Certes Networks, Inc.
CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 Software with CEP220,
CEP250, CEP300, CEP420, and CEP520 running CEP v5.3
Firmware
Security
Target
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL): EAL4+
Document Version: 0.7
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Certes Networks, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
300 Corporate Center Drive 13921 Park Center Road Suite 460
Moon, PA 15108 Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 412 262 2571 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
www.certesnetworks.com www.corsec.com
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
Certes CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 Software with CEP220, CEP250, CEP300, CEP420, and CEP520 running CEP v5.3 Firmware v5.3
©2019 Certes Networks, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Page 2 of 51
Table of Contents
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Purpose .....................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Target and TOE References.........................................................................................................5
1.3 Product Overview......................................................................................................................................6
1.4 TOE Overview............................................................................................................................................8
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE.............................................................................9
1.4.2 TOE Environment........................................................................................................................... 10
1.5 TOE Description...................................................................................................................................... 10
1.5.1 Physical Scope ............................................................................................................................... 11
1.5.2 Logical Scope ................................................................................................................................. 12
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE............................. 14
2. Conformance Claims....................................................................................................................................... 15
3. Security Problem............................................................................................................................................. 16
3.1 Threats to Security................................................................................................................................. 16
3.2 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................................. 16
3.3 Assumptions........................................................................................................................................... 17
4. Security Objectives ......................................................................................................................................... 18
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................................. 18
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment........................................................................... 18
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives.................................................................................................................... 18
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives............................................................................................................ 19
5. Extended Components ................................................................................................................................... 20
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Components ................................................................................... 20
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Components.................................................................................... 20
6. Security Requirements.................................................................................................................................... 21
6.1 Conventions ........................................................................................................................................... 21
6.2 Security Functional Requirements......................................................................................................... 21
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit............................................................................................................... 22
6.2.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.................................................................................................. 24
6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection.................................................................................................... 26
6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication................................................................................. 28
6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management................................................................................................. 29
6.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.................................................................................................... 31
6.2.7 Class FTA: TOE Access.................................................................................................................... 31
6.2.8 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels................................................................................................. 32
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................... 32
7. TOE Security Specification .............................................................................................................................. 34
7.1 TOE Security Functionality ..................................................................................................................... 34
7.1.1 Security Audit ................................................................................................................................ 35
7.1.2 Cryptographic Support .................................................................................................................. 35
7.1.3 User Data Protection..................................................................................................................... 36
7.1.4 Identification and Authentication ................................................................................................. 37
7.1.5 Security Management ................................................................................................................... 37
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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7.1.6 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................................... 38
7.1.7 TOE Access..................................................................................................................................... 38
7.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels.................................................................................................................. 38
8. Rationale......................................................................................................................................................... 39
8.1 Conformance Claims Rationale.............................................................................................................. 39
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................................................ 39
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats ........................................................................ 39
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies ........................................................................ 41
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions................................................................ 41
8.3 Rationale for Extended Security Functional Requirements................................................................... 42
8.4 Rationale for Extended TOE Security Assurance Requirements............................................................ 42
8.5 Security Requirements Rationale........................................................................................................... 42
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives....................................... 42
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ................................................................................ 46
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale .................................................................................................................. 46
9. Acronyms........................................................................................................................................................ 49
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Deployment Configuration of the TOE ......................................................................................................9
Figure 2 – Physical TOE Boundary ........................................................................................................................... 11
List of Tables
Table 1 – ST and TOE References ...............................................................................................................................5
Table 2 – CEP Network Topologies.............................................................................................................................7
Table 3 – CryptoFlow Net Creator Server Requirements........................................................................................ 12
Table 4 – CC and PP Conformance .......................................................................................................................... 15
Table 5 – Threats ..................................................................................................................................................... 16
Table 6 – Assumptions............................................................................................................................................. 17
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................................................... 18
Table 8 – IT Security Objectives............................................................................................................................... 19
Table 9 – Non-IT Security Objectives....................................................................................................................... 19
Table 10 – TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................................. 21
Table 11 – Auditable Events .................................................................................................................................... 23
Table 12 – Cryptographic Key Generation Standards for CryptoFlow Net Creator ................................................ 24
Table 14 – Cryptographic Operations of the CryptoFlow Net Creator.................................................................... 25
Table 16 – Password Conventions........................................................................................................................... 28
Table 17 – Management of TSF Data for CryptoFlow Net Creator ......................................................................... 30
Table 18 – Management of TSF Data for CEP CLI.................................................................................................... 30
Table 19 – User Roles .............................................................................................................................................. 31
Table 20 – Assurance Requirements....................................................................................................................... 32
Table 21 – Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements...................................... 34
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Table 22 – Threats: Objectives Mapping................................................................................................................. 39
Table 23 – Assumptions: Objectives Mapping ........................................................................................................ 41
Table 24 – Objectives: SFRs Mapping...................................................................................................................... 43
Table 25 – Functional Requirements Dependencies............................................................................................... 46
Table 26 – Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... 49
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
Certes CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 Software with CEP220, CEP250, CEP300, CEP420, and CEP520 running CEP v5.3 Firmware v5.3
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1. Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the ST organization. The TOE is
the Certes Networks, Inc. CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 Software with CEP220, CEP250, CEP300, CEP420, and
CEP520 running CEP v5.3 Firmware and will hereafter be referred to as the TOE throughout this document. The
TOE is a high performance, low latency, multi-layer encryption appliance known as a CEP and web-based
management software called the CryptoFlow Net Creator. The CEP provides Ethernet frame encryption for Layer
2 networks, Internet Protocol (IP) packet encryption using IP Security (IPSec) for Layer 3 networks, and data
payload encryption for Layer 4 MPLS1
networks. CryptoFlow Net Creator is used to manage the CEP encryption
appliances.
1.1 Purpose
This ST is divided into nine sections, as follows:
• Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and describes the organization of
other sections within this document. It also provides an overview of the TOE security functionality and
describes the physical and logical scope for the TOE as well as the ST and TOE references.
• Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common Criteria (CC), Protection
Profile (PP), and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package claims. It also identifies whether the ST
contains extended security requirements.
• Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security policies, and assumptions
that pertain to the TOE and its environment.
• Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and its
environment.
• Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)) that are not included in CC
Part 2 or CC Part 3.
• Security Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SFRs and SARs to which the TOE adheres.
• TOE Security Specification (Section 7) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE that satisfy
the SFRs and objectives.
• Rationale (Section 8) – Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and SFR
dependencies as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
• Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms and terminology used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target and TOE References
Table 1 below shows the ST and TOE references.
Table 1 – ST and TOE References
ST Title
Certes Networks, Inc. CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 Software with CEP220, CEP250, CEP300, CEP420,
and CEP520 running CEP v5.3 Firmware Security Target
1 MPLS – Multiprotocol Label Switching
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
Certes CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 Software with CEP220, CEP250, CEP300, CEP420, and CEP520 running CEP v5.3 Firmware v5.3
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Page 6 of 51
ST Version Version 0.7
ST Author Corsec Security, Inc.
ST Publication Date January 22, 2019
TOE Reference
Certes Networks, Inc. CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 Software with CEP220, CEP250, CEP300, CEP420,
and CEP520 running CEP v5.3 Firmware composed TOE consisting of the following components:
• CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3.8447
• CEP220, CEP250, CEP300, CEP420, and CEP520
• CEP v5.3.0290
FIPS 140-2 Status Level 1 Validated Cryptographic Modules: See tables 12-15 for certificate numbers
1.3 Product Overview
The Product Overview provides a high-level description of the product that is the subject of the evaluation. The
following section, TOE Overview, will provide the introduction to the parts of the overall product offering that
are specifically being evaluated.
The TOE is a suite of components consisting of CEP encryption appliances and CryptoFlow Net Creator central
security and policy management software. CryptoFlow Net Creator is a web-based GUI2
that configures and
monitors the CEP encryption appliances, stores and deploys policies (or rules), and provides key management
and auditing capabilities. Policies created and distributed by CryptoFlow Net Creator define the actions CEPs
take on protected network traffic, either to encrypt and decrypt it, send it in the clear, or drop it. All remote
management traffic transmitted between the CryptoFlow Net Creator and CEP encryption appliances is
protected via TLS3
v1.2 sessions.
The CEP encryption appliance provides high-speed processing capabilities to protect data travelling over
untrusted networks while in transit between sites. It provides Ethernet frame encryption for Layer 2 networks,
IPSec encryption for Layer 3 networks, and data payload encryption for Layer 4 MPLS networks. The CEP220, 250,
300, 420, and 520 encryption appliances offer full-duplex, line rate encryption up to 20 Mbps4
, 20 Mbps, 200
Mbps, 1 Gbps5
, and 10 Gbps speeds, respectively, using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm.
Each CEP encryption appliance has one management port and two data ports. A local data port is used for LAN6
connections to trusted networks, while a remote data port provides WAN7
connections over untrusted networks.
Unencrypted traffic that originates from a trusted, local network is received on the local data port of the
origination CEP. This CEP encrypts the received traffic and sends it out through the remote data port to another
CEP via an untrusted network, such as Private WAN. At the receiving CEP, the process is reversed; encrypted
traffic is received on the CEP remote data port where it is decrypted and sent out the local data port to the
destination. Encryption policies use IP addresses, port numbers, protocol IDs8
, or VLAN9
tags to identify and
2 GUI – Graphical User Interface
3 TLS – Transport Layer Security
4 Mbps – Megabits per Second
5 Gbps – Gigabits per Second
6 LAN – Local-Area network
7 WAN – Wide Area Network
8 ID – Identifier
9 VLAN – Virtual Local Area Network
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Page 7 of 51
apply security processing to network traffic. CEPs secure network traffic using 256-bit AES10
-GCM11
and AES-
CBC12
for encryption, as well as SHA13
-2 for message integrity and authentication.
The CEP encryption appliance provides full data encryption for Layer 3 IP networks using standard IPSec packet
format while preserving the original IP header. It also provides Layer 4 encryption using a patented scheme that
protects the IP payload while preserving the original IP and TCP14
/UDP15
headers. This unique capability
maintains network transparency while providing strong data protection. By preserving the original header and
encrypting only the payload, the CEP encryption appliance protects user data over any IP network. This includes
any multi-carrier, load-balanced, or high-availability network. This feature also allows network services, such as
Netflow/Jflow, and Class of Service (CoS) based traffic shaping to be maintained throughout the network.
The CEP encryption appliances are managed via a CLI16
hosted on the appliance itself or via the CryptoFlow Net
Creator GUI Server running on a separate Linux based platform. The CEP CLI, accessed via serial port or remote
SSH17
, is used for initial setup, troubleshooting, and diagnostic tasks.
The CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI is the primary management interface. It is a web-based application and
database server supporting role-based access that is used to provision CEP encryption appliances, define polices,
and manage keys and certificates. Policies and key data, used by the CEPs to derive encryption keys, are
generated and securely distributed to CEP encryption appliances via a TLS authenticated and encrypted channel,
with the option for bilateral certificate-based authentication. CryptoFlow Net Creator offers high availability and
the web-based, three-tier architecture scales linearly. CryptoFlow Net Creator also provides SNMP18
access to
host information and has the capability to forward logs to an administrator assigned syslog server and generate
email notifications when critical alerts are generated in the system.
The CEPs can be deployed into many network topologies.
Table 2 identifies the network topologies that are supported by the TOE’s policies.
Table 2 – CEP Network Topologies
Encryption Policy Type Layer Topology
Policies Layer 3 Hub-and-Spoke
Point-to-Point
Mesh
Multicast
Layer 2 Mesh
10 AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
11 GCM – Galois Counter Mode
12 CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
13 SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm
14 TCP – Transmission Control Protocol
15 UDP – User Datagram Protocol
16 CLI – Command Line Interface
17 SSH – Secure Shell
18 SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. This section provides a context
for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type, describing the TOE, and defining the specific evaluated
configuration.
The TOE is the CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 Software with CEP220, CEP250, CEP300, CEP420, and CEP520
running CEP v5.3 Firmware, which is a software and hardware TOE. The TOE is a CEP encryption appliance,
configured and managed using the CryptoFlow Net Creator custom-written application software. The TOE
provides Layer 2 Ethernet frame encryption, Layer 3 IP packet encryption, Layer 4 encryption, encryption keys
required for the encryption, and a GUI and CLI for the management of its functionality. All of the security
features of the TOE, including the cryptographic algorithms, are implemented in the CryptoFlow Net Creator
v5.3 Software and the CEP v5.3 Firmware. No security features of the TOE are implemented in the TOE hardware.
In addition, the security features are the same amongst all the TOE CEP encryption appliance models.
The CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 software includes a FIPS-140-2 validated cryptographic module (cryptographic
library). Also, the TOE CEP encryption appliances themselves are FIPS-140-2 validated and are running the CEP
v5.3 Firmware that provides all of the FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic algorithms for the CEP encryption
appliances.
The CEP encryption appliances are the policy enforcement points. Because of this, CEPs are referred to as Certes
Enforcement Points. According to the policies received, CEPs can encrypt and decrypt traffic, send traffic in the
clear, or drop traffic. A brief description of the encryption processes at Layer 2 and Layer 3 is given below:
Layer 2 Ethernet Frame Encryption:
In Layer 2 policies, the CEP provides encryption services to Ethernet frames by using a VLAN ID as an encryption
selector or by encrypting all Ethernet frames received from the trusted network.
Layer 3 IP Packet Encryption:
For Layer 3 IP Packet encryption, the CEPs use the IPSec protocol to provide full data encryption for Layer 3 IP
networks. They use the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol to preserve the original IP packet header
and encrypt just the payload. By doing so, the CEPs can encrypt data over load-balanced, redundant, and
resilient networks.
Layer 4 Packet Encryption:
Layer 4 packet encryption is a variant of Layer 3 IP Packet encryption in which the CEPs preserve not just the
original IP packet header, but also the original TCP/UDP header. Only the traffic payload beyond the original
TCP/UDP header is encrypted. This mode allows visibility of the packet to any network monitoring tools in the
network.
Before secured data can be exchanged, a Security Association (SA) must be established between the CEP
encryption appliances exchanging the information. An SA identifies what traffic to act on, what kind of security
to apply, and the CEP with which the traffic is being exchanged. SAs are created when policies are deployed to
the CEPs and can be refreshed during a rekey. Two SAs are established for each connection: one for inbound
communication and one for outbound communication.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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When sending a packet or frame, the CEP checks its Security Policy Database (SPD)19
to determine which SA to
use. The SA determines the security processing required for the packet or frame. For receiving packets or frames,
the CEP examines each packet or frame it receives and decides what actions need to be exercised. The actions
include one of the following:
• Clear: Packets or frames that match a clear text policy are passed unencrypted.
• Discard: Packets or frames that match a discard policy are dropped and do not exit the CEP.
• Encrypt/Decrypt: All packets matching this policy are encrypted or decrypted.
Figure 1 shows the details of the deployment configuration of the TOE. The following previously undefined
acronym appears in Figure 1:
• NTP – Network Time Protocol
Figure 1 – Deployment Configuration of the TOE
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE
The CEPs can be managed by authorized administrators using the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI or the CEP CLI.
Using the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI, an administrator can configure and manage multiple appliances from a
single centralized location. In addition, security policies defining how and where the encryption will take place
can be created. The CEP CLI can be accessed from the management workstation either directly via a serial port
or through an SSH connection. It allows an administrator to perform initial setup and troubleshooting of the CEP.
A policy defines networks to be protected and groups these networks to form Network Sets. A policy can have
one or more Network Sets associated with it. Once the Network Sets are established, CEPs can be assigned to
19 SPD – An SPD defines the traffic to be protected, how to protect it, and with whom the protection is shared. The SPD uses selectors to
map traffic to a policy, which maps to an SA that is maintained in the Security Association Database (SAD).
Local Area
Network
Certes
Enforcement
Point (CEP)
Certes
Enforcement
Point (CEP)
Wide Area
Network
Remote Area
Network
Users
Remote
Users
Application Servers
(NTP, Syslog)
Management
Workstation
running
browser with
TLS support
and SSH client
CryptoFlow Net Creator Server
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
Certes CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3 Software with CEP220, CEP250, CEP300, CEP420, and CEP520 running CEP v5.3 Firmware v5.3
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Page 10 of 51
those Network Sets and the security policies governing them are defined. Each CEP in a given network is given
the same group encryption key data to be used to derive encryption keys. Policy types supported are specified in
Table 2. CryptoFlow Net Creator centralizes the creation and distribution of key data and policies. In addition, it
provides a rekeying capability that ensures that CEPs generate new encryption keys at defined rekey intervals.
Each policy specifies the encryption and hash algorithms to be used, re-key periods, and whether the key
generation technique being used is per Network Set or global. It also specifies the lifetime of the policy, the CEPs
that enforce the policy, what kind of traffic the policy acts on, and what actions should be taken on the traffic
along with which networks are to be protected. Traffic encryption can be based on the source IP address,
destination IP address, source port number, destination port number, protocol ID, or VLAN tag ID.
Once a policy is defined, CryptoFlow Net Creator generates and distributes the required key data and
appropriate policies to the CEPs. CryptoFlow Net Creator is installed under a Linux OS20
. Only the CryptoFlow Net
Creator software is included within the TOE boundary, while the physical hardware and Linux OS are considered
outside of the TOE boundary.
1.4.2 TOE Environment
The TOE is intended to be deployed in a physically secure cabinet or data center with the appropriate level of
physical access control and physical protection (e.g., fire control, locks, alarms). The TOE is intended to be
managed by administrators operating under a consistent security policy.
The TOE is meant to provide confidentiality and integrity services to information traveling across an untrusted
network. The TOE environment should ensure stable network connectivity for the TOE to perform its intended
function.
The TOE requires reliable timestamps to audit its security-relevant events. The TOE requires the clocks on the
different components of the TOE to be synchronized so that the time each event occurred can be accurately
audited. The TOE environment is responsible for providing an NTP server for time synchronization.
The TOE management functionality is accessed via an independent third-party SSH client or Web browser. Any
standards-compliant SSH client is suitable for use with the TOE. One of the following types of Web browsers
should be used:
• Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE v11+)
• Mozilla Firefox (v64+)
• Google Chrome (v71+)
• Apple Safari (v12+)
1.5 TOE Description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in the
evaluation.
20 OS – Operating System
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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1.5.1 Physical Scope
Figure 2 illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the overall solution and ties together all of
the components of the TOE. The TOE is a software and hardware TOE. The TOE is a CEP encryption appliance
(both hardware and software) configured and managed using the CryptoFlow Net Creator custom-written
application software.
Figure 2 – Physical TOE Boundary
1.5.1.1 TOE Hardware and Software
The essential physical components for the proper operation of the TOE in the evaluated configuration include
the following:
Local Area
Network
Hardware
CEP Software
Certes
Enforcement
Point (CEP)
Windows OS
Hardware
Web Browser
Linux OS
Hardware
CryptoFlow Net Creator
Software
NTP and Syslog Servers
CryptoFlow Net
Creator Server
Legend:
TOE Boundary
Management
Workstation
SSH Client
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Page 12 of 51
• One of each of these Certes encryption appliances:
o CEP220
o CEP250
o CEP300
o CEP420
o CEP520
• CryptoFlow Net Creator Server
• CEP v5.3.0290, in binary format pre-installed on the CEP encryption appliances
• CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3.8447, in binary format pre-installed on the CryptoFlow Net Creator Server
The CryptoFlow Net Creator v5.3.8447 is shipped to customers on a CryptoFlow Net Creator Server that meets
the minimum system requirements listed in Table 3.
Table 3 – CryptoFlow Net Creator Server Requirements
Component Requirement
OS CentOS 6.7 (with the current released updates applied)
CPU21 Intel Xeon E3-1270 v5, 3.6 GHz22
Memory 8 GB23
Disk Space 500 GB minimum
Only the CEP (hardware and software) and CryptoFlow Net Creator (software-only) are included in the TOE
boundary. The CEP hardware includes purpose-built appliances that are included with the purchase of the TOE.
The software is custom-made to provide cryptographic functionality and the ability to manage the CEP
encryption appliances.
1.5.1.2 Guidance Documentation
The following guides are required reading and part of the TOE:
• CEP 5.3 User Guide, Version 5.3, REV A
• Certes 5.3 Enforcers for Certifications Product Guide, Rev A, 4/20/2018
• CFNC User Guide, Version 5.3, REV A
• CryptoFlow Net Creator 5.3 Installation Guide, Version 5.3, REV A
These guides may be downloaded in PDF format from the Certes’s Customer Portal at
https://support.certesnetworks.com/.
1.5.2 Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE will be broken down into the following security classes, which are further
described in sections 6 and 7 of this ST. The logical scope also provides the description of the security features of
the TOE. The SFRs implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped under the Security Function Classes described
in the sections below.
21 CPU – Central Processing Unit
22 GHz - Gigahertz
23 GB - Gigabyte
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Page 13 of 51
1.5.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE provides functionality for the generation and viewing of audit records. As administrators manage and
configure the TOE, the TOE tracks their activities by recording audit records in audit logs. The TOE records all
security-relevant configuration settings and changes to ensure accountability of the administrator’s actions.
Authorized administrators can view the audit records through the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI and the CEP CLI.
The audit records show the identity of the user that triggered the event. The TOE applies a set of rules in
monitoring the audited events, and based upon these rules, indicates a potential violation of the enforcement of
the SFRs by displaying an alert at the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI.
1.5.2.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE uses two FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules to perform cryptographic operations. The
cryptographic operations are used to secure communications from remote administrators at the CryptoFlow Net
Creator GUI and CEP CLI. They are also used to encrypt user data, create a secure communication channel for
the transfer of user data between CEPs, and protect TSF data (e.g., key data, policies) transmitted between
CryptoFlow Net Creator and the CEPs. All cryptographic keys generated by the TOE are destroyed by overwriting
them according to FIPS 140-2 zeroization methods.
1.5.2.3 User Data Protection
The TOE enforces the Information Flow Control SFP24
that applies a set of rules to Ethernet frames or IP traffic
passing through the TOE. Depending on the operation identified in the SFP, the TOE will determine whether to
pass user traffic in the clear, discard it, or encrypt/decrypt it. Authorized TOE administrators configure the SFP
by setting security attributes using the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI or the CEP CLI.
1.5.2.4 Identification and Authentication
All TOE administrators must be identified and authenticated prior to performing any actions at the CryptoFlow
Net Creator GUI or CEP CLI. Access to the TOE requires an authorized username and role. This ensures that only
legitimate administrators of the TOE can gain access to the configuration and management settings. The TOE
obscures passwords at the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI and CEP CLI during authentication. The CryptoFlow Net
Creator GUI uses a bullet (•) in place of each character, and the CEP CLI gives no feedback.
1.5.2.5 Security Management
The TOE is managed by administrators in one of eight roles: Platform Administrator, Administrator, Appliance
Administrator, Appliance Operator, Policy Creator, Policy Deployer, User, and Ops. The TOE is capable of
performing the following management functions: managing the Information Flow Control SFP security attributes
and managing TSF data. The TOE restricts access to management functions based on the administrator’s role.
The Information Flow Control SFP is permissive by default, allowing information to pass between CEPs in the
clear; however, authorized administrators are able to modify the Information Flow Control SFP to perform
alternative operations, like dropping or encrypting the information.
1.5.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects TSF data from disclosure and modification when it is transmitted between separate parts of
the TOE. The TOE uses TLSv1.2 to secure communication between CryptoFlow Net Creator and a CEP encryption
appliance.
24 SFP – Security Function Policy
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The TOE and TOE environment provide reliable timestamps for the CEP encryption appliance and CryptoFlow
Net Creator software, respectively. The timestamps are used to record accurate time for audit records. The time
for all TOE components is synchronized using an NTP server in the TOE environment.
1.5.2.7 TOE Access
The TOE terminates an inactive administrator CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI or CEP CLI session after a
preconfigured time period. Administrators must re-authenticate after being logged out. This prevents an
unauthorized individual from gaining access to the TOE management functions through an unattended session.
Administrators may also terminate their own interactive sessions.
Before establishing a user session, the TOE displays a login banner containing an advisory warning message
regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.
1.5.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE (CEP encryption appliance) provides a trusted channel between itself and another trusted IT25
product
(another CEP encryption appliance in this case) by encrypting and decrypting and authenticating all transmitted
data using cryptographic algorithms provided by a FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module. It uses this
trusted channel to transfer user data (Ethernet frames and IP packets) between CEP encryption appliances.
Using a supported web browser, a remote administrator initiates a secure connection to the CryptoFlow Net
Creator GUI. The secure path is established using HTTPS26
. Using an SSH client, a remote administrator initiates a
secure connection to the CEP CLI over SSH. The HTTPS and SSH connections are used to protect data
communications from modification or disclosure and ensure end point identification.
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not
included in the TOE
The following features and functionality are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE:
• Hardware and Linux OS that CryptoFlow Net Creator runs on
• Strict Authentication
• Non-Transparent Mode
• CryptoFlow Net Creator in High Availability configuration
• SNMP management of CEPs
• Email Alerts
25 IT – Information Technology
26 HTTPS – Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
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2. Conformance Claims
This section and Table 4 provide the identification for any CC, PP, and EAL package conformance claims.
Rationale is provided for any extensions or augmentations to the conformance claims. Rationale for CC and PP
conformance claims can be found in Section 8.1.
Table 4 – CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria (CC)
Identification and
Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017; CC
Part 2 conformant; CC Part 3 conformant; PP claim (none); Parts 2 and 3 Interpretations of the CEM as
of 2018/10/02 were reviewed, and no interpretations apply to the claims made in this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4+ Augmented with Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR.3)
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3. Security Problem
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the manner in
which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statement of the TOE security environment, which
identifies and explains all of the following:
• Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment
• Organizational security policies to which the TOE must comply
• Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel, and connectivity aspects
3.1 Threats to Security
This section identifies the threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by the
security environment. The threat agents are divided into two categories:
• Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and are
assumed to possess a low skill level, limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings or parameters,
and no physical access to the TOE.
• TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess a high
skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings or parameters, and physical access to
the TOE (TOE users are, however, assumed not to be willfully hostile to the TOE).
Both are assumed to have a low level of motivation. The IT assets requiring protection are the TSF and user data
saved on or transitioning through the TOE and the hosts on the protected network. Removal, diminution, and
mitigation of the threats are through the objectives identified in Section 4 Security Objectives. Table 5 below
lists the applicable threats.
Table 5 – Threats
Name Description
T.DISCLOSE An unauthorized person may intercept data within a packet or frame transmitted or received by the TOE when traveling
over an untrusted network.
T.MODIFY An unauthorized person may modify a packet or frame transmitted or received by the TOE when traveling over an
untrusted network.
T.NO_AUDIT An attacker may perform security-relevant operations on the TOE without being held accountable for them.
T.SPOOF An unauthorized person may attempt to impersonate the identity (IP address) of a trusted system.
T.UNATH An unauthorized person may gain access to the TOE and compromise its security functions by changing its configuration.
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
An Organizational Security Policy (OSP) is a set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed by an
organization on the operational environment of the TOE. There are no OSPs imposed upon the TOE or its
operational environment by any organization implementing the TOE in the CC evaluated configuration.
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3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. The operational
environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for delivery,
operation, and user guidance. Table 6 lists the specific conditions that are required to ensure the security of the
TOE and are assumed to exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Table 6 – Assumptions
Name Description
A.INSTALL The TOE is installed on the appropriate, dedicated hardware and operating system.
A.NETCON The TOE environment provides the network connectivity required to allow the TOE to perform its intended functions.
A.TIMESTAMP The IT environment provides CryptoFlow Net Creator with the necessary reliable timestamps.
A.LOCATE The TOE, management network, CryptoFlow Net Creator hardware platform, and NTP and syslog servers are all located
within a controlled access facility behind a secured network.
A.PROTECT The TOE software will be protected from unauthorized modification.
A.MANAGE There are one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.
A.NOEVIL The users who manage the TOE are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all guidance.
A.AUDIT The TOE environment will audit the shutdown of the CryptoFlow Net Creator, which is linked to the shutdown of the
CryptoFlow Net Creator audit function.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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4. Security Objectives
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by the
security problem definition (see Section 3). The set of security objectives for a TOE form a high-level solution to
the security problem. This high-level solution is divided into two part-wise solutions: the security objectives for
the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE’s operational environment. This section identifies the security
objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The specific security objectives for the TOE are listed in Table 7 below.
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Name Description
O.ADMIN The TOE must include a set of functions that allow efficient management of its functions, security attributes, and TSF
data, ensuring that only authorized TOE administrators (in defined roles) may exercise such control.
O.AUDIT The TOE must record security relevant events with accurate dates and timestamps, associate each event with the
identity of the user that caused the event, and provide authorized administrators with the ability to review the audit
trail. The TOE shall send an alert email upon detection of potential security violations.
O.AUTHENTICATE The TOE must be able to identify and authenticate users prior to allowing access to TOE administrative functions and
TSF data.
O.ENCRYPT The TOE must provide the means of protecting the confidentiality of information transferred across a public network
between two protected networks using cryptography that conforms to standards specified in FIPS PUB27 140-2.
O.INTEGRITY The TOE must provide mechanisms to ensure that any attempt to corrupt or modify an IP packet or Ethernet frame
flow transmitted to or from the TOE will be detected.
O.KEYMAN The TOE must provide the means for secure management of cryptographic keys. This includes establishment,
generation, encryption, and destruction of the keys.
O.PROTECT The TOE must ensure the integrity of system data by protecting itself from unauthorized modifications and access to
its functions and data.
O.SECURE_COMM The TOE shall securely transfer data between a CEP device and a remote user, CryptoFlow Net Creator, or another
CEP device and between CryptoFlow Net Creator and a remote user.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
This section describes the environmental objectives.
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
Table 8 below lists the IT security objectives that are to be satisfied by the environment.
27 PUB - Publication
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Table 8 – IT Security Objectives
Name Description
OE.SECURE_NETWORK The LAN that the CryptoFlow Net Creator hardware platform, CEP, management workstation, and TOE
environmental components are connected to a secure network that provides protection against outside attacks.
OE.TRAFFIC The TOE environment must be implemented such that the TOE is appropriately located within the network to
perform its intended function.
OE.TIMESTAMP NTP servers providing time information to the TOE shall be on the local network and inaccessible to non-
administrators.
OE.AUDIT The TOE environment must audit the shutdown of CryptoFlow Net Creator, which is linked to the CryptoFlow Net
Creator audit function.
OE.PROTECT The TOE environment must protect itself and the TOE from external interference or tampering.
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
Table 9 below lists the non-IT environment security objectives that are to be satisfied without imposing technical
requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware
and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through the application of procedural or administrative
measures.
Table 9 – Non-IT Security Objectives
Name Description
OE.PHYSICAL Those responsible for the physical security of the TOE must ensure that the TOE is protected from physical attacks.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Those responsible for the management and configuration of the TOE must be trusted and adequately trained to
perform their functions.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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5. Extended Components
This section defines the extended SFRs and extended SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are presented
following the conventions identified in Section 6.1.
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional Components
There are no extended TOE security functional components defined for this evaluation.
5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance Components
There are no extended TOE security assurance components defined for this evaluation.
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6. Security Requirements
This section defines the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are presented following the
conventions identified in Section 6.1.
6.1 Conventions
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to aid the
Security Target reader.
The CC allows for assignment, refinement, selection, and iteration operations to be performed on security
functional requirements. All of these operations are used within this ST with the exception of iteration. These
operations are performed as described in Part 2 of the CC and are shown as follows:
• Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
• Completed selection statements are identified using [underlined text within brackets].
• Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken (Example: TSF Data) and should
be considered as a refinement.
• Extended Functional and Assurance Requirements are identified using “EXT_” at the beginning of the
short name.
• Iterations are identified by appending a letter in parentheses following the component title. For
example, FAU_GEN.1(a) Audit Data Generation would be the first iteration and FAU_GEN.1(b) Audit
Data Generation would be the second iteration.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 10 identifies all
SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each requirement.
Table 10 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms ✓
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation ✓ ✓
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis ✓
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review ✓
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation ✓
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key agreement ✓ ✓
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction ✓
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation ✓
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control ✓
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Name Description S A R I
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes ✓
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality ✓ ✓
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity ✓ ✓
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets ✓
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback ✓
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes ✓ ✓
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation ✓ ✓
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data ✓ ✓
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions ✓
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles ✓
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection ✓
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps ✓
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination ✓
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel ✓ ✓
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path ✓ ✓
Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_ARP.1.1
The TSF shall take [action to make alert viewable via the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI] upon detection of
a potential security violation.
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events, for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c. [other specifically defined auditable events – See Table 11 below].
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
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a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [no other audit relevant information].
Table 11 – Auditable Events
Component Auditable Events
CryptoFlow Net Creator Communication operations and failures with the CEP
Successful and unsuccessful login attempts, log out activity
Administrative activity (e.g., modifications to user accounts, appliance configuration changes, and policy
deployments)
CryptoFlow Net Creator output when CryptoFlow Net Creator starts/stops
Activities regarding updates
CEP System startup and shutdown, includes reboots and power cycles
Successful and unsuccessful login attempts and log out activity
Administrative activities related to CEP user accounts
Any administrative functions that result in a change to the appliance configuration and data traffic policy
deployments
Appliance software upgrade status
Failure state entered
CEP not encrypting
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1.1
The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and based upon these rules
indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.
FAU_SAA.1.2.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events:
• Accumulation or combination of [a CEP is not encrypting] known to indicate a potential security
violation;
• [no other rules].
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [Platform Administrator, Administrator, Appliance Administrator, Appliance
Operator, Policy Creator, Policy Deployer, User, Ops] with the capability to read [all audit information]
from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.
6.2.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm – see Table 12 and Table 13] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes – see Table 12 and Table 13] that meet the following:
[list of standards – see Table 12].
Table 12 – Cryptographic Key Generation Standards for CryptoFlow Net Creator
Key Generation Type Key Size Standards (Certificate #)
AES Key 128, 192, 256 NIST28 SP29 800-133 (5028)
ECDSA Key Pair Gen P-256, P-384 FIPS PUB30 186-4 (1284)
HMAC Key 256, 384, 512 FIPS PUB 198-1 (3342)
Pseudo Random Number Generator 256 NIST SP 800-90A (1842)
Table 13 – Cryptographic Key Generation Standards for CEP
Key Generation Type Key Size Standards (Certificate #)
AES Key 128, 192, 256 NIST SP 800-133 (5338)
ECDSA Key Pair Gen P-22431, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS PUB 186-4 (1402)
HMAC Key 16032, 256, 384, 512 FIPS PUB 198-1 (3535)
Pseudo Random Number Generator 256 NIST SP 800-90A (2061)
28 NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
29 SP – Special Publication
30 PUB – Publication
31 P-224 used only for pairwise consistency test.
32 HMAC 160 used only for SNMP, which is outside the scope of the evaluation.
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FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key agreement (Refinement)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key agreement in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
agreement method: [
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication
800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography”;
] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction
method [zeroization] that meets the following: [FIPS 140-2 zeroization requirements].
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operations – see Table 14 and Table 15] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm – see Table 14 and Table 15] and
cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes – see Table 14 and Table 15] that meet the following:
[list of standards – see Table 14 and Table 15].
Table 14 – Cryptographic Operations of the CryptoFlow Net Creator
Cryptographic Operations Cryptographic Algorithm Key Sizes (bits) Standards (Certificate #)
Key Pair Generation and Verification ECDSA P-256, P-384 FIPS PUB 186-4 (1284)
Digital Signature Generation and Verification ECDSA P-256, P-384 FIPS PUB 186-4 (1284)
Key Agreement ECC CDH33 primitive P-256, P-384 NIST SP 800-56A (1574)
Symmetric Encryption and Decryption AES (CBC, ECB34, CCM35, and GCM mode) 128, 192, 256 FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38C
NIST SP 800-38D (5028)
33 ECC CDH – Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
34
ECB – Electronics Code Book
35 CCM – Counter with CBC-MAC
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Cryptographic Operations Cryptographic Algorithm Key Sizes (bits) Standards (Certificate #)
Message Authentication HMAC-SHA-2 256
384
512
FIPS PUB 198-1 (3342)
Message Digest SHA-1
SHA-2
160
256
384
512
FIPS PUB 198-1 (4087)
DRBG36 AES-CTR37 256 NIST SP 800-90A (1842)
Table 15 –Cryptographic Operations of the CEP
Cryptographic Operations Cryptographic Algorithm Key Sizes (bits) Standards (Certificate #)
Key Pair Generation and Verification ECDSA PKG P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS PUB 186-4 (1402)
Digital Signature Generation and Verification ECDSA SigGen, SigVer P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS PUB 186-4 (1402)
Key Agreement ECC CDH primitive P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 NIST SP 800-56A (1800)
Symmetric Encryption and Decryption AES (CBC, CFB128 38 , ECB,
CMAC39, and GCM modes)
128, 192, 256 FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38A
NIST SP 800-38D (5338)
Message Authentication HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-2
160
256
384
512
FIPS PUB 198-1 (3535)
Message Digest SHA-1
SHA-2
160
256
384
512
FIPS PUB 180-4 (4289)
DRBG AES-CTR 256 NIST SP 800-90A (2061)
Key Derivation, KBKDF40 Counter mode with AES-CMAC NIST SP 800-108 (193)
Key Derivation TLSv1.2, SSHv2, and SNMPv3 NIST SP 800-135rev1
(1827, 1828, and 1829)
6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] on
[
36 DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
37 CTR – Counter
38 CFB – Cipher Feedback
39 CMAC – Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
40 KBKDF – Key-based Key Derivation Function
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Subjects: External IT entities41
that send or receive information through the TOE
Information: Ethernet Frames or IP packets
Operations: Encrypt/decrypt, clear or drop
].
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_IFF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] based on the following types of subject and
information security attributes:
[
Subject attributes:
1. Topology
2. IP address
Information attributes:
1. Source IP Address
2. Destination IP Address
3. Source port number
4. Destination port number
5. Protocol ID
6. VLAN ID
].
FDP_IFF.1.2
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a
controlled operation if the following rules hold: [an SA is negotiated and agreed upon for the
transmission of Ethernet frames or IP packets].
FDP_IFF.1.3
The TSF shall enforce the [no additional information flow control SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
41
In the case of this SFR, trusted external IT entities refers to user workstations sending traffic between CEPs. External IT entities could
also refer to traffic originating from another CEP, management workstations used by administrators to manage the TOE, or any other
device intended to send traffic to the TOE (switches, routers, NTP servers, etc.).
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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FDP_UCT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] to be able to [transmit, receive] user data in a
manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] to be able to [transmit, receive] user data in a
manner protected from [modification, insertion] errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether [modification, insertion] has
occurred.
6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_SOS.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [a defined quality metric – see Table 16].
Table 16 – Password Conventions
Parameters Conventions
Length Minimum 8
Case sensitive Yes
Valid characters a-z A-Z 0-9 ! @ # % ^ * + = { } : . , _ ~ / \ - [ ]
Spaces allowed Yes
Dictionary words Not allowed*
Mix Must contain at least 2 characters from a mix of upper-case letters,
lower case letters, numbers, and non-alphanumeric symbols
*Application Note: Passwords that have a dictionary word are rejected by the CEP. While the CFNC does not
reject dictionary words, it mitigates any risk by implementing an administrator-configured limit on the number
of allowed failed authentication attempts.
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback via CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI and no feedback via CEP
CLI] to the user while the authentication is in progress.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [change_default, query,
modify, delete] the security attributes [in the policy rules] to [Platform Administrator, Administrator,
Policy Creator].
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP] to provide [permissive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow the [Platform Administrator, Administrator, Policy Creator] to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [operations – see Table 17 and Table 18] the [list of TSF data – see
Table 17 and Table 18] to [the authorized identified roles – see Table 17 and Table 18].
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Table 17 – Management of TSF Data for CryptoFlow Net Creator
Operation TSF Data
Platform
Administrator
Administrator User
Appliance
Admin
Appliance
Operator
Policy
Creator
Policy
Deployer
Modify Users and Passwords X X
Modify Password expiration X X
Create, Delete Users X X
Modify Usernames and passwords X X
Change Own password X X
Modify User’s assigned role X X
View Audit logs and performance
statistics
X X X X X X X
Configure Policies X X X
Deploy Policies and keys X X X
Modify Inactivity timeout interval X X
Configure Appliances X X X
View Appliance statistics X X X X
Table 18 – Management of TSF Data for CEP CLI
Operation TSF Data Administrator Ops
Create Administrator accounts (username and role) X
Delete Administrator accounts X
Modify Administrator’s password X
Change Own password X X
Modify Administrator’s assigned role X
View Audit logs and performance statistics X X42
Configure policy mode CEP policy mode (Layer 2 or Layer 3) X
Modify CLI inactivity timeout interval X
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [management of
Information Flow Control SFP security attributes, management of TSF data – see Table 17 and Table 18].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
42 Ops user role can view certain audit logs via the CEP CLI show system-log command but cannot execute the show audit-log command.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [the authorized identified roles – see Table 19 below].
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Table 19 – User Roles
Component Roles
CryptoFlow Net Creator Platform Administrator
Administrator
Appliance Admin
Appliance Operator
Policy Creator
Policy Deployer
User
CEP Administrator
Ops
6.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_ITT.1.1
The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure, modification] when it is transmitted between separate
parts of the TOE.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable timestamps for CEP.
6.2.7 Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [time interval of user inactivity as configured by an
administrator].
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Dependencies: No dependencies
FTA_SSL.4.1
The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user’s own interactive session.
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning message regarding
unauthorized use of the TOE.
6.2.8 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is
logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [transfer of user data between CEPs].
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTP_TRP.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [remote] users that is logically distinct
from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of
the communicated data from [modification, disclosure].
FTP_TRP.1.2
The TSF shall permit [remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [initial user authentication, [HTTPS connections to
the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI, SSH connections to the CEP CLI]].
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are taken from the CC
Part 3 and are EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.3. Table 20 summarizes these requirements.
Table 20 – Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Assurance Requirements
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Class ALC: Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM43 coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
Class ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
Class AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Class ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
43 CM – Configuration Management
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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7. TOE Security Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in
previous sections of this ST.
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to a security functionality. Hence,
each security functionality is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This
serves to both describe the security functionality and rationalize that the security functionality satisfies the
necessary requirements. Table 21 lists the security functionality and their associated SFRs.
Table 21 – Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Functionality SFR ID Description
Security Audit FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key agreement
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
User Data Protection FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Identification and Authentication FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Security Management FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Protection of TOE Security Functionality FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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TOE Security Functionality SFR ID Description
TOE Access FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
Trusted Path/Channels FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
7.1.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for start-up and shutdown of the CEP encryption appliance and CryptoFlow Net
Creator as well as the events listed in Table 11. These records contain the following information:
• Date and time of the event
• Type of event
• Identity of subject
• Outcome of the event
CEP log files are stored in the CEP file system and can be viewed by authorized administrators from the CEP CLI
using the show audit-log and show system-log commands. CryptoFlow Net Creator audit logs can
be viewed by authorized administrators through the Admin → Audit Log menu item. CEP logs can also be
retrieved (exported from the CEP) and viewed through the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI. Audit records are
displayed in a human-readable format and show the identity of the user that triggered the event.
The TOE applies a set of rules to monitor the audited events and based upon these rules indicates a potential
violation of the enforcement of the SFRs by displaying an alert at the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI. Specifically,
the TOE will detect if a CEP is not encrypting.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FAU_ARP.1, FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAA.1, FAU_SAR.1
7.1.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE uses two FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules to perform the cryptographic operations listed in
Table 14.
The FIPS cryptographic modules are used to provide the following functionality:
• Secure communications from remote administrators to the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI - relies on the
symmetric encryption and decryption operations, HMAC-SHA-2 for message authentication, ECC CDH
primitive for key agreement, and ECDSA for digital signatures
• Secure communications from remote administrators to the CEP CLI - relies on the symmetric encryption
and decryption operations, HMAC-SHA-2 for message authentication, ECC CDH primitive for key
agreement, and ECDSA for the HostKey algorithms
• Data confidentiality of IP packets and Ethernet frames - relies on the symmetric encryption and
decryption operations
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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• Data origin authentication of IP packets and Ethernet frames - relies on HMAC-SHA-2
• Secure communications between CryptoFlow Net Creator and the CEPs using TLSv1.2 - relies on the
symmetric encryption and decryption operations, HMAC-SHA-2 for message authentication, ECC CDH
primitive for key agreement, and ECDSA for digital signatures
• TOE operator passwords are stored in hashed format using the SHA-512 algorithm
• ECDSA public key is used to authenticate firmware uploads
• SHA-1 is only used in the CRC44
check of the license string.
The TOE uses the FIPS cryptographic modules to generate the asymmetric and symmetric keys with key sizes as
listed in Table 12. The keys are generated by an AES-CTR DRBG, no derivation. The TOE uses an Elliptic curve-
based key agreement scheme that meets the following standard: NIST SP 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-
Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”.
All cryptographic keys generated by the TOE are destroyed by overwriting them with zeroes according to FIPS
140-2 zeroization methods. TOE user data encryption keys are destroyed after the SA lifetime has expired.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1.
7.1.3 User Data Protection
The User Data Protection function implements an Information Flow Control policy on user traffic flowing
through the TOE. The Information Flow Control SFP enforces rules on subjects that transmit or receive traffic
through the TOE. The rules determine what types of operations should be applied to the traffic as the traffic is
flowing through the TOE based on the source IP address, destination IP address, source port number,
destination port number, protocol ID, and VLAN tag ID.
If the operation in the policy is defined as “encrypt”, then the Ethernet frames or IP Packets will be passed with
the Ethernet Payload or IP Payload encrypted or decrypted, as appropriate. If the operation in the Policy is
defined as “clear”, then the Ethernet frames or IP Packets will be passed with the Ethernet Payload or IP Payload
without modification. If the operation in the Policy is defined as “drop”, then the Ethernet frames or IP Packets
will be discarded without further action.
The TOE implements ESP as the IPSec security protocol, which provides confidentiality, integrity, and data origin
authentication. The TOE provides confidentiality services by implementing the AES cipher in CBC and GCM mode.
The TOE generates cryptographic keys required for encryption in accordance with the AES algorithm. Keys are
destroyed after the SA has expired. The TOE provides integrity services by implementing SHA-2. The TOE
provides data origin authentication services for the IP packet or Ethernet frame by implementing HMAC-SHA-2.
For each packet or frame, this creates a cryptographic checksum ensuring that only the external IT entities
(users sending traffic through the CEP) having knowledge of the keys could have sent the packet or the frame.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1.
44 CRC – Cyclic Redundancy Check
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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7.1.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides functionality that enables authorized administrators to effectively manage the TOE and its
security functions.
The TOE requires administrators to enter a correct username and password before allowing any action to take
place. The authentication check is intended to prevent an unauthorized person from adding, deleting, or
modifying appliance configurations or policies.
In the evaluated configuration, default passwords must be changed from their initial values after the first login.
The CryptoFlow Net Creator Platform Administrator logs in first and creates other users, granting them roles and
setting their passwords. The CEP Administrator logs in first and sets the Administrator’s and Ops passwords. The
Platform Administrator and Administrator set their own passwords after their first login. The TOE obscures
passwords while authentication is in process using a bullet (•) in place of each character for the CryptoFlow Net
Creator GUI and no feedback for the CEP CLI. The password requirements for the TOE are as specified in Table
16.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2
7.1.5 Security Management
The Security Management function specifies the management of several aspects of the TSF, including security
function behavior and security attributes. The permissions of the administrator roles are also defined in Table 17
and Table 18.
The TOE provides authorized administrators the capability to configure the TOE and its security policies to
secure the data and management paths. CryptoFlow Net Creator provides seven administrative roles: Platform
Administrator, Administrator, Appliance Admin, Appliance Operator, Policy Creator, Policy Deployer, and User.
The TSF maintains a list of permissions for all seven roles. When an administrator logs in and authenticates
through the CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI, the TSF shall be able to associate that administrator with one or more
of the above roles.
The CEP has two administrative roles: Administrator and Ops. The Administrator role has privileges to manage
users, configure the appliance, and create and deploy policies. The Ops role has access to a limited set of CEP CLI
commands for initial appliance configuration, status reporting and diagnostics (via show commands).
The TOE uses permissive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the information flow
control SFP. The TOE will allow the authorized user to override the default values by specifying alternative initial
values.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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7.1.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects TSF data from disclosure and modification when it is transmitted between separate parts of
the TOE. The TOE uses TLSv1.2 to secure communication between CryptoFlow Net Creator and a CEP encryption
appliance.
The TOE boundary for the CEP includes the hardware and system clock, and therefore the CEP gets the reliable
timestamps from the CEP appliance’s system clock. The hardware and Linux OS that CryptoFlow Net Creator is
installed on is not included in the TOE boundary, and therefore the TOE environment provides the reliable
timestamps for CryptoFlow Net Creator.
All the TOE component’s times are synchronized with the NTP server. The CEP uses the time from the NTP server
to update its system clock used to provide reliable timestamps. The order of the audit records are determined
by the value of the timestamps. The time can be synchronized to Coordinated Universal Time manually through
the configuration settings. Administrators are assumed to be trusted and competent and may change the
system time whenever necessary.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPT_ITT.1, FPT_STM.1.
7.1.7 TOE Access
The TOE will terminate an administrator CEP CLI or CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI session after an administrator-
defined interval of inactivity. Each time a login is completed, the inactivity-timeout value is updated. If the time
since the last activity time exceeds the inactivity-timeout value, the administrator is logged out. The cli
inactivity-timer command sets an inactivity timer for the CEP CLI. The timer applies to a CEP CLI session
initiated through the serial port or SSH. Administrators may also terminate their own interactive sessions.
Before establishing a user session, the TOE displays a login banner containing an advisory warning message
regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTA_SSL.3, FTA_SSL.4, FTA_TAB.1
7.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The trusted path function guarantees a secure channel that the TOE can use to communicate with remote
administrators via HTTPS (CryptoFlow Net Creator GUI) and SSH (CEP CLI). The HTTPS and SSH connections are
used to protect data communications from modification or disclosure and ensure end point identification.
The TOE provides a trusted channel between CEPs by encrypting and decrypting all transmitted data using
cryptographic algorithms provided by a FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module. It uses this trusted channel
to transfer user data. Only the TOE can initiate this secure channel communication.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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8. Rationale
8.1 Conformance Claims Rationale
This Security Target conforms to Part 2 and Part 3 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Release 5.
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each threat, policy statement, and assumption that
compose the Security Target. Sections 8.2.1, 8.2.2, and 8.2.3 demonstrate that the mappings between the
threats, policies, and assumptions to the security objectives are complete. The following discussion provides
detailed evidence of coverage for each threat, policy, and assumption.
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Table 22 below provides a mapping of the objectives to the threats they counter.
Table 22 – Threats: Objectives Mapping
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.DISCLOSE
An unauthorized person may intercept
data within a packet or frame
transmitted or received by the TOE
when traveling over an untrusted
network.
O.ENCRYPT
The TOE must provide the means of protecting
the confidentiality of information transferred
across a public network between two protected
networks using cryptography that conforms to
standards specified in FIPS PUB 140-2.
O.ENCRYPT counters this threat by ensuring
that information traveling over a public network
cannot be intercepted by an un-authorized
person. The confidentiality is assured by
encryption operations.
O.KEYMAN
The TOE must provide the means for secure
management of cryptographic keys. This
includes establishment, generation, encryption,
and destruction of the keys.
O.KEYMAN counters this threat by ensuring that
the cryptographic keys required to provide
confidentiality are managed securely,
conforming to the standards specified.
O.SECURE_COMM
The TOE shall securely transfer data between a
CEP device and a remote user, CryptoFlow Net
Creator, or another CEP device and between
CryptoFlow Net Creator and a remote user.
O.SECURE_COMM counters this threat by
ensuring that data traveling between CEPs is
transferred securely.
T.MODIFY
An unauthorized person may modify a
packet or frame transmitted or
received by the TOE when traveling
over an untrusted network.
O.INTEGRITY
The TOE must provide mechanisms to ensure
that any attempt to corrupt or modify an IP
packet or Ethernet frame flow transmitted to or
from the TOE will be detected.
O.INTEGRITY counters this threat by ensuring
that the information traveling over a public
network cannot be modified by an un-
authorized person.
O.SECURE_COMM
The TOE shall securely transfer data between a
CEP device and a remote user, CryptoFlow Net
Creator, or another CEP device and between
CryptoFlow Net Creator and a remote user.
O.SECURE_COMM counters this threat by
ensuring that data traveling between CEPs is
transferred securely.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Page 40 of 51
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.NO_AUDIT
An attacker may perform security-
relevant operations on the TOE
without being held accountable for
them.
O.AUDIT
The TOE must record security relevant events
with accurate dates and timestamps, associate
each event with the identity of the user that
caused the event, and provide authorized
administrators with the ability to review the
audit trail. The TOE shall send an alert email
upon detection of potential security violations.
O.AUDIT counters this threat by ensuring that
security relevant events of the TOE are
preserved. O.AUDIT ensures that accurate
timestamps are provided for all audit records,
allowing the order of events to be preserved.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must be able to identify and
authenticate users prior to allowing access to
TOE administrative functions and TSF data.
O.AUTHENTICATE counters this threat by
ensuring that a user or administrator is properly
identified, thereby allowing the TSF to record
the user's identity for any logs created as a
result of the user's or administrator's actions.
OE.AUDIT
The TOE environment must audit the shutdown
of CryptoFlow Net Creator, which is linked to
the CryptoFlow Net Creator audit function.
OE.AUDIT counters this threat by ensuring that
the shutdown of the CryptoFlow Net Creator
audit function is captured and preserved by the
TOE environment.
T.SPOOF
An unauthorized person may attempt
to impersonate the identity (IP
address) of a trusted system.
O.INTEGRITY
The TOE must provide mechanisms to ensure
that any attempt to corrupt or modify an IP
packet or Ethernet frame flow transmitted to or
from the TOE will be detected.
O.INTEGRITY counters this threat by
guaranteeing the integrity of communications
with the TOE. Any attempt to spoof the TOE will
be detected by invalid results of integrity
checks.
O.SECURE_COMM
The TOE shall securely transfer data between a
CEP device and a remote user, CryptoFlow Net
Creator, or another CEP device and between
CryptoFlow Net Creator and a remote user.
O.SECURE_COMM counters this threat by
ensuring that the TOE provides a secure
communications channel for use by those
attempting to connect to a CEP. Since secure
channels are used, any spoofing of CEP
components will be indicated by an invalid
certificate.
T.UNATH
An unauthorized person may gain
access to the TOE and compromise its
security functions by changing its
configuration.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must include a set of functions that
allow efficient management of its functions,
security attributes, and TSF data, ensuring that
only authorized TOE administrators (in defined
roles) may exercise such control.
O.ADMIN counters this threat by ensuring that
only authorized users have access to TOE
management functions.
O.AUDIT
The TOE must record security relevant events
with accurate dates and timestamps, associate
each event with the identity of the user that
caused the event, and provide authorized
administrators with the ability to review the
audit trail. The TOE shall send an alert email
upon detection of potential security violations.
O.AUDIT counters this threat by ensuring that
unauthorized attempts to access the TOE are
recorded.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must be able to identify and
authenticate users prior to allowing access to
TOE administrative functions and TSF data.
O.AUTHENTICATE counters this threat by
ensuring that users are identified and
authenticated prior to gaining access to TOE
security data.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Page 41 of 51
Threats Objectives Rationale
O.PROTECT
The TOE must ensure the integrity of system
data by protecting itself from unauthorized
modifications and access to its functions and
data.
O.PROTECT counters this threat by ensuring
that a login banner is displayed regarding
unauthorized use of the TOE.
Every threat is mapped to one or more objectives in the table above. This complete mapping demonstrates that
the defined security objectives counter all defined threats.
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies
There are no OSPs for this ST.
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Table 23 below gives a mapping of assumptions and the environmental objectives that uphold them.
Table 23 – Assumptions: Objectives Mapping
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.INSTALL
The TOE is installed on the
appropriate, dedicated hardware and
operating system.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
Those responsible for the management and
configuration of the TOE must be trusted and
adequately trained to perform their functions.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN upholds this assumption
by ensuring that the TOE administrators read
and follow the guidance for installation and
deployment of the TOE.
A.NETCON
The TOE environment provides the
network connectivity required to allow
the TOE to perform its intended
functions.
OE.TRAFFIC
The TOE environment must be implemented
such that the TOE is appropriately located
within the network to perform its intended
function.
OE.TRAFFIC upholds this assumption by
ensuring that the environment provides the
TOE with the appropriate network
configuration.
A.TIMESTAMP
The IT environment provides
CryptoFlow Net Creator with the
necessary reliable timestamps.
OE.TIMESTAMP
NTP servers providing time information to the
TOE shall be on the local network and
inaccessible to non-administrators.
OE.TIMESTAMP upholds this assumption by
ensuring that NTP servers providing timestamps
are on the local network and in-accessible to
non-administrators.
A.LOCATE
The TOE, management network,
CryptoFlow Net Creator hardware
platform, and NTP and syslog servers
are all located within a controlled
access facility behind a secured
network.
OE.PHYSICAL
Those responsible for the physical security of
the TOE must ensure that the TOE is protected
from physical attack.
OE.PHYCAL upholds this assumption by
ensuring that the environment provides
protection against physical attack.
OE.SECURE_NETWORK
The LAN that the CEP, CryptoFlow Net Creator
hardware platform, management workstation,
and TOE environmental components are
connected to is a secure network that provides
protection against outside attacks.
OE.SECURE_NETWORK upholds this assumption
by ensuring that the TOE and TOE
environmental components connected to the
LAN are protected from outside attacks.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.MANAGE
There are one or more competent
individuals assigned to manage the
TOE and the security of the
information it contains.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
Those responsible for the management and
configuration of the TOE must be trusted and
adequately trained to perform their functions.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN upholds this assumption
by ensuring that those responsible for the TOE
will provide competent individuals to perform
management of the security of the environment
and restrict these functions and facilities from
unauthorized use.
A.NOEVIL
The users who manage the TOE are
non-hostile, appropriately trained, and
follow all guidance.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
Those responsible for the management and
configuration of the TOE must be trusted and
adequately trained to perform their functions.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN upholds this assumption
by ensuring that all administrators assigned to
manage the TOE are not careless, negligent, or
willfully hostile; are appropriately trained; and
follow all administrator guidance.
A.AUDIT
The TOE environment will audit the
shutdown of the CryptoFlow Net
Creator, which is linked to the
shutdown of the CryptoFlow Net
Creator audit function.
OE.AUDIT
The TOE environment must audit the shutdown
of CryptoFlow Net Creator, which is linked to
the CryptoFlow Net Creator audit function.
OE.AUDIT upholds this assumption by ensuring
that TOE environment audits shutdown of
CryptoFlow Net Creator and therefore audits
the shutdown of the CryptoFlow Net Creator
audit function.
A.PROTECT
The TOE software will be protected
from unauthorized modification.
OE.PROTECT
The TOE environment must protect itself and
the TOE from external interference or
tampering.
The TOE environment provides protection from
external interference or tampering.
OE.PROTECT satisfies this assumption.
Every assumption is mapped to one or more objectives in the table above. This complete mapping demonstrates
that the defined security objectives uphold all defined assumptions.
8.3 Rationale for Extended Security Functional Requirements
There are no extended functional requirements defined for this TOE.
8.4 Rationale for Extended TOE Security Assurance
Requirements
There are no extended assurance requirements defined for this TOE.
8.5 Security Requirements Rationale
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE
Objectives
Table 24 below shows a mapping of the objectives and the SFRs that support them.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Table 24 – Objectives: SFRs Mapping
Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
O.ADMIN
The TOE must include a set of
functions that allow efficient
management of its functions, security
attributes, and TSF data, ensuring that
only authorized TOE administrators (in
defined roles) may exercise such
control.
FIA_SOS.1
Verification of secrets
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the authentication process meets
the password requirements of the TOE.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any action
This requirement meets the objective by
requiring all TOE administrators to authenticate
before any other TSF-mediated actions are
performed.
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any action
This requirement meets the objective by
requiring all TOE administrators to identify
before any other TSF-mediated actions are
performed.
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
This requirement meets the objective by
allowing authorized TOE administrators to
manage the TOE security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE restricts administrative
functions to only those users with the
appropriate privileges.
FMT_MTD.1
Management of TSF data
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE restricts access to TSF
data based on the user's role.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management functions
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE includes administrative
functions to facilitate the management of the
TSF.
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE associates users with
roles to provide access to TSF management
functions and data.
O.AUDIT
The TOE must record security relevant
events with accurate dates and
timestamps, associate each event with
the identity of the user that caused the
event, and provide authorized
administrators with the ability to
review the audit trail. The TOE shall
send an alert email upon detection of
potential security violations.
FAU_ARP.1
Security alarms
The requirement meets this objective by
ensuring that the TOE sends email alerts for
potential security violations.
FAU_GEN.1
Audit Data Generation
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE maintains a record of
defined security related events, including
relevant details about the event.
FAU_GEN.2
User Identity Association
The requirement meets the objective by
identifying the users that perform functions
resulting in audit records.
FAU_SAA.1
Potential violation analysis
The requirement meets the objective by
identifying potential security violations that
result in email alerts.
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
The requirement meets the objective by ensure
that the TOE provides the ability to review logs.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
FPT_STM.1
Reliable time stamps
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE can provide reliable
timestamps. The timestamps allow the TOE to
place events in the order that they occurred.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must be able to identify and
authenticate users prior to allowing
access to TOE administrative functions
and TSF data.
FIA_SOS.1
Verification of secrets
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the authentication process meets
the password requirements of the TOE.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any action
This requirement meets the objective by
requiring all TOE administrators to authenticate
before any other TSF-mediated actions are
performed.
FIA_UAU.7
Protected authentication feedback
The requirement meets the objective by
obscuring feedback through CryptoFlow Net
Creator and the CEP CLI during authentication.
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any action
This requirement meets the objective by
requiring all TOE administrators to identify
before any other TSF-mediated actions are
performed.
FMT_MTD.1
Management of TSF data
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that only authorized users are allowed
access to TSF data, including authentication
data.
FTA_SSL.3
TSF-initiated termination
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE users are logged off after
an administrator-defined period of inactivity,
ensuring that unauthenticated entities do not
gain access to the TOE through an unattended
session. This ensures that unauthenticated
users do not hijack an authorized
administrator's unattended session.
FTA_SSL.4
User-initiated termination
This requirement meets the objective by
providing a means for TOE users to log off to
terminate their sessions, ensuring that
unauthenticated entities do not gain access to
the TOE through an unattended session. This
ensures that unauthenticated users do not
hijack an authorized administrator's unattended
session.
O.ENCRYPT
The TOE must provide the means of
protecting the confidentiality of
information transferred across a public
network between two protected
networks using cryptography that
conforms to standards specified in FIPS
PUB 140-2.
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the cryptographic keys are
generated according to an assigned standard.
FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key agreement
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that key agreement is performed
according to defined standards.
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the cryptographic keys are
destroyed according to FIPS 140-2 zeroization
requirements.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the cryptographic operations are
performed according to the specified
algorithms with the specified key sizes.
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control
This requirement meets the objective by
defining the types of subjects, information, and
operations for the Information Flow Control SFP
that is applied to traffic flowing through the
TOE.
FDP_IFF.1
Simple security attributes
This requirement meets the objective by
defining a list of attributes of subjects and
information for the Informational Flow Control
SFP that is applied to traffic flowing through the
TOE.
FDP_UCT.1
Basic data exchange confidentiality
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the traffic flowing through the
TOE is protected from unauthorized disclosure.
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
This requirement supports the objective by
specifying that the Informational Flow Control
policy shall be applied permissively to traffic
flowing through the TOE. This means that the IP
packets or Ethernet frames are sent
unencrypted by default. Authorized
administrators can modify the default values to
ensure that some or all traffic is decrypted
instead.
FTP_ITC.1
Inter-TSF trusted channel
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that any information exchange
between the TOE and another trusted IT
product happens over a trusted channel.
O.INTEGRITY
The TOE must provide mechanisms to
ensure that any attempt to corrupt or
modify an IP packet or Ethernet frame
flow transmitted to or from the TOE
will be detected.
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the cryptographic operations are
performed according to the specified
algorithms with the specified key sizes.
FDP_UIT.1
Data exchange integrity
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the traffic flowing through the
TOE is protected from modification and
insertion errors.
O.KEYMAN
The TOE must provide the means for
secure management of cryptographic
keys. This includes establishment,
generation, encryption, and
destruction of the keys.
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the cryptographic keys are
generated according to an assigned standard.
FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key agreement
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that key agreement is performed
according to defined standards.
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the cryptographic keys are
destroyed according to FIPS 140-2 zeroization
requirements.
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the cryptographic operations are
performed according to the specified
algorithms with the specified key sizes.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must ensure the integrity of
system data by protecting itself from
unauthorized modifications and access
to its functions and data.
FTA_TAB.1
Default TOE access banners
This requirement meets the objective by
displaying an advisory warning message
regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.
O.SECURE_COMM
The TOE shall securely transfer data
between a CEP device and a remote
user, CryptoFlow Net Creator, or
another CEP device and between
CryptoFlow Net Creator and a remote
user.
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
This requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that TSF data transmitted between the
CryptoFlow Net Creator and a CEP device or
between CEP devices is protected.
FTP_ITC.1
Inter-TSF trusted channel
This requirement meets the objective by
providing a trusted channel for the transfer of
user data between CEP devices.
FTP_TRP.1
Trusted path
This requirement meets the objective by
protecting the communication path to remote
users of CryptoFlow Net Creator and the CEP
CLI.
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL4+ was chosen because it is best suited to address the stated security objectives. EAL4+ challenges vendors
to use best (rather than average) commercial practices. EAL4+ allows the vendor to evaluate their product at a
detailed level while benefitting from the Common Criteria Recognition Agreement. The chosen assurance level is
appropriate for the threats defined in the environment. At EAL4+, penetration testing is performed by the
evaluator assuming an attack potential of Enhanced-Basic.
The augmentation of ALC_FLR.3 was chosen to give greater assurance of the developer’s on-going flaw
remediation processes.
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale
The SFRs in this ST satisfy all of the required dependencies listed in the Common Criteria and SFRs explicitly
stated in this ST. Table 25 lists each requirement to which the TOE claims conformance and indicates whether
the dependent requirements are included. As the table indicates, all dependencies have been met.
Table 25 – Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency Met Rationale
FAU_ARP.1 FAU_SAA.1 ✓
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 ✓
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 ✓
FIA_UID.1 ✓
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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SFR ID Dependencies Dependency Met Rationale
FAU_SAA.1 FAU_GEN.1 ✓
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 ✓
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4 ✓
FCS_COP.1 ✓
FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.4 ✓
FCS_CKM.1 ✓
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1 ✓
FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4 ✓
FCS_CKM.1 ✓
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 ✓
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1 ✓
FMT_MSA.3 ✓
FDP_UCT.1 FDP_IFC.1 ✓
FTP_ITC.1 ✓
FDP_UIT.1 FDP_IFC.1 ✓
FTP_ITC.1 ✓
FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies ✓
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 ✓ Although FIA_UID.1 is not included, FIA_UID.2, which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1, is included. This satisfies this dependency.
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 ✓ Although FIA_UAU.1 is not included, FIA_UAU.2, which is hierarchical to
FIA_UAU.1, is included. This satisfies this dependency.
FIA_UID.2 No dependencies ✓
FMT_MSA.1 FDP_IFC.1 ✓
FMT_SMF.1 ✓
FMT_SMR.1 ✓
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1 ✓
FMT_SMR.1 ✓
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1 ✓
FMT_SMR.1 ✓
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies ✓
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 ✓ Although FIA_UID.1 is not included, FIA_UID.2, which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1, is included. This satisfies this dependency.
FPT_ITT.1 No dependencies ✓
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies ✓
FTA_SSL.3 No dependencies ✓
FTA_SSL.4 No dependencies ✓
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Page 48 of 51
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency Met Rationale
FTA_TAB.1 No dependencies ✓
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies ✓
FTP_TRP.1 No dependencies ✓
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Page 49 of 51
9. Acronyms
Table 26 defines the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 26 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CA Certificate Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CEP Certes Enforcement Point
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
CoS Class of Service
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CTR Counter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GB Gigabyte
Gbps Gigabits per second
GHz Gigahertz
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HSM Hardware Security Module
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
ID Identifier
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec IP Security Protocol
Security Target, Version 0.7 January 22, 2019
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Acronym Definition
IT Information Technology
LAN Local-Area Network
MAC Message Authentication Code
Mbps Megabits per second
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching
NTP Network Time Protocol
PUB Publication
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PMTU Path Maximum Transmission Unit
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
RNG Random Number Generator
SA Security Association
SAD Security Association Database
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SPD Security Policy Database
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VM Virtual Machine
WAN Wide Area Network
XML-RPC Extensible Markup Language Remote Procedure Call
Prepared by:
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Phone: +1 703 267 6050
Email: info@corsec.com
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