Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model Security Target Version 1.03 2015/07/23 Canon Inc. This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1. 1. 1.7 1.8 1. 1. 1. 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3.1 SFR Packages reference . 2.3.2 SFR Package functions... 2.3.3 SFR Package attributes.. 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.1.1 User Authentication Function .. 6.1.2 Function Use Restriction Functio 6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions 6. 6. 6. 6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function ..... Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Table of Contents ST introduction ST reference TOE reference TOE overview. Terms and Abbreviations . TOE description Scope of the TOE. 6.1 Physical Scope of the TOE Conformance claims 0 6.2 Logical Scope of the TOE 1 Users ofthe TOE 3 Assets 3 8.1 User Data 3 8.2 TSF Data. 3 8.3 Functions 4 .15 5 CC Conformance claim. PP claim, Package claim SFR Packages PP Conformance rationale Security Problem Definition Notational conventions. Threats agents Threats to TOE Assets ... Organizational Security Policies Assumptions... Security Objective: Security Objectives for the TOE.. Security Objectives for the IT environment Security Objectives for the non-IT environment . Security Objectives rationale............. Extended components definition (APE_ECD) . FPT_CIP_EXP Confidentiality and integrity of stored data FPT_FDLEXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Security requirements ... Security functional requirements 1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function.. 1.5 HDD Data Erase Function... 1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon 6.1.8 Self-Test Function 6.1.9 Audit Log Function .. .1.10 Management Function. Security assurance requirements Security functional requirements rationale ... 6.3.1 The completeness of security requirements 6.3.2 The sufficiency of security requirements 6.3.3 The dependencies of security requirements 6.4 Security assurance requirements rationale 7 TOE Summary specification 7.1 User Authentication Function 7.2 Function Use Restriction Function 7.3 Job Output Restriction Functions 7.3.1 Job Cancel... 7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control .... 7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs . 7.4 Forward Received Jobs Function.... 7.5 HDD Data Erase Function... 7.6 HDD Data Encryption Function... 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function .... 6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function.... .6.3 Device Identification and Authentication Function LAN Data Protection Function ‚Tl IP Packet Encryption Function .7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function 7. Self-Test Function 7.9 Audit Log Function 7.10 Management Functions.... 7.10.1 User Management Function .. 7.10.2 Device Management Function . 7. Trademark Notice + Canon, the Canon logo, imageRUNNER, imageRUNNER ADVANCE, MEAP, and the MEAP logo are trademarks of Canon Inc. + Microsoft, Windows, Windows XP, Windows 2000, Windows Vista, and Active Directory are trademarks or registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the US. + Mac OS is a trademark of Apple Computer Inc. in the US. + Oracle and Java are registered trademarks of Oracle Corporation and its affiliates in the United States and in other countries. + All names of companies and products contained herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of the respective companies. + Portions of sections 1.1, 1.4, 5.3, 7, 8, 9, 10.1, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 11, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 13.2, 14.2, 15.2, 16.2, 17.2, 18.2, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4, Annex A and Annex B are reprinted with permission from IEEE, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, New Jersey 08854, from IEEE 2600.1(tm)-2009 Standard for a Protection Profile in Operational Environment A, Copyright(c) 2009 IEEE. All rights reserved. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 1 ST introduction 1.1 ST reference This section provides the Security Target (ST) identification information. ST name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model Security Target Version: 1.03 Issued by: Canon Inc. Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Keywords: IEEE 2600, Canon, imageRUNNER, iR, Advance, digital MFP, multifunction product (MFP), copy, print, fax, send, facsimile, identification, authentication, access control, log, encryption, Secured Print, BOX, security kit 1.2 TOE reference This section provides the TOE identification information. TOE name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model Version: 1.0 The TOE is comprised of the following software, hardware, and licenses. iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria Ver 1.00 HDD Data Encryption Kit-C (Canon MFP Security Chip 2.01) Super G3 FAX Board-AR1 Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series Access Management System (License option: Standard equipment in the United States and Canada) (Japanese Name) iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Ver 1.00 HDD Data Encryption Kit-C (Canon MFP Security Chip 2.01) Super G3 FAX Board-AR1 (Standard equipment on "F model") Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series Access Management System (Standard equipment in Japan) 1.3. TOE overview The TOE is a digital multi-function product (MFP) known as < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model >. This is a version of the standard model < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series > which by installing/attaching the following 4 products (standard equipment in part) and making the proper settings, makes up the < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model > or TOE. - iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria - HDD Data Encryption Kit-C - Fax Board (Standard equipment on "F model") Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss - (Access Management System): License option ! For machines in Japan, the United States and Canada, this option is standard-equipped. For machines in Asia and Oceania, "ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM KIT-B1" option is needed. iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria contains the < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series > control software and security kit license. HDD Data Encryption Board is the hardware which encrypts all data stored in the HDD (including software). The HDD of the TOE may be a removable drive. Fax Board is hardware to use fax functionalities. < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model > is capable of fully implementing the Protection Profile (PP) for Multi-Function Products indicated below, as well as the security functions required by the 7 SFR Packages defined in the PP. Protection Profile - 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A SFR Packages - 2600.1-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment A - 2600.1-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment A - 2600.1-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment A - 2600.1-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment A. - 2600.1-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment A - 2600.1-NVS, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Nonvolatile Storage Functions, Operational Environment A - 2600.1-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment A 14 Terms and Abbreviations The following terms and abbreviations are used throughout this ST. Table 1 —Terms and Abbreviations Terms/Abbreviations Description Multi-Function A machine which incorporates the functionality of multiple devices in one, such as Product (MFP) copier, fax, printer, and Universal Send, and containing a large capacity HDD to facilitate such capabilities. Control software Software that runs on the hardware of the device, and controls security functions. Control panel One of the hardware elements of the MFP, consisting of a touch panel and operation keys, which provides the interface for operation of the MFP. Remote UI An interface that provides access to the MFP from a Web browser via the LAN, to allow the acquisition of operating status, perform job operations or BOX operations, and making various settings. HDD Hard disk drive mounted on the MFP, where control software and assets are stored. I-Fax Short for Internet Fax. Uses the Internet to receive and send faxes. 1 "Access Management System" is a license option. The component of "Access Management System" is included in iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Terms/Abbreviations Description Image file Image data generated within the MFP, from operations such as scan, print, and receive. Temporary image file Image files generated during jobs such as Copy and Print, which are needed only until the job completes. Roles Used by access restriction functions to restrict the functions that each user can use. One role is associated with each user. In addition to pre-defined default roles, default roles may be modified to create custom roles. The default roles are: Administrator, Power User, General User, Limited User, and Guest User. A user assigned the Administrator role is capable of using management operations (administrative privileges). Administrator User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges. Equivalent to U.ADMINISTRATOR defined in the PP. Job When a user uses the functions of the TOE to execute an operation on a document, a Job is the intended document data combined with the user instructions for processing those data. The operations that can be performed on a document are: Scan, Print, Copy, Fax TX, Save, and Delete. The processing phases for a Job issued by the user are: generation, execution, and completion. Document data User data processed within the MFP, consisting of image files and attribute information. Memory RX | Allows data received by fax/I-fax to be stored in the Memory RX Inbox for later (Reception) processing. Box Collective name for Mail Boxes, Fax Inboxes, or the Memory RX Inbox wherein data from operations such as scan, print, and received faxes are stored in the MFP. *Use of Fax Inboxes is not included in this TOE. Mail Box When a general user feeds data to the MFP directly, or specifies a document for printing from a PC, data can be stored here to be printed later. Memory RX Inbox When memory reception is set, documents received by fax/I-fax are stored in the Memory RX Inbox. Stored documents can be printed or sent later. Mail server Server that facilitates I-fax transmission or email transmission of document data in the MFP. User — authentication server Server that maintains user information such as user ID and password, for user authentication over the network. Firewall Device or system designed to protect the internal LAN against threats from the Internet. Time server Server that uses the Network Time Protocol to provide the accurate time over the Internet. [Secured Print] A button on the control panel that activates the Secured Print function (print jobs with a PIN). [Copy] A button on the control panel that activates the Copy function. [Fax] A button on the control panel that activates the Fax function. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss Terms/Abbreviations Description [Scan] Indicates the [Scan and Store] and [Scan and Send] buttons on the control panel, that allow the user to scan paper documents to be stored as files, or scanned documents to be sent to some location such as to an email address or a shared folder in a PC, respectively. [Fax/I-Fax Inbox] A button on the control panel that activates the Fax/I-Fax Inbox function. There are two types of Fax/I-Fax Inbox: the Memory RX Inbox and Confidential Fax Inbox. You can use both inboxes to store files received by Fax and I-Fax. [Access Stored Files] A button on the control panel that allows the user to access files stored in a box. Remote UI [Access Received/Stored Files] A button on the remote UI that allows the user to access files stored in a box. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss 1.5 TOE description The TOE is a MFP that offers Copy, Print, Universal Send, Fax, I-Fax RX and Mail Box capabilities. The TOE, which conforms to " 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A" is designed to operate in an environment such as the one shown below (as excerpted from " 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A" clause "1.1 Scope"). This standard is for a Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in a restrictive commercial information processing environment in which a relatively high level of document security, operational accountability, and information assurance are required. The typical information processed in this environment is trade secret, mission critical, or subject to legal and regulatory considerations, such as for privacy or governance. This environment is not intended to support life-critical or national security applications. This environment will be known as "Operational Environment A." Figure 1 shows the environment for which the TOE or < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model > has been designed, with options included. Since not all of these features may be required, the actual operational environment is expected to differ than what is shown here. Figure 1 The assumed operational environment of the MFP < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series > Som "est À Multi-Function = Product Pacer _ documents N = Fax ex. Pacer Jeunes User authentication _ server as Pye User authentication ———> 8 <—Atthentication result —— ee a ‘Send via I-Fax/E-Mal > —L_- (er IN res Far — Y | Mail Box RX bon psmu \ A ht Tx HDD. Mail server ie) = In Figure 1, the MFP is connected by an internal LAN, to all of the other major components, namely the Mail Server, User Authentication Server, PC, and Firewall. Furthermore, the internal LAN is protected by Firewall from threats from the Internet. To send (via I-Fax or email) a previously scanned document or when receiving a document by I-Fax for example, the MFP connects to the Mail Server. By using a PC with a Web browser’, functions such as printing, storing, or I-Fax can also be executed remotely. However, in order to print from a PC, the appropriate printer driver needs to be installed in the PC. Alternatively, a USB 2 This evaluation was performed using Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 as the Web browser. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon could be used to connect the PC directly, and print or store document data from the PC. In this case, some configuration is required initially, in order to protect against data being taken out of the MFP and stored in a PC or USB device. Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 The TOE also obtains accurate time from the Time server for time synchronization, and supports user authentication through the External Authentication Server. The functions available to the MFP in such an environment are listed below: Copy function Produces duplicates of the hardcopy document by scanning and printing. Print function Produces a hardcopy document from its electronic form (contained in the MFP or sent from a PC). I-Fax RX (receive) function Uses the Internet to receive faxes. Data received by I-fax is not printed immediately; rather it is stored in Memory RX Inbox for processing at a later time. Stored documents can be printed, sent or deleted later. Fax RX (receive) function Uses a fax line to receive faxes. Data received by fax is not printed immediately; rather it is stored in Memory RX Inbox for processing at a later time. Stored documents can be printed, sent or deleted later. Fax TX (send) function Scanned document data or in Memory RX Inbox can be retrieved for transmission by fax. Universal Send function Scanned document data or in Memory RX Inbox can be transmitted by email or I-fax, or sent to a shared folder on a PC, in TIFF or PDF file format. Mail Box function Refers to the storage of image files into a Mail Box or in Memory RX Inbox, or to functions that utilize the Mail Box/inbox functionality. - Functions to store image files in Mail Box Scanned document data or electronic data specified for storage from a PC, are stored in a Mail box. - Functions to utilize Mail Box functionality The following functions can be executed on data stored in a Mail Box. = Print - Delete Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 1.6 Scope of the TOE The TOE conforms to " 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A" and is designed to meet the requirements specified therein, as described below. The physical and logical scopes of the TOE are described below. 1.6.1 Physical Scope of the TOE The TOE is a MFP consisting of hardware and software components. The physical scope of the TOE is illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2 Hardware and software components of the TOE Control Software (TOE: Software) Fax Boar oard Canon imageRUNNER ("F model" is ADVANCE C3300 Series HDD Data Encryption Board equipped with Fax Board by default) MEP Main Unit (TOE: (TOE: Hardware) Hardware) (TOE: Hardware) In Figure 2, "Control Software" is provided as the iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria. Note also that the "MFP Main Unit" together with the iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria make up the MFP main unit. The TOE or < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model > consists of the MFP main unit combined with the HDD Data Encryption Board and Fax Board. < Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series >, or the hardware making up the TOE, refers to the following line of products. Table 2 —Line of Products Products iR-ADV C3330 / iR-ADV C3330i / iR-ADV C3330F / iR-ADV C3325/ iR-ADV C3325i/ iR-ADV C3320/ iR-ADV C3320i/ iR-ADV C3320F The guidance documents for the TOE are listed below. (English Name) + imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model e-Manual CD (USE Version) imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300 Series 2600.1 model e-Manual CD (APE Version) iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria Certification Administrator Guide Before Using the iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Common Criteria Certification HDD Data Encryption Kit Reference Guide (Japanese Name) imageRUNNER ADVANCE C3300F e-Manual CD iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 Administrator Guide Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon + Before Using the iR-ADV Security Kit-L1 for IEEE 2600.1 + HDD Data Encryption Kit User's Guide Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 1.6.2 Logical Scope of the TOE The logical scope of the TOE is illustrated in Figure 3 (excluding: User, User Authentication Server, Mail Server, PC, and Time Server). In the table, the security functions of the TOE are shown in blue. Figure 3 Functional configuration of the TOE User Auth Server Mail Server PC Time Server User Auth Function Email Function Web Browser Time Function LAN Data Protection LAN Data Protection LAN Data Protection LAN Data Protection 7 Authlnfo DocData DocData Timelnfo tory t t t LAN Data Protection Function + + Hocument dat ke PC Function Use Restriction User Authentication HDD Data Erase USB connection Job Output Restriction Self-Test Audit Log Document dat Management Function Forward Received Jobs fe FAX t | Phone line Print Copy Mailbox/Inbox HDD Data Encryption Scan Send Receive I ! ! > u Fe Input Func Output Fune HDD 4 > Flow of dat 1 Operate” Ee [Hardcopy ower ¥ Displa locument jocument User In addition to the capabilities described in Section 1.5, the TOE embodies the following basic functionality. - Ul Functionality Enables the user to operate the TOE from the control panel, and the TOE to display information on the control panel. - Output Functionality Enables the TOE to output hardcopy documents. - Input Functionality Enables the TOE to input hardcopy documents. The TOE embodies the following security functions. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 - User Authentication Function Performs authentication on the user, to prevent any unauthorized access to the TOE. Two types of user authentication are supported: Internal Authentication wherein authentication takes place internally within the TOE, and External Authentication which uses an external user authentication server. External authentication uses Kerberos’ or LDAP* authentication. - Function Use Restriction Function Uses role management to restrict the functions that each authenticated user can use. - Job Output Restriction Function This function restricts access to print, cancel, and other job operations, to the user that executed the job. - Forward Received Jobs Function This function restricts the machine from forwarding received data directly to the LAN. It is provided as a countermeasure against threats arising from misuse of the fax line. - HDD Data Erase Function Function for erasing unnecessary data from the hard disk by overwriting the data, in order to prevent unauthorized use of previously generated image data. - HDD Data Encryption Function Because the HDD (alone or together with the HDD Data Encryption Board) could potentially be removed for unauthorized access to its contents, the HDD Data Encryption Board addresses this threat by identifying the MFP at startup, so that it may only be used with the correct MFP. Additionally, all data stored in the HDD are encrypted to protect the confidentiality of the HDD data. - LAN Data Protection Function To protect LAN data from IP packet sniffing, IP packets are encrypted using IPSec. - Self-Test Function When the machine starts, this function checks to see that the primary security functions are running properly. - Audit Log Function Allows auditing of user operations by generating logs which are stored in the HDD. Stored audit logs are protected and can be viewed. The date/time recorded on the audit log is provided by the TOE. The TOE's date/time information is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the accurate time is obtained from the Time Server. - Management Function Consists of user management functions such as user registration and role management, and device management functions which enable proper operation of various security functions, which can only be specified by Administrators. 3 This evaluation was performed using Active Directory Domain Services as the authentication server software for Kerberos authentication. 4 This evaluation was performed using eDirectory 8.8 SP8 as the authentication server software for LDAP authentication. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon 1.7 Users of the TOE Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 The TOE has two types of users (U.USER): U.NORMAL and U.ADMINISTRATOR Table 3 —Users Designation Definition U.USER Any authorized User. U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions of the TOE. U.ADMINISTRATOR | A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TOE security policy (TSP). Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP. 1.8 Assets There are three types of assets: user data, TSF data, and functions. 1.8.1 User Data User data are created by the user, and have no effect on TOE security functions. There are two types of user data: D.DOC and D.FUNC. Table 4 — User Data Designation | Definition D.DOC User Document Data consist of the information contained in a user's document. This includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or residually-stored data created by the hardcopy device while processing an original document and printed hardcopy output. D.FUNC User Function Data are the information about a user's document or job to be processed by the TOE. 1.8.2 TSF Data TSF Data are data that have an effect on TOE security functions. There are two types of TSF data: D.PROT and D.CONF. Table 5 — TSF Data Designation | Definition D.PROT TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable. D.CONF TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE. A list of the TSF data used in this TOE is given in Table 6. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Table 6 — List of TSF data Type TSF data Description Stored in D.PROT | User name User identification information used by the user | HDD identification and authentication function. Role Used by access restriction functions to restrict the | HDD functions that each user can use. Lockout policy | Settings for the lockout function, such as number of | HDD settings attempts before lockout and the lockout time. Password policy | Policy for the password for user authentication, such as | HDD settings minimum password length, allowed characters, and combination of character types. Auto Reset Time | Settings for session timeout in the control panel. HDD setting Date/Time setting Specifies the date and time that is set. RTC HDD Data Erase | Settings for the HDD Data Erase function, including the | HDD setting settings to enable or disable the HDD Data Erase function. IPSec settings Settings for the LAN Data Protection function, including | HDD the settings to enable or disable the LAN Data Protection function. D.CONF | Password Password used to authenticate the user in the User | HDD Identification and Authentication function. Audit logs Logs generated by the Audit Log function. HDD BOX PIN PIN used for access control to the Mail Box and Memory | HDD RX Inbox where the data is stored, for Job Output Restriction functions. 1.8.3 Functions Refer to the functions listed in Table 7. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon 2 Conformance claims 2.1 CC Conformance claim This ST conforms to the following Common Criteria (CC). 2.2 Common Criteria version: Common Criteria conformance: Assurance level: PP claim, Package claim Version 3.1 Release 4 Date of Iss Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 This ST conforms to the following Protection Profile (PP). - Title: 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A Version:1.0, dated June 2009 This ST is package-conformant to and package-augmented by the following SFR packages: 2.3 2.3.1 Title: 2600.1-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment A 2600.1-PRT conformant 2600.1-SCN conformant 2600.1-CPY conformant 2600.1-FAX conformant 2600.1-DSR conformant 2600.1-NVS augmented 2600.1-SMI augmented SFR Packages SFR Packages reference Package version: 1.0, dated June 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR package shall be used for HCD products (such as printers, paper-based fax machines, and MFPs) that perform a printing function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document output. Title: 2600.1-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment A Package version: 1.0, dated June 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR package shall be used for HCD products (such as scanners, paper-based fax machines, and MFPs) that perform a scanning function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document output. Copyright Canon Inc. : 2015/07/23 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Title: 2600.1-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment A Package version: 1.0, dated June 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This Protection Profile shall be used for HCD products (such as copiers and MFPs) that perform a copy function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document output. Title: 2600.1-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment A. Package version: 1.0, dated June 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR package shall be used for HCD products (such as fax machines and MFPs) that perform a scanning function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a printing function in which a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) reception is converted to physical document output. Title: 2600.1-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment A Package version: 1.0, dated June 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR package shall be used for HCD products (such as MFPs) that perform a document storage and retrieval feature in which a document is stored during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs. Title: 2600.1-NVS, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Nonvolatile Storage Functions, Operational Environment A Package version: 1.0, dated June 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR package shall be used for products that provide storage of User Data or TSF Data in a nonvolatile storage device (NVS) that is part of the evaluated TOE but is designed to be removed from the TOE by authorized personnel. This package applies for TOEs that provide the ability to protect data stored on Removable Nonvolatile Storage devices from unauthorized disclosure and modification. If such protection is supplied only by the TOE environment, then this package cannot be claimed. Title: 2600.1-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment A Package version: 1.0, dated June 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR package shall be used for HCD products that transmit or receive User Data or TSF Data over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio frequency wireless media. This package applies for TOEs that provide a trusted channel function allowing for secure and authenticated communication with other IT systems. If such protection is supplied by only the TOE environment, then this package cannot be claimed. 2.3.2 SFR Package functions Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data that may be present in HCD products. The functions that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection Profile, are listed in Table 7: Table 7 —SFR Package functions Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Designation Definition F.PRT Printing: a function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document output F.SCN Scanning: a function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document output F.CPY Copying: a function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document output F.FAX Faxing: a function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a function in which a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) reception is converted to physical document output F.DSR Document storage and retrieval: a function in which a document is stored during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs F.NVS Nonvolatile storage: a function that stores User Data or TSF Data on a nonvolatile storage device that is part of the evaluated TOE but is designed to be removed from the TOE by authorized personnel F.SMI Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data or TSF Data over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio-frequency wireless media 2.3.3 SFR Package attributes When a function is performing processing, storage, or transmission of data, the identity of the function is associated with that particular data as a security attribute. This attribute in the TOE model makes it possible to distinguish differences in Security Functional Requirements that depend on the function being performed. The attributes that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection Profile, are listed in Table 8: Table 8 —SFR Package attributes Designation | Definition +PRT Indicates data that are associated with a print job. +SCN Indicates data that are associated with a scan job. +CPY Indicates data that are associated with a copy job. +FAXIN Indicates data that are associated with an inbound (received) fax job. +FAXOUT _| Indicates data that are associated with an outbound (sent) fax job. +DSR Indicates data that are associated with a document storage and retrieval job. +NVS Indicates data that are stored on a nonvolatile storage device. +SMI Indicates data that are transmitted or received over a shared-medium interface. 2.4 PP Conformance rationale In addition to the primary functionality of the MFP (Copy, Print, Scan, and Fax), the TOE implements document storage function, HDD encryption function, and the LAN data encryption function. As such, it is appropriate to conform to all of the SFR Packages defined by the PP in Section 2.2(PP claim, Package Claim). In the following, the ST is compared against the PP containing all the seven SFR Packages. In terms of the Security Problem Definition, the ST is equivalent to the PP except for the addition of one other OSP: P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION This OSP is a restriction on the TOE, rather than a restriction on the operational environment. As such: All TOEs that would meet the security problem definition in the ST also meet the security problem definition in the PP. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon All operational environments that would meet the security problem definition in the PP would also meet the security problem definition in the ST. Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 In terms of Objectives, the ST is equivalent to the PP except for the addition of one other objective: O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED This objective is a restriction on the TOE. As such: All TOEs that would meet the security objectives for the TOE in the ST also meet the security objectives for the TOE in the PP. All operational environments that would meet the security objectives for the operational environment in the PP would also meet the security objectives for the operational environment in the ST. In terms of the functional requirements, the ST compared with the PP contains all functional requirements of the PP including the 7 SFR Packages, as well as additional functional requirements, as shown in Table 9. Table 9 — Functional requirements specified in the PP and the ST PP_Package | PP functional requirement ST functional requirement Common FAU_GEN.1 N.1 Common FAU_GEN.2 3EN.2 Common FAU_SAR.I FAU_SAR.1 ‘Common FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.2 Common FAU_STG.I FAU STG.I Common FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.4 Common FDP_ACC.I(a) FDP_ACC.I(delete-job) Common FDP_ACC.1(b) FDP_ACC. I(exec-job) Common FDP_ACF.1(a) FDP_ACF.I(delete-job) Common FDP_ACF.1(b) FDP_ACF.I(exec-job) Common FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1 Common FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 Common FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.I Common FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 Common FIA_USB.1 FIA_USB.1 Common FMT_MSA.I(a) FMT_MSA.I(delete-job) Common FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) Common FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MSA.I(exec-job) Common FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(a)) | FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(b)) | FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) Common FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 Common FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 Common FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 Common FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1 Common FTA_SSL3 FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui) PRT FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) PRT FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) SCN FDP_ACC.I FDP_ACC.1(in-job) SCN FDP_ACFI FDP_ACF.I(in-job) CPY FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) ) CPY FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) FAX FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) FAX FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) DSR FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) DSR. FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) NVS FPT_CIP_EXP.1 FPT_CIP_EXP.1 SMI FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 SMI FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FPT_FDI EXP.1 Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 PP_Package | PP functional requirement ST functional requirement SMI FTP_ITC.1 FTP_ITC.1 Common = FIA_AFL.1 Common = FIA_SOS.1 Common - FIA_UAU.7 NVS = FCS_COP.I(h) NVS:SMI = FCS_CKM.I SMI = FCS_COP.I(n) SMI - FCS_CKM.2 NVS - FPT_PHP.1 Note the following: For FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP, the Subject for a Delete of +FAXIN D.DOC, and Delete of +FAXIN D.FUNC is specified as U.NORMAL. For FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) in the ST, the Subject is specified as U.ADMINISTRATOR, with Access Control rule for U.NORMAL specified as "Denied". For FDP_ACC.1 in the PP, the Subject for a Read of +FAXIN D.DOC is specified as U. NORMAL. For FDP_ACC.I(in-job) in the ST, the Subject for a Read of +FAXIN D.DOC is specified as U.ADMINISTRATOR, with Access Control rule for U.NORMAL specified as "Denied". The ST functional requirements as mentioned above, are restrictive in the scope of Subjects allowed to Delete or Read, and restrains U.NORMAL from having access to any Object. As such, the ST functional requirements specify greater restrictions than the corresponding PP functional requirements. For FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP, the Subject for aModify of +FAXIN D.FUNC is specified as U. NORMAL. For FDP_ACF.I(delete-job) in the ST, the Subject is specified as U.User, with Access Control rule specified as "Denied". The ST functional requirement as mentioned above, does not allow use of the function to any Subject. As such, the ST functional requirement specifies greater restriction than the corresponding PP functional requirement. Consequently, the SFRs of the ST compared with the PP, specifies equal or greater restrictions on the TOE. As such: - All TOEs that would meet the SFRs in the ST would also meet the SFRs in the PP. In terms of the Security Assurance Requirements, the ST and PP are equivalent. As such, this ST compared with the PP, specifies equal or greater restrictions on the TOE, and at most equal restrictions on the operational environment of the TOE. Therefore, this ST claims demonstrable conformance to the PP. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 3 Security Problem Definition 3.1 3.2 Notational conventions Defined terms in full form are set in title case (for example, "Document Storage and Retrieval"). Defined terms in abbreviated form are set in all caps (for example, "DSR"). In tables that describe Security Objectives rationale, a checkmark ("¥") placed at the intersection of a row and column indicates that the threat identified in that row is wholly or partially mitigated by the objective in that column. In tables that describe completeness of security requirements, a bold typeface letter "P" placed at the intersection of a row and column indicates that the requirement identified in that row performs a principal fulfillment of the objective indicated in that column. A letter "S" in such an intersection indicates that it performs a supporting fulfillment. In tables that describe the sufficiency of security requirements, a bold typeface requirement name and purpose indicates that the requirement performs a principal fulfillment of the objective in the same row. Requirement names and purposes set in normal typeface indicate that those requirements perform supporting fulfillments. In specifications of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs): Bold typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been completed or refined in this Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or an Extended Component Definition. Italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that must be completed by the ST Author in a conforming Security Target. Bold italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been partially completed or refined in this Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or an Extended Component Definition, but which also must be completed by the ST Author in a conforming Security Target. The following prefixes are used to indicate different entity types: Table 10— Notational prefix conventions Prefix Type of entity U. User D. Data F. Function T. Threat P. Policy A. Assumption O._ | Objective OE. | Environmental objective + Security attribute Threats agents This security problem definition addresses threats posed by four categories of threat agents: a) Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE b)Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE functions for which they are not authorized. c) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in ways for which they not authorized. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 20 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 d)Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the TOE to unanticipated threats. The threats and policies defined in this Protection Profile address the threats posed by these threat agents. 3.3. Threats to TOE Assets This section describes threats to assets described in clause 1.8. Table 11—Threats to User Data for the TOE Threat Affected asset Description T.DOC.DIS D.DOC User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons T.DOC.ALT D.DOC User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons T.FUNC.ALT | D.FUNC User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons Table 12—Threats to TSF Data for the TOE Threat Affected asset Description T.PROT.ALT D.PROT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons T.CONF.DIS D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons T.CONF.ALT D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons 3.4 Organizational Security Policies This section describes the Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) that apply to the TOE. OSPs are used to provide a basis for Security Objectives that are commonly desired by TOE Owners in this operational environment but for which it is not practical to universally define the assets being protected or the threats to those assets. Table 13—Organizational Security Poli Name Definition P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner P.SOFTWARE. VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION To prevent access TOE assets in the HDD with connecting the other HCDs, TOE will have authorized access the HDD data. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 21 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 3.5 Assumptions The Security Objectives and Security Functional Requirements defined in subsequent sections of this Protection Profile are based on the condition that all of the assumptions described in this section are satisfied. Table 14—Assumptions Assumption Definition A.ACCESS.MANAGED | The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE. A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures. A.ADMIN.TRAINING — | Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 22 Canon 4 Security Objectives 41 Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the Security Objectives that are satisfied by the TOE. Table 15— Security Objectives for the TOE Objective Definition O.DOC.NO DIS The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized disclosure. O.DOC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized alteration. O.FUNC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized alteration. O.PROT.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized alteration. O.CONF.NO DIS The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized disclosure. O.CONF.NO ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users, and shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with security policies before allowing them to use the TOE. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies. O.SOFTWARE. VERIFIED The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF. O.AUDIT.LOGGED The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure or alteration. O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED The TOE shall protect TOE assets in the HDD from accessing without the TOE authorization. 4.2 Security Objectives for the IT environment This section describes the Security Objectives for the IT environment. Table 16— Security Objectives for the IT environment Objective Definition OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED If audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records are protected from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications. OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED If audit records generated by the TOE are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations, and only by authorized persons OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged access to TOE external interfaces. 4.3 Security Objectives for the non-IT environment This section describes the Security Objectives for non-IT environments. Table 17— Security Objectives for the non-IT environment Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 23 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Objective Definition OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be authorized to use the TOE according to the security policies and procedures of their organization. OE.USER.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and have the training and competence to follow those policies and procedures. OE.ADMIN.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, have the training, competence, and time to follow the manufacture: guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators will not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes. OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate intervals for security violations or unusual patterns of activity. 4.4 Security Objectives rationale This section describes the rationale for the Security Objectives. Table 18—Completeness of Security Objectives Threats. Policies, and Assumptions Objectives I0.DOC.NO_ALT |0.PROT.NO_ALT I0.CONF.NO_ALT (D.CONF.NO DIS (D.FUNC.NO_ALT (OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED (O.SOFTWARE. VERIFIED (0.AUDIT.LOGGED (0. HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED (OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED (OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED (0. INTERFACE.MANAGED IOE.PHYISCAL.MANAGED IOE.INTERFACE.MANAGED (OE.ADMIN.TRAINED IOE.ADMIN.TRUSTED IOE.USER.TRAINED |T.DOC.DIS <0.DOC.NO_DIS |T.DOC.ALT < |T.FUNC.ALT |T.PROT.ALT |T.CONF.DIS |T.CONF.ALT SA} | S| S| \] \JO.USER.AUTHORIZED \}| A} | S| S| \) \|OE.USER.AUTHORIZED [P.USER.AUTHORIZATION IP.SOFTWARE. VERIFICATION IPAUDIT.LOGGING IPINTERFACE.MANAGEMENT [P.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION |A.ACCESS.MANAGED |A.ADMIN.TRAINING |A.ADMIN.TRUST Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 24 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Threats. Policies, and Assumptions Objectives (O.PROT.NO_ALT (O.CONF.NO_ALT (D.CONF.NO DIS (D.DOC.NO DIS (D.DOC.NO_ALT (O.FUNC.NO_ALT (O.USER.AUTHORIZED IOE.USER.AUTHORIZED |0.SOFTWARE. VERIFIED I0.AUDIT. LOGGED (OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED (OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED (OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED (O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED (OE. INTERFACE.MANAGED (O.INTERFACE.MANAGED (OE.ADMIN.TRAINED IOE.PHYISCAL.MANAGED IOE.ADMIN.TRUSTED A.USER.TRAINING < JOE.USER.TRAINED Table 19—Suffi iency of Security Objectives Threats, Policies, and Assumptions Summary Objectives and rationale T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons O.DOC.NO_DIS protects D.DOC from unauthorized disclosure O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons O.DOC.NO_ALT protects D.DOC from unauthorized alteration O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons O.FUNC.NO_ALT protects D.FUNC from unauthorized alteration O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons O.PROT.NO_ALT protects D.PROT from unauthorized alteration O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons O.CONF.NO DIS protects D.CONF from unauthorized disclosure O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization 25 Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be O.CONF.NO_ALT protects D.CONF from altered by unauthorized persons | unauthorized alteration O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization P.USER.AUTHORIZ | Users will be authorized to use O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user ATION the TOE identification and authentication as the basis for authorization to use the TOE OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization P.SOFTWARE.VERIF | Procedures will exist to O.SOFTWARE. VERIFIED provides procedures ICATION self-verify executable code in to self-verify executable code in the TSF the TSF P.AUDIT.LOGGING | An audit trail of TOE use and O.AUDIT.LOGGED creates and maintains a log security-relevant events will be of TOE use and security-relevant events, and created, maintained, protected, prevents unauthorized disclosure or alteration and reviewed. OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED protects exported audit records from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of, the TOE Owner to provide appropriate access to exported audit records OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to ensure that audit logs are appropriately reviewed P.HDD.ACCESS.AUT | To prevent access TOE assets in | O.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED protects TOE HORIZATION the HDD with connecting the assets in the HDD from accessing without the other HCDs, TOE will have TOE authorization. authorized access the HDD data. P.INTERFACE.MAN | Operation of external interfaces | O.INTERFACE.MANAGED manages the AGEMENT will be controlled by the TOE operation of external interfaces in accordance and its IT environment . with security policies OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED establishes a protected environment for TOE external interfaces A.ACCESS.MANAG | The TOE environment provides | OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED establishes a ED protection from unmanaged protected physical environment for the TOE access to the physical components and data interfaces ofthe TOE. A.ADMIN.TRAININ | TOE Users are aware of and OE.ADMIN.TRAINED establishes G trained to follow security responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide policies and procedures appropriate Administrator training. A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their OE.ADMIN.TRUST establishes responsibility of privileged access rights for the TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship malicious purposes. with Administrators. A.USER.TRAINING | Administrators are aware ofand | OE.USER.TRAINED establishes responsibility trained to follow security policies and procedures ofthe TOE Owner to provide appropriate User training. 26 Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 5 Extended components definition (APE_ECD) This Protection Profile defines components that are extensions to Common Criteria 3.1 Release 2, Part 2. These extended components are defined in the Protection Profile but are used in SFR Packages, and therefore, are employed only in TOEs whose STs conform to those SFR Packages. 5.1. FPT_CIP_EXP Confidentiality and integrity of stored data Family behaviour: This family defines requirements for the TSF to protect the confidentiality and integrity of both TSF and user data. Confidentiality and integrity of stored data is important security functionality in the case where the storage container is not, or not always, in a protected environment. Confidentiality and integrity of stored data is often provided by functionality that the TSF uses for both TSF and user data in the same way. Examples are full disk encryption functions, where the TSF stores its own data as well as user data on the same disk. Especially when a disk is intended to be removable and therefore may be transported into an unprotected environment, this becomes a very important functionality to achieve the Security Objectives of protection against unauthorized access to information. Component leveling: FPT_CIP_EXP.1 Confidentiality and integrity of stored data 1 FPT_CIP_EXP.1 Confidentiality and integrity of stored data, provides for the protection of user and TSF data stored on a storage container that cannot be assumed to be protected by the TOE environment. Management: FPT_CIP_EXP.1 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: a) Management of the conditions under which the protection function is activated or used; b) Management of potential restrictions on the allowance to use this function. Audit: FPT_CIP_EXP.1 The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST: a) Basic: failure condition that prohibits the function to work properly, detected attempts to bypass this functionality (e. g. detected modifications). FPT_CIP_EXP.1 Confidentiality and integrity of stored data Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies FPT_CIP_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a function that ensures the confidentiality and integrity of user and TSF data when either is written to lassignment: media used to store the datal. FPT_CIP_EXP.1.2 The TSF shall provide a function that detects and performs [assignment: Jist of actions] when it detects alteration of user and TSF data when Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 27 Canon either is written to [assignment: media used to store the datal. Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Rationale: The Common Criteria defines the protection of user data in its FDP class and the protection of TSF data in its FPT class. Although both classes contain components that define confidentiality protection and integrity protection, those components are defined differently for user data and TSF data and therefore are difficult to use in cases where a TOE provides functionality for the confidentiality and integrity for both types of data in an identical way. This Protection Profile defines an extended component that combines the confidentiality and integrity protection for both types of data in a single component. The authors of this Protection Profile view this as an approach that simplifies the statement of security functional requirements significantly and therefore enhances the readability and applicability of this Protection Profile. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this functionality. This extended component protects both user data and TSF data, and it could therefore be placed in either the FDP or FPT class. Since it is intended to protect data that are exported to storage media, and in particular, storage media that might be removable from the TOE, the authors believed that it was most appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this led the authors to define a new family with just one member. 5.2 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Family behaviour: This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one external interface to another external interface. Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and process this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products may provide the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or devices that are connected to the TOE's external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP has been defined to specify this kind of functionality. Component leveling: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces 1 FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces, provides for the functionality to require TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before these data are sent out on another external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires explicit allowance by an authorized administrative role. Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: a) Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities; b) Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an administrative role; c) Revocation of such an allowance. Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST: Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 28 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 There are no auditable events foreseen. Rationale: Quite often a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one external interface before such (processed) data are allowed to be transferred to another external interface. Examples are firewall systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow for the incoming data before it can be transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i. e. without processing the data first) between different external interfaces is therefore a function that — if allowed at all — can only be allowed by an authorized role. It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows specifying the property to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can allow this. Since this is a function that is quite common for a number of products, it has been viewed as useful to define an extended component. The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of user data flow in its FDP class. However, in this Protection Profile, the authors needed to express the control of both user data and TSF data flow using administrative control instead of attribute-based control. It was found that using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this purpose resulted in SFRs that were either too implementation-specific for a Protection Profile or too unwieldy for refinement in a Security Target. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this functionality. This extended component protects both user data and TSF data, and it could therefore be placed in either the FDP or FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the authors believed that it was most appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this led the authors to define a new family with just one member. FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMF-.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles. FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: Jist of external interfaces] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: Jist of external interfaces]. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 29 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 6 Security requirements This section describes the security requirements for the TOE. 6.1 Security functional requirements This section describes the security functional requirements for the TOE. The text in brackets following the component identifier or element name denotes iteration operations. 6.1.1 User Authentication Function FIA_AFL.1 FIA_AFL.1.1 FIA_AFL.1.2 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1.1 Authentication failure handling Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication The TSF shall detect when [selection: /assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer withinlassignment: range of acceptable values/\ unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: List of authentication events]. [selection /assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer withinlassignment: range of acceptable values} = an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 to 10 [assignment: /ist of authentication events] = Login attempts from the control panel or remote UIs. When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed, the TSF shall [assignment: Jist of actions]. [selection: met, surpassed] = met [assignment: Jist of actions] = Lockout User attribute definition Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [assignment: Jist of security attributes]. [assignment: Jist of security attributes] = User name, role Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 30 Canon FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1.1 FIA_UAU.1.2 FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU .7.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1.1 FIA_UID.1.2 Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Timing of authentication Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. The TSF shall allow [assignment: Jist of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions of the TOH on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. lassignment: Jist of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions of the TOE " Submission of print jobs, fax jobs, I-fax jobs The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. Protected authentication feedback Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication The TSF shall provide only [assignment Jist of feedback] to the user while the authentication is in progress. [assignment: list of feedback] . x Timing of identification Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. The TSF shall allow [assignment: Jist of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions of the TOH| on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. lassignment: Jist of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions of the TOK " Submission of print jobs, fax jobs, I-fax jobs The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 31 Canon FIA_USB.1 FIA_USB.1.1 FIA_USB.1.2 FIA_USB.1.3 : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss User-subject binding Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment Jist of user security attributes]. [assignment: list of user security attributes] =" Username, role The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]. [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes] = None The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes). [assignment rules for the changing of attributes] = None FTA_SSL.3(lui) TSF-initiated termination Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FTA_SSL.3.1(lui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of user inactivity]. [assignment: time interval of user inactivity] = User inactivity at the control panel lasting for the specified period of time. FTA_SSL.3(rui) TSF-initiated termination Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FTA_SSL.3.1(rui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a lassignment: time interval of user inactivity]. [assignment: time interval of user inactivityl = User inactivity at the remote UI lasting for 15 minutes. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 32 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 6.1.2. Function Use Restriction Function FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) Management of security attributes Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MSA.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP, [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, lassignment: other operations] the security attributes [assignment: Jist of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)| = None [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, lassignment: other operations] = query, modify, delete, create [assignment: Jist of security attributes] " Role [assignment: the authorised identified roles] = U.ADMINISTRATOR FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) Static attribute initialisation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.3.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control Policy, [assignment: access control SFP information flow control SFA to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, lassignment: other property] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. [assignment: access control SFP information flow control SFA = None [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, lassignment: other property) = Restrictive [refinement] = TOE Function Access Control Policy -> TOE Function Access Control SFP FMT_MSA.3.2(exec-job) The TSF shall allow the [assignment the authorized identified roles| to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. [assignment: the authorized identified roles] = Nobody Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 33 Canon FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) Subset access control Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC.1.1(exec-job) | The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP on users as subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the right to use the functions as operations. FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) Security attribute based access control Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACF.1.1(exec-job) | The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP to objects based on the following: users and [assignment: List of TOE functions and the security attribute(s) used to determine the TOE Function Access Control SFP. [assignment: List of TOE functions and the security attribute(s) used to determine the TOE Function Access Control SFÄ = objects controlled under the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 20. FDP_ACF.1.2(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [selection: the user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function, a user that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions [assignment: List of functional, [assignment: other conditions]. [selection: the user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function, a user that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions [assignment: List of functions], [assignment: other conditions] = [assignment: other conditions] [assignment: other conditions] = rules specified in the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20 governing access among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects FDP_ACF.1.3(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: the user acts in the role U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: other rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: other rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] = None FDP_ACF.1.4(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects). [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 34 Canon subjects to objects] = None Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Table 20—TOE Function Access Control SFP Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject | Attribute | Access control rule Use ofthe For the attribute of the Object, . function, using Role the role associated with the Secured Print] +PRT pointer to the U.USER Subject, must be authorized to Object. perform the Operation. Use of the Role For the attribute of the Object, +CPY function, using the role associated with the Copy] +DSR pointer to the U.USER Subject, must be authorized to Object. perform the Operation. Use ofthe Role For the attribute of the Object, +SCN function, using the role associated with the Scan] +DSR pointer to the U.USER Subject, must be authorized to Object. perform the Operation. Use of the Role For the attribute of the Object, function, using the role associated with the Fax] +FAXOUT pointer to the U.USER Subject, must be authorized to Object. perform the Operation. Use of the Role For the attribute of the Object, function, using the role associated with the Fax/I-Fax Inbox] +FAXIN pointer to the U.USER Subject, must be authorized to Object. perform the Operation. Use of the Role For the attribute of the Object, Access Stored function, using the role associated with the Files] +DSR pointer to the U-USER Subject, must be authorized to Object perform the Operation. Remote UI Use of the Role . . 4DSR function, usin; Tf the role associated with the Access 4FAXIN vointer t th ® | V.USER Subject is Administrator, the Received/Stored pointer fo the Operation is permitted. Files] Object. 6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions 6.1.3.1 Delete Job FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) Management of security attributes Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MSA.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)\ to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, lassignment: other operations] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 35 Canon [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)| " In The Job Access Control SFP in Table 23 Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, lassignment: other operations] = Refer to "Operation" in Table 21. [assignment: Jist of security attributes] = Refer to "Security Attributes" in Table 21. [assignment: the authorised identified roles] "Refer to "Role" in Table 21. Table 21—Management of security attributes Security Attributes Operation Role User name delete, create, query U.ADMINISTRATOR Box PINs modify, create U.ADMINISTRATOR PINs of own Mail Box modify U.NORMAL APPLICATION NOTE 1. This Protection Profile does not define any mandatory security attributes, but some may be defined by SFR packages or by the ST Author. The ST Author should define how security attributes are managed. Note that this Protection Profile allows the ST Author to instantiate "Nobody" as an authorized identified role, which makes it possible for the ST Author to state that some management actions (e.g., deleting a security attribute) may not be performed by any User. FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) Static attribute initialisation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.3.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, [assignment: access control SFP information flow control SFA to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, lassignment: other property] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. [assignment: access control SFP information flow control SFA = Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 " In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, lassignment: other property} "restrictive FMT_MSA.3.2(delete-job) The TSF shall allow the lassignment: the authorized identified roles| to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. [assignment: the authorized identified roles] = Nobody Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 36 Canon FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)Subset access control Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 on the list of users as subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22. FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) Security attribute based access control Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACF.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 to objects based on the following: the list of users as subjects and objects controlled under the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 22. FDP_ACF.1.2(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 governing access among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects. FDP_ACF.1.3(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects). [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] " U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to delete any D.DOC/D.FUNC. = U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to modify any + CPY, +SCN, +DSR, +FAXOUT D.FUNC. FDP_ACF.1.4(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects). [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] = None Table 22—Common Access Control SFP Object Attribute Operation(s) | Subject Access control rule D.DOC +PRT,+SCN,+CPY, Delete U.NORMAL | Denied, except for his/her own +FAXOUT, documents +DSR D.DOC +FAXIN Delete U.NORMAL | Denied Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 37 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Object Attribute Operation(s) | Subject Access control rule D.FUNC | +PRT,+SCN,+CPY, Modify; U.NORMAL | Denied, except for his/her own +FAXOUT, Delete function data +DSR D.FUNC | +FAXIN Modify U.USER Denied D.FUNC | +FAXIN Delete U.NORMAL | Denied 6.1.3.2 In The Job FDP_ACC.1(in-job) Subset access control Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23 on the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23. FDP_ACF.1(in-job) Security attribute based access control Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACF.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23 to objects based on the following: the list of subjects and objects controlled under the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 23. FDP_ACF.1.2(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23 governing access among Users and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects. FDP_ACF.1.3(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] = U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to Read any +FAXIN/+DSR D.DOC. FDP_ACF.1.4(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects). [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] " None Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 38 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Table 23—In The JOB Access Control SFP Object | Attribute(s) Operation | Subject Access control rule D.DOC_| +PRT Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents D.DOC_| +SCN Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents D.DOC_| +CPY Read U.USER Denied D.DOC_| +FAXIN Read U.NORMAL _| Denied D.DOC_| +FAXOUT Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents D.DOC_ | +DSR Read U.NORMAL | Denied, except for his/her own documents 6.1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles. FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on any external Interface from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to any Shared-medium Interface. 6.1.5 HDD Data Erase Function FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: a//ocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: D.DOC, [assignment: Jist of objects. [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] = deallocation of the resource from [assignment: Zist of objects] " None 6.1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function 6.1.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic operation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 39 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1.1(h) The TSF shall perform [assignment: Jist of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm) and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes| that meet the following: [assignment: Zist of standards]. [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] = Encryption of data written to the HDD = Decryption of data read out from the HDD [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] = AES [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] = 256 bit [assignment: list of standards] = FIPS PUB 197 FPT_CIP_EXP.1 Confidentiality and integrity of stored data Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies FPT_CIP_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a function that ensures the confidentiality and integrity of user and TSF data when either is written to [assignment: a Removable Nonvolatile Storage devicel. [assignment: a Removable Nonvolatile Storage device = HDD FPT_CIP_EXP.1.2 The TSF shall provide a function that detects and performs [assignment: Jist of actions] when it detects alteration of user and TSF data when either is written to [assignment: a Removable Nonvolatile Storage devicel. [assignment: Jist of actions] * noaction [assignment: a Removable Nonvolatile Storage device = HDD APPLICATION NOTE 2. Today many manufacturers are looking at hardware solutions such as fully encrypting disks to meet disk encryption requirements. Some of these drives will not allow data to be written to the drive unless the correct credentials (either the key itself or credentials required to unlock the key stored in a secure area of the drive) are presented. Assuming that this functionality cannot be bypassed, detection of modifications is not a useful function within the TOE and therefore it should be possible to instantiate "no action" in the assignment for the "list of actions" in FPT_CIP_EXP.1.2, arguing that unauthorized modification is prevented by the design of the system. Quote from [PP Guide] 6.1.6.2 Device Identification and Authentication Function FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack Hierarchical to: No other components. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 40 Canon Dependencies: FPT_PHP.1.1 No dependencies. compromise the TSF. Date of Iss : 2015/07/23 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might [refinement] physical tampering -> Physical replacement of the HDD and HDD Data Encryption Board FPT_PHP.1.2 with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred. The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering [refinement] physical tampering -> Physical replacement of the HDD and HDD Data Encryption Board 6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function 6.1.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function FCS_COP.1(n) Cryptographic operation Hierarchical to: Dependencies: No other components. [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1.1(n) The TSF shall perform [assignment: Jist of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm) and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes| that meet the following: [assignment: Zist of standards]. lassignment: Jist of cryptographic operations] = Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN = Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] = Refer to "Cryptographic Algorithm" in Table 24. [assignment: cryptographic key sizes) = Refer to "Cryptographic Key Sizes" in Table 24. [assignment: Jist of standards] "Refer to "List of Standards" in Table 24. Table 24 - IPSec cryptographic algorithm, key sizes and standards 41 cryptographic algorithm cryptographic key sizes list of standards 3DES-CBC 168 bit FIPS PUB 46-3 AES-CBC 128 bit, 192bit, 256 bit FIPS PUB 197 AES-GCM 128 bit, 192bit, 256 bit SP800-38D Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon FTP_ITC.1 FTP_ITC.1.1 FTP_ITC.1.2 FTP_ITC.1.3 : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss Inter-TSF trusted channel Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or disclosure. The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel. The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communication of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF over any Shared-medium Interface. 6.1.8 Self-Test Function FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1.1 FPT_TST.1.2 FPT_TST.1.3 TSF testing Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, peviodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occun] to demonstrate the correct operation of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSA, the TSH [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions lassignment: conditions under which self test should occur\] = during initial start-up [selection: [assignment: parts of TSA, the TSH = Cryptographic algorithms used with the LAN Data Protection Function (AES, 3DES) The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection: assignment: parts of TSA, TSF data]. [selection: [assignment parts of TSF, TSF datal = Cryptographic key The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 42 Canon 6.1.9 Audit Log Function Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: - Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; - All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; and - all Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if one is specified) for the Relevant SFR in Table 25; [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]. [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified = not specified [assignment other specifically defined auditable events] = None FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: - Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and - For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, for each Relevant SFR listed in Table 25: (1) information as defined by its Audit Level (if one is specified), and (2) all Additional Information (if any is required); [assignment: other audit relevant information]. [assignment other audit relevant information| = None Table 25—Audit data requirements Auditable event Relevant SFR Audit level Additional information Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Not specified Type of job Both successful and unsuccessful use of the FIA_UAU.1 Basic None required authentication mechanism Both successful and unsuccessful use of the FIA_UID.1 Basic Attempted user identification mechanism identity, if available Use of the management functions FMT_SMF.1 Minimum None required Modifications to the group of users that are FMT_SMR.1 Minimum None required | part of a role Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 Minimum None required Termination of an interactive session by the FTA_SSL.3 Minimum None required session locking mechanism* Failure of the trusted channel functions FTP_ITC.1 Minimum None required 5 See “Section 14.1 IEEE Std 2600.1 Errata” in the PP Guide. In IEEE Std 2600.1, this is indicated as “Locking of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism” but notes that this is a transcription error. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 43 Canon FAU_GEN.2 User identity association Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users| with the capability to read [assignment: List of audit information] from the audit records. [assignment: authorised users] = U.ADMINISTRATOR [assignment: list of audit information] = Refer to the audit logs listed in Table 25. FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion. FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of prevent, detect] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect| " prevent FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records’| and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full. [selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records" = "overwrite the oldest stored audit records" [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] " None 6.1.10 Management Function 6.1.10.1 User Management Function FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: a defined quality metric]. [assignment: a defined quality metrie = Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length = Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters = Use at least one uppercase character (A to Z) = Use at least one lowercase character (a to z) Use at least one number (0-9) = Use at least one non-alphabet characters (/-@[]:;,./F!"#$%&'()=~|{'+*}_2><) * Allowed characters Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 45 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 ¢ All characters other than control characters FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) Management of TSF data Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MTD.1.1 (user-mgt) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, lassignment: other operations] the [assignment: list of TSF data associated with a U. NORMAL or TSF Data associated with documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAÏ] to (selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, the U. NORMAL to whom such TSF data are associated]. (selection: change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations/\ = Refer to "Operation" in Table 26. [assignment: Jist of TSF data associated with a U.NORMAL or TSF Data associated with documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL " Referto "TSF Data" in Table 26. [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, the U.NORMAL to whom such TSF data are associated] = Refer to "Role" in Table 26. Table 26— User information management TSF data Role Operation User name U.ADMINISTRATOR | delete, create, query Role U.ADMINISTRATOR | modify, delete, create, query Passwords U.ADMINISTRATOR | modify, delete, create Own password U.NORMAL modify FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles UADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL, [selection: Nobody, |assignment: the authorised identified roles|]. [selection: Nobody, lassignment: the authorised identified roles|] "= Nobody FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles, except for the role "Nobody" to which no user shall be associated. 6.1.10.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 46 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm l[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: List of standards]. assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] = Cryptographic key generation algorithm according to FIPS PUB 186-2 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes) = 128bit, 168bit, 192bit, 256 bit [assignment: Jist of standards] = FIPS PUB 186-2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [assignment cryptographic key distribution method) that meets the following: [assignment: Jist of standardsl. [assignment: cryptographic key distribution method] = DH (Diffie Hellman) and ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman) [assignment: Zist of standards] = SP800-56A 6.1.10.3 Device Management Function FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) Management of TSF data Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MTD.1.1(device-mgt)The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, lassignment: other operations] the [assignment: list of TSF datal to [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAN]). [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, lassignment: other Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 47 Canon operations/\ = Refer to "Operation" in Table 27. Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 [assignment: Jist of TSF data] " Referto "TSF Data Table 27. [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, lassignment: the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL|]] = Refer to "Role" in Table 27. Table 27— Device management function TSF Data Role Operation Date/Time settings U.ADMINISTRATOR | modify HDD Data Erase settings U.ADMINISTRATOR | query, modify IPSec settings U.ADMINISTRATOR | query, modify Auto Reset settings U.ADMINISTRATOR | query, modify Lockout policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR | query, modify Password policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR | query, modify Audit log U.ADMINISTRATOR | query, delete FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment List of management functions to be provided by the TSF). [assignment List of management functions to be provided by the TSF = Refer to "Management Function" in Table 28. Table 28—The management of security requirements Management Function Operation Date/Time settings modify HDD Data Erase settings query, modify IPSec settings query, modify Auto Reset settings query, modify Lockout policy settings query, modify Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 48 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Management Function Operation. Password policy settings query, modify Audit log query, delete delete, create, Username query Role modify, delete, create, query Password modify, delete, create Box PIN modify, create Own password modify PIN of own Mail Box modify 6.2 Security assurance requirements This section defines the security assurance requirements for the TOE. Table 29 lists the security assurance requirements for 2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A, and related SFR packages, EAL 3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2. Table 29— 2600.1 Security Assurance Requirements Assurance Class Assurance components ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures (augmentation of EAL3) ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ASE: Security Target evaluation | ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE _OBJ.2 Security objectives ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample AVA: Vulnerability assessment_| AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 49 Canon 6.3 Security functional requirements rationale Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 6.3.1. The completeness of security requirements Table 30 provides a mapping of TOE Security Objectives and security functional requirements. This shows how each of the security functional requirements corresponds to at least one TOE Security Objective. Bold typeface items provide principal (P) fulfillment of the objectives, and normal typeface items provide supporting (S) fulfillment. Table 30—The completeness of security requirements Objectives SERs FIA_AFL.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UID.1 s{[s[s[s]fsf[s FIA_USB.1 FTA _SSL.3(lui) FTA _SSL.3(rui) FMT_MSA.I(exec-job) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) FDP_ACC.I(exec-job) FDP_ACF.I(exec-job) FMT_MSA.I(delete-job) SA.3(delete-job) FDP_ACC. I(delete-job) FDP_ACF. (delete-job) FDP_ACC.I(in-job) FDP_ACF.I(in-job) FPT_FDI EXP. P FDP _RIP.1 FPT_CIP EXPI FCS_COP.1(h) FPT PHP. P FCS_COP.1(n) FTP_ITC.1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FPT_TST.1 P FAU GEN.I P FAU_GEN.2 FAU_SAR.I P IO.FUNC.NO_ALT (O.PROT.NO_ ALT I0.CONF.NO_DIS I0.CONF.NO_ALT IO.INTERFACE.MANAGED IO.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED I0.AUDIT.LOGGED IO.HDD.ACCESS.AUTHORISED |0.DOC.NO_DIS |0.DOC.NO_ALT ” olw|lun|un | || won) | | W/O.USER.AUTHORIZED wl] alan als} alan ale] A) ala ~ ~ ~ KL ” ” a a a a a a al aly} a] alla a] alla a] aly} al als} a] alla ~ Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 50 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Objectives a a a 2 AÉIÈIRE Ga SZ |= 5 4 2\ FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FPT_CIP_EXP.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FCS_COP.1(h) [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.I FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, 53 Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 Dependencies Dependencies required by CC satisfied by ST FCS_CKM.1] and disappear when power is shut off. FCS_CKM.4 Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FPT PHP. No dependencies. | No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FTP_ITC.I No dependencies. | No dependencies. NA (no dependencies) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, [FDP_ITC.1 or and disappear when power is shut off. FDP_ITC.2 or FCS CKM.1 Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is FCS_CKM.1] —_ prevented by the design of the system. As FCS_CKM.4 such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. FCS_COP.I(n) Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is FCS_COP.I(h) prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, [FDP_ITC.1 or and disappear when power is shut off. FCS_COP.I(n) [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_CKM.I FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ITC.2 or Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.1] FCS_CKM.I prevented by the design of the system. As FCS_CKM.4 such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FPT_TST.1 No dependencies. | No dependencies. N/A (no dependencies) FAU GENI FPT STM1 FPT STM1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) . FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_GEN.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 FPT_STM.1 No dependencies. | No dependencies. NIA (no dependencies) FAU_SAR.I FAU_GEN.I FAU_GEN.I N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU STG.I FAU_GEN.I FAU_GEN.I N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies. | No dependencies. N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MTD.(user-m || FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.I N/A (dependencies are satisfied) gt) FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.I FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MTD.I(device- | FMT_SMR.I FMT_SMR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) mgt) FMT_SME.1 FMT_SME.1 FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies. __ | No dependencies. NIA (no dependencies) 6.4 Security assurance requirements rationale This Protection Profile has been developed for Hardcopy Devices used in restrictive commercial information processing environments that require a relatively high level of document security, operational accountability and information assurance. The TOE environment will be exposed to only a low level of risk because it is assumed that the TOE will be located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 54 Canon almost constant protection from unauthorized and unmanaged access to the TOE and its data interfaces. Agents cannot physically access any nonvolatile storage without disassembling the TOE except for removable nonvolatile storage devices, where protection of User and TSF Data are provided when such devices are removed from the TOE environment. Agents have limited or no means of infiltrating the TOE with code to effect a change and the TOE self-verifies its executable code to detect unintentional malfunctions. As such, the Evaluation Assurance Level 3 is appropriate. Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 EAL 3 is augmented with ALC_FLR.2, Flaw reporting procedures. ALC_FLR.2 ensures that instructions and procedures for the reporting and remediation of identified security flaws are in place, and their inclusion is expected by the consumers of this TOE. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 55 Canon : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss 7 TOE Summary specification This section describes the TOE summary specifications. 7.1 User Authentication Function - Supported functional requirements: FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, FIA_AFL.1, FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui) When the control panel or a remote UI is used to operate the MFP, before permitting such operations, the TOE requires user authentication in order to identify and authenticate valid users. However, the submission of print jobs, fax jobs, and I-fax jobs is always permitted. [FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1] Two methods of user authentication are supported: - External Authentication Authentication is based on user information registered in the authentication server. This may be an Active Directory server that uses Kerberos authentication, or LDAP server that uses LDAP authentication. - Internal Authentication Authentication is based on user information registered in the device. For user authentication, the TOE prompts input of the user name, password, and the login destination. User authentication succeeds only if the user name and password matches the one at the specified destination. For security, note that the password is masked by asterisks in the text field. [FLA_UAU.7] The TOE issues an Access Control Token (ACT) to each user successfully authenticated. The ACT is an object that contains the user's name and role, as well as the access permissions to the application functions that are specified for each user role. [FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1] The TOE provides a lockout function in order to minimize invalid login attempts. [FLA_AFL.1] - This function locks out any user that fails to login successfully within the maximum number of failed authentication attempts. A value from 1 to 10 can be specified as the number of attempts before lockout (Initial value: 3). - Any user that is locked out will not be able to login until the lockout time passes. A value from 1 to 60 minutes can be specified as the lockout time (Initial value: 3 minutes). The TOE terminates an interactive session when there is no user activity at the control panel or remote UI lasting for a specified period of time. [FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui)] - At the control panel, session timeout occurs after a specified period of user inactivity. A value from 10 seconds to 9 minutes can be specified (Initial value: 2 minutes). - Ataremote UI, session timeout occurs after 15 minutes of user inactivity. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 56 Canon 7.2 Function Use Restriction Function : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss - Supported functional requirements: | FDP_ACC.1(exec-job), FDP_ACF.I(exec-job), FMT_MSA.1(exec-job), FMT_MSA.3(exec-job), FMT_SMF.1 For each UI, the TOE provides Function Use Restriction, which controls access based on the contents of the ACT issued to authenticated users. Any queries, modifications, deletions, and additions to the role contained in the ACT, are performed by U.ADMINISTRATORs only. For Function Use Restriction, the attribute of the Object is the functions itself, and is therefore fixed. When the control panel is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions depending on the settings in "Application Restrictions", which are based on the role contained in the ACT. When a remote UI is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions based on attribute values associated with the role in the ACT. Only U.ADMINISTRATORS are allowed use of all functions. Table 32— Function Use Restriction Policy UI Object Condition Operation Control panel | Pointer to [Secured The role associated with U.USER must Executed by Print] have permission to the [Secured Print] activating the function. Object. Pointer to [Copy] The role associated with U.USER must Executed by have permission to the [Copy] function activating the Object. Pointer to [Scan and The role associated with U.USER must Executed by Send] have permission to the [Scan and Send] activating the function Object. Pointer to [Fax] The role associated with U.USER must Executed by have permission to the [Scan and Send] activating the function Object. Pointer to [Fax/I-Fax The role associated with U.USER must Executed by Inbox] have permission to the [Access Stored activating the Files] function Object. Pointer to [Access The role associated with U.USER must Executed by Stored Files] have permission to the [Access Stored activating the Files] function Object. Pointer to [Scan and The role associated with U.USER must Executed by Store] have permission to the [Scan and Store] activating the function Object. Remote UI Pointer to [Access The role associated with U.USER is Cannot be executed. Received/Stored Files] | anything other than Administrator. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 57 Canon 7.3 Job Output Restriction Functions : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss For Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax TX jobs, etc., the TOE provides the following security functions to restrict access. 7.3.1 Job Cancel - Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMF.1 TOE can delete Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax TX jobs according to following. The user name of these jobs is initialized by username of the user that executed the job. - U.NORMAL is authorized to delete his/her own job. - U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to display a list of all jobs and delete any of them. With the cancellation of the job, the attribute value to be attached to the job is deleted. 7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control - Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(in-job), | FDP_ACF.1(in-job), FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMF.1 TOE provides the following access control functions for documents in each jobs. User name of these jobs is initialized by username of the user that executed the job. Copy, Scan, Fax TX Jobs - Nobody is authorized to read documents in any copy jobs. Note that the owner of the documents and U.ADMINISTRATOR can execute priority/ interrupting print. - Nobody is authorized to read documents in any scan, and Fax TX jobs, except in case of 7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs. Temporarily Stored Print Jobs If a print job with a PIN is submitted, the job is temporarily stored in the machine without being output. Additionally, it uses the user name associated with the print job to determine its owner, in order to realize access restriction as described below. For temporarily stored jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job. - Print - Change priority for printing - Delete Printing starts when the PIN for the print job is entered from the control panel of the machine. For all temporarily stored print jobs, U. ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to display a list of jobs and execute the following: - Delete Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 58 Canon Received Fax Jobs : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss For documents received by fax/I-fax, the TOE provides the Memory RX Inbox where these jobs may be stored as files, to be output at a later time. Since these are stored in the Memory RX Inbox, access control to this inbox, is equivalent to access control to the stored document data. A seven digit PIN can be assigned to the Memory RX Inbox, to prevent unauthorized access by a user. Only U.ADMINISTRATORs are authorized to initialize, set, or modify the PIN on the Memory RX Inbox, which means only U.ADMINISTRATORS are allowed access to the stored document data. The TOE realizes access restriction, by determining the U.ADMINISTRATOR that enters the correct PIN to be the owner of the stored document data, preventing any U.NORMAL from executing print or send operations on the document data. If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without entering any PIN. - Print - Send - Delete If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by entering the correct PIN. - Print - Send - Delete Document Data Stored in Mail Box For Copy, Scan, or Send jobs, the TOE provides Mail Boxes where these jobs may be stored as document data, to be printed or sent at a later time. Since these are stored in Mail Boxes, access control to Mail Boxes, is equivalent to access control to the stored document data. A seven digit PIN can be assigned to a Mail Box, to help prevent unauthorized access by a user. No PIN is required when storing document data in a Mail Box. The TOE realizes access restriction, by determining the U.USER that enters the correct PIN, to be the owner of the stored document data. For document data stored in a Mail Box, the following operations are made available to U.NORMAL only by entering the correct PIN. - Print - Change print settings - Delete If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without entering any PIN. = Print - Change print settings - Delete Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 59 Canon If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by entering the correct PIN. : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss - Print - Change print settings - Delete Box PIN For the PIN set on Mail Boxes/Memory RX Inbox, only UADMINISTRATORs assigned the Administrator role are allowed to set or change any PIN. Note however, that U.NORMALs are allowed to change the PIN for the Mail Box they use. 7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs - Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(in-job), FDP_ACF.1(in-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) There are two types of Send Jobs: Fax TX job and Scan job. And there are Delayed Send function and Preview function as Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs function to store jobs temporarily. Delayed Send When the TOE receives a FAX TX job with transmission time specified, it is first stored temporarily, until sending at the specified time. For temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.NORMALS, only if the user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job. - Change destination For all temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, UADMINISTRATOR is allowed to execute the following: - Change destination Preview When the TOE receives a FAX TX job with Preview setting, it is first stored temporarily and previewed, and sent later. For temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job. - Preview - Delete Pages - Delete Jobs 7.4 Forward Received Jobs Function - Supported functional requirements: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 The design of the TOE prevents received data from being forwarded directly to a server or computer. This function enables the user to restrict forwarding of received jobs to the LAN. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 60 Canon Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 7.5 HDD Data Erase Function - Supported functional requirements: FDP_RIP.1 By overwriting with random data, the TOE permanently erases document data (including temporary image files) in the HDD, to ensure that no trace of the document data remains on the HDD. The user can choose one of the following erasure methods: - Overwrite using the DoD standard - Overwrite with random data three times - Overwrite once with random data - Overwrite once with null data The timing in which data are erased is specified below. - Image files temporarily stored in the HDD as a result of job processing is completely erased during or after processing of the job. - Document data are completely erased from the HDD, immediately after being deleted from Mail Box/Memory RX Inbox. - Residual information that remained unerased due to a sudden power shutdown, are completely erased from the HDD upon startup of the TOE. 7.6 HDD Data Encryption Function - Supported functional requirements: FPT_CIP_EXP.1 The security functions provided by the TOE's "HDD Data Encryption Board" are described below. The encryption/decryption function together with the Device Identification and Authentication function provide confidentiality and integrity protection for user data and TSF data stored in the HDD. 7.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function - Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(h) To protect the confidentiality and integrity of user data and TSF data stored in the HDD, the TOE performs the following cryptographic operations to encrypt all data stored in the HDD. - Encryption of data written to the HDD. - Decryption of data read out from the HDD. The cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key size are specified below: - AES algorithm (FIPS PUB 197) - 256 bit key length Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 61 Canon 7.6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss - Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1 The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the HDD data encryption function. - Uses a cryptographic key generation algorithm according to FIPS PUB 186-2 - Generates a cryptographic key with 256 bit key length The cryptographic key is managed as follows. - Upon startup, the TOE reads the seed information stored in FlashROM and generates a cryptographic key. - After generating the cryptographic key, the TOE stores the key in RAM. No method is available for acquiring the seed from the encryption board. Note also, that because the cryptographic key is stored in volatile RAM memory, it disappears when power is shut off. 7.6.3 Device Identification and Authentication Function - Supported functional requirements: FPT_PHP.1 The HDD Data Encryption Board identifies the MFP at each startup, and permits access to the HDD only if it is identified as the correct MFP. This function helps prevent unauthorized access to the contents of the HDD, even if the HDD and HDD Data Encryption Board are physically removed and connected to a different MFP. [Registration of the Authentication ID] The HDD Data Encryption Board, when it is initially mounted, acquires the device authentication ID from the MFP device, and stores it in FlashROM. [Procedure for identification and authentication] Upon startup, the HDD Data Encryption board generates a pseudo-random number which it passes to the MFP device as a random number to a challenge. The MFP device makes a computation using its device authentication ID and the received random number, and passes the resulting hash value (SHA-1) to the encryption board. The HDD Data Encryption Board performs the same computation in order to verify the response. Access to the HDD is denied, unless the HDD Data Encryption Board confirms successfully that it is mounted on the correct MFP device. 7.7 LAN Data Protection Function LAN Data Protection Function encrypts/decrypts all IP packets that are used in communication with an IT device. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 62 Canon 7.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function Date of Issue: 2015/07/23 - Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1 To ensure confidentiality and integrity of user data and TSF data communicated to and from an IT device, the TOE uses IPSec to encrypt/decrypt all IP packets. - Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN - Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN The following cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key sizes are used. - See Table 24 7.7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function - Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2 The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the IP packet encryption function. - Uses a cryptographic key generation algorithm according to FIPS PUB 186-2 - Generates a cryptographic key with 128/168/192/256 bit key length The following method is used by the TOE, to transmit the cryptographic key used by the IP Packet Encryption Function, to the other party - ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman) and DH (Diffie Hellman) according to SP800-56A. 7.8 Self-Test Function - Supported functional requirements: FPT_TST.1 At startup, the TOE performs the following self-test. - Checks whether cryptographic algorithms are running properly (AES, 3DES) - Checks the integrity of the cryptographic key - Checks the integrity of the executable code of the cryptographic algorithm 7.9 Audit Log Function - Supported functional requirements: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4 The TOE generates logs for the following events. - Startup - Shutdown - Job completion - User authentication success/failure Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 63 Canon : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss - Logout - Use of device management functions - Use of user management functions - Changes to the date/time setting - IPSec connection failures The items that are recorded on each log, are listed below. The date/time is provided by the TOE. The TOE's date/time information is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the accurate time is obtained from the Time Server. - Date/Time, User Name, Event Type, Outcome (Success/Failed) Other log events may have additional items as described below. - Job type (job completion) - Name of the user that failed authentication (authentication failure) Also, export of audit logs can be performed from a remote UI, in order to read out log records, although use of this function is restricted to UADMINISTRATORs only. Users other than UADMINISTRATOR are not allowed to export audit logs when logged in to the TOE from a remote UI. When accessing the TOE from a remote UI, another capability restricted to UADMINISTRATORs only is the deletion of log records from the [Deleting Collected Logs] menu. Users other than U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed access to this capability when logged in to the TOE from a remote UI, thus preventing unauthorized alterations from occurring. A maximum of 20,000 audit records can be maintained. Once this becomes full, the oldest audit record is overwritten with the newest. 7.10 Management Functions 7.10.1 User Management Function - Supported functional requirements: FIA_SOS.1, FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt), FMT_MSA.I(exec-job), FMT_MSA.I(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1 In the TOE, only UADMINISTRATORs assigned the Administrator role can set, change, or delete user, role, and access restriction information and inbox PINs. General users or UNNORMAL can only change their own passwords and the PIN for the Mail Box they use. [Setting/Changing/Deleting User, Role, and Access Restriction Information] New users are registered by setting the user name and password, and assigning a role to the user. Registered user information can be modified by changing password or the assigned role, or the user's registration can be deleted altogether. User specified passwords are checked to see that they are consistent with the password policy. Five roles exist, which are called "Base Roles": Administrator, Power User, General User, Limited User, and Guest User. To create a new "Custom Role" different than these, any one of four base roles excluding Guest User, is used as a template for the new role, which can then be registered. Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 64 Canon The Administrator role is a role whose base role is "Administrator", and has administrative privileges. : 2015/07/23 Date of Iss The initial value for "Base Role" can be changed to any one of four base roles except Guest User. The access restriction information that determines whether use of certain functions is permitted or denied, is specified by the "Application Restrictions" setting, which depends on what role is assigned. Although the initial value for "Application Restrictions" is fixed for base roles, the initial value of "Application Restrictions" can be changed for custom roles. [Types of Users] There are two types of users: U.ADMINISTRATOR and U.NORMAL. - U.ADMINISTRATOR User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges. - U.NORMAL General user assigned a role other than Guest User role or Administrator role. 7.10.2 Device Management Function - Supported functional requirements: FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), FMT_SMF.1 To provide for the effective enforcement of security functions, the TOE allows only U.ADMINISTRATORs to set the device management settings in Table 27. The following settings are also provided. [Password Policy Settings] To encourage the use of strong passwords, the following password policy may be set. - Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length - Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters - Use at least one uppercase characters (A to Z) - Use at least one lowercase characters (a to z) - Use at least one number (0-9) - Use at least one non-alphabet characters (*-@[]:;,./¥!"#$%&'()=~|{+*}_2><) - Allowed characters: All characters other than control characters [Lockout Policy Settings] The number of attempts before lockout and the lockout time can be set. - Number of attempts before lockout Select a value from 1 to 10 (Initial value: 3) - Lockout time Select a value from | to 60 minutes (Initial value: 3 minutes) END Copyright Canon Inc. 2015 65