Samsung Smart TV Security
Solution GAIA V1.0
Security Target
V1.5
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., Ltd.
2 / 51
Document History
VERSION DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE DATE
1.0 Initial version 2015. 09. 04
1.1 TOE Scope Change 2015. 10. 12
1.2
Applied Requested Revisions from
Evaluator
2015. 12. 04
1.3
Applied Requested Revisions from
Evaluator
2015. 12. 15
1.4
Applied Requested Revisions from
Evaluator
2015. 12. 24
1.5
Applied Requested Revisions from
Evaluator
2016. 01. 07
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CONTENTS
1. Introduction of Security Target.............................................................6
1.1. Security Target Reference .........................................................................................................................6
1.2. TOE Reference...................................................................................................................................................6
1.3. TOE Overview ....................................................................................................................................................7
1.4. TOE Description ............................................................................................................................................. 11
1.4.1. Physical Scope of TOE............................................................................................................................... 11
1.4.2. Logical Scope of TOE.................................................................................................................................. 11
1.5. Conventions ....................................................................................................................................................... 14
1.6. Terms and Definitions................................................................................................................................. 16
2. Conformance Claims............................................................................18
2.1. Conformance to Common Criteria........................................................................................................ 18
2.2. Conformance to Packages......................................................................................................................... 18
2.3. Conformance to Protection Profiles ................................................................................................... 19
3. Security Objectives .............................................................................20
3.1. Security Objectives for Operational Environment..................................................................... 20
4. Security Requirement..........................................................................21
4.1. Security Functional Requirements ...................................................................................................... 21
4.1.1. Cryptographic support (FCS)................................................................................................... 23
4.1.2. User data protection(FDP) ........................................................................................................ 25
4.1.3. Security management(FMT)..................................................................................................... 27
4.1.4. Protection of the TSF (FPT).................................................................................................... 30
4.1.5. Trusted path/channels (FTP) .................................................................................................. 30
4.2. Security Assurance Requirements...................................................................................................... 32
4.2.1. Security Target evaluation......................................................................................................... 32
4.2.2. Development........................................................................................................................................ 38
4.2.3. Guidance documents....................................................................................................................... 40
4.2.4. Life-cycle support.......................................................................................................................... 42
4.2.5. Tests........................................................................................................................................................ 43
4.2.6. Vulnerability assessment ............................................................................................................ 44
4.3. Dependency Rationale................................................................................................................................. 46
4.3.1. SFR Dependencies........................................................................................................................... 46
4.3.2. SAR Dependencies .......................................................................................................................... 47
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5. TOE Summary Specification................................................................48
5.1. System Integrity Monitoring................................................................................................................... 48
5.2. Web App Protection...................................................................................................................................... 48
5.3. Data Encryption/Decryption.................................................................................................................... 49
5.4. Phishing Site Blocking................................................................................................................................. 49
5.5. Secure Communication ............................................................................................................................... 50
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Non-TOE Hardware/Software required by the TOE...................................................9
Table 2: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment............................................... 20
Table 3: Security Functional Requirements ........................................................................................ 21
Table 4: Security Assurance Requirements........................................................................................ 32
Table 5: Dependencies on the TOE Security Functional Components ................................ 46
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1. Introduction of Security Target
1.1. Security Target Reference
This section provides information to refer to the Security Target (ST) as in
the following Table. The ST is identified by the ST Title (including the
Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification) and the ST Version.
Security Target
Title
Samsung Smart TV Security Solution GAIA V1.0 Security
Target
Security Target
Version
V1.5
Publication Date 2016. 01. 07
Authors SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
CC
Identification
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
(CC Version 3.1 Revision 4)
Evaluation
Assurance
Level
EAL1
1.2. TOE Reference
This section provides information to refer to the TOE as in the following
Table. The TOE is identified by the TOE Title and the TOE
Version(Samsung Smart TV Security Solution GAIA V1.0).
TOE Title Samsung Smart TV Security Solution GAIA
TOE Version V1.0
TOE
Component
SYSTEM_001_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm
PLATFORM_001_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm
PLATFORM_002_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm
SERVICE_001_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm
SERVICE_002_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm
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Developer SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., Ltd.
1.3. TOE Overview
Samsung Smart TV Security Solution GAIA V1.0 (hereinafter TOE) is a
Smart TV Security Solution that provides security functions in the form of
library by being embedded on TV. The TOE provides functions for the
secure operation of Samsung Smart TV with system(kernel of Tizen OS)
integrity verification, blocking the execution of unauthorized Web App, and
blocking access to phishing sites. In addition, the TOE also provides
encryption/decryption function for data used in Web App, and secure
communication channel for transmitted data when communicating with an
external IT entity.
The TOE provides the security functions as follows:
- System Integrity Monitoring function: Integrity verification function
for the kernel of Tizen OS
- Web App Protection function: Function to block the execution of
unauthorized Web App in Smart TV
- Data Encryption/Decryption function: Function to encrypt and decrypt
data that developer designates for protection out of the data used in
Web App
- Phishing Site Blocking function: Function to verify whether the site to
access is a phishing site or not when Smart TV User accesses the
site by using Web Browser (linked to Google Safe Browsing)
- Secure Communication function: Secure communication function
provided for the confidentiality and integrity of data transmitted with
the Update Server when Phishing Site Blocking function is executed.
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The TOE is distributed to the developers of Samsung Smart TV in the form
of a library which is a kind of software, and is not in charge of all kinds of
security functions provided in Samsung Smart TV. The TOE provides only
the security function defined in the above.
The TOE is a library included in the firmware of Samsung Smart TV, and
performs the role of being in charge of security function of Samsung Smart
TV. The TOE allows a secure web surfing of a Samsung Smart TV User
who accesses a web site using Web Browser by providing Phishing Site
Blocking function. In addition, by blocking the execution of unauthorized
Web App, the TOE prevents the execution of an unauthorized Web App from
accessing the resource of Samsung Smart TV. Important data used in Web
App are stored securely with encryption. With System Integrity Monitoring
function, the verification on the integrity of the system(kernel of Tizen OS)
is performed to guarantee secure operation of Samsung Smart TV. The TOE
communicates with an external IT entity. Communication with external IT
entity can be done in the form of a wired communication using Ethernet and
a wireless communication using Wi-Fi. Google Safe Browsing server and
Update server are external IT entities which communicate with Phishing
Site Blocking function. The TOE provides secure communication channel
that supports confidentiality and integrity when communicating with external
it entities.
The TOE is a security solution that is in the form of library running in
Samsung Smart TV and has the hardware and the software requirements as
in the following Table 1. Table 1 is classified as the TOE Operational
Environment not included in the TOE scope.
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Table 1: Non-TOE Hardware/Software required by the TOE
Category Contents
H/W
CPU ARM architecture (Cortex A12 Quad)
DDR Memory 2GB
Flash Memory eMMC 8GB
NIC 10/100 MB Ethernet*1
Wi-Fi 802.11a/b/g/n
S/W
Web Brower Tizen Browser 1.0
Web App Web App running in Samsung Smart TV
REE OS Tizen 2.3
TEE OS TrustWare V1.0
External IT entities needed for the TOE operation are as follows. The TOE
provides a secure communication channel when communicating with the
external IT entity of below.
- Google Safe Browsing Server : A server provided by Google that
informs whether a relevant URL is a phishing site or not.
- Update Server : A server that performs updates of phishing site
database used in the Phishing Site Blocking function.
The architecture of Samsung Smart TV is basically composed based on the
ARM TrustZone technology provided by ARM CPU. The execution
environment of Samsung Smart TV is classified as Trusted Execution
Environment(TEE) and Rich OS Application Environment. TEE functions
based on TrustWare V1.0(Operating System Self-Developed by Samsung
Electronics) and Rich OS Application Environment functions in Tizen 2.3
Operating System. Among the security functions of the TOE, System
Integrity Monitoring function is executed in TEE, whereas Web App
Protection function, Data Encryption/Decryption function, Phishing Site
Blocking function, Secure Communication Channel function are executed in
10 / 51
Rich OS Application Environment. System Integrity Monitoring function is
executed in TEE, but the Controlling function that controls this function is
executed in Rich OS Application Environment. Controlling function executes
the startup process, scheduling, monitoring that performs System Integrity
Monitoring function.
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1.4. TOE Description
1.4.1.Physical Scope of TOE
The TOE consists of software provided in the form of a library, and
developer guidance. The TOE is distributed to the developers of Samsung
Smart TV, and is operated in the form of a library for its operation after
installation. The scope of the TOE includes only some of the library that is
in charge of security function out of all the elements that compose the whole
Samsung Smart TV. That is, the physical scope of TOE includes the library
and the developer guidance illustrated with the installation of the TOE and
the guideline of the API provided by the library.
TOE Element
Distribut
ion Form
Note
SYSTEM_001_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm
Software
(CD)
System Integrity Monitoring
PLATFORM_001_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm Data Encryption/Decryption
PLATFORM_002_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm Web App Protection
SERVICE_001_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm Phishing Site Blocking
SERVICE_002_V1.0_Release_1.armv7l.rpm Secure Communication
Samsung Smart TV Security Solution GAIA
V1.0 Developer Guidance V1.5
Document
File
(CD)
1.4.2.Logical Scope of TOE
Logical scope of the TOE includes all the aspects that are included in the
physical scope of TOE. That is, all the functions provided by the library are
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included in the logical scope of TOE. The security function provided by the
logical scope of TOE is as follows.
The logical scope of TOE will be explained by being classified according to
security function provided by the TOE.
System Integrity Monitoring
The TOE periodically performs the verification on the kernel integrity of
Tizen OS during normal operation through System Integrity Monitoring
function so that Samsung Smart TV can be operated securely.
System Integrity Monitoring function mainly consists of two parts. The part
that actually performs System Integrity Monitoring and the part that
controls System Integrity Monitoring function.
System Integrity Monitoring Controlling function is in charge of the startup
of the execution, the scheduling for periodic verification.
System Integrity Monitoring function plays the role of carrying out Integrity
verification. The function determines whether there is any modification or
not by comparing the hash values (SHA-256).
Web App Protection
The TOE provides Web App Protection function in order to prevent
execution of an unauthorized Web App in Samsung Smart TV. Samsung
Smart TV can download and store only the Web App provided in App Store
(hereinafter “App Contents Server”) provided by Samsung Electronics.
When registering Web App in App Contents server, Samsung Electronics
registered after encrypting the Web App, and Samsung Smart TV User can
13 / 51
download the Web App from App Contents Server and store it on Samsung
Smart TV. In order to execute the stored Web App, the decryption process
is required. During the decryption process of the Web App, if the Web App
is determined to be modified, the execution of the relevant Web App will be
blocked. The TOE uses AES Algorithm (CTR mode) for decryption of Web
App, and the 128-bit sizes of the cryptographic key.
The cryptographic key for the same Web App exists separately for each
Smart TV. The cryptographic key distribution function is excluded from the
scope of TOE.
Data Encryption/Decryption
The TOE provides encryption/decryption function for important data used in
Web App. The TOE uses AES algorithm (CBC mode) for encryption, and the
128-bit sizes of the cryptographic key. The cryptographic key is derived
from hardware key and random value using PBKDF2 algorithm. The
Cryptographic key exists on memory after being generated, and is
destroyed after encryption/decryption operation is completed. The
zeroization is used as the cryptographic key destruction method.
Phishing Site Blocking
The TOE provides Phishing Site Blocking function in order to prevent
private information from being exposed to any risks through the access to a
harmful phishing site by Samsung Smart TV User. If Samsung Smart TV
User accesses web sites using Web Browser(Tizen Browser), Phishing Site
Blocking function checks the site based on the phishing site database stored
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in Smart TV. If the site is suspected for being a phishing site, Google Safe
Browsing service is used to check whether the relevant site is a phishing
site or not. If the relevant site is confirmed to be a phishing site, the
information of such for the site being a phishing site is informed to the user.
If the user selects to block the access to the site, the access to the phishing
site is blocked to protect private information of the user. The TOE also
provides Smart TV user the ability to either disable or enable the Phishing
Site Blocking function. If a user disables to use the Phishing Site Blocking
function, the Phishing Site Blocking function is not performed.
The list of Phishing Site on the database is updated periodically through
Update Server.
 When communicating with the TOE and Google Safe Browsing server, the
transmitted data is protected by using TLS protocol provided by the
operational environment.
Secure Communication
The TOE provides the Secure Communication function in order to protect
transmitted data when communicating with Update Server. Communication
with Update Server is performed when updating the list of phishing site on
the database.
1.5. Conventions
This section describes the conventions used to denote Common Criteria (CC)
operations on security functional components and to distinguish text with
special meaning. The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this ST
are largely consistent with those used in the CC. Four presentation choices
are discussed here.
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Refinement
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and, thus,
further restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is
denoted by bold text.
Selection
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by
the CC in stating a requirement. Selections are denoted by underlined
italicized text.
Assignment
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an
unspecified parameter such as the length of a password. Showing the value
in square brackets [assignment_value(s)] indicates an assignment.
Iteration
Iterated functional components are given unique identifiers by appending to
the component name, short name, and functional element name from the CC
an iteration number inside parenthesis, for example, FIA_AFL.1 (1) and
FIA_AFL.1 (2).
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1.6. Terms and Definitions
Update Server
Server that performs the update on the database for the list of phishing site
used in Phishing Site Blockage function
Smart TV User
Users installing and executing Web App in order to use various smart
functions embedded on TV and using management function supported in TV.
Google Safe Browsing
Google Safe Browsing is a service provided by Google offering URL list that
contains phishing contents and open API that can use the list.
RO
Abbreviation of Read-Only..
Web App
Application for Tizen OS based on HTML5 which can be used by being
downloaded on TV.
Tizen OS
Tizen is based on the Linux kernel of Linux foundation, and is made based
on HTML5 and C++. It is an open source operating system having the
purpose of being included in mobile devices including smart phone, and
electronic devices such as TV.
TEE(Trusted Execution Environment)
17 / 51
This refers to a execution environment providing the security of a quality
higher than the execution environment provided in general operating
environment. This defined the function of security hardware and software
providing execution environment based on safe reliability of security related
applications in devices such as smartphone, smart TV. Global Platform,
which is a standard group, establishes the standard in the architecture of
TEE and related API.
REE(Rich Execution Environment)
This is a concept that is contradictory to TEE, and refers to execution
environment provided by general operating environment such as Tizen,
Android.
TrustWare V1.0
This is an operating environment installed for the application of TEE(ARM
TrustZone) technology, and TrustWare V1.0 is the operating system self-
developed by Samsung Electronics even from the kernel stage.
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2. Conformance Claims
This chapter describes how the Security Target conforms to the Common
Criteria, Protection Profile and Package.
2.1. Conformance to Common Criteria
This Security Target conforms to the following Common Criteria:
 Common Criteria Identification
- Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, version 3.1r4, 2012. 9,
CCMB-2012-09-001
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2: SFR (Security Functional Requirement), version 3.1r4, 2012.
9, CCMB-2012-09-002
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3: SAR (Security Assurance Requirement), version 3.1r4, 2012.
9, CCMB-2012-09-003
 Common Criteria Conformance
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2 extended
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3 conformant
2.2. Conformance to Packages
This Security Target conforms to the following Protection Profile:
- Assurance Package: EAL1
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2.3. Conformance to Protection Profiles
- There is no Protection Profile that this Security Target conforms.
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3. Security Objectives
3.1. Security Objectives for Operational Environment
This section describes the Security Objectives that must be fulfilled by
technical and procedural measures in the operational environment of the
TOE.
Table 2: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.Firmware Update Smart TV User shall install immediately when
an alert for firmware update pops up on TV so
that the security functions can be maintained
in a most up-to-date version.
OE.Secure Communication Smart TV shall provide secure communication
channel when communicating with the TOE
and Google Safe Browsing server.
OE.Trusted Developer The developer shall not have any malicious
intention, should receive proper education for
the use of the TOE and shall perform the
obligation accurately.
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4. Security Requirements
This chapter describes security functional requirements and security
assurance requirements which should be satisfied in the TOE.
4.1. Security Functional Requirements
The security functional requirements defined in this Security Target are
based on the functional requirements in Part 2 of the Common Criteria.
Table 3 summarizes the security functional requirements defined by this ST.
Table 3: Security Functional Requirements
Class Component
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1(1)
Cryptographic operation (Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2)
Cryptographic operation (Web App
Protection)
FCS_COP.1(3)
Cryptographic operation (System
Integrity Monitoring)
FCS_COP.1(4)
Cryptographic operation (Phishing Site
Blocking)
User Data
Protection
FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1
Management of security functions
behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Protection of the
TSF
FPT_TEE.1 Testing of external entities
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Trusted
paths/channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
23 / 51
4.1.1.Cryptographic support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation (Data Encryption/Decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
[Password Based Key Derivation Function(PBKDF2)] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [128-bit] that meet the
following: [RFC2898].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction (Data Encryption/Decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key destruction method
[Zeroization] that meets the following: [None].
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (Data Encryption/Decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes, or
24 / 51
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption on the
important data used by Web App] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [Advanced Encryption
Standard(AES-CBC)] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit]
that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 197].
 Precautions for Application: Important data means data designated to be
important as the developer of the Web App thought of as such among the
data used by Web App.
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (Web App Protection)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [decryption of Web App] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[Advanced Encryption Standard(AES-CTR)] and
cryptographic key sizes [128-bit] that meet the following:
[FIPS PUB 197].
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (System Integrity Monitoring)
25 / 51
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [verification of kernel integrity] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Secure
Hash Algorithm(SHA)] and cryptographic key sizes [256-
bit] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 180-4].
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (Phishing Site Blocking)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [Phishing Site Blocking function] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Secure
Hash Algorithm(SHA)] and cryptographic key sizes [256-
bit] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 180-4].
4.1.2.User data protection(FDP)
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FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_DAU.1.1 The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that
can be used as a guarantee of the validity of [Web App].
FDP_DAU.1.2 The TSF shall provide [library for Web App Protection
function] with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of
the indicated information.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Phishing site blocking SFP] on
[the below list of subjects, information, and operations that
cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled
subjects covered by the SFP].
 subject : user
 information: web packet
 operation: web site blocking
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Phishing site blocking SFP]
based on the following types of subject and information
security attributes: [the below list of subjects and
information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each,
27 / 51
the security attributes].
 subject: user
 information: web packet
 subject security attribute: None
 information security attribute: destination URL
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a
controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold: [If the destination URL
included in the information security attribute is not included
in the list of Phishing Sites].
 Precautions for Application: For determination of a phishing site, two
steps should be performed. The first step is to compare with the list of
phishing site in the database, and if suspected for being a phishing site
after the comparison, the second step of using Google Safe Browsing
service should finally determine whether the site is a phishing site or not.
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [None].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based
on the following rules: [If the destination URL included in
the information security attribute is included in the list of
phishing sites, but if the user decided to access the relevant
URL].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on
the following rules: [None].
4.1.3.Security management(FMT)
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable, enable the
behaviour of the functions [Phishing site blocking] to [Smart
TV User].
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Phishing site blocking SFP] to
restrict the ability to [send] the security attributes
[destination URL] to [Smart TV User].
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Phishing site blocking SFP] to
provide permissive default values for security attributes that
are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [Smart TV User] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when
29 / 51
an object or information is created.
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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [Phishing site blocking].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Smart TV User].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
4.1.4.Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_TEE.1 Testing of external entities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TEE.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests periodically during normal
operation to check the fulfillment of [kernel integrity for
Tizen OS].
FPT_TEE.1.2 If the test fails, the TSF shall [report when kernel integrity
violation is detected].
4.1.5.Trusted path/channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel
data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the
trusted channel for [communication with the Update Server
in order to update the list of phishing site on database.].
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4.2. Security Assurance Requirements
Security assurance requirements (SAR) defined in this document consists of
assurance component in Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 3. The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) is
EAL1. Table 4 shows the summary of assurance components.
Table 4: Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Assurance Component
ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_OBJ.1
Security objectives for the operational
environment
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ADV:
Development
ADV_FSP.1
Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1
Vulnerability survey
4.2.1.Security Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
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ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE
reference, a TOE overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major
security features of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE
hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the
TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the
TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE
overview, and the TOE description are consistent with each
other.
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Dependencies: ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
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ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Developer action elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim
that identifies the version of the CC to which the ST and the
TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of
the ST to CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC
Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of
the ST to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC
Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the
extended components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security
requirement packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of
the ST to a package as either package-conformant or
package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the
TOE type is consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the
statement of the security problem definition is consistent
with the statement of the security problem definition in the
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PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the
statement of security objectives is consistent with the
statement of security objectives in the PPs for which
conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the
statement of security requirements is consistent with the
statement of security requirements in the PPs for which
conformance is being claimed.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security
objectives.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the
security objectives for the operational environment.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
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evidence.
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components
definition.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all
extended security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an
extended component for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each
extended component is related to the existing CC
components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing
CC components, families, classes, and methodology as a
model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and
objective elements such that conformance or
nonconformance to these elements can be demonstrated.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
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meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can
be clearly expressed using existing components.
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Dependencies: ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Developer action elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security
requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements
rationale.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the
SFRs and the SARs.
ASE_REQ.1.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes,
external entities and other terms that are used in the SFRs
and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.1.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all
operations on the security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.1.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either
be satisfied, or the security requirements rationale shall
justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.1.6C The statement of security requirements shall be internally
consistent.
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Evaluator action elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Dependencies: ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE
meets each SFR.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary
specification is consistent with the TOE overview and the
TOE description.
4.2.2.Development
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ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional
specification to the SFRs.
Content and presentation elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and
method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall identify all parameters
associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall provide rationale for the
implicit categorisation of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs
in the functional specification.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional
specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the
SFRs.
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4.2.3.Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user
role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that
should be controlled in a secure processing environment,
including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user
role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the
TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user
role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all
security parameters under the control of the user, indicating
secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role,
clearly present each type of security-relevant event
relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be
performed, including changing the security characteristics of
entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible
modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following
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failure or operational error), their consequences and
implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role,
describe the security measures to be followed in order to
fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment
as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its
preparative procedures.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps
necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in
accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps
necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the
secure preparation of the operational environment in
accordance with the security objectives for the operational
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environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to
confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
4.2.4.Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
Dependencies: ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for
the TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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Developer action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE
itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the
configuration items.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
4.2.5.Tests
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
ATE_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
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Evaluator action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that
the TSF operates as specified.
4.2.6.Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided
meets all requirements for content and presentation of
evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain
sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
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AVA_VAN.1.3E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on
the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the
TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker
possessing Basic attack potential.
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4.3. Dependency Rationale
4.3.1.SFR Dependencies
Table 5 shows the dependencies on the TOE Security Functional
Components.
Table 5: Dependencies on the TOE Security Functional Components
No
TOE Security
Functional
Component
Claimed
Dependencies
Note
1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.4
2 FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1
3 FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
4 FCS_COP.1(2) -
5 FCS_COP.1(3) -
6 FCS_COP.1(4) -
7 FDP_DAU.1 -
8 FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1
9 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1, FMT_MSA.3
10 FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
11 FMT_MSA.1
FDP_IFC.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
12 FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1
13 FMT_SMF.1
14 FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1
15 FPT_TEE.1 -
16 FTP_ITC.1 -
The dependency of some functional components is not satisfied, and the
description for the justification of such is as follows.
FIA_UID.1
- Smart TV embedded with security function of TOE is generally the
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possession of the individual of the Smart TV user, and all the rights
are given to individual users, and thus identification or authentication
is not provided.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4(Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(2)) :
- The cryptographic key used to decrypt the Web App in the Web App
Protection function is provided in the Operational Environment, and
thus does not have a process for generation and destruction of the
cryptographic key.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4(Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(3)) :
- System Integrity Monitoring function uses SHA-256 hash algorithm
in order to verify the integrity of the kernel, and thus does not have a
process for generation and destruction of the cryptographic key.
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4(Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(4)) :
- Phishing Site Blocking function uses SHA-256 hash algorithm in
order to check whether the web site is a phishing site or not, and
thus does not have a process for generation and destruction of the
cryptographic key.
4.3.2.SAR Dependencies
The dependency of each assurance package (EAL1) provided by the CC is
already satisfied.
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5. TOE Summary Specification
5.1. System Integrity Monitoring
The TOE periodically performs the integrity verification on the kernel
(Read-Only area and Text area) of Tizen OS during normal operation
through System Integrity Monitoring function so that Samsung Smart TV
can be operated securely.
System Integrity Monitoring function mainly consists of two parts. The part
that actually performs System Integrity Monitoring and the part that
controls System Integrity Monitoring function.
System Integrity Monitoring Controlling function is in charge of the startup
of the execution, the scheduling for periodic verification.
System Integrity Monitoring function plays the role of carrying out Integrity
verification. The function determines whether there is any modification or
not by comparing the hash values (SHA-256).
Relevant SFR : FPT_TEE.1, FCS_COP.1(3), FTP_ITC.1
5.2. Web App Protection
The TOE provides Web App Protection function in order to prevent
execution of an unauthorized Web App in Samsung Smart TV. Samsung
Smart TV can download and store only the Web App provided in App Store
(hereinafter “App Contents Server”) provided by Samsung Electronics.
When registering Web App in App Contents server, Samsung Electronics
49 / 51
registered after encrypting the Web App, and Samsung Smart TV User can
download the Web App from App Contents Server and store it on Samsung
Smart TV. In order to execute the stored Web App, the decryption process
is required. During the decryption process of the Web App, if the Web App
is determined to be modified, the execution of the relevant Web App will be
blocked. The TOE uses AES Algorithm (CTR mode) for decryption of Web
App, and the 128-bit sizes of the cryptographic key.
Relevant SFR : FDP_DAU.1, FCS_COP.1(2)
5.3. Data Encryption/Decryption
The TOE provides encryption/decryption function for important data used in
Web App. The TOE uses AES algorithm (CBC mode) for encryption, and the
128-bit sizes of the cryptographic key. The cryptographic key is derived
from hardware key and random value using PBKDF2 algorithm. The
Cryptographic key exists on memory after being generated, and is
destroyed after encryption/decryption operation is completed. The
zeroization is used as the cryptographic key destruction method.
Data Encryption/Decryption function has the lifecycle of 1) Cryptographic
key generation, 2) Encryption and Decryption operation, 3) Cryptographic
key destruction.
Relevant SFR : FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1(1)
5.4. Phishing Site Blocking
The TOE provides Phishing Site Blocking function in order to prevent
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private information from being exposed to any risks through the access to a
harmful phishing site by Samsung Smart TV User. If Samsung Smart TV
User accesses web sites using Web Browser(Tizen Browser), Phishing Site
Blocking function checks the site based on the phishing site database(SQLite)
stored in Smart TV. If the site is suspected for being a phishing site, Google
Safe Browsing service is used to check whether the relevant site is a
phishing site or not. If the relevant site is confirmed to be a phishing site,
the information of such for the site being a phishing site is informed to the
user. If the user selects to block the access to the site, the access to the
phishing site is blocked to protect private information of the user. The TOE
also provides Smart TV user the ability to either disable or enable the
Phishing Site Blocking function. If a user disables to use the Phishing Site
Blocking function, the Phishing Site Blocking function is not performed.
The list of Phishing Site on the database is updated periodically through
Update Server.
Relevant SFR : FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FTP_ITC.1
5.5. Secure Communication
The TOE provides Secure Communication channels in order to protect
transmitted data when communication between the TOE and an external IT
entity. The External IT entity that communicates with the TOE is Update
Server. Secure Communication function can securely protect the transmitted
data from any modification or exposure by providing confidentiality and
integrity of the transmitted data. TLS(OpenSSL) is used as secure
communication protocol.
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The purpose for the TOE communicating with an external IT entity is as
follows.
 Communication with Update Server in order to update the list of
phishing site database
Relevant SFR : FTP_ITC.1