NetScreen Appliances
Validation Report
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
NetScreen Technologies, Incorporated
NetScreen Appliances
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-02-0027
Version 1.0
Dated: 30 November 2002
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6740
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6740
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jean Hung
Yi-Fang Koh
The MITRE Corporation
Bedford, Massachusetts
Janine Pedersen
National Security Agency
Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Science Applications International Corporation
Columbia, Maryland
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Table of Contents
DATED: 30 NOVEMBER 2002 ....................................................................................................I
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................... 5
2 IDENTIFICATION................................................................................................................ 5
3 SECURITY POLICY............................................................................................................. 6
4 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE...................................................... 7
4.1 USAGE ASSUMPTIONS 7
4.2 PHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS 7
4.3 LOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 7
4.4 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE 7
5 ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION................................................................................ 8
5.1 TOE SUBSYSTEMS 8
5.1.1 Administrative Subsystem.......................................................................................... 8
5.1.2 Networking Subsystem............................................................................................... 9
6 DOCUMENTATION............................................................................................................. 9
7 IT PRODUCT TESTING.................................................................................................... 10
7.1 DEVELOPER TESTING 10
7.2 EVALUATOR TESTING 11
8 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION................................................................................... 11
9 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION.................................................................................. 12
9.1 EVALUATION OF THE NETSCREEN APPLIANCES SECURITY TARGET (ST) (ASE) 12
9.2 EVALUATION OF THE CM CAPABILITIES (ACM) 13
9.3 EVALUATION OF THE DELIVERY AND OPERATION DOCUMENTS (ADO) 13
9.4 EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT (ADV) 13
9.5 EVALUATION OF THE GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS (AGD) 13
9.6 EVALUATION OF THE TEST DOCUMENTATION AND THE TEST ACTIVITY (ATE) 13
9.7 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITY (AVA) 13
9.8 SUMMARY OF EVALUATION RESULTS 13
10 VALIDATOR COMMENTS........................................................................................... 13
11 SECURITY TARGET.......................................................................................................... 14
12 GLOSSARY...................................................................................................................... 14
13 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................. 16
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Main Components of a NetScreen Appliance.............................................................. .12
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers....................................................................................................... 6
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report documents the NIAP validators’ assessment of the CCEVS evaluation of NetScreen Appliances. It presents
the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance result.
The evaluation was performed by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and was completed on 30
November 2002. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) written by
SAIC and submitted to the validators. The evaluation determined the product conforms to the CC Version 2.1, Part 2 and
Part 3 to meet the requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2, resulting in a “pass” in accordance with CC Part
1 paragraph 175. The Target of Evaluation (TOE) also conforms to the U.S. Government Traffic-Filter Firewall
Protection Profile for Low-Risk Environments, Version 1.1, April 1999.
The NetScreen Appliances under evaluation are integrated security network devices designed and manufactured by
NetScreen Technologies, Incorporated. NetScreen’s line of appliances combines firewall, virtual private networking
(VPN), and traffic management functions. Installing and managing appliances is accomplished using a command line
interface (CLI).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) includes the NetScreen appliances that run ScreenOS 4.0.0r7.0, a proprietary operating
system. The NetScreen appliances that meet the definition of the TOE includes models: 5XP, 5XT, 25, 50, 100, 204,
208, 500, and 5200. Each identified model consists of hardware, firmware, and ScreenOS that runs in firmware.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, observed evaluation testing activities, provided
guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the
ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements
and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that SAIC's
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results correct.
Disclaimers: The information contained in this Validation Report is not an endorsement of NetScreen Appliances by any
agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of NetScreen Appliances is either expressed or implied.
2 IDENTIFICATION
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations
are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through EAL 4 in accordance with
National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of information technology products desire a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a
fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s
Validated Products List. Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
· the Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated,
· the Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product,
· the conformance result of the evaluation,
· the organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
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Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
Target of Evaluation
NetScreen Appliances includes models: 5XP, 5XT, 25, 50, 100, 204,
208, 500, and 5200
Protection Profile
U.S. Government Traffic-Filter Firewall Protection Profile for Low-
Risk Environments, Version 1.1, April, 1999
Security Target
NetScreen Appliances, Security Target Revision E, November 27,
2002
Evaluation Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report for NetScreen Appliances, November,
2002
Conformance Result Part 2 conformant, Part 3 conformant, and EAL 2
Version of CC
CC Version 2.1 [1], [2], [3], [4] and all applicable National and
International Interpretations effective on May 22, 2002
Version of CEM
CEM Version 1.0 [5], [6] and all applicable National and International
Interpretations effective on May 22, 2002
Sponsor NetScreen Technologies, Incorporated
Developer NetScreen Technologies, Incorporated
Evaluators
Science Applications International Corporation
Ms. Cynthia Reese
Mr. Neal Haley
Validators
Mrs. Jean Hung (The MITRE Corporation)
Mrs. Yi-Fang Koh (The MITRE Corporation)
Mrs. Janine Pedersen (NSA)
3 SECURITY POLICY
NetScreen’s Networking subsystem provides the packet flow sequence to ensure that only packets that are expressly
allowed to traverse the NetScreen appliances are allowed to do so. If a matching policy is found, then the packet is
processed according to the policy. If a matching policy is not found, then the traffic is denied.
The Networking subsystem provides the functionality required to process packets based on specific criteria, including:
· Presumed source address: the presumed source IP address of the arriving packet
· Presumed destination address: the presumed destination IP address of the arriving packet
· Transport layer protocol: TCP or UDP protocols. Other protocols are not allowed through a
NetScreen device
· Arrival interface: the arrival interface is identified by the source zone
· Service: the service, or port, is identified by the incoming packet
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The Networking subsystem uses the above information to identify the incoming packet and uses the information to
process the packet, thus enforcing an Information Flow policy upon all packets attempting to traverse the NetScreen
appliances. The policy is configurable by the administrator and is based on the specified criteria.
4 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The evaluation made the following assumptions concerning product usage:
· Human users within the physically secure boundary protecting the TOE may attempt to access the TOE from some
direct connection (e.g., a console port) if the connection is part of the TOE.
· Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator guidance; however, they are capable of error.
4.2 Physical Assumptions
The evaluation made the following environmental assumptions:
· A VT-100 terminal or any device that can emulate a VT-100 terminal is required for use as a locally connected
console. The VT-100 terminal/emulator is part of the IT environment and it expected to correctly display what is
sent to it from the TOE.
· The management console (VT-100 terminal/emulator) access will be restricted to authorized administrators.
· The TOE is physically secure.
· Information cannot flow among the internal and external networks unless it passes through the TOE.
4.3 Logical Assumptions
The evaluation made the following logical assumptions:
· There is no general purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability to execute arbitrary code or applications) and
storage repository capabilities on the TOE.
· The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable vulnerabilities is considered low.
· The TOE does not host public data.
· Human users who are not authorized administrators cannot access the TOE remotely from the internal or external
networks.
4.4 Clarification of Scope
NetScreen appliances provide for a level of protection that is appropriate for IT environments that require strict control
over the information flow across a network. NetScreen appliances are not designed to withstand physical attacks
directed at disabling or bypassing its security features; however, it is designed to withstand logical attacks originating
from its attached network performed by an attacker possessing a low attack potential.
All TOE security objectives, categorized as either IT security objectives or non-IT security objectives, reflect the stated
intent to counter identified threats in light of specific assumptions. The ST did not list any organizational security
policies.
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5 ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION
This section provides a high level description of the TOE and its subsystems as described in the NetScreen design
documentation.
NetScreen appliances provide two subsystems to support the security functionality of the TOE, the Administrative
subsystem and the Networking subsystem. Together the subsystems provide the following security functionality:
Audit Generation, Review, and Protection
Information Flow Policy Enforcement
Identification and Authentication
Management of Security Functions
Protection of TOE Security Functions
5.1 TOE Subsystems
The following subsections describe the subsystems support of the above security functionality.
5.1.1 Administrative Subsystem
The Administrative subsystem includes the console port and the Command Line Interface (CLI). The CLI is accessible
through the console port on each NetScreen appliance and is used to manage a NetScreen appliance. The CLI also
provides the audit functionality. The TOE enforces the identification and authentication at the console before allowing
use of the CLI.
The Syslog interface is an interface to an external Syslog server. This interface is used to transmit audit log information
to a Syslog server for longer-term data storage than is possible on the internal flash memory on each NetScreen
appliance.
The Administrative subsystem generates audit records corresponding to administrator actions, and identification and
authentication. The Administrative subsystem provides interfaces that allow the administrator to review the audit
records, including the ability to search and sort upon the audit records. Additionally, the Administrative subsystem
provides the ability to protect the audit records and limit the loss of records due to audit storage exhaustion by providing
an ability to archive audit data and to stop traffic from traversing the network.
Administrators are the only users of the TOE and are forced to identify and authenticate themselves before they are
allowed to invoke any administrator commands. Note that the TOE includes the console port, however, the actual
console used is not part of the TOE but is part of the environment. The Security Target includes an assumption that a
VT-100 terminal or any device that can emulate a VT-100 terminal is required for use as a locally connected console.
Security Management is provided through the administrator interface. This interface allows an administrator (when
properly identified and authenticated) to configure the NetScreen appliances. Therefore, the security management
functions are only available to administrators.
The security functions of the TOE are protected by the administrative interface being a separate interface that is not
connected to the network and, therefore, is not susceptible to many of the general threats on the network such as sniffing
packets or attempts to log into a public administrative interface. The administrative commands are limited to the console
port, in the evaluation configuration, and the console port does not pass network traffic. Additionally, the TOE includes
a system clock that can only be set and modified by the administrator, providing reliable timestamps for audit
information.
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5.1.2 Networking Subsystem
The Networking Subsystem processes packets as they arrive at a physical interface, providing the packet flow sequence
through the device. The traffic flow is audited by the Networking Subsystem and sent to the administrative subsystem
for collection and presentation to the administrator.
The Networking subsystem has a packet buffer for temporary storage of packet information. All of the temporary
storage is accounted for in that the size of the temporary storage relative to every packet is known, thereby ensuring that
the TOE does not reuse any previous packet information. Additionally, in the evaluated configuration the security
functions of the TOE are protected by the administrative interface being a separate interface that is not connected to the
network and therefore, not susceptible to any of the general threats on the network such as sniffing packets or attempts to
log into a public administrative interface.
6 DOCUMENTATION
This section provides a complete listing of the documentation which was issued by the developer (and sponsor).
Design documentation:
1) NetScreen Functional Specification for Common Criteria", Document Number 093-0628-000, Revision F
2) NetScreen High Level Design Document for Common Criteria", Document Number 093-0629-000,
Revision E.
3) NetScreen Correspondence Matrix for Common Criteria, Revision F, 093-0654-000
Guidance documentation:
Command Line Interface (CLI) Document Set:
1) NetScreen CLI Reference Guide, Volume 1, P/N 093-0549-000, Rev D
2) NetScreen CLI Reference Guide, Volume 2, P/N 093-0550-000, Rev D
3) NetScreen CLI Reference Guide, Volume 3, P/N 093-0551-000, Rev D
4) NetScreen CLI Reference Guide, Volume 4, P/N 093-0552-000, Rev D
Concepts and Examples Document Set:
1) NetScreen Concepts and Examples ScreenOS Reference Guide, Volume 2, P/N 093-0520-000, Rev E
2) NetScreen Concepts and Examples ScreenOS Reference Guide, Volume 3, P/N 093-0521-000, Rev E
Audit Record Description Document:
1) NetScreen Message Log Reference Guide, P/N 093-0590-000, Rev E
Installation Guides:
1) NetScreen-5XT Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0581-000, Rev D
2) NetScreen-5XP Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0580-000, Rev D
3) NetScreen-25 Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0579-000, Rev D
4) NetScreen-50 Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0578-000, Rev D
5) NetScreen-100 Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0577-000, Rev D
6) NetScreen-200 Series Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0576-000, Rev D
7) NetScreen-500 Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0575-000, Rev D
8) NetScreen-5000 Series Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0573-000, Rev D
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Configuration Management documentation:
1) NetScreen Configuration Management for Common Criteria 093-0630-000A, Revision F
2) Engineering Change Request and Engineering Change Control Procedure 093-0173-000, Rev A
3) Creating, Labeling and Tracking Serial Numbers and MAC Addresses 093-0229-000, Rev A
Delivery and Operation documentation:
1) Delivery of the Product to Buyer, 093-0648-000, Rev C
2) The “Properly Identifying the NetScreen Device for a CC EAL 2 Compliance” section in the below
documents:
NetScreen-5XT Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0581-000, Rev C
NetScreen-5XP Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0580-000, Rev C
NetScreen-25 Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0579-000, Rev C
NetScreen-50 Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0578-000, Rev C
NetScreen-100 Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0577-000, Rev C
NetScreen-200 Series Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0576-000, Rev C
NetScreen-500 Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0575-000, Rev C
NetScreen-5000 Series Installer’s Guide, P/N 093-0573-000, Rev C
Test documentation:
1) NetScreen Correspondence Matrix for Common Criteria, P/N 093-0654-000, Revision F.
2) NetScreen Test Cases for Common Criteria, P/N 093-0736-000, Revision F
Vulnerability Assessment documentation:
1) NetScreen Vulnerability Analysis for Common Criteria", Document Number 093-0595-000, Revision C.
Security Target:
1) NetScreen Appliances Security Target, Revision E, November 27, 2002.
7 IT PRODUCT TESTING
7.1 Developer Testing
Testing Approach:
The developer extracted from a test database (Test Technologies database) a set of test cases that reflect the TSF
requirements (those requirements included in the Security Target (ST)). The test cases selected are included in
the test evidence, specifically, the Test Cases document.
Each test case selected and included in the Test Cases document consisted of:
Test Procedure Description - TSF Code (a specific requirement element), Test Doc #, Test Doc. Name, Test
Case No.
Test Procedures – For each Test Procedure Description, a test procedure is provided that includes the following
information:
· Test procedure Steps: these are the steps that must be taken to stimulate the functionality being tested;
· Verification Steps: these are the steps that must be taken to confirm the actual result;
· Expected Results: these are the results expected based on the stimuli described in the test procedure steps
and the verification steps; and
· Actual Results: these are snapshots of the results received when the test case is run.
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Test Configuration:
The Introduction of the Test Cases document includes a description of test beds, each of which identifies a
configuration of a NetScreen appliance(s). The test bed identifies the number of NetScreen appliances included
in the configuration, the amount of PCs and if they are on the Trusted or Untrusted side of the NetScreen
appliance, the syslog server if included in the configuration, the NTP server if included, the TFTP server if
included, and the models included in each test bed.
Depth:
The amount of testing performed as it relates to the required functionality is described in the rationale for
ATE_COV.1. Note that complete test coverage of the TSF is not required. The evaluation team considered the
required functionality that was not tested in the developer test suite when formulating their team independent
tests.
Test Results:
The test suite is primarily a manual test suite. The expected and actual test results for each test case is included
in the Test Cases document. In addition to what can be observed by viewing the stream of traffic flow through
the firewall, test results are also confirmed in audit records.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluators performed testing on a sample set of the vendor test suite. The selection of vendor tests to be
included in the sample set was based on the following:
· Coverage of security functions
· Coverage of subsystems
· Size (20% of vendor test suite)
Each vendor test in the sample set was run successfully (i.e., the actual results matched the expected results).
The evaluators then used the same configuration used in the vendor test subset to perform team tests. The
evaluation team used the same test tools (such as the packet sniffers) documented and used for the vendor test
subset, as well as their own packet sniffer.
All team tests performed succeeded (actual results matched the expected results). The penetration tests did
not reveal any vulnerability that can be exploited in the evaluated configuration.
The results of the evaluation team tests and the evaluation penetration tests demonstrated the NetScreen
Appliances product behaved as claimed in the Security Target. The testing found that the product was
implemented as described in the functional specification and did not uncover any undocumented interfaces or
other security vulnerabilities.
8 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The hardware is manufactured to NetScreen’s specifications by sub-contracted manufacturing facilities.
NetScreen’s custom OS, ScreenOS, runs in firmware. The NetScreen appliances provide no extended
permanent storage like disk drives and no abstractions like files. Audit information is stored in flash memory.
The main components of a NetScreen appliance are the processor, ASIC, memory, interfaces, and
surrounding chassis and components. The differences between NetScreen appliances are the types of
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processor(s), traffic interfaces, management interfaces, number of power supplies, type of ASIC, and
redundancy to ensure high availability.
Console
Interfaces 1-n
Modem
Power
supply
CPU Controller/
Bridge
Flash
Card
GigaScreen
ASIC &
Memory
10/100
MAC
10/100
MAC
Figure 1: Main components of a NetScreen Appliance
9 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding
evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 2.1 [1], [2], [3] ,[4] and
CEM version 1.0 [5], [6] and all applicable National and International Interpretations in effect on May 22,
2002. The evaluation determined the product to be Part 2 conformant, and to meet the Part 3 EAL 2
requirements. The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report [8] which is
controlled by SAIC.
9.1 Evaluation of the NetScreen Appliances Security Target (ST) (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 2 ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements
claimed to be met by the NetScreen product that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements.
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9.2 Evaluation of the CM capabilities (ACM)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 2 ACM CEM work unit. The ACM evaluation ensured the TOE is identified
such that the consumer is able to identify the evaluated TOE. The evaluation team ensured the following items were
considered configuration items: TOE implementation, design documentation, test documentation, and user and
administrator guidance.
9.3 Evaluation of the Delivery and Operation documents (ADO)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 2 ADO CEM work unit. The ADO evaluation ensured the adequacy of the
procedures to deliver, install, and configure the TOE securely.
9.4 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 2 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design documentation
and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation
consists of a functional specification and a high-level design document. The evaluation team also ensured that the
correspondence analysis between the design abstractions correctly demonstrated that the lower abstraction was a correct
and complete representation of the higher abstraction.
9.5 Evaluation of the guidance documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 2 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the
administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE.
9.6 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 2 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured that the TOE performed as
described in the functional specification and as stated in the TOE security functional requirements. The evaluation team
performed a sample of the vendor test suite, and devised an independent set of team test and penetration tests. The
vendor tests, team tests, and penetration tests substantiated the security functional requirements in the ST.
9.7 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 2 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured that the TOE does not
contain obvious vulnerabilities that can be exploited in the evaluated configuration, based upon the developer strength of
function analysis and the developer vulnerability analysis as well as the evaluation team’s performance of penetration
tests.
9.8 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met.
Additionally, the evaluation team’s performance of a subset of the vendor test suite, the independent tests, and the
penetration test also demonstrates the accuracy (or veracity) of the claims in the ST.
10 VALIDATOR COMMENTS
The NetScreen Appliances TOE satisfies the NetScreen Appliances Security Target, Revision E, when configured
according to the Installation Guides listed in Section 8 and the NetScreen Appliances ST is a CC compliant ST.
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11 SECURITY TARGET
The Security Target, "NetScreen Appliances Security Target, Revision E, November 27, 2002", is included here by
reference.
12 GLOSSARY
CC Common Criteria
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCTL Common Evaluation Testing Laboratory
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CI Configuration Items
CLI Command Line Interface
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
I&A Identification and Authentication
I/O Input/Output
IP Internet Protocol
MAC Mandatory Access Control
MRA Mutual Recognition Arrangement
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards & Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
OR Observation Report
PP Protection Profile
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirements
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
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TOE Target of Evaluation
TSFI TSF Interface
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Networking
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13 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general
model, dated August 1999, Version 2.1.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional
requirements, dated August 1999, Version 2.1.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Annexes, dated August
1999, Version 2.1.
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, dated August 1999, Version 2.1.
[5] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 1: Introduction and
general model, dated 1 November 1998, version 0.6.
[6] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Part 2: Evaluation
Methodology, dated August 1999, version 1.0.
[7] NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme for IT Security, Guidance to Common
Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 1.0, March 20, 2001.
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for the NetScreen Appliances Product, Version 0.3, November 12, 2002.
[9] NetScreen Technologies, Inc. NetScreen Appliances Security Target Revision E, November 27, 2002.
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