National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11201-2022
Dated: 3 March 2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Department of Defense
ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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Acknowledgements
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification......................................................................................................................................... 2
3 TOE Architecture................................................................................................................................... 4
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................................... 5
4.1 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................5
4.2 User Data Protection.....................................................................................................................5
4.3 Identification and Authentication.................................................................................................5
4.4 Security Management...................................................................................................................5
4.5 Privacy...........................................................................................................................................5
4.6 Protection of the TSF ....................................................................................................................6
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels .................................................................................................................6
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope................................................................................................ 7
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................7
5.2 Clarification of Scope ....................................................................................................................7
6 Documentation ..................................................................................................................................... 8
7 IT Product Testing ................................................................................................................................. 9
7.1 Test Configuration.........................................................................................................................9
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................................. 11
8.1 Evaluated Configuration .............................................................................................................11
8.2 Excluded Functionality................................................................................................................11
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................................... 12
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)...............................................................................12
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)........................................................................................12
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)...........................................................................12
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................................................12
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ...........................................13
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA).....................................................................................13
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results ..................................................................................................13
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations ........................................................................................... 14
11 Security Target.................................................................................................................................... 15
12 Abbreviations and Acronyms.............................................................................................................. 16
13 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 17
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers 2
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment
of the evaluation of Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f (the Target of Evaluation,
or TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not
an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either
expressed or implied.
This VR is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent for that end-
user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment. End-
users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in
conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were evaluated and tested and any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration
of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST. Prospective users should carefully read the
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
The evaluation was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia,
Maryland, USA, and was completed in March 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from
the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report written by Leidos. The evaluation
determined that the TOE is Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Common Criteria Part 3 Extended and
meets the assurance requirements of the following documents:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 ([5])
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 ([6])
• Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016 ([7]).
The TOE is Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f.
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5). The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions
of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical
issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the
Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation team found the evaluation demonstrated the product
satisfies all of the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)
specified in the ST. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
produced. Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct.
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the TOE is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile,
Functional Package, and Extended Package, and when installed, configured and operated as described in
the evaluated guidance documentation, satisfies all the SFRs specified in the ST ([8]).
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) use the
Common Criteria (CC) and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) to conduct security
evaluations, in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee
for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to
NIAP’s Product Compliant List (PCL).
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE—the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated
• The ST—the unique identification of the document describing the security features, claims, and
assurances of the product
• The conformance result of the evaluation
• The PP/PP-Modules to which the product is conformant
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f
Security Target Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f Security
Target, Version 1.0, 3 February 2022
Sponsor & Developer Axonius Federal Systems LLC
10010 Junction Dr Suite No. 102-S
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701
Completion Date March 2, 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017
CEM Version Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017
PP • Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March
2019 ([5])
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1,
12 February 2019 ([6])
• Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February
2016 ([7]).
Conformance Result PP Compliant, CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
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Item Identifier
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Evaluation Personnel Anthony Apted
Pascal Patin
Furukh Siddique
Validation Personnel Sheldon Durrant
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
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3 TOE Architecture
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.
The TOE is a Linux-based containerized software application written in Python (both versions 2 and 3) and
includes the Python Cryptography library that uses CAVP validated OpenSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM)
for its cryptographic functionality. JavaScript version ES6 is used for the web app’s front end and nginx as
its web server. The embedded Python Paramiko module is used for the SSHv2 implementation. The
embedded Python Secrets module provides random number generation services. The TOE includes a
MongoDB database running within its own Docker container for secure storage of credentials. Both
modules and the database use the FOM for cryptographic primitives. The FOM is included with the TOE.
Axonius integrates with numerous security and management solutions or assets on a network that are
referred to as adapter data sources. Outbound connections to data sources are secured using HTTPS or
SSH. In the evaluated configuration, unsecured connections to data sources should not be used. All
management of the TOE is done through the GUI, which is protected by HTTPS/TLS.
The TOE is supported on a Ubuntu Linux-based virtualized appliance platform with Linux Unified Key Setup
(LUKS) and uses Docker to run its containerized applications. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE runs
on a virtual machine with Ubuntu 16.04 and Docker runtime engine v19.0.3 on ESXi 6.5 on AMD Ryzen
Threadripper 1950X (Zen microarchitecture).
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4 Security Policy
The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.
Note: Much of the description of the security policy has been derived from the ST and the Final ETR.
4.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements cryptography to protect data at rest and in transit.
For data at rest, the TOE securely stores the credential data used to log in to the TOE, private keys, and
the credentials the TOE uses to authenticate to adapter data sources. This stored data is protected using
either PBKDF2_HMAC with SHA512 and 100,000 rounds in conjunction with LUKS or using MongoDB’s
Client-Side Field Level Encryption (AES-256-CBC).
For data in transit, the TOE implements HTTPS and TLS as both a client and a server. The TOE implements
a HTTPS/TLS server for its administrative interface, while it implements either an SSH Client or a HTTPS/TLS
client to communicate with any data sources connected to it. The TOE does not support mutual
authentication.
The TOE implements all cryptography used for these functions using its own OpenSSL with CAVP validated
algorithms. The TOE’s DRBG is seeded using entropy from the underlying OS platform.
4.2 User Data Protection
The TOE protects sensitive data in non-volatile memory using approved cryptographic algorithms and by
leveraging LUKS functionality provided by the host platform.
The TOE relies on the network connectivity capabilities of its host OS platform. The TOE supports user-
initiated and application-initiated uses of the network.
The TOE does not access any of the sensitive information repositories on the host platform.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports X.509 certificate validation as part of establishing TLS and HTTPS connections. The TOE
supports various certificate validity checks and checks certificate revocation status using OCSP. If the
certificate is invalid or the revocation status of a certificate cannot be determined, the certificate will not
be accepted.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE itself and the configuration settings it uses are stored in locations recommended by the Linux
platform vendor.
The TOE includes a web GUI. This interface enforces username/password authentication using locally
stored credentials that are created using the TOE. The TOE does not include a default user account to
access its management interface.
The security-relevant management functions supported by the TOE relate to configuration of adapters
and certificates.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE does not collect or transmit personally identifiable information (PII) of any individuals.
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4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE enforces various mechanisms to prevent itself from being used as an attack vector to its host OS
platform. The TOE runs on top of the host operating system as a series of Docker containers containing
Python and JavaScript code, and does not explicitly require disabling built-in operating system controls
for any reason (e.g., those built into Ubuntu 16.04). As such, the TOE relies on the operating system to
handle sensitive low-level operations such as memory mapping, and is compatible with Ubuntu 16.04,
including when SELinux is enabled on the host OS. The TOE is interpreted code and not just-in-time
compiled and therefore compiler flags to enforce ASLR are not necessary. The TOE also does not use both
PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC on the same memory regions. There is no situation where the TSF maps
memory to an explicit address.
The TOE does not use any undocumented platform APIs and no system calls are directly invoked in Axonius
code. The TOE is entirely Dockerized Python/JavaScript, so all calls are indirect.
The TOE has a mechanism to determine its current software version. Software updates to the TOE can be
acquired by leveraging its OS platform. All updates are digitally signed to guarantee their authenticity and
integrity.
The TOE developer has internal mechanisms for receiving reports of security flaws, tracking product
vulnerabilities, and distributing software updates to customers in a timely manner.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE encrypts sensitive data in transit between itself and its operational environment using TLS,
HTTPS, or SSH.
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5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The ST references the PP to which it claims conformance for assumptions about the use of the TOE. Those
assumptions, drawn from the claimed PP, are as follows:
• The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for its execution.
This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
• The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in
compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
• The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and
administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the PPs listed
under Identification, as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs
to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying.
This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation shows only that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance, achieved through performance by the
evaluation team of the evaluation activities specified in the following documents:
o Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 ([5])
o Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 ([6])
o Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016 ([7])
• This evaluation covers only the specific software distribution and version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f Security Target, Version 1.0, 3
February 2022 ([8]). Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product
were not covered by this evaluation. In particular, the functionality mentioned in Section 8.2 of
this document is excluded from the scope of the evaluation.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious”
vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
• The TOE must be installed, configured and managed as described in the documentation
referenced in Section 6 of this VR.
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6 Documentation
The vendor offers guidance documents describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance
for subsequent administration and use of the applicable security features. The guidance documentation
examined during the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is as follows:
• Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f Common Criteria Evaluated
Configuration Guide (CCECG), Version 1.0, 14 January 2022 ([9])
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in this
documentation.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be available online,
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon to configure or
operate the TOE as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download the evaluated administrative
guidance documentation from the NIAP website.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained
in the following proprietary document:
• Axonius Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.1, 22 February 2022 ([14])
A non-proprietary description of the tests performed and their results is provided in the following
document:
• Assurance Activities Report for Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f, Version
1.0, 28 February 2022 ([13])
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security
functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product that claims conformance to the following
specifications:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 01 March 2019
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, February 12, 2019
• Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, February 19, 2016
The evaluation team devised a test plan based on the test activities specified in these documents. The test
plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The
evaluation team executed the tests specified in the test plan and documented the results in the team test
report listed above.
Independent testing took place at Leidos CCTL facilities in Columbia, Maryland, from June 2021 through
February 2022.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that customers would receive it, installed and configured the
TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the team test plan on equipment configured
in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing
requirements for Protection Profile for Application Software, Functional Package for Transport Layer
Security (TLS), and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH) were fulfilled.
7.1 Test Configuration
The evaluation team established a test configuration comprising one instance of the TOE as follows:
Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0.11-f. A schematic of the test configuration is
presented in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: TOE Test Configuration
The test configuration included the following devices in the operational environment of the TOE:
• TOE platform—execution environment for the TOE, comprising:
o Docker runtime engine v19.0.3
o Ubuntu 16.04
o VMware ESXi 6.5
o AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X (Zen microarchitecture) processor
• Test Server—used for general testing and collection of test artifacts. It included the following
software:
o Ubuntu 20.04
o Sslyze v5.0.0
• TLS Server/OCSP Responder—used to test TLS client, TLS server, X.509 requirements. It included
the following software:
o Ubuntu 18.04.1
o OpenSSL v1.1.1
o Wireshark v2.6.1.0
o XCA v1.3.2
o Nmap v7.6
o Hex Editor v1.2.13
o CCTL’s custom TLS Server and TLS Client test tools
• SSH Server—used to test SSH client. It included the following software:
o Ubuntu 16.04.7
o OpenSSH v7.2p2
o Wireshark v2.6.1.0.
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8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
The specific tested version was 4.0.11-f. The TOE consists of exactly one instance of Axonius Cybersecurity
Asset Management Platform v4.0-f provided as either a .deb file or a .deb file packaged as an OVA file,
executing on a platform consisting of:
• Docker runtime engine v19.0.3
• Ubuntu Linux 16.04
• VMware ESXi 6.5
• AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X (Zen microarchitecture) processor.
In addition to the execution platform identified above, the TOE’s operational environment includes:
• A web browser, used to access the management web GUI (Chrome v84 and Firefox v79 are
vendor-tested)
• One or more adapter data sources as identified in Appendix B of the ST.
8.2 Excluded Functionality
The following features and capabilities of Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f are
not covered by the evaluation:
• The TOE’s data collection, analysis, and automated response capabilities (aside from the trusted
channels used to communicate with assets)
• Any other product behavior not explicitly specified and described in the claimed PP and associated
packages.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the evaluation of the TOE against its target assurance requirements are generally described
in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report for Axonius
Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f ([10]). The reader of this VR can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received passing verdicts.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1,
revision 5 ([1], [2], [3]) and CEM version 3.1, revision 5 ([4]), and the specific evaluation activities specified
in:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 ([5])
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 ([6])
• Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016 ([7])
The evaluation determined the TOE satisfies the conformance claims made in the Axonius Cybersecurity
Asset Management Platform v4.0-f Security Target, of Part 2 extended and Part 3 extended. The TOE
satisfies the requirements specified in the PP and associated packages listed above.
The Validators reviewed all the work of the evaluation team and agreed with their practices and findings.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)
The evaluation team performed each TSS evaluation activity and ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation
ensured the ST contains an ST introduction, TOE overview, TOE description, security problem definition in
terms of threats, policies and assumptions, description of security objectives for the operational
environment, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the product that are consistent
with the claimed PP, and security function descriptions that satisfy the requirements.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team performed each ADV evaluation activity and applied each ADV_FSP.1 CEM work unit.
The evaluation team assessed the evaluation evidence and found it adequate to meet the requirements
specified in the claimed PP for design evidence. The ADV evidence consists of the TSS descriptions
provided in the ST and product guidance documentation providing descriptions of the TOE external
interfaces.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team performed each guidance evaluation activity and applied each AGD work unit. The
evaluation team determined the adequacy of the operational user guidance in describing how to operate
the TOE in accordance with the descriptions in the ST. The evaluation team followed the guidance in the
TOE preparative procedures to test the installation and configuration procedures to ensure the
procedures result in the evaluated configuration. The guidance documentation was assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure it was complete.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team performed each ALC evaluation activity and applied each ALC_CMC.1 and ALC_CMS.1
CEM work unit, to the extent possible given the evaluation evidence required by the claimed PP. The
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evaluation team ensured the TOE is labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE identification
in the evaluation evidence, and that the ST describes how timely security updates are made to the TOE.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team performed each test activity and applied each ATE_FUN.1 CEM work unit. The
evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the claimed PP and recorded the results in the Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team performed each AVA evaluation activity and applied each AVA_VAN.1 CEM work
unit. The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis following the processes described in the
claimed PP. This comprised a search of public vulnerability databases.
The evaluation team performed a search of the National Vulnerability Database (https://nvd.nist.gov/).
The evaluation team initially performed searches on 14 January 2022 and repeated those searches on 8
February 2022. The evaluation team performed final searches, including new search terms suggested by
the validators, on 28 February 2022, using the following search terms:
• “axonius”
• “asset management platform”
• “mongodb 4.2.8”
• “openssl 1.0.2”
• “python”
• “tls 1.2”
• “paramiko ssh”
• “esxi 6.5”
• “ubuntu 16.04”
• “docker 19.03”.
The results of these searches did not identify any vulnerabilities that are applicable to the TOE. The
conclusion drawn from the vulnerability analysis is that no residual vulnerabilities exist that are
exploitable by attackers with Basic Attack Potential as defined by the Certification Body in accordance
with the guidance in the CEM.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met, sufficient to satisfy the assurance activities specified in the claimed PP. Additionally, the evaluation
team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates
that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the
product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of the
TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the SFRs
specified in the Security Target, and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the
SFRs claimed in the Security Target. All other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed
separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the Configuration
Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration is established and
maintained.
The validators note that rekeying of SSH sessions will not occur because the transactions performed over
SSH are so short that they will never reach the time and data thresholds mandated by Extended Package
for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016 ([7])
The validators note that, because the TOE runs in a Docker container, dynamic libraries are not installed
in the typical location.
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11 Security Target
The ST for this product’s evaluation is Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f Security
Target, Version 1.0, 3 February 2022 ([8]).
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12 Abbreviations and Acronyms
This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this document.
CA Certificate Authority
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
cPP collaborative Protection Profile
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FOM FIPS Object Module
GUI Graphical User Interface
IT Information Technology
LUKS Linux Unified Key Setup
PCL Product Compliant List
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSS TOE Summary Specification
VM Virtual Machine
VR Validation Report
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13 Bibliography
The validation team used the following documents to produce this VR:
[1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Evaluation Methodology for
Information Technology Security, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[5] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019.
[6] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019.
[7] Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016.
[8] Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f Security Target, Version 1.0, 3 February
2022.
[9] Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f Common Criteria Evaluated
Configuration Guide (CCECG), Version 1.0, 14 January 2022.
[10] Evaluation Technical Report for Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f,
Version 1.0, 28 February 2022.
[11] Assurance Activities Report for Axonius Cybersecurity Asset Management Platform v4.0-f, Version
1.0, 28 February 2022.
[12] Axonius Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.1, 22 February 2022.