Security Target Lite KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on S3D384E Date : 2025. 9. 22. Filename : EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) KOMSCO Technology Research Institute ITC Research Departmentr This page left blank on purpose for double-side printing. Revision History Document EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC (Lite) 개정번호 변경 내용 변경일 비고 1.0 KCOS V5.1, CC:2022 2025.08.18 1.1 Certification Body Feedback Reflected 2025.09.22 - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) 1. ST Introduction 1 1.1. ST Reference 1 1.2. TOE Reference 1 1.3. TOE Overview 2 1.4. TOE Definition 3 1.4.1. TOE usage and security features for operational 3 1.4.2. TOE Life Cycle 5 1.4.3. TOE Physical Boundaries 7 1.4.4. TOE Logical Boundaries 9 2. Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1) 14 2.1. CC Conformance Claim 14 2.2. PP Claim 14 2.3. Package Claim 14 2.4. Conformance rationale 15 2.5. Conformance Statement 15 3. Security Problem Definition 18 3.1. Introduction 18 3.1.1. Assets 18 3.1.2. Subjects 18 3.1.3. Assumptions 20 3.2. Threats 21 3.3. Organizational Security Policies 25 4. Security Objectives 26 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 26 - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) 4.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment 29 4.3. Security Objective Rationale 33 5. Extended Components Definition 37 5.1. Definition of the family FAU_SAS 37 6. Security Requirements 38 6.1. Security Functional Requirements for the TOE 39 6.1.1. Class FAU Security Audit 39 6.1.2. Class FCS Cryptographic Support 40 6.1.3. Class FIA Identification and Authentication 47 6.1.4. Class FMT Security Management 55 6.1.5. Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions 60 6.2. Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE 64 6.3. Security Requirements Rationale 65 6.3.1. Security functional requirements rationale 65 6.3.2. Dependency Rationale 70 6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale 73 6.3.4. Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency 74 7. TOE Summary Specification 76 7.1. TOE Security Functions 76 7.1.1. SF.IC 76 7.1.2. SF.PAC_AUTH 76 7.1.3. SF.BAC_AUTH 77 7.1.4. SF.ACTIVE_AUTH 77 7.1.5. SF.SEC_MESSAGE 78 7.1.6. SF.ACC_CONTROL 78 7.1.7. SF.RELIABILITY 78 7.2. Compatibility of Security Requirements 78 - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) 7.3. Compatibility of Assurance Requirements 81 7.4. Compatibility of Security Objectives 82 8. Reference 79 8.1. Acronyms 79 8.2. Glossary 81 8.3. Technical References 93 - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) (Table 1-1) Identification of the actors 7 (Table 5-1) Family FAU_SAS 37 (Table 6-1) Definition of security attributes 39 (Table 6-2) Algorithms and key sizes for PAC 43 (Table 6-3) Overview of authentication SFRs 47 (Table 6-4) Summarizes the assurance components that define the security assurance requirements for the TOE. 64 (Table 6-5) Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR 65 (Table 6-6) Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE 70 (Table 7-1) TOE Security Feature 76 (Table 7-2) Mapping of hardware to TOE Security SFRs 78 (Table 7-2) Compatibility of Assurance Requirements 81 (Table 7-3) Mapping of hardware to TOE security objectives including those of the environment (only those that can be mapped directly are shown) 84 - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) [Figure 1-1] TOE Physical/Logical Boundaries 8 - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 1 - 1. ST Introduction 1.1. ST Reference Title Security Target Date 2025.09.22 Version 1.1 Assurance Level EAL4+ (ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3) Protection Profile BSI-PP-0055, version 1.10, 25th March 2009 [BACPassPP] Evaluation Criteria - Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation CC:2022 R1 - Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1), Version 1.1, Editor(s) KOMSCO Keywords MRTD, e-Passport, BAC, AA 1.2. TOE Reference TOE name · KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 - BAC and AA on S3D384E - K5.1.01.SS.D38E.02(S3D384E) TOE version Version 5.1 TOE developer KOMSCO TOE component - IC chip : Samsung S3D384E Family[HWCR] (ANSSI-CC-2024/02-R01) • including the IC Dedicated Crypto Library S/W - IC Embedded Software(OS) : KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 - BAC and AA - The guidance documentation • EPS-05-QT-OPE-BAC-2.2 • EPS-05-QT-PRE-BAC-2.3 1 The TOE identification is provided by the Card Production Life Cycle Data (CPLCD) of the TOE, located in OTP and in Flash. These data are available by executing a dedicated command. 2 This identification data is described in the TOE guidance documentation. A more detailed explanation is described in the preparation guide(AGD-PRE) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 2 - 1.3. TOE Overview 3 The TOE is the native chip operating system(COS), MRTD application and MRTD application data implemented on the IC chip and additionally includes S3D384E version 2, which is a contactless IC chip of Samsung Electronics and is certified according to CC EAL 6+(ANSSI-CC-2024/02-R01). 4 According to the Technical Guideline [EAC-TR] and [ICAO 9303], the ePassport Application supports Passive Authentication, Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), Terminal and Chip Authentication(EAC), Active Authentication(AA) and also Basic Access Control (BAC). 5 In this Security Target, only BAC and AA are considered for evaluation. 6 the TOE also carries out the PAC (Personalization Access Control), which is a security mechanism for the secure personalization and management on the personalization phase at the Personalization Agent. 7 The main objectives of this ST are: - To introduce TOE and the MRTD application, - To define the scope of the TOE and its security features, - To describe the security environment of the TOE, including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment during the product development, production and usage. - To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its environment supporting in terms of integrity and confidentiality of application data and programs and of protection of the TOE. - To specify the security requirements which includes the TOE security functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and TOE security functions. 8 The TOE uses generation of random numbers. TDES, AES, Retail MAC, CMAC, RSA and ECC supported by the MRTD chip. 9 Since The TOE is a composite evaluation product, it includes IC chip, COS, application programs, and etc. There is no non-TOE HW/FW/SW requested to perform TOE security attributes. Note, the RF antenna and the booklet are needed to represent a complete MRTD to ePassport holder, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 3 - 1.4. TOE Definition 10 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to [ICAO-9303]. In addition to [BACPassPP], the TOE supports the Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303]. The TOE comprises at least § the circuitry of the travel document’s chips(the integrated circuit, IC) § the IC Dedicated Software and the IC Dedicated Support Software § the IC Embedded Software(operating system), § the epassport application compliant with [ICAO-9303] § the associated guidance documentation 1.4.1. TOE usage and security features for operational 11 A State or Organization issues travel documents to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveller presents a travel document to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The travel document in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the travel document’s chip according to LDS in case of contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a valid travel document personalised for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the travel document. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine travel documents. The receiving State trusts a genuine travel document of an issuing State or Organization. For this security target the travel document is viewed as unit of 12 (i) the physical part of the travel document in form of paper and/or plastic and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel document holder (a) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the travel document surface, (b) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and (c) the printed portrait. 13 (ii) the logical travel document as data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as defined in [ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 4 - data of the travel document holder (a) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1), (b) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2), (c) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both (d) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and (e) the Document Security Object (SOD). 14 The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the travel document to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the travel document and their data. The physical part of the travel document and the travel document’s chip are identified by the Document Number. 15 The physical part of the travel document is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the travel document’s chip) and organizational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO-9303]. These security measures can include the binding of the travel document’s chip to the passport book. 16 The logical travel document is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the travel document’s chip. 17 The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control and Password Authenticated Connection Establishment to the logical travel document, Active Authentication of the travel document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in [ICAO-9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and Data Encryption are performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment. 18 This security target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control Mechanism. This security target addresses the Active Authentication but does not address the Extended Access Control. 19 The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the TOE. The inspection system (i) reads optically the travel document, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection system by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection system the travel document’ chip provides read access to the logical travel document by means of private communication (Secure Messaging) with this inspection system [ICAO-9303]. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 5 - 1.4.2. TOE Life Cycle 20 The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases. (With respect to the [PP-IC-0084], the TOE life-cycle the life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.) 21 Phase 1 “Development” (Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. (Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software(COS), the ePassport application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the ePassport application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the travel document manufacturer. 22 Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (Step3) The TOE integrated circuit is produced by the IC manufacturer conforming with KOMSCO requirements. The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC during the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer. If necessary, the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (FLASH) (Step4) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport book. (Step5) The MRTD manufacturer (i) Initializes the MRTD application and (ii) equips MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data. The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier are securely delivered from the MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 6 - 23 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” (Step6) The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the MRTD, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use. 24 Phase 4 “Operational Use” (Step7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified. 25 Application note 1 : In this ST, the role of the Personalization Agents is strictly limited to the phase 3 Personalization. In the phase 4 Operational Use updating and addition of the data groups of the MRTD application is forbidden. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 7 - Actors 26 The TOE is a composite evaluation product. For this reason, the evaluation of from (Step 1) to (Step 3) coverd by ALC assurance. And then, the process of delivery between ePassport/Inlay manufacturer, Personalization agent and ePassport holder is not included in the scope of this evaluation. 1.4.3. TOE Physical Boundaries 27 The physical TOE is the following: ￭ the integrated circuit chip S3D384E(microcontoller) programmed with the operating system and with the ICAO application. The components of chip are CPU, Crypto Co-Processor, I/O, Memory(RAM, FLASH), and various H/W functions. In IC Chip’s flash area, after e-passport application is installed, flash area is changed locked state.(Lock NVM attribute). And also, e-passport data like biometric data (face, fingerprint) and TSF data(keys for authentication such as PAC private key, BAC key and AA private key) are saved in the flash area. Actors Identification Integrated Circuit (IC) Developer Samsung Embedded Software Developer KOMSCO Integrated Circuit (IC) Manufacturer Samsung COB Manufacturer Linxens or INESA Code Image Downloader KOMSCO or Samsung Pre-personalizer KOMSCO or Samsung MRTD manufacturer KOMSCO or another printer Personalization Agent The agent who is acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization and personalize the MRTD for the holder by activities establishing the identity of the holder with biographic data. MRTD Holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalizes the MRTD. (Table 1-1) Identification of the actors - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 8 - IC CHIP S3D384E Samsung S3D384E Family which is the composition element of he IC chip, is a product certified with CCRA EAL 6+ assurance level, and the composition elements included in the authentication are IC chip hardware and cryptogaphic calculation software library as shown in the following. (Table 1-1) TOE Components Identification Classification Identification information Delivery form/method TOE IC Chip + COS + Application · KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 - BAC and AA on S3D384E - K5.1.01.SS.D38E.02(S3D384E) IC Chip (COB Format)/by a person - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 9 - 1.4.4. TOE Logical Boundaries 28 KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA operating system manages all the resources of the integrated circuit that equips the passport, providing secure access to data and functions. Major tasks performed by operating system are: • Communication with external devices(Inspection System and Personalization Agent) • Data storage in the file system and secure memory area • Dispatch and execution of commands • Cryptographic operation • Management of the security policies Logical area in Figure 1-1 shows an overview of the TOE architecture. • Crypto Operation : provides the cryptographic services(Triple-DES, AES, SHA, MAC, RSA, ECC etc.) • Authentication : loading of keys related to authentication and the function of authentication TOE Comp onents IC Chip (HW) S3D384E revision 2 wafer or module/ by a person IC Dedicated SW Secure Boot loader (S3D384E_Bootloader.hex) 0.2 DTRNG FRO M library (S3D384E_PTG2_DTRNG_library_v1.4.lib) ATP1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA Library (PKA_Lib_ATP1_v2.01.lib) Softcopy/PGP email COS+Applic ation (SW) KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA · FLASH image - KCOS51_384E.hex-1.2 ⇒ included certified crypto library of IC chip FLASH code/ PGP email DOC - AGD_OPE : EPS-05-QT-OPE-BAC-2.2 - AGD_PRE : EPS-05-QT-PRE-BAC-2.3 Softcopy or Book/ PGP email or a person - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 10 - such as PAC, BAC, AA • Card Management : sending and receiving of APDU, integrity checking, clearing of residual information and the function for preservation of TOE secure state • Memory Management : creating, selection, deleting of files and management of transaction • Secure Messaging : securemessaging for secure communication channel • User Data : All data(being not authentication data) stored in the context of the ePassport application of travel document as defined in [EAC-TR] and [ICAO-9303] such as EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 ~ EF.DG16 • TSF Data : Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE including the private authentication key such as PAC private key, BAC key and AA private key Security Mechanism 29 The TOE provides security features such as confidentiality, integrity, access control and authentication for e-Passport personalization data and TSF data security. These security features implemented as BAC security mechanism which defined [ICAO-9303] and PAC security mechanism for personalization. Also, The TOE consists of PA authentication and AA authentication features for detect e-Passport personalization data forgery through digital signature verification of SOD which is from TOE to verification system. < PAC(Personalization Access Control) > 30 The TOE provides the PAC security mechanism which consists of PAC mutual authentication and PAC session key generation used for access control of Personalization Agent in initialization phase and personalization phase. The PAC authentication is entity authentication protocol based on TDES/AES to authenticate between Personalization Agent and TOE in personalization phase. The PAC authentication uses TDES/AES algorithm. However, according to Application note 31 at [BACPassPP], it does not include 2-KEY based TDES algorithm for evaluation scope. The PAC session key generation feature is to make PAC session key(i.e. PAC session crypto key and PAC session MAC key) in order to create secure channel between TOE and Personalization Agent. The PAC session key generation is implemented by key derivation protocol based on TDES/AES. The way to create secure channel is similar to that of the BAC mechanism. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 11 - < BAC(Basic Access Control) > 31 Basic Access Control provides mutual authentication and session key establishment by means of a three-step challenge-response protocol, Key Establishment Mechanism using Triple DES [FIPS PUB 46-3] as block cipher. A cryptographic checksum according to [ISO_9797-1], MAC Algorithm 3, is calculated over and appended to the ciphertexts. The modes of operation described in [ICAO-9303] are used. Exchanged nonces must be 8 bytes long, exchanged keying material must be 16 bytes long. < PA(Passive Authentication) > 32 The integrity of data stored under the LDS is checked by means of the Passive Authentication mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303]. Passive Authentication consists of the following steps : 1. The inspection system reads the Document Security Object (SOD), which contains the Document Signer Certificate from the IC. 2. The inspection system builds and validates a certification path from a Trust Anchor to the Document Signer Certificate used to sign the Document Security Object (SOD). 3. The inspection system uses the verified Document Signer Public Key to verify the signature of the Document Security Object (SOD). 4. The inspection system reads relevant data groups from the IC. 5. The inspection system ensures that the contents of the data groups are authentic and unchanged by hashing the contents and comparing the result with the corresponding hash value in the Document Security Object (SOD). < AA(Active Authentication) > 33 Active Authentication authenticates the IC by signing a challenge sent by the inspection system with a private key known only to the IC[ICAO-9303]. For this purpose, the IC contains its own Active Authentication key pair. A hash representation of Data Group 15 (public key info) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD), and is therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding private key is stored in the IC secure memory. By authenticating the Document Security Object (SOD) and Data Group 15 by means of Passive Authentication in combination with Active Authentication, the inspection system verifies that the Document Security Object (SOD) has been read from a genuine IC. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 12 - Additional Security Features 34 The TOE provides crypto operation, identification, authentication and access control through the PAC and BAC secure mechanism. The TOE manages the function such as initialization, Pre-personalization, personalization and managing TSF such as data crypto key for security mechanism and certifications. Also, The TOE manages the security role such as Manufacturer, Personalization Agent, Terminal. The TOE performs self test and provides integrity check way to ensure secure operation. While in operation, The TOE operates countermeasure from DPA/SPA technique which is extracting crypto information by analysing the physical phenomenon(such as current, voltage, electro-magnetic). Also, it provides protection countermeasure from physical invasion when case of failure. IC Chip Providing Features 35 IC chip is composed of a processing unit, security components, contactless and contact based I/O ports. IC chip also includes any IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software as long as it physically exists in the smartcard integrated circuit after being delivered by the IC Manufacturer. Such software (also known as IC firmware) is used for testing purpose during the manufacturing process but also provides additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services, including optional public key cryptographic libraries, a random number generation library and an random number generator. The public key cryptographic libraries further include the functionality of hash computation. IC chip also supports the feature : • Security Security sensors, detectors or filters • Shields • Life time detector • Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure topology • Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 13 - (Table 1-2) The main feature of IC chip and usage in TOE The feature of IC chip usage in TOE Security ㆍTDES ○ ㆍAES ○ ㆍRSA ㆍECC ○ ㆍSHA-2 ○ ㆍRNG ○(DTRNG) ㆍAbnormal condition detectors ○ ㆍMPU ○ ㆍMEMORY ENCRYPTION ○ ㆍRandom Branch Insertion(RBI) ○ ㆍVariable Clock ○ Communication ㆍISO7816 contact interface X ㆍISO14443 contactless interface ○ - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 14 - 2. Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1) 2.1. CC Conformance Claim 36 This Security Target claims conformance to Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation [CC], • Part 1: Introduction and general model, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-001, • Part 2: Security functional components, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-002, • Part 3: Security assurance components, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-003 • Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-004 • Part 5: Pre-defined package of security requirements, November 2022, CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-005 • Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1), CCMB-2024-07-002 Version 1.1, July 2024 as follows: • Part 2 extended. • Part 3 conformant. 37 The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology CEM:2022 R1, CCMB-2022-11-006 ([CC]) has to be taken into account. The evaluation follows the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) with current final interpretations. . 2.2. PP Claim 38 This ST claims strict conformance to ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Read-able Travel Document with ICAO Application” Basic Access Control’, Version 1.10, BSI-CC-PP-0055 issued by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) [BACPassPP]. 39 Application note 2 : The IC chip, which is a component of the TOE, complies with the Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0 (BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014). Refer to ST[HWST] of the IC chip for rationale of conformance to this PP. 2.3. Package Claim 40 The evaluation of the TOE is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC evaluation provided by [HWCR]. The IC hardware platform and its primary embedded software - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 15 - are evaluated at level EAL 6+. 41 This ST is conforming to the following assurance package. CC Package Claim Claim State Part 5 EAL : EAL4+ (ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3, ALC_DVS.2) package-augmented COMP : ASE_COMP,1, ADV_COMP.1, ALC_COMP.1, ATE_COMP.1, AVA_COMP.1 package-conformant STA : STA-STD package-conformant 2.4. Conformance rationale 42 Since this ST is not claiming conformance to any other protection profile, and the PP [BACPassPP] is not claiming conformance to another PP, no rationale is necessary here. 2.5. Conformance Statement 43 This ST strictly conforms to [BACPassPP]. 44 However, in this ST, the contents related to AA and PAC the are added as follows - P.Active_Auth : Added AA related contents Justification : OSP in ST is inclusion set of OSP in PP - OT.Active_Auth_Proof : Added contents related to AA Justification : The TOE security objectives in ST is inclusion set of The TOE security objectives in PP - OE.Active_Auth_Key_travel-document : Added contents related to AA Justification : Considered allowed exception, because these operating environment does not cover related threat and secure policies. - Security Functional Requirements : Added SFR related PAC, AA secure mechanism Justification : ST complies with all of SFR in PP - Security Assurance Requirements : EAL4+ (ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3) Justification : ST complies with all of SAR(EAL4+(ALC_DVS.2) in PP 45 The following extended components in the CC 3.1-based [BACPassPP] have been replaced by CC :2022 Part 2 components: - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 16 - 46 - FCS_RND.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMSEC.1 Justification: According to 「Transition Policy to CC:2022 and CEM:2022」, conflicts that arise when a CC :2022-based Security Target declares conformance to a CC v3.1 Protection Profile may be resolved by replacing CC 3.1 extended components with their CC :2022 counterparts. 47 In the CC 3.1-based [BACPassPP], the following component has been replaced with the revised CC :2022 Part 2 component - FCS_CKM.4 -> FCS_CKM.6 Justification: This replacement is performed in accordance with the Transition Policy to CC:2022 and CEM:2022, which provides guidance for resolving conflicts that arise when a CC-:2022–based Security Target declares conformance to a CC v3.1 Protection Profile. Extended components [CC Part 2] Replaceable functional components Justification: FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation FCS_RNG.1 is equivalent to the extended component FCS_RND.1, since it requires that random numbers satisfy a defined quality metric. FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1 is equivalent to the extended component FMT_LIM.1, as it requires that the TSF be constructed to provide only those capabilities (performing actions, gathering information) necessary for its genuine purpose. FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability FMT_LIM.2 is equivalent to the extended component FMT_LIM.1, as it requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions. FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1 Emanation of TSF and User data FPT_EMS.1 is equivalent to the extended component FPT_EMSEC.1, as it addresses requirements related to information leakage via emanation. Existing components [CC Part 2] Justification: - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 17 - Replaceable functional components FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.6 In CC:2022, it has been replaced by the requirement for cryptographic key deletion, FCS_CKM.6. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 18 - 3. Security Problem Definition 3.1. Introduction 3.1.1. Assets 48 The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’ chip. Logical MRTD Data 49 The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16(with dierent security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [ICAO-9303]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the Inspection System for the Chip Authentication and the Active Authentication Public Key (EF.DG15) for Active Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD. Due to interoperability reasons the ’ICAODoc 9303’[ICAO_9303] specifies only the BAC mechanisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack potential granting access to • LogicalMRTD standardUser Data (i.e. Personal Data) of theMRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) • Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14 • Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15 • Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD • Common data in EF.COM 50 A sensitive asset is the following more general one. Authenticity of the MRTD’ chip 51 The authenticity of the MRTD’ chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove this possession of a genuine MRTD. 3.1.2. Subjects 52 This protection profile considers the following subjects: Manufacturer 53 The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 19 - Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. Personalization Agent 54 The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO-9303]. Terminal 55 A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface. Inspection system (IS) 56 A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates. MRTD Holder 57 The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 20 - Traveler 58 Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder. Attacker 59 A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD. Application note 3 : An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE. 3.1.3. Assumptions 60 The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used. A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6 61 It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use). A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6 62 Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives: - Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage. - Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage. - Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill. A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip 63 The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 21 - (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms. A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability 64 The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD. A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys 65 The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential. 66 Application note 4 : When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy potential dependencies between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have to be considered and taken into account. E.g. there might be a direct dependency between the Document Number when chosen consecutively and the issuing date. 3.2. Threats 67 This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE. The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 22 - T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip 68 Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance Asset: Anonymity of user, T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD 69 Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system 70 Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip 71 Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 23 - automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data 72 The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below. T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality 73 Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase “Operational Use” in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip 74 Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis). - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 24 - Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering 75 Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress 76 Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 25 - an attacker needs information about the functional operation. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF 3.3. Organizational Security Policies 77 The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see CC part 1, sec. 3.2). P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip 78 The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key. P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only 79 The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only. P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy 80 The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [ICAO-9303]. P.Active_Auth Active Authentication 81 The TOE implements the active authentication protocol as described in [ICAO-9303]. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 26 - 4. Security Objectives 82 This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 83 This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE. 84 OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according to LDS [ICAO-9303] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added. 85 Application note 5 : The OT.AC_Pers implies that (1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization, (2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional. 86 OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data. 87 OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 27 - authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System. 88 Application note 6 : The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by presenting the MRTD. The MRTD’s chip shall provide read access to these data for terminals successfully authenticated by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys. The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the security function Basic Access Control Authentication. The Document Basic Access Keys are derived from the MRZ data defined by the TOE environment and are loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Therefore the sufficient quality of these keys has to result from the MRZ data’s entropy. Any attack based on decision of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] that the inspection system derives Document Basic Access is ensured by OE.BAC-Keys. Note that the authorization for reading the biometric data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after successful Enhanced Access Control not covered by this security target. Thus the read access must be prevented even in case of a successful BAC Authentication. 89 OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent. 90 Application note 7 : The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to support the life cycle security in the manufacturing and personalization phases. The IC Identification Data are used for TOE identification in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and for traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE from Phase 2 “Manufacturing” into the Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE manufacturing. In the Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 28 - identified by the Document Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN) or MRTD identifier through the contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection System or as Personalization Agent. 91 OT.Active_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by AA The TOE must support the Basic Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. 92 The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip independent of the TOE environment. 93 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded ICEmbedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here. 94 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip • by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and • by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or • by a physical manipulation of the TOE. 95 Application note 8 : This security objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 29 - Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here. 96 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of • measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or • measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis) • manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as • controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) with a prior • reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. 97 OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature. 98 Application note 9 : A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interactionwith elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internals. 4.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Issuing State or Organization 99 The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. 100 OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6. During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 30 - 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data. 101 OE.MRTD_Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives - identification of the element under delivery, - meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment), - physical protection to prevent external damage, - secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s), - traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters: • origin and shipment details, • reception, reception acknowledgement, • location material/information. Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process. Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations. 102 OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data. 103 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 31 - Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [ICAO-9303]. 104 OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential. Receving State or Organization 105 The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the environment. 106 OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303]. 107 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 32 - traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems. 108 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems). 109 OE.Active_Auth_Key_travel-document travel-document Active Authentication key 1 The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the travel-document’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organizations to verify the authenticity of the travel-document’s chip used for genuine travel-document by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 33 - 4.3. Security Objective Rationale 110 The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage OT 。 AC_Pers OT 。 Data_Int OT 。 Data_Conf OT 。 Identification OT 。 Activ_Auth_Proof OT 。 Prot_Abuse-Func OT 。 Prot_Inf_Leak OT 。 Prot_Phys-Tamper OT 。 Prot_Malfunction OE 。 MRTD_Manufact OE 。 MRTD_Delivery OE 。 Personalization OE 。 Pass_Auth_Sign OE 。 BAC-Keys OE 。 Exam_MRTD OE 。 Passive_Auth_Verif t OE 。 Prot_Logical_MRTD O E 。 A c t i v e A u t h K e y T ra v e l D o c u m e n t T.Chip_ID X X T.Skimming X X T.Eavesdropping X X T.Forgery X X X X X X T.Abuse-Func X X T.Information_Leakage X T.Phys-Tamper X T.Malfunction X P.Manufact X P.Personalization X X X P.Personal_Data X X P.Active_Auth X X A.MRTD_Manufact X A.MRTD_Delivery X A.Pers_Agent X A.Insp_Sys X X A.BAC-Keys X 111 The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification. 112 The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 34 - according to OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent. 113 The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic Access and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the protection of the confidentiality. 114 In addition, the OSP P.Active_Auth is countered by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authenticity by AA” using an authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Active Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document “the travel document Authentication Key”. 115 The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective OT.Identification by Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys. 116 The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system” address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys. 117 The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 35 - access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”. 118 The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported by the security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE. 119 The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”. 120 The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps. The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 36 - 121 The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data. 122 The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling. 123 The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing State or Organization. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 37 - 5. Extended Components Definition 124 This ST uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components are defined in protection profile [PP-IC-0084]; others are defined in the protection profile [BACPassPP]. 5.1. Definition of the family FAU_SAS 1 To describe the security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FAU_SAS of the class FAU (Security audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records. The family ‘Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)’ is specified as follows: FAU_SAS Audit data storage Family behaviour: This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data. Component leveling: FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1 FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data Management There are no management activities foreseen. Audit There are no actions defined to be auditable FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No Dependencies. FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records. (Table 5-1) Family FAU_SAS - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 38 - 6. Security Requirements 125 The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in section 8.1 of Part 1 of the Common Criteria [CC]. Each of these operations is used in this ST. 126 The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in bold text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed. 127 The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP author are denoted as underlined text. and the original text of the compnent is given by a footnot. Selections to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that a selection is to be made, [selection:], and underlined text with “<” like . 128 The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that an assignment is to be made [assignment:], and are italicized. In some cases the assignment made by the PP authors defines a selection to be performed by the ST author. Thus this text is underlined and italicized with “<” like . 129 The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier. 130 The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Basic Inspection System” and “Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1. Note, that all these subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined in section 8. The operations “write”, “read”, “modify”, and “disable read access” are used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations “transmit”, “receive” and “authenticate” are originally taken from [CC]. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 39 - Security attribute Values Meaning Terminal authentication status None (any Terminal) Default role (i.e. without authorisation after start-up) Basic Inspection System Terminal is authenticated as Basic Inspection System after s uccessful Authentication in accordance with the definition in rule 2 of FIA_UAU.5.2. Personalization Agent Terminal is authenticated as Personalization Agent after succ essful Authentication in accordance with the definition in rul e 1 of FIA_UAU.5.2. (Table 6-1) Definition of security attributes 6.1. Security Functional Requirements for the TOE 131 This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the main security functionality. 6.1.1. Class FAU Security Audit 132 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (CC part 2 extended). FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage 133 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies 134 Application note 10 : The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the life cycle phase ‘manufacturing’. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD ma-nufacturer in the Manufacturer role write the Initialization and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF-data into the TOE. The audit records are usually write-only-once data of the MRTD (see 1) [assignment: authorized users] 2) [assignment: list of audit information] FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer1) with the capability to store the IC Identification Data2) in the audit records. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 40 - FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS). 6.1.2. Class FCS Cryptographic Support 135 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (CC part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE. FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation - Generation of Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE 136 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [ FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: [FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation, or FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers] FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction 137 Application note 11 : The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated and downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol described in [ICAO_9303] produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in [ICAO_9303]. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as required by FCS_RNG.1. FCS_CKM.1/PAC Cryptographic key generation – Generation of PAC session keys 138 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or 3) [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] 4) [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 5) [assignment: list of standards] FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm3) and specified cryptographic key sizes: 112 bits4) that meet the following: [ICAO-9303] Part-11 Section 9.75) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 41 - FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: [FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation, or FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers] FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction 139 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation] 140 Application note 12 : The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging. 6) [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] 7) [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 8) [assignment: list of standards] 9) [assignment: list of cryptographic keys (including keying material)] 10) [selection: no longer needed, [assignment: other circumstances for key or keying material destruction]]. 11) [assignment: list of standards] FCS_CKM.1.1/PAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm : 6) and specified cryptographic key sizes: <112 ,128>7), that meet the following: <[ICAO-9303] Part-11 Section 9.7>8) FCS_CKM.6.1 The TSF shall destroy 9) when 10). FCS_CKM.6.2 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by FCS_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method that meets the following: 11) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 42 - 141 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below (CC part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE. FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD 142 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation] FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction 143 Application note 13 : This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (see also FIA_UAU.4) according to [ICAO-9303], as well as the hash function SHA-256 for the Personalization Agent Authentication Mechanism. FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption/Decryption Triple-DES 144 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation] FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction 12) [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 13) [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 14) [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 15) [assignment: list of standards] FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing12) in accordance with a specific cryptographic algorithm: 13) and specified cryptographic key sizesd: none14), that meet the following: 15), - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 43 - 145 Application note 14 : This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4. FCS_COP.1/PAC Cryptographic operation – Symmetric encryption/decryption and MAC during Personalization 146 Hierarchical to : No other components. Dependencies : [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation] FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction (Table 6-2) Algorithms and key sizes for PAC 17) [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 18) [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 19) [assignment: list of standards] 20) [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 21) [selection: AES, 3DES] in CBC mode 22) [selection: 112, 128] 23) [assignment: list of standards] FCS_COP.1.1/ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption and decryption16) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode17) and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit18) that meet the following: [FIPS46-3] and [ICAO-9303], Part-11 Section 9.719). FCS_COP.1.1/PAC The TSF shall perform 20) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm <3-DES, AES>21) and cryptographic key sizes <112, 128 bit>22) that meet the following :
23) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 44 - Algorithm Key size List of standards TDES encryption and decryption 112 bits [SP 800-67] AES encryption and decryption 128 bits [FIPS 197] TDES Retail MAC 112 bits [ISO 9797] AES CMAC 128 bits [NIST-SP800-38B] FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication 147 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation] FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction 148 Application note 15 : This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric authentication mechanism (cf. FIA_UAU.4). FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC 149 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation] 24) [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 25) [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 26) [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 27) [assignment: list of standards] FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption and decryption24) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm 25) and cryptographic key sizes <112 bit for Triple-DES and 128 bit for AES>26) that meet the following: <[FIPS 46-3] and [FIPS 197]>27) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 45 - FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction 150 Application note 16 : This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4. FCS_COP.1/AA_SIGN Cryptographic operation – Active Autentication 151 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation] FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction 152 Application note 17 : This SFR has been added by the ST author to specify the cryptographic algorithm and key sizes used by the TOE to perform an Active Authentication in accordance with [ICAO9303-11]. 28) [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 29) [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 30) [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 31) [assignment: list of standards] FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code28) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC and CMAC29) and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit for Retail MAC and 128 bit for CMAC30) that meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2) and [NIST_SP800-38B]31). FCS_COP.1.1/ AA_SIGN The TSF shall perform in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key sizes <2048 bit for RSA and 192, 224, 256, 384, 512 bit for ECDSA> that meet the following: <[ISO9796-2] and [ECC-TR]>. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 46 - FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation 153 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. 154 Application note 18 : This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4. 32) [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic] 33) [assignment: list of security capabilities]. 34) [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]] 35) [assignment: a defined quality metric]. FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a 32) random number generator that implements: <(PTG.2.1) A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output. (PTG.2.2) If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source (PTG.2.3) The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected. (PTG.2.4) The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random numbers soon. (PTG.2.5) The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is triggered at regular intervals or continuously. The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time>33) FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide >34) that meet 35) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 47 - 6.1.3. Class FIA Identification and Authentication 155 The following Table provides an overview of the authentication mechanisms used. Mechanism SFR for the TOE Algorithms and key sizes according to [ICAO-9303], and [EACTR] Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.6 Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/ENC) and Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/MAC) Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for Personalization Agents FIA_UAU.4 either Triple-DES with 112 bit keys or AES with 128 up to 256 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/AUTH) Active Authentication Protocol FIA_API.1/AA and FIA_UAU.4 ECDSA, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, and 512 bitsand RSA CRT, 2048 bits (Table 6-3) Overview of authentication SFRs FIA_AFL.1/PAC Authentication failure handling in Pesonalization 156 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_AFL.1/BAC Authentication failure handling in BAC authenticaion 157 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication 36)[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] 37) [assignment: list of authentication events] 38) [selection: met or surpassed] 39) [assignment: list of actions] FIA_AFL.1.1/PAC The TSF shall detect when <5>36) unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to 37). FIA_AFL.1.2/PAC When the defined number of consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts has been 38), the TSF shall 39). FIA_AFL.1.1/BAC The TSF shall detect when <2>40) unsuccessful authentication attempt occurs related to 41). - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 48 - 158 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below (CC part 2). FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 159 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. 160 Application note 19 : The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the initialization data and/or pre-personalization data in the audit records of the IC during the phase 2 “Manufacturing” The audit records can be written only in the phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE” At this time the Manufacturer is the only user role available for the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer creates the user role Personalization Agent for transition from phase 2 to phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” The users in role Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication key. Aer personalization in the phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ and the Document Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection System is created by writing the Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is identified as default user after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System. 161 Application note 20 : In the “Operational use” phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to 40) [assignment: positive integer number] 41) [assignment: list of authentication events] 42) [assignment: met or surpassed] 43) [assignment: list of actions] 44) [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] FIA_AFL.1.2/BAC When the defined number of consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts has been 42), the TSF shall 43). FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”, 2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”, 3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”44) on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 49 - read the ICCSN, the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification before the user is authenticated as Basic Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the terminal and the MRTD’ chip use a randomly chosen identifier for the communication channel to allow the terminal to communicate with more then one RFID. This identifier will not violate the OT.Identification. 162 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below (CC part 2). FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication 163 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 164 Application note 21 : The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent authenticate themselves. 165 The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (CC part 2). FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE 166 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. 45) [assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)] FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism 2. Authentication Mechanism based on 45) FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”, 2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”, 3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use” on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 50 - 167 Application note 22 : The authentication mechanisms use a challenge freshly and randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication attempt. 168 Application note 23 : The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303]. In the first step the terminal authenticates itself to the MRTD’ chip and the MRTD’ chip authenticates to the terminal in the second step. In this second step the MRTD’ chip provides the terminal with a challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD’ chip with some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys. Therefore the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is not successfully authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfill the security objective OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip_ID. 169 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (CC part 2). FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms 170 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. 171 Application note 24 : In case the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable 46) [assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms] 47) [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication] FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide 1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism 2. Authentication Mechanism based on 46) to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following rules: 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the following mechanisms 2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys47) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 51 - Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control’ [EACPassPP] should also be fulfilled the Personalization Agent should not be authenticated by using the BAC or the symmetric authentication mechanism as they base on the two-key Triple-DES. The Personalization Agent could be authenticated by using the symmetric AES-based authentication mechanism or other (e.g. the Terminal Authentication Protocol using the Personalization Key, cf. [EACPassPP] FIA_UAU.5.2). 172 Application note 25 : The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system. The Personalization Agent may use Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as well if the personalization environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System may use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. 173 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below (CC part 2) FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE 174 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. 175 Application note 26 : The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [ICAO-9303] includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands received from the previously authenticated BAC user. 48) [assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required] FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism48). - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 52 - 176 Application note 27: Note that in case the TOE should also fulfill [EACPassPP] the BAC communication might be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing a new secure messaging that is distinct from the BAC based communication. In this case the condition in FIA_UAU.6 above should not contradict to the option that commands are sent to the TOE that are no longer meeting the BAC communication but are protected by a more secure communication channel established after a more advanced authentication process. 177 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified below (CC part 2 extended). FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity - Active Authentication 178 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. 179 Application note 28 : This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Active Authentication Mechanism specified in [ICAO-9303]. The terminal generate a challenge then verifies whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to sign it properly using its Active Authentication private key corrensponding to the Active Authentication public key (EF.DG.15) 6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection 180 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria part 2). FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control - Basic Access Control 181 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 49) [assignment: authentication mechanism] 50) [assignment: authorized user or rule] 51) [assignment: list of properties] FIA_API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a to prove the identity of the by including the following properties to an external entity. FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP52) on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 53 - 182 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (CC part 2). FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 183 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization 52) [assignment: access control SFP] 53) [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes] EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD53) FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following: 1. Subjects: a. Personalization Agent, b. Basic Inspection System, c. Terminal, 2. Objects: a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, b. data in EF.COM, c. data in EF.SOD, 3. Security attributes: a. authentication status of terminals54). FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, 2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD55). FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 54 - 184 Application note 29 : The inspection system needs special authentication and authorization for read access to DG3 and DG4 defined in [EACPassPP]. 185 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below (CC part 2). FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD 186 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] 54) [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes] 55) [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects] 56) [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] 57) [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] 58) [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] 59) [selection: transmit, receive] 60) [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay] 61) [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay] the following additional rules: none56) FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: 1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. 2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. 3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.57). FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP58) to be able to transmit and receive59) user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay60) errors FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay61) has occurred. - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 55 - 187 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD 188 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] 6.1.4. Class FMT Security Management 189 The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the management of the TSF data. 190 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (CC part 2). FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 191 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No Dependencies 192 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below (CC 62) [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] 63) [selection: transmit, receive] 64) [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF] FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: 1. Initialization, 2. Pre-Personalization, 3. Personalization64) FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP62) to be able to transmit and receive63) user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 56 - part 2). FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 193 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification. 194 Application note 30 : The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life-cycle phases. 195 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below(CC part 2 extended). FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities 196 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability. 6.1.6.4 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability 197 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below (CC part 2 extended). 65) [assignment: the authorized identified roles] FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles: 1. Manufacturer, 2. Personalization Agent, 3. Basic Inspection System65) FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow 1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, 3. software to be reconstructed, 4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 57 - FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability 198 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities 199 Application note 31 : The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy. Note that the term “software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software. 200 Application note 32 : the following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below. 201 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified below (CC part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF data. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data 202 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow 1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, 3. software to be reconstructed, 4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks FMT_MTD.1.1/ The TSF shall restrict the ability to write66) the Initialization Data and - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 58 - 203 Application note 33 : The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric ryptographic Personalization Agent Key. FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disable of Read Access to Initialisation Data and Pre-personalization Data 204 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 205 Application note 34 : According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Prepersonalization Data by (i) allowing to write these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2. The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides a unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3 “personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization Data. FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write 206 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 66) [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] 67) [assignment: list of TSF data] 68) [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 69) [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] 70) [assignment: list of TSF data] 71) [assignment: the authorised identified roles] INI_ENA Pre-personalization Data67) to the Manufacturer68). FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to69) the Initialization Data70) to the Personalization Agent71) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 59 - FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read 207 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read75) the 1. Document Basic Access Keys 2. Personalization Agent Keys76) 3. Active Authentication Private Key to none77) 208 Application note 35 : The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the correctness of the Document Basic Access Keys. FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key 209 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MTD.1/PAC_KEY Management of TSF data – Updating of PAC Key 210 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: 72) [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] 73) [assignment: list of TSF data] 74) [assignment: the authorized identified roles] 75) [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] 76) [assignment: list of TSF data] 77) [assignment: the authorized identified roles] 78) [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] 79) [assignment: list of TSF data] 80) [assignment: the authorised identified roles] FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_ WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write72) the Document Basic Access Keys73) to the Personalization Agent74) FMT_MTD.1.1/ AAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to <>78) the 79) to the 80) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 60 - FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 6.1.5. Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions 211 The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSFdata.The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE security functionality. 212 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below (CC part 2 extended): FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation 213 Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies. 81) [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] 82) [assignment: list of TSF data] 83) [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 84) [assignment: list of types of user data] FPT_EMS.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that the TOE does not emit emissions over its attack surface in such amount that these emissions enable access to TSF data and user data as specified in the below: FMT_MTD.1.1/PAC_KEY The TSF shall restrict the ability to 81) the 82) to the 83) - Public - Security Target Copyright Ⓒ 2025 KOMSCO. All rights reserved EPS-05-AN-ST-BAC(Lite) - 61 - 214 Application note 36: The TOE prevents attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card. The travel document’s chip can provide a smart card contactless interface, but may have also (not used by the terminal, but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contact according to ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in the power consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmissions. 215 The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information leakage including physical manipulation. 216 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below (CC part 2). FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state ID Emissions attack surface TSF data User data 1 [assignment: list of types of emissions] [assignment: list of types of attack surface] [assignment: list of types of TSF data] [assignment: list of types of user data]