assets.
The TOE must provide measures
against unauthorised access to
sensitive assets and functionality
of the TOE.
T.Spoofing is mitigated by
requirements on authentication to
prevent unauthorised access.
The requirements shall be met by
cryptographic mechanisms
(O.Crypto) and secure
cryptographi key handling
(O.Keys).
O.Crypto
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms
according to ref. [6]. This
includes mechanisms to:
- encrypt and decrypt user
data,
- calculate and verify message
authentication codes over
user data,
- calculate and verify digital
signatures over user data,
- derive keys,
- encrypt and decrypt keys,
and
- generate random data for key
and challenge generation.
O.Keys
The TOE shall provide secure
key mechanisms according to ref.
[6]. This includes mechanisms to:
- generate,
- derive,
- import,
- export, and
- backup keys.
The TOE (P-SAM) shall
increment a derivation counter
monotonically every time a key is
derived. The derivation counter
shall start on zero and shall not
be possible to reset after SAM
production until the key is
deleted.
T.Replay
A threat agent may gain access
to sensitive information by
replaying TOE external
communication.
O.Replay_Detection
The TOE shall detect attempts to
replay the following TOE
commands defined in ref. [6]:
- Export of Admin Keys,
T.Replay is mitigated by
measured to detect replay
attacks.
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Threat/OSP/Assumption Objective Rationale
- Export of Non-admin Keys,
- Export of asymmetric keys,
- Import of Non-admin Keys,
- Import of Admin Keys,
- Reading encrypted binary
file content, and
- Update encrypted binary file
content.
T.Unint_Corruption
An authorised user may by
mistake override or bypass
security features of the TOE or
enable opportunities for others to
do so.
OE.Config_Review
The configuration performed by
an Authorised admin must be
reviewed by a second Authorised
admin to minimise unintentional
corruption before applied the
TOE.
T.Unint_Corruption is mitigated
by requirements on peer review
of configuration applied to the
TOE.
P.Crypto
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms
according to ref. [6]. This
includes mechanisms to:
- encrypt and decrypt user
data,
- calculate and verify message
authentication codes over
user data,
- calculate and verify digital
signatures over user data,
- derive keys,
- encrypt and decrypt keys,
and
- generate random data for key
and challenge generation.
O.Crypto
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms
according to ref. [6]. This
includes mechanisms to:
- encrypt and decrypt user
data,
- calculate and verify message
authentication codes over
user data,
- calculate and verify digital
signatures over user data,
- derive keys,
- encrypt and decrypt keys,
and
- generate random data for key
and challenge generation.
The P.Crypto policy is directly
covered by O.Crypto.
P.Keys
The TOE shall provide secure
mechanisms to generate, derive,
import, export, and backup keys.
The TOE (P-SAM) shall
increment a derivation counter
monotonically every time a key is
derived. The derivation counter
shall start on zero and shall not
be possible to reset after SAM
production until the key is
deleted.
O.Keys
The TOE shall provide secure
key mechanisms according to ref.
[6]. This includes mechanisms to:
- generate,
- derive,
- import,
- export, and
- backup keys.
The TOE (P-SAM) shall
increment a derivation counter
monotonically every time a key is
P.Keys policy is directly covered
by O.Keys.
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Threat/OSP/Assumption Objective Rationale
derived. The derivation counter
shall start on zero and shall not
be possible to reset after SAM
production until the key is
deleted.
P.Memory_Test
The TOE shall detect memory
deficiencies in the operational
environment at initial start-up.
O.Memory_Test
The TOE shall detect memory
deficiencies in the operational
environment at start-up.
P.Memory_Test policy is directly
covered by O.Memory_Test.
A.Deployment
The TOE operational
environment is assumed to react
on faulty deployment performed
by the Authorised service
personnel.
OE.Deployment
The TOE operational
environment must react on faulty
deployment performed by the
Authorised service personnel.
A.Deployment assumption is
directly covered by
OE.Deployment.
A.OBU_Protection
The TOE operational
environment is assumed to be
equipped with tamper protection.
OE.OBU_Protection
The OBU must be equipped with
tamper protection.
A.OBU_Protection assumption
is directly covered by
OE.OBU_Protection.
A.No_Evil
Authorised admins and service
personnel are assumed to be
security screened to be non-
hostile, sufficiently trained, and
willing to follow their instructions,
before authorised to interact with
the TOE.
OE.No_Evil
Authorised admins and service
personnel must be security
screened to be non-hostile,
sufficiently trained, and willing to
follow their instructions, before
authorised to interact with the
TOE.
A.No_Evil assumption is directly
covered by OE.No_Evil.
A.Counter
The TOE operational
environment is assumed to use
the Security Critical Commands
Usage Counter to request a new
authentication before e.g. 20000
Triple-Des or AES operations
have been performed
OE.SecurityCounter
The TOE operational
environment will use the Security
Critical Commands Usage
Counter to request a new
authentication before e.g. 20000
Triple-Des or AES operations
have been performed.
A.Counter assumption is directly
covered by
OE.SecurityCounter.
Table 21, Security objectives sufficiency
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5 Extended Components Definition
No extended components are defined.
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6 Security Requirements
6.1 TOE Security Functionality
The commands allowed by the TOE in its different deployments are defined in ref. [6].
6.2 Security Functional Policies
Access rules for Users operating the TOE by commands defined in ref. [6] are stated in the Access
Condition Policy, defined below by the FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, and FMT_MSA.3 requirements.
Information flow control is restricted by the rules stated in the Import/Export Key Policy defined below
by the FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1, FDP_ETC.2, and FDP_ITC.2.1 requirements.
6.3 Security Functional Requirements
6.3.1 Cryptographic Support – FCS
6.3.1.1 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1a (AES)
FCS_CKM.1.1a The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm AES and specified cryptographic key
sizes 128 and 256 bits that meet the following: Ref. [11].
6.3.1.2 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1b (DES)
FCS_CKM.1.1b The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm DES and specified cryptographic key
sizes 64 and 128 bits that meet the following: Ref. [11].
6.3.1.3 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1c (RSA)
FCS_CKM.1.1c The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and specified cryptographic key
sizes 1024, 2048, and 4096 bits that meet the following: Ref. [27].
6.3.1.4 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1d (ECC)
FCS_CKM.1.1d The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm ECC and specified cryptographic key
sizes 256 and 521 bits that meet the following: Ref. [22].
Application note: Only valid for: TR-SAM
6.3.1.5 Cryptographic key generation – FCS_CKM.1e (EC DH)
FCS_CKM.1.1e The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm EC DH, SHA-256 and specified
cryptographic key sizes 128 and 256 bits based on ECC P-256 and ECC P-
512/521 that meet the following: EC DH: Ref. [26], SHA-256: Ref. [21].
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6.3.1.6 Cryptographic key access – FCS_CKM.3
FCS_CKM.3.1 The TSF shall perform backup of keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key access method encrypting the keys with a 256 bits AES
key used only for backup that meets the following: AES: Ref. [20].
6.3.1.7 Cryptographic key destruction – FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting with zeroes that meets the
following: None.
6.3.1.8 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1a (AES encrypt/decrypt)
FCS_COP.1.1a The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in CBC or ECB modes and
cryptographic key sizes 128 or 256 bits that meet the following: AES: Ref. [20];
CBC, ECB: Ref. [24].
6.3.1.9 Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1b (DES encrypt/decrypt)
FCS_COP.1.1b The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm DES used in CBC or ECB modes and
cryptographic key sizes 64 or 128 bits that meet the following: DES: Ref. [19];
CBC, ECB: Ref. [24].
Application note: DES encryption in CBC mode with 64 or 128 bits key length used for calculation
of access credentials is only valid for: CS-SAM, CP-SAM, and P-SAM. Other use
of DES encryption/decryption is valid for: M-SAM, CS-SAM, CP-SAM, and P-
SAM. It is a requirement given by the system design and protocols that the SAM
must support DES also in the 64 bits mode [13].
6.3.1.10Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1c (AES key derivation)
FCS_COP.1.1c The TSF shall perform key derivation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 128 or
256 bits that meet the following: Scheme: Ref. [13] 9.8, 9.9, 10.9, 10.10; AES:
Ref. [20]; CBC: Ref. [24].
6.3.1.11Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1d (DES key derivation)
FCS_COP.1.1d The TSF shall perform key derivation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 64 or
128 bits that meet the following: Scheme: Ref. [13] 9.10, 10.7, 10.8; DES: Ref.
[19]; CBC: Ref. [24].
Application note: Derivation of 64 or 128 bits DES keys is used for calculation of access
credentials. Only valid for: CS-SAM, CP-SAM, and P-SAM.
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6.3.1.12Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1e (Key encrypt/decrypt)
FCS_COP.1.1e The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES in CBC mode and cryptographic key
sizes AES: 128 or 256 bits that meet the following: AES: Ref. [20]; CBC: Ref.
[24].
6.3.1.13Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1f (RSA encrypt/decrypt)
FCS_COP.1.1f The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSAES-OAEP or RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 and
cryptographic key sizes 2048 that meet the following: Ref. [27].
Application note: RSA encryption using 2048 bits key length is only valid for M-SAM. RSA
decryption is valid for all SAM deployments.
6.3.1.14Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1g (AES MAC)
FCS_COP.1.1g The TSF shall perform calculation and verification of message
authentication codes in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithms
AES MAC in CBC and EMAC or CMAC mode and cryptographic key sizes 128
or 256 bits that meet the following: AES: Ref. [20]; CBC Ref. [24]; EMAC: Ref.
[23]; CMAC: Ref. [25]. TR-SAM: Ref. [14] clause 7.1.2.
Application note: EMAC and CMAC are only valid for: CS-SAM, CP-SAM, TR-SAM and P-SAM.
6.3.1.15Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1h (DES MAC)
FCS_COP.1.1h The TSF shall perform calculation and verification of message
authentication codes in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
DES MAC in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 64 or128 bits that meet
the following: Ref. [18].
Application note: DES MAC calculation with 64 or 128 bits key length is used for calculation of
access credentials. Only valid for: CS-SAM, CP-SAM, and P-SAM.
6.3.1.16Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1i (SHA)
FCS_COP.1.1i The TSF shall perform calculation of a message digest in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes
NA that meet the following: Ref. [21].
Application note: Only used for digital signature calculations and verifications. When calculating
signatures the host calculates the hash, not the TOE. The TOE does hash
calculations as part of digital signatures but it is not an observable output. Only
valid for: CS-SAM and CP-SAM. It is a requirement given by the system design
and protocols that the SAM also must support SHA-1 [13]
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6.3.1.17Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1j (RSA digital signatures)
FCS_COP.1.1j The TSF shall perform calculation and verification of digital signatures in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithms RSASSA-PSS SHA-1,
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-5 SHA-1/SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes
1024/2048/4096 that meet the following: RSASSA-PSS, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1-
5: Ref. [27]; SHA-1/SHA-256: Ref. [21].
Application note: Only valid for: M-SAM, CS-SAM, CP-SAM, and P-SAM.
6.3.1.18Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1k (ECC digital signatures)
FCS_COP.1.1k The TSF shall perform calculation and verification of digital signatures in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm EC-DSA and cryptographic
key sizes NIST P-256, NIST P-521 (only verification) and BrainpoolP256r1,
SHA-1/SHA-256 that meet the following: Ref. [22], Ref. [16], and [15]. TR-
SAM: Ref. [14] clause 7.1.3; SHA-1/SHA-256: Ref. [21].
Application note: Verification is not valid for P-SAM. It is a requirement given by the system design
and protocols that the SAM also must support SHA-1 [13]
6.3.1.19Cryptographic operation – FCS_COP.1l (RNG)
FCS_COP.1.1l The TSF shall perform true random number generation in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm None and cryptographic key sizes NA that
meet the following: For TR-SAM 1/2: [12].
Application note: The random number generator is provided by the TOE operational environment.
6.3.2 User Data Protection - FDP
6.3.2.1 Subset access control – FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Condition Policy on
Subject: User
Objects: Master file,
Elementary files, and
Individual keys stored in a file
Operations: TOE Commands covered by access conditions according to
ref. [6].
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6.3.2.2 Security attribute based access control – FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Condition Policy to objects based on the
following subjects, objects and resp. attributes:
Attributes:
Subjects: Users PINs,
Challenge,
Nonce,
MAC,
Start-up usage counter,
Security critical commands usage counter,
Host Authenticated Mode indicator
Objects: Master file File identifier,
Access conditions: ALW, PwdGx, AutGSx,
AutDHx, ProGSx, NEV
Elementary files File identifier,
Access conditions: ALW, PwdGx, AutGSx,
AutDHx, ProGSx, NEV
Individual keys Key identifier (record number in file),
Access conditions: ALW, PwdGx, AutGSx,
AutDHx, ProGSx, NEV
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
a) Users may access objects which have the PwdGx access
condition defined only if the user has been authenticated by
the PIN x before the access. (Only valid for: M-SAM, CS-SAM
and P-SAM)
b) Users may access objects which have the AutGSx access
condition defined only if the user has been authenticated using
challenge response and the administrative symmetric key with
index x before the access. (Only valid for: CS-SAM, CP-SAM,
TR-SAM and P-SAM)
c) Users may access objects which have the AutDHx access
condition defined only if the user has been authenticated using
a challenge response and a symmetric session key as the
result of a Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme. If x=0 a
Nonce will be sent by the TOE, if x=1 a Nonce will be received
by the TOE.
d) Users may access objects which have the ProGSx access
condition defined only if a MAC is calculated over the whole
data field of the command using the administrative symmetric
key with identifier x. (Only valid for: CS-SAM, CP-SAM and P-
SAM)
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FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
a) Users may always access objects which have the ALW access
condition defined using TOE commands.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
a) Users shall be denied access to objects which have the NEV
access condition defined.
b) Users shall be denied access to objects if the usage counters
requests re-authentication (i.e. is/are configured to be used
and has/have reached zero). (Only valid for: CS-SAM, CP-SAM
and P-SAM)
c) Users shall be denied to load the SD Issuing CA container
more than once (overwrite).
d) Users shall be denied to load the SD public key container more
than once (overwrite).
e) Users shall be denied to generate SD asymmetric key pair
more than once (overwrite).
f) Access to Factory Authentication key shall be denied for all
other commands than: Load SD Issuing CA Container, Load
SD Target CA Container, Generate SD Key Pair, and Generate
Admin Transfer Key(commands according to ref. [6]).
g) If a command is not explicitly allowed for a key, it shall be
denied.
h) Data authentication requests to the TOE (TR-SAM) shall be
denied when the value of the referenced Toll Domain Counter
has reached its maximum. (Only valid for TR-SAM 1/2)
Application note: A Toll Domain Counter in the TR-SAM configuration 1 and 2 is incremented at
each authentication request from a Toll Domain. See ref. [14] for more
information.
6.3.2.3 Subset information flow control – FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Import/Export Key Policy on
Subject: Users
Information: Admin Keys and
Non-admin Keys.
Operations: Import and export
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6.3.2.4 Simple security attributes – FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Import/Export Key Policy based on the following
types of subject and information security attributes:
Attributes:
Subjects: Users PINs,
Challenge,
Nonce
Information: Admin Keys Key identifier
Non-admin Keys Key identifier
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and
controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold:
a) The user and the TOE shall be mutually authenticated by a
Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme before importing Admin
Keys.
b) The user and the TOE shall be mutually authenticated using a
challenge response and a symmetric session key as the result
of a Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme before exporting
Admin Keys. (Only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and P-SAM)
c) The user and the TOE shall be mutually authenticated by
challenge-response schemes based on Admin Keys before
importing Non-admin Keys.
d) The user and the TOE shall be mutually authenticated by
challenge-response schemes based on Admin Keys before
exporting Non-admin Keys. (Only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM,
and P-SAM)
e) The user shall be authenticated by a PIN before importing Non-
admin Keys. (Only valid for CS-SAM)
f) The user shall be authenticated by a PIN before exporting Non-
admin Keys. (Only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and P-SAM)
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP rules:
None.
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following
rules: None.
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:
a) It shall not be possible to export derived keys other than
explicitly derived for the DERIVE KEY External Export
command. (Only valid for CS-SAM and P-SAM)
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b) A Trusted Recorder master key, derived TR key, or internally
calculated MAC shall not be possible to export. (Only valid for
TR-SAM)
6.3.2.5 Export of user data with security attributes – FDP_ETC.2
FDP_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the Import/Export Key Policy when exporting user data,
controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security
attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside the
TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported from the
TOE:
a) Export of Admin Keys:
Admin Keys shall be encrypted using AES-CBC and a 256 bits
key encryption key, Admin Transfer encryption key. An CMAC
using a 256 bits key authentication key, Admin Transfer
authentication key, shall be applied. (Only valid for M-SAM, CS-
SAM, and P-SAM)
b) Export of Non-admin Keys using symmetric methods:
Non-admin Keys shall be decrypted using AES-CBC and a 256
bits key encryption key. (Only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and
P-SAM)
c) Export of Non-admin Keys using asymmetric methods:
Non-admin Keys shall be encrypted using RSA 2048 bits key. A
RSA digital signature shall be applied using 2048 bits key.
(Only valid for M-SAM)
d) Derived AES 128/256 bits key and derived DES 64 bits keys
shall be possible to export in plain text in a physically secure
environment. (Only valid for CS-SAM and P-SAM)
6.3.2.6 Import of user data with security attributes – FDP_ITC.2
FDP_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the Import/Export Key Policy when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous
association between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported
user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE:
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a) Import of Admin Keys:
Admin Keys shall be decrypted using AES-CBC and a 256 bits
key encryption key, Admin Transfer encryption key. An AES
MAC using CBC and a 256 bits key authentication key, Admin
Transfer authentication key, shall be verified. The Admin
Transfer keys shall only be used for import and export of
Admin keys. (Only valid for CS-SAM, CP-SAM, TR-SAM, and P-
SAM)
b) Import of Non-admin Keys using symmetric methods:
Non-admin Keys shall be decrypted using AES-CBC and a 256
bits key encryption key. (Only valid for CS-SAM, CP-SAM, TR-
SAM, and P-SAM)
c) Import of Non-admin Keys using asymmetric methods:
Non-admin Keys shall be decrypted using RSA 2048 bits key.
d) Import of KMS Issuing CA container:
The integrity and authenticity of the KMS Issuing CA container
shall be verified using a digital signature verified against the
pre-loaded KMS Root CA public key.
e) Import of SD container:
The integrity and authenticity of the SD container shall be
verified using a digital signature verified against the loaded
KMS Issuing CA public key.
6.3.3 Identification and Authentication – FIA
6.3.3.1 Authentication failure handling – FIA_AFL.1a (PIN)
FIA_AFL.1.1a The TSF shall detect when three unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to authentication using PIN.
FIA_AFL.1.2a When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met
the TSF shall
- block/disable commands secured by PwdGx,
- allow unblocking the TOE using a dedicated unblocking PIN.
Application note: There are two PINs defined each with a dedicated unblocking PIN. Which of the
two PIN’s, if any, the user shall supply for authentication is set by access
conditions. Only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and P-SAM.
6.3.3.2 Authentication failure handling – FIA_AFL.1b (Unblocking)
FIA_AFL.1.1b The TSF shall detect when seven unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to unblocking the TOE.
FIA_AFL.1.2b When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met
the TSF shall
- block/disable commands secured by PwdGx,
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- disallow unblocking the TOE using the dedicated unblocking
PIN.
Application note: There are two PINs defined, each with a dedicated unblocking PIN. Which of the
two PIN’s, if any, the user shall supply for authentication is set by access
conditions. Only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and P-SAM.
6.3.3.3 Verification of secrets – FIA_SOS.1
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that PINs meet the length of eight
bytes, each byte with possible values of 0x00 – 0xFF.
Application note: Only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and P-SAM.
6.3.3.4 Timing of authentication – FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow commands that does not have the PwdGx, AutGSx,
AutDHx or ProGSx access conditions defined on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note: The PwdGX authentication method is only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and P-
SAM), the AutGSx is only valid for CS-SAM, CP-SAM, TR-SAM, and P-SAM, the
ProGSx is only valid for CS-SAM, CP-SAM, and P-SAM).
6.3.3.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms – FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide the following mechanisms:
- Verification of a user supplied PIN, PwdGx (M-SAM, CS-SAM,
P-SAM)
- Verification using challenge – response, AutGSx (CS-SAM, CP-
SAM, TR-SAM, and P-SAM)
- Verification using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme,
AutDHx
- Verification using a calculated MAC, ProGSx (CS-SAM, CP-
SAM, and P-SAM)
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the access
conditions defined for the object accessed by the requested TOE
command.
Application note: There are two PINs defined. Which of the two PIN’s the user shall supply for
authentication is set by access conditions. The PIN values can be changed by a
management function command. The authentication mechanisms are defined in
ref. [13].
6.3.3.6 Re-authenticating – FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions:
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- The TOE is configured to use the Start-up Usage Counter and
it has reached zero: Authentication to fulfill the AutGS1 access
condition is required.
- The TOE is configured to use the Security Critical Commands
Usage Counter and it has reached zero: Authentication is
required before executing any of the security critical
commands:
- CALCULATE ACCESS CREDENTIALS,
- CALCULATE AES MAC,
- CALCULATE DES MAC,
- DECRYPT DATA
- DERIVE KEY EXTERNAL EXPORT,
- ENCRYPT DATA
- OBU KEY PERSONALISATION,
- VERIFY AES MAC,
- VERIFY DES MAC,
- DECRYPT DATA ASYM, or
- SIGN DATA.
- If the TOE is configured to use both the Start-up Usage
Counter and the Security Critical Commands Usage Counter,
the Security Critical Commands Usage Counter will be reset to
its preconfigured initial value when the Start-up Usage Counter
is decremented and has not reached zero.
Application note: Only valid for CS-SAM, CP-SAM, and P-SAM. Please see ref. [6] for
descriptions of the security critical commands.
6.3.4 Security Management – FMT
6.3.4.1 Static attribute initialisation – FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Condition Policy to provide the NEV access
condition as default values for access conditions of dynamically created
objects that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow none to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
6.3.4.2 Specification of Management Functions – FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
a) It shall be possible to read out the unique chip serial number of
the TOE.
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b) The TOE shall support changing and unblocking of PINs. (Only
valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and P-SAM)
c) It shall possible to reset both Usage Counters to their pre-
configured value before they have reached zero without
blocking other communication. (Only valid for CS-SAM, CP-
SAM and P-SAM)
d) It shall be possible to delete keys, after authentication using an
Admin Key (only valid for CS-SAM, CP-SAM, TR-SAM, and P-
SAM) or after authentication using PIN verification (only valid
for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and P-SAM), accordingly:
a. All keys, except the Factory Authentication Key and the
SD Key Pair, individually.
b. All symmetric keys, except the Admin Keys (Only valid
for CS-SAM, CP-SAM, TR-SAM and P-SAM).
c. All keys, except the Factory Authentication Key and the
KMS Root CA public key container. Note: This will bring
the TOE to factory settings. Also PINs and counters will
be reset to factory default values. (Only valid for CS-
SAM, CP-SAM, TR-SAM and P-SAM)
d. A Kill command shall unconditionally erase ALL keys
including the Factory Authentication Key and the KMS
Root CA public key container. (Only valid for CS-SAM,
CP-SAM, TR-SAM and P-SAM)
e) It shall be possible to obtain the following information about a
key:
a. The key unique identifier
b. The Key Verification Code, KVC (for symmetric keys)
c. The key derivation counter (Only valid for P-SAM)
f) At key generation is shall be possible to define a set of
commands allowed for the key. The set of commands shall be
possible to change after generation.
g) It shall be possible to modify and delete the access conditions
of dynamically created objects.
Application note: The key derivation counter is only used in the P-SAM and is monotonically
incremented every time a key is derived from the key. The derivation counter
shall start on zero and not be possible to reset until the key is deleted. The
derivation counter shall stop when reaching its maximum value and reject further
derivations to be performed.
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6.3.5 Protection of the TSF – FPT
6.3.5.1 Replay Detection – FPT_RPL.1
FPT_RPL.1.1 The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities:
At commands:
- Export of Admin Keys (Only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and P-
SAM)
- Export of Non-admin Keys (Only valid for M-SAM, CS-SAM, and
P-SAM)
- Import of Non-admin Keys (Only valid for CS-SAM, CP-SAM,
TR-SAM, and P-SAM)
- Import of Admin Keys (Only valid for CS-SAM, CP-SAM, TR-
SAM, and P-SAM)
- Reading encrypted binary file content
- Update encrypted binary file content
The replay shall be detected by using a random number, received from a
previously issued get challenge command, as initialisation vector, IV, for
the encryption/decryption of the data.
If the Backup-key is used for the encryption the IV will be set to zero and
no replay detection will be possible.
FPT_RPL.1.2 The TSF shall discard the command when replay is detected.
6.3.5.2 Testing of External Entities – FPT_TEE.1
FPT_TEE.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests during initial start-up to check the fulfilment
of the integrity of the Memory Protection Unit’s, MPU, configuration and the
Non-Volatile Memory, NVM.
FPT_TEE.1.2 If the test fails, the TSF shall be possible to be informed about the test
results.
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6.4 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements according to Table 22 have been chosen. The comprise EAL5.
Assurance Class Assurance Component Name Component
ADV: Development Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1
Complete semi-functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.5
Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1
Well-structured internals ADV_INT.2
Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.4
AGD: Guidance documents Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1
ALC: Life-cycle support Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.4
Development tools CM coverage ALC_CMS.5
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1
Identification of security
measures
ALC_DVS.1
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.2
ASE: Security Target evaluation Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1
ST introduction ASE_INT.1
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1
ATE: Tests Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2
Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.3
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4
Table 22, Security Assurance Requirements
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6.5 Security Requirements Rationale
6.5.1 Security Functional Requirements Dependencies
Requirement
Direct explicit
dependencies
Dependencies met
by
Comment
FCS_CKM.1a [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1a,
FCS_COP.1g,
FCS_COP.1e and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1b [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1b,
FCS_COP.1h and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1c [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1f,
FCS_COP.1j and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1d [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1k and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1e [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1a and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.3 [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
---
FCS_CKM.4
The backup key is pre-loaded
in TOE at the Personalization
phase.
FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FDP_ITC.2 and
FCS_CKM.1a - e
Both generated and imported
keys are deleted.
FCS_COP.1a [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1a,
FCS_CKM.1e,
FDP_ITC.2 and
FCS_CKM.4
Both generated and imported
keys are used for AES
encryption/decryption.
FCS_COP.1b [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1b,
FDP_ITC.2 and
FCS_CKM.4
Both generated and imported
keys are used for DES
encryption/decryption.
FCS_COP.1c [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1a,
FCS_CKM.1e,
FDP_ITC.2 and
FCS_CKM.4
Both generated and imported
keys are used for AES key
derivation.
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Requirement
Direct explicit
dependencies
Dependencies met
by
Comment
FCS_COP.1d [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1b,
FDP_ITC.2 and
FCS_CKM.4
Both generated and imported
keys are used for DES key
derivation.
FCS_COP.1e [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1a,
FCS_CKM.1e,
FDP_ITC.2 and
FCS_CKM.4
Both generated and imported
keys are used for AES key
encryption.
FCS_COP.1f [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1c,
FDP_ITC.2, and
FCS_CKM.4
Both generated and imported
keys are used for RSA
encryption/decryption
FCS_COP.1g [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1a,
FCS_CKM.1e,
FDP_ITC.2 and
FCS_CKM.4
Both generated and imported
keys are used for AES MAC.
FCS_COP.1h [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1b,
FDP_ITC.2 and
FCS_CKM.4
Both generated and imported
keys are used for DES MAC.
FCS_COP.1i [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
---
---
No keys are used for SHA-1
calculation.
FCS_COP.1j [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1c,
and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1k [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1d and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1l [FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1a,
FCS_COP.1b and
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 and
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ETC.2 FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1
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Requirement
Direct explicit
dependencies
Dependencies met
by
Comment
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1 and
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1 FMT_MSA.3 is not applicable
since no default values exists
for the security attributes.
FDP_ITC.2 [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1] and
[FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1] and
FPT_TDC.1
FDP_IFC.1
---
---
Imported keys are always
encrypted no trusted channel is
needed.
Consistency with the user (the
host) is assured at integration
not at run-time. FPT_TDC.1 is
not needed.
FIA_AFL.1a FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_AFL.1b FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_SOS.1 - -
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Not met No identification is required in
this single user system.
FIA_UAU.5 - -
FIA_UAU.6 - -
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_SMR.1
-
-
Restrictions to access security
attributes are controlled by
access conditions.
The TOE is not aware of roles.
FMT_SMF.1 - -
FPT_RPL.1 - -
FPT_TEE.1 - -
Table 23, SFR dependencies
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6.5.2 Security Assurance Dependencies Analysis
The chosen evaluation assurance level is EAL5 and all dependencies are met internally by the EAL
package.
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6.5.3 Security Functional Requirements Coverage
O.Authentication
O.Confidentiality
O.Crypto
O.Keys
O.Integrity
O.Replay-Detection
O.Memory_Test
FCS_CKM.1a X
FCS_CKM.1b X X
FCS_CKM.1c X
FCS_CKM.1d X X
FCS_CKM.1e X
FCS_CKM.3 X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1a X
FCS_COP.1b X
FCS_COP.1c X
FCS_COP.1d X
FCS_COP.1e X X
FCS_COP.1f X X
FCS_COP.1g X X
FCS_COP.1h X
FCS_COP.1i X X
FCS_COP.1j X X
FCS_COP.1k X X
FCS_COP.1l X X X
FDP_ACC.1 X
FDP_ACF.1 X
FDP_ETC.2 X X
FDP_IFC.1 X
FDP_IFF.1 X
FDP_ITC.2 X X
FIA_AFL.1a X
FIA_AFL.1b X
FIA_SOS.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X
FIA_UAU.5 X
FIA_UAU.6 X
FMT_MSA.3 X
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O.Authentication
O.Confidentiality
O.Crypto
O.Keys
O.Integrity
O.Replay-Detection
O.Memory_Test
FMT_SMF.1 X X
FPT_RPL.1 X
FPT_TEE.1 X
Table 24, Security Functional Requirements Coverage
6.5.4 Security Functional Requirements Sufficiency
Objective SFR Rationale
O.Authentication
The TOE must provide measures
against unauthorised access to
sensitive assets and functionality
of the TOE.
FCS_COP.1l
FCS_COP.1b
FCS_COP.1d
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1
FIA_AFL.1a
FIA_AFL.1b
FIA_SOS.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMF.1
Authentication (FIA_UAU.1) is required for
operations on objects according to access
conditions (FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1,
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1) using the NEV
access condition as default on dynamically
created objects (FMT_MSA.3).
Authentication shall be obtained either by
PIN or challenge-response (FIA_UAU.5)
and re-authentication shall be performed
with intervals according defined counters
(FIA_UAU.6). PINs shall be of a certain
length (FIA_SOS.1) and shall be blocked
after unsuccessful authentication attempts
(FIA_AFL.1a) but possible to be
unblocked (FIA_AFL.1b, FMT_SMF.1).
Challenges shall be random
(FCS_COP.1l). Access credentials shall
be created by DES using 64/128 bits keys
(FCS_COP.1b, FCS_COP.1d).
O.Confidentiality
The TOE shall provide measures
against disclosure of Admin Keys
and Non-admin Keys at import and
export.
FCS_COP.1e
FCS_COP.1f
FDP_ETC.2
FDP_ITC.2
AES-CBC 256 bits keys shall be used for
encryption/decryption (FCS_COP.1e) of
Admin Keys and Non-Admin Keys at
export (FDP_ETC.2) and import
(FDP_ITC.1). RSA with 2048 bits keys
shall be used for encryption/decryption
(FCS_COP.1f) of Non-admin Keys at
export (FDP_ETC.2) and import
(FDP_ITC.2).
O.Crypto
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms to
encrypt and decrypt user data.
FCS_COP.1a
FCS_COP.1b
FCS_COP.1c
FCS_COP.1d
FCS_COP.1e
AES and DES encryption/decryption shall
be provided for user data (FCS_COP.1a,
FCS_COP.1b).
AES MAC and DES MAC shall be
provided for message authentication
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Objective SFR Rationale
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms to
calculate and verify message
authentication codes over user
data.
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms to
calculate and verify digital
signatures over user data.
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms to
derive keys.
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms to
encrypt and decrypt keys.
The TOE shall provide
cryptographic mechanisms to
generate random data for key and
challenge generation.
FCS_COP.1f
FCS_COP.1g
FCS_COP.1h
FCS_COP.1i
FCS_COP.1j
FCS_COP.1k
FCS_COP.1l
calculations and verifications over user
data (FCS_COP.1g, FSC_COP.1h).
RSA and ECC digital signatures shall be
provided for user data (FCS_COP.1i,
FCS_COP.1j, FCS_COP.1k).
AES and DES algorithms shall be provided
for key derivation (FCS_COP.1c,
FCS_COP.1d).
AES and DES algorithms shall be provided
for key encryption and decryption
(FCS_COP.1e, FCS_COP.1f).
Random data generation shall be provided
using AES and TDES (FCS_COP.1l).
O.Keys
The TOE shall provide secure
mechanisms to generate, derive,
import, export, and backup keys.
The TOE shall increment a
derivation counter monotonically
every time a key is derived. The
derivation counter shall start on
zero and shall not be possible to
reset after SAM production until
the key is deleted.
FCS_CKM.1a
FCS_CKM.1b
FCS_CKM.1c
FCS_CKM.1d
FCS_CKM.1e
FCS_CKM.3
FCS_CKM.4
Generation of AES 128/256, DES 64/128,
RSA 1024/2048/4096, ECC 256/521 bits
key shall be provided (FCS_CKM.1a,
FCS_CKM.1b, FCS_CKM.1c,
FCS_CKM.1d).
Generation of symmetric keys using EC
DH and SHA-256 shall be provided
(FCS_CKM.1e).
Encrypted backu of keys shall be
performed (FCS_CKM.3).
Keys shall be deleted using overwriting
(FCS_CKM.4).
O.Integrity
The TOE shall provide measures to
ensure integrity and authenticity of
Admin Keys and Non-admin Keys
at import and export.
The TOE shall provide measures
ensure integrity and authenticity of
KMS Issuing CA container and SD
container at import.
FCS_COP.1g
FCS_COP.1i
FCS_COP.1j
FCS_COP.1k
FDP_ETC.2
FDP_ITC.2
Both AES MAC, DES MAC, RSA digital
signatures, and ECC digital signatures
shall be used to ensure integrity of assets
(FCS_COP.1g, FCS_COP.1i,
FCS_COP.1j, FCS_COP.1k, FDP_ETC.2,
FDP_ITC.2).
O.Replay_Detection
The TOE must detect attempts to
replay TOE commands.
FPT_RPL.1 Replay attempts on import/export of keys
and reading/updating of binary file
contents shall be detected (FPT_RPL.1).
O.Memory_Test
The TOE shall detect memory
deficiencies in the operational
environment at initial start-up.
FPT_TEE.1 Memory tests shall be done at initial start-
up (FPT_TEE.1).
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Table 25, Security Functional Requirements Sufficiency
6.5.5 Justification of the Chosen Evaluation Assurance Level
The assurance level EAL5 has been chosen as appropriate for a Secure Application Module since it
provides a moderate level of assured security, and a thorough investigation of the TOE.
It is assumed that the TOE is operated in an environment where attackers have public or moderate
expertise of the involved systems (e.g., general and publicly available knowledge about the technology
area), resources and motivation are assumed to be high because of possible high-value assets
protected by the TOE and the opportunity for an attack is varies between the deployment scenarios.
The overall attack potential is assumed to be moderate, which means that EAL5 and AVA_VAN.4 is
considered an appropriate assurance level.
The assurance requirements are not reproduced in this protection profile as they are chosen from
Common Criteria Part 3, without any alterations done to the SARs.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
This section presents information to how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in
previous sections of this ST.
7.1 TOE Security Functions
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to security functions.
Hence, each function is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This
serves to both describe the security functions and rationalize that the security functions satisfy the
necessary requirements. Table 26 lists the security functions and their associated SFRs.
TOE Security Function SFR Description
Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1a Cryptographic key generation – AES
FCS_CKM.1b Cryptographic key generation – DES
FCS_CKM.1c Cryptographic key generation – RSA
FCS_CKM.1d Cryptographic key generation – ECC
FCS_CKM.1e Cryptographic key generation – EC DH
FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access - Backup
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1a Cryptographic operation – AES
encrypt/decrypt
FCS_COP.1b Cryptographic operation – DES
encrypt/decrypt
FCS_COP.1c Cryptographic operation – AES key
derivation
FCS_COP.1d Cryptographic operation – DES key
derivation
FCS_COP.1e Cryptographic operation – AES key
encrypt
FCS_COP.1f Cryptographic operation – RSA
encrypt/decrypt
FCS_COP.1g Cryptographic operation – AES MAC
FCS_COP.1h Cryptographic operation – DES MAC
FCS_COP.1i Cryptographic operation – SHA-1
FCS_COP.1j Cryptographic operation – RSA digital
signature
FCS_COP.1k Cryptographic operation – ECC digital
signature
FCS_COP.1l Cryptographic operation - RNG
User Data Protection FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute access control
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TOE Security Function SFR Description
FDP_ETC.2 Export of user data with security
attributes
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes
Identification and
Authentication
FIA_AFL.1a Authentication failure handling - PIN
FIA_AFL.1b Authentication failure handling –
Challenge-response
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
Security Management FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Protection of the TSF FPT_RPL.1 Replay Detection
FPT_TEE.1 Testing of External Entities
Table 26, TOE Security Functions
7.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptographic support to the user and for the protection of the TSF. The
cryptographic support includes encryption and decryption of data and keys using AES, DES, RSA and
ECC algorithms. Authentication of data is provided as AES and DES MAC calculation and verification
as well as digital signatures using RSA or ECC algorithms. (FCS_COP.1a – l)
Cryptographic keys are generated for AES, DES, RSA, and ECC as well as using an EC DH scheme.
(FCS_CKM.1a – e)
Backup is taken of cryptographic keys and keys are destroyed in a secure way. (FCS_CKM.3,
FCS_CKM.4)
7.3 User Data Protection
Access control to sensitive assets is restricted by an access control policy, Access Condition Policy
(FDP_ACC.1) that requires authentication according to configurable access conditions (FDP_ACF.1).
Import and export of sensitive assets are restricted by an information flow control policy, Import/Export
Key Policy (FDP_IFC.1), that requires authentication before import or export can take place
(FDP_IFF.1) and ensures that the assets are confidentiality, integrity, and authentication protected
(FDP_ETC.2, FDP_ITC.2).
7.4 Identification and Authentication
Authentication (FIA_UAU.1) is required according to access conditions set for each asset. The
authentication can be performed either by PIN, a challenge-response scheme, a Diffie-Hellman key
exchange scheme, or a calculated MAC authentication code (FIA_UAU.5). Re-authentication is
required according to configurable conditions (FIA_UAU.6). The PIN secrets shall be of a certain length
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(FIA_SOS.1) and unsuccessful authentication attempts shall block the PIN (FIA_AFL.1a). Unsuccessful
attempts to unblock the PIN shall block the unblocking function (FIA_AFL.1b).
7.5 Security Management
Certain management functions can be performed (FMT_SMF.1) and the access condition security
attributes shall have restricted default values (FMT_MSA.3).
7.6 Protection of the TSF
Measures are applied to detect replay attempts at export and import of keys as well as for reading and
updating binary file contents within the TOE (FPT_RPL.1).
Memory provided by the operational environment is functionally tested at start-up (FPT_TEE.1) and the
result can be read by the user.
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8 Statement of Compatibility
8.1 TSF
The platform SFRs from Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-PP-0035, ref. [8], and Security
Target Lite, M9900, M9905, M9906 including optional Software Libraries RSA - EC – Toolbox – FTL,
Infineon Technologies AG, ref. [9], have been separated into Irrelevant Platform-SFRs, IP, not being
used by the TOE, and Relevant Platform-SFRs, RP, being used by the TOE. The separation is
presented in Table 27.
SFR SFR Name Ref. IP RP
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance [8] X
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state [8] X
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities [8] X
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability [8] X
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage [8] X
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack [8] X
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection [8] X
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection [8] X
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control [8] X
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE security testing [9] X
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control [9] X
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control [9] X
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes [9] X
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization [9] X
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management functions [9] X
FCS_COP.1/DES-1121 Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/DES-1681 Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/AES-1281 Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/AES-1921 Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/AES-2561 Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/RSA
RSAEP/RSADP 1024
Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/RSA
RSAEP/RSADP 2048
Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/RSA
RSAEP/RSADP 4096
Cryptographic support [9] X
1 Hardware interface is used in ECB and CBC modes
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SFR SFR Name Ref. IP RP
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1024 Cryptographic key generation [9] X
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2048 Cryptographic key generation [9] X
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-4096 Cryptographic key generation [9] X
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-
P-{256, 521},
Brainpool P256r1
Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-
P-{192, 224, 384},
K-{163, 233, 409},
B-{233, 283, 409},
Brainpool P{160, 192, 224,
320, 384, 512} r1,
Brainpool P{160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384, 512} t1
Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_CKM.1/EC-
P-{256, 521}
Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_CKM.1/EC-
P-{192, 224, 384},
K-{163, 233, 409},
B-{233, 283, 409},
Brainpool P{160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384, 512} r1,
Brainpool P{160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384, 512} t1
Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-
P-{256, 521}
Cryptographic support [9] X
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-
P-{192, 224, 384},
K-{163, 233, 409},
B-{233, 283, 409},
Brainpool P{160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384, 512} r1,
Brainpool P{160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384, 512} t1
Cryptographic support [9] X
FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring [9] X
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action [9] X
FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for random numbers [9] X
Table 27, Irrelevant and relevant platform-SFRs
From Table 27 can be deduced that the platform-TSF is complete and consistent. All operations on the
relevant platform-SFRs, including refinements, are also appropriate for the TOE.
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8.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The platform security assurance requirements, SARs, defined in the IC chip Protection Profile, BSI-PP-
0035, ref. [8], and Infineon Security Target, ref. [9], have been compiled together with the SARs from
this ST in Table 28.
Security Assurance Requirements PP [8] ST [9] TOE ST
Class ADV: Development
Architectural design ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1
Functional specification ADV_FSP.4 ADV_FSP.5 ADV_FSP.5
Implementation representation ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1
TSF Internals ADV_INT.2 ADV_INT.2
TOE design ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.4 ADV_TDS.4
Class AGD: Guidance documents
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1
Preparative user guidance AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1
Class ALC: Life-cycle support
CM capabilities ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4
CM scope ALC_CMS.4 ALC_CMS.5 ALC_CMS.5
Delivery ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1
Development security ALC_DVS.2 ALC_DVS.2 ALC_DVS.1
Life-cycle definition ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT.1 ALC_TAT.2 ALC_TAT.2
Class ASE: Security Target
evaluation
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1
Class ATE: Tests
Coverage ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2
Depth ATE_DPT.2 ATE_DPT.3 ATE_DPT.3
Functional tests ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1
Independent testing ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2
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Security Assurance Requirements PP [8] ST [9] TOE ST
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 AVA_VAN.5 AVA_VAN.4
Table 28, Security Assurance Requirements
From Table 28 it is evident that the SARs stated for the TOE is a subset of the platform SARs and do
not exceed those.
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8.3 Security Objectives
8.3.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The relevant security objectives for the certified platform have been reproduced below for the reader’s
convenience.
Platform Security Objectives Ref.
O.Leak-Inherent
Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data stored and/or
processed in the Security IC
- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals (for example on the
power, clock, or I/O lines) and
- by measurement and analysis of the time between events found by measuring signals (for
instance on the power, clock, or I/O lines).
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing whereas
O.Phys-Probing is about direct measurements on elements on the chip surface. Details
correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
[8]
O.Phys-Probing
Protection against Physical Probing
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of User Data, against the
disclosure/reconstruction of the Security IC Embedded Software or against the disclosure of
other critical information about the operation of the TOE. This includes protection against
- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
with a prior
- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. The TOE
must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex equipment,
knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other information
which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack.
[8]
O.Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions The TOE must ensure its correct operation.
The TOE must indicate or prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where
reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent malfunctions.
Examples of environmental conditions are voltage, clock frequency, temperature, or external
energy fields.
[8]
O.Phys-Manipulation
Protection against Physical Manipulation
The TOE must provide protection against manipulation of the TOE (including its software and
Data), the Security IC Embedded Software and the User Data. This includes protection against
- reverse-engineering (understanding the design and its properties and functions),
- manipulation of the hardware and any data, as well as
- controlled manipulation of memory contents (Application Data).
[8]
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Platform Security Objectives Ref.
The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex
equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other
information which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack.
O.Leak-Forced
Protection against Forced Information Leakage
The Security IC must be protected against disclosure of confidential data processed in the
Security IC (using methods as described under O.Leak-Inherent) even if the information
leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker
- by forcing a malfunction (refer to “Protection against Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
(O.Malfunction)â€
and/or
- by a physical manipulation (refer to “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-
Manipulation)â€.
If this is not the case, signals which normally do not contain significant information about
secrets could become an information channel for a leakage attack.
[8]
O.Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery
can be abused in order to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the
Security IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded Security IC Embedded Software
or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or security services of the TOE.
Details depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC
Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
[8]
O.Identification
TOE Identification
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data in its
non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification.
[8]
O.RND
Random Numbers
The TOE will ensure the cryptographic quality of random number generation. For instance
random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have a sufficient entropy.
The TOE will ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to
an attacker since they might be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys.
[8]
O.Add-Functions
Additional Specific Security Functionality
The TOE must optionally provide the following specific security functionality to the Smartcard
Embedded Software:
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES)
- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC)
[9]
O.Mem-Access
Area based Memory Access Control
The TOE must provide the Smartcard Embedded Software with the capability to define
restricted access memory areas. The TOE must then enforce the partitioning of such memory
[9]
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Platform Security Objectives Ref.
areas so that access of software to memory areas and privilege levels is controlled as
required, for example, in a multi-application environment.
Table 29, Platform security objectives
The platform security objectives are complementing the TOE security objectives by
- Protection from confidential data disclosure on a physical hardware level (O.Leak-Inherent,
O.Phys-Probing, O.Leak-Forced)
- Protection from platform malfunction or manipulation (O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation,
O.Abuse-Func, O.Mem-Access)
- Offering means for identification and cryptographic operations (O.Identification, O.RND,
O.Add-Functions)
No contradiction between the certified platform and the TOE security objectives has been identified.
8.3.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
The security objectives for the certified platform environment have been reproduced below for the
reader’s convenience.
Platform Security Objectives for the Environment Ref. Met by the TOE
OE.Plat-Appl
Usage of Hardware Platform
To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the Security IC
Embedded Software shall be designed so that the requirements
from the following documents are met: (i) hardware data sheet for
the TOE, (ii) data sheet of the IC Dedicated Software of the TOE,
(iii) TOE application notes, other guidance documents, and (iv)
findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC
Embedded Software as referenced in the certification report.
[8] ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
ADV_INT
ADV_TDS
OE.Resp-Appl
Treatment of User Data
Security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are
treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as required by the
security needs of the specific application context.
[8] O.Authentication
O.Confidentiality
O.Crypto
O.Keys
O.Integrity
O.Replay_Detection
O.Memory_Test
OE.Process-Sec-IC
Protection during composite product manufacturing
Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery
to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the
TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any
possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).
This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase
6 (refer to Section 1.2.3) must be protected appropriately. For a
preliminary list of assets to be protected refer to paragraph 140H
92 (page 141H 30).
[8] ALC_CMC
ALC_CMS
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
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Table 30, Platform security objectives for the environment
The platform security objectives for the environment are all met by the requirements in this ST according
to the Table 30. No contradictions between the security objectives stated for the platform environment
and for the TOE (section 4.3) exist.
8.4 Security Problem Definition
8.4.1 Threats
See section 3.2 for a description of the threats against the TOE and the certified platform.
8.4.2 Organizational Security Policies
See section 3.3 for a description of the OSPs for the TOE and the certified platform.
8.4.3 Assumptions on the Environment
The assumptions for the platform environment have been reproduced below for the reader’s
convenience. The corresponding objectives are all met by the TOE according to section 8.3.2.
Platform Assumptions on the Environment Met by objective Ref.
A.Process-Sec-IC
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the
TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer
to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its
manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).
This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery (refer to Sections
119H 1.2.2 and 120H 7.1) are assumed to be protected
appropriately. For a preliminary list of assets to be protected refer
to paragraph 121H 92 (page 122H 30).
OE.Process-Sec-IC [8]
A.Plat-Appl
Usage of Hardware Platform
The Security IC Embedded Software is designed so that the
requirements from the following documents are met: (i) TOE
guidance documents (refer to the Common Criteria assurance
class AGD) such as the hardware data sheet, and the hardware
application notes, and (ii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports
relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software as documented in
the certification report.
OE.Plat-Appl [8]
A.Resp-Appl
Treatment of User Data
OE.Resp-Appl [8]
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Platform Assumptions on the Environment Met by objective Ref.
All User Data are owned by Security IC Embedded Software.
Therefore, it must be assumed that security relevant User Data
(especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC
Embedded Software as defined for its specific application context.
A.Key-Function
Usage of Key-dependent Functions
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the
Smartcard Embedded Software in a way that they are not
susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-Inherent
and T.Leak-Forced).
OE.Plat-Appl
OE.Resp-Appl
[9]
Table 31, Platform assumptions on the environment
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Appendix A – Abbreviations and Acronyms
Acronym or Abbr. Explanation
Admin Key Admin Keys are symmetric AES keys used to protect a security domain
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CA Certification Authority
CMAC Cipher-based MAC
CP-SAM Communication Point SAM
CS-SAM Central Services SAM
DES Data Encryption Standard
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication. Denotes the interface between
the OBU and the ES.
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
Host The host is an actor with its own SAM. Typically this is a central system
with an attached CSM.
KMS Key Management System
KVC Key Verification Code
MAC Message Authentication Code
M-SAM Master SAM
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
Non-Admin Keys Non-Admin keys are symmetric keys used in operation.
OBU On Board Unit
OSP Organisational Security Policy
P-SAM OBU Personalisation SAM
PIN Personal Identification Number
RSAES-OAEP RSA encoding mechanism identical to REM 1 according to ISO/IEC
18033-2:2006 §11.3.2 .
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 RSA encoding mechanism identical to REM 1 according to ISO/IEC
18033-2:2006 §11.3.2 .
SAM Secure Application Module
SD Security Domain. Within one SD devices have trust in each other.
Technically they have the same of Administrative Master keys. One project
has one SD.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMD Surface-Mount Device
TOE Target Of Evaluation
Toll domain An area or part of a road network where a toll regime is applied
TR Trusted Recorder
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Acronym or Abbr. Explanation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Table 32, Abbreviations and acronyms
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Appendix B - Referenced Documents2
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Systems, Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001, September 2012
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Systems, Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-002, September 2012
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Systems, Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
[4] SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES, FIPS 140-2,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
[5] BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V6-2017 for Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (SecurityController)
M9900 A22/G11/C22/D22, M9905 A11,M9906 A11 with optional
RSAv1.03.006/v2.05.005/v2.07.003, ECv1.03.006/v2.05.005/v2.07.003,
Toolboxv1.03.006/v2.05.005/v2.07.003, Flash TranslationLayer V1.01.0008, SCL
v2.01.011/v2.02.010 andPSL v4.00.09 libraries with specific IC dedicated software from
Infineon Technologies AG
[6] Interface Specification for Kapsch SAM 5000, 8633 803-311, Kapsch TrafficCom AB 1
[7] https://partners-
global.kapschtraffic.com/rfid/Security/Standards/ACQ20121128RFI_TollTechnology.pdf
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15.06.2007, BSI-PP-0035, European
Smart Card Industry Association
[9] Security Target Lite, M9900, M9905, M9906 including optional Software Libraries RSA -
EC - SCL- PSL, Version 2.8.0, Date 2017-08-18, Infineon Technologies AG
[10] Cl97_2-07-003_RSA4k-ECC521_Embedding
[11] IFX Application Notes SLE97 version 2.5.0
[12] NIST-Recommended Random Number Generator Based on ANSI X9.31, Appendix
A.2.4, Using the 3-Key Triple DES and AES Algorithms, January 31, 2005, NIST
[13] Device Requirement Specification for Kapsch SAM 5000, 8633 803-253, Kapsch
TrafficCom AB 1
[14] Electronic fee collection — Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems — Part 2:
Trusted recorder, March 2015, CEN/TS 16702-2
[15] RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard, Curves and Curve
Generation
[16] ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Digital
signatures with appendix -- Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms
2 When referenced version is not provided the current version of the applicable document applies. The current version can be
found in the SAM 5000 Product Baseline 8633 803-576
Kapsch TrafficCom AB
Utfärdare (tj-st-bet, namn)/Issued by Datum/Date Arkiveringsdata/File Utgåva/Issue. Sida/Page
KTC-AB-SGR 2018-03-21 902390D.docx D 73 (73)
page 73 of 73
[17] ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006, Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 3: Cards with
contacts -- Electrical interface and transmission protocols
[18] ISO 16609:2012, Financial services, Requirements for message authentication using
symmetric techniques
[19] ISO/IEC 18033-3:2007, Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption
algorithms — Part 3: Block ciphers
[20] ISO/IEC 18033-3:2005, Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption
algorithms — Part 3: Block ciphers
[21] FIPS PUB 180-4. Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
[22] FIPS PUB 186-2, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
[23] ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, Information technology -- Security techniques – Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher
[24] ISO/IEC 10116:2006, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Modes of
operation for an n-bit block cipher
[25] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
[26] NIST Special Publication 800-56A, rev 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
[27] PKCS #1 V2.1, PKCS #1 V2.1: RSA CRYPTOGRAPHY STANDARD (June 14, 2002)
from RSA Laboratories
[28] Implementing a NIST SP800-90A Random Bit Generator (DRBG), TRNG post-
processing for PTG.3, DRG.4 and FIPS compliance, Application Note, Rev.1.1 2014-09-
30