KECS-CR-25-34
KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 - BAC and AA on
S3D384E
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-ISIS-1371-2025
2025. 9. 30.
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2025.09.30 -
Certification report for KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 -
BAC and AA on S3D384E
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for KCOS e-Passport Version
5.1 – BAC and AA on S3D384E of KOMSCO.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
5. Architectural Information .................................................................................. 11
6. Documentation...................................................................................................12
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................12
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................13
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................14
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................15
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................15
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................17
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................17
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................18
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................19
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................20
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................21
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................22
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................22
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................25
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL4+ evaluation of KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 - BAC and AA on
S3D384E with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1][3]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness
and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite product which is consisting of the
certified contactless integrated circuit chip(IC chip) and embedded software (IC chip
operating system(COS) and the application of machine readable travel
documents(MRTD application).
The TOE provides Basic Access Control (BAC) and Active Authentication (AA) defined
in the ICAO’s Machine Readable Travel Documents, DOC 9303, 7th edition [6], the
BSI’s Advanced Security Mechanisms Machine Readable Travel Documents and
eIDAS Token, Version 2.20 [7]. Supplemental Access Control (SAC) and Extended
Access Control (EAC) is also supported by the TOE, but this is not considered in the
scope of this evaluation due to the fact that SAC, EAC provides resistance against high
attack potential (i.e. AVA_VAN.5).
The TOE(KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on S3D384E) is composed of
the following components:
⚫ IC chip: S3D384E revision 2 provided by Samsung Electronics, see ANSSI-
CC-2024/02-R01, and
⚫ Embedded software: KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA provided by
KOMSCO.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on September 25, 2025. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [8] and the Security Target (ST)
[9][10].
The ST is based on the certified Protection Profile (PP) Machine Readable Travel
Document with ICAO Application and Basic Access Control Version 1.10 (“BAC PP”
hereinafter) [11]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only
upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented by ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
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ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3. Therefore, the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)
are based upon both functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined
component in the Extended Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE
satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2
extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities. For more details refer to the ST [9][10].
TOE Security Features Brief Summary
SF.PAC_AUTH Personalization Agent Authentication
SF.BAC_AUTH BAC Authentication
SF.ACTIVE_AUTH AA
SF.SEC_MESSAGE Secure Messaging
SF.ACC_CONTROL Access Control for Personalization Agent and IS,
Personalization and Management
SF.RELIABILITY TSF testing, protection against tempering and observation,
preservation of secure state, residual information protection
SF.IC IC chip security functionality
[Table 1] TOE Security Functionalities
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report Page 7
2. Identification
The TOE is composite product consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Identifier Release Delivery Form /
Method
HW/SW S3D384E Revision 2 IC Chip Module
(Note: The SW is
contained in
FLASH)/
By a person(HW),
PGP mail(SW)
ATP1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA Library V2.01
DTRNG FRO M library V1.4
Secure Boot loader V0.2
SW KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 - BAC
and AA
Rev 1
Document Operational User Guidance: EPS-05-
QT-OPE-BAC-2.2
V2.2 Softcopy or
Hardcopy /
By PGP mail or a
person
Preparative Procedures Guidance: EPS-
05-QT-PRE-BAC-2.3
V2.3
[Table 2] TOE identification
The TOE is composite product that should be considered in the Composite Product life
cycle. Composite product integrator performs Composite product integration(FLASH
code download into IC chip), preparation and shipping to the personalization for the
Composite product (Composite Product Integration). After Composite Product
Integration, the ePassport manufacturer (i.e., inlay and e-Cover manufacturer) embeds
the TOE into the passport booklet. Then, the Personalization Agency performs
personalization and testing stage where the User Data/TSF Data is loaded into the IC’s
memory.
The Personalization Agency can only access the TOE using the securely delivered
personalization key set. The personalization key set and the Guidance documents are
securely delivered (through PGP or directly from the SW developer to the
Personalization Agency).
Also, the certified IC chip which is a component of the TOE provides Contact interfaces
and Contactless interfaces, the Contact interfaces are not used by the TOE. Thus, the
Type A Contactless interface is used by the TOE.
For details on the IC chips, the IC dedicated software and the crypto libraries, see the
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documentation under ANSSI-CC-2024/02-R01 [12].
[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Guidelines
(Ministry of Science and ICT Guidance No. 2022-61,
October 31, 2022)
Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Regulation
(Ministry of Science and ICT·ITSCC, May 17, 2021)
TOE KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on S3D384E
- K5.1.01.SS.D38E.02(S3D384E)
⚫ K5.1: KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1
⚫ 01: Rev1
⚫ SS.D38E.02: IC chip identifier (Samsung S3D384E
Revision 2)
FLASH images: KCOS51_384E.hex-1.2
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-001 ~
CCMB-2022-11-005, November 2022
Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and
CEM:2022 (Release 1), Version 1.1, CCMB-2024-07-002,
July 2024
EAL EAL4+
(augmented by ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3)
Developer KOMSCO
Sponsor KOMSCO
Evaluation Facility Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
September 25, 2025
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
Certification Report Page 9
3. Security Policy
The ST [9][10] for the TOE claims strict conformance to the BAC PP [11] and the TOE
complies security policies defined in the PP [11] by security objectives and security
requirements based on the ICAO document [6], BSI specification [7]. Thus the TOE
provides security features BAC, AA.
Additionally, the TOE provides security features for Personalization Agent to protect
initialization data and application data (during pre-personalization and personalization
phase):
⚫ Personalization Agent authentication, ensures only authorized entity can
access to the TOE during pre-personalization and personalization phase
⚫ Secure messaging, ensures transmitted data to be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and modification during pre-personalization and
personalization phase.
Furthermore, the TOE is composite product based on the certified IC chip, the TOE
utilizes and therefore, provides some security features covered by the IC chip
certification such as Security sensors/detectors, Life time detector, Dedicated tamper-
resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure topology, Dedicated
hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks, Secure DES and AES Symmetric
Cryptography support, Secure TORNADO-T Prime coprocessor for the support of RSA
and ECC cryptographic operations, and One Hardware Digital True Random Number
Generator (DTRNG FRO M) that meets PTG.2 class of BSI-AIS31 (German scheme)
and some of ANSSI RGS requirements (French Scheme). For more details refer to the
Security Target Lite for the IC chip [13].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [9][10], chapter 3.1):
⚫ It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is
assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test
operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its
manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification,
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retention, theft or unauthorized use).
⚫ Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage
process and conformance to its objectives:
- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under
delivery and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of
improper operation in the delivery process and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery
have got the required skill.
⚫ The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with
respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip
Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the
Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The
Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The
Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to
authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
⚫ The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key
and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization,
and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [6]. The Basic
Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and
performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
⚫ The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by
the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic
strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [6], the Document Basic
Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual printed
MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to
withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to
derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic
attack potential.
Furthermore, some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not
covered by the TOE itself, thus these aspects are addressed by the TOE environment:
Examination of the physical part of the MRTD, MRTD holder Obligations, Issuing of the
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MRTD, Terminal operating, etc. Details can be found in the ST [9][10], chapter 3.2, 3.3
and 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 1] show the physical scope of the TOE. The TOE is the composite product
which is consisting of the certified contactless IC chip and the embedded software (i.e.,
COS and MRTD application).
[Figure 1] Scope of the TOE
⚫ IC chip provides security features such as Security sensors/detectors,
MPU(memory Protection Unit), Secure DES and AES Symmetric Cryptography
support, Secure coprocessor TONADO-T Prime for RSA and ECC
Cryptographic Support, and One Hardware Digital True Random Number
Generator (DTRNG FRO M).
⚫ COS, which processes commands and manages files according to ISO/IEC
7816-4, 8, and 9 [20], executes MRTD application and provides functions for
management of application data. The COS is contained in FLASH.
⚫ Application provides MRTD application(BAC and AA according to the ICAO
document [6]). It also provides additional security mechanisms for
personalization agent such as authentication and personalization of MRTD.
The Application is contained in FLASH.
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⚫ Application Data is consisting of User Data and TSF Data. The Application
Data is contained in FLASH.
For the detailed description is referred to the ST [9][10].
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on
S3D384E Operational User Guidance V2.2(EPS-05-
QT-OPE-BAC-2.2)
V2.2 Sep. 22, 2025
KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on
S3D384E Preparative Procedures Guidance
V2.3(EPS-05-QT-PRE-BAC-2.3)
V2.3 Sep. 22, 2025
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The Developer’s Testing was performed on the final TOE, consisting of the platform,
COS, and application.
Tests for the TOE are:
⚫ Standard and Security Mechanisms Test
◼ Layer 6~7 MRTD Application Protocol & Data Test (Security and Command
Test, Logical Data Structure Tests, etc.), which tests MRTD application
according to Standard Test Specifications (the ICAO Technical Report RF
Protocol and Application Test Standard, BSI TR-03105, etc.),
⚫ Operational Mode Test : Additional features test which are not defined in the
ICAO document [6], BSI specification [7] such as pre-personalization,
personalization and inspection, Positive and Negative Test for APDUs in each
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TOE life cycle(5 phases), life cycle state change, residual information removal,
etc.
⚫ Other Test: Layer 3~4 RF Protocol Activation and Transmission Test (anti-
collision test, etc.)
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSFI behaves
as described in the functional specification.
The developer tested both subsystems (including their interactions) and modules
(including their interfaces), and analyzed testing results according to the assurance
component ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests and conducted independent testing
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are
identical to the developer’s tests. The tests cover preparative procedures, according to
the guidance. Some tests were performed by design and source code analysis to verify
fulfillment of the requirements of the underlying platform to the COS and Application.
The implementation of the requirements of the platform’s ETR and guidance as well as
of the MRTD security mechanisms was verified by the evaluators.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. These test cases cover testing APDU commands, bypass, fault injection
attacks, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing enhanced-
basic attack potential were found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [8].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on S3D384E. The TOE is
composite product consisting of the following components:
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⚫ IC chips: S3D384E Revision 2 (ANSSI-CC-2024/02-R01)
⚫ Embedded software: KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA
The TOE is identified by the name, version and release number. The TOE identification
information is provided by the command-response APDU as follows:
⚫ Command APDU : 80FB000113
⚫ Part of Response APDU: D38E 4250 4248 4252 4257 4B53 5194 51 01 02
9000
◼ D38E: IC chip identifier (S3D384E)
◼ 4250: IC Manufacturer (Samsung)
◼ 4248: IC Date (YDDD, 2024. 9. 4)
◼ 4B53: OS ID (KCOS e-Passport)
◼ 5194: OS Date (YDDD, 2025. 7. 13)
◼ 51: OS Level (Version 5.1)
◼ 01: OS Release Level (Rev 1)
◼ 02: IC Chip Version (Revision 2)
◼ 9000: Response APDU Status Word
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 4] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [8] which references
Work Package Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1][3] and CEM [2][3], and CCRA
supporting documents for the Smartcard and similar device [15], [16], [17], [18], [22],
[23]. Also the evaluation facility utilized German scheme’s Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Class for EAL5+ and EAL6 [14] under confirmation of the CB.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL4 augmented by ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3.
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9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
The consistency of composite product ST and its related base component ST has been
confirmed. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_COMP.1
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the ST of the composite TOE does not contradict the
ST of the IC chip according to the CCRA supporting document Composite Product
Evaluation [15].
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer has used well-defined development tools (e.g. programming languages
Certification Report Page 16
or computer-aided design (CAD) systems) that yield consistent and predictable results,
and implementation standards have been applied. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_TAT.2.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws, development tools and related
information, and the evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in
accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.5.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Additionally,
sufficiency of the measures as applied is intended be justified. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
The correct version of the dependent component was installed on the correct version of
the base component. The delivery procedures of the base and dependent component
developers are compatible with the composite product integrator’s acceptance
procedures. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_COMP.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the embedded software is
installed onto/into the correct version of the underlying IC chip, and the delivery
procedures of IC chip and embedded software developers are compatible with the
acceptance procedure of the composite product integrator according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
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9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
modules and enough information about the SFR-non-interfering modules for the
evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented; as
such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation representation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.4.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the ST.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.5.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1. Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements
according to the CCRA supporting document ADV_ARC Evaluation [22], [23].
The implementation representation is sufficient to satisfy the functional requirements of
the ST and is a correct realisation of the low-level design. Therefore, the verdict PASS
is assigned to ADV_IMP.1.
The TSF internal is well-structured such that the likelihood of flaws is reduced and that
Certification Report Page 18
maintenance can be more readily performed without the introduction of flaws.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_INT.2.
The requirements for the dependent component imposed by the base component have
been confirmed to be met in the composite product. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ADV_COMP.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements on the embedded software,
imposed by the IC chip, are fulfilled in the composite product according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), an implementation description (a source code level
description), and TSF internals description (which describes evidence of the structure
of the design and implementation of the TSF). In addition, there is a security
architecture description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to
explain how its security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design
and the security architecture description. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
The composite product as a whole was confirmed to exhibit the necessary attributes to
Certification Report Page 19
satisfy the functional requirements of the composite ST. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COMP.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that composite product as a whole exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements of its ST according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing enhanced-basic attack potential in the
operational environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AVA_VAN.3.
The composite TOE as a whole was confirmed to be free of exploitable flaws or
vulnerabilities within its intended environment. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to AVA_COMP.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that there is no exploitability of flaws or weakness in the
composite TOE as a whole in the intended environment according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15],[16],[17],[18].
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don’t allow attackers possessing enhanced-basic attack potential to
violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 20
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ASE_COMP.1 ASE_COMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2 ALC_TAT.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2.2E PASS
ALC_CMS.5 ALC_CMS.5.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2 ALC_DVS.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_COMP.1 ALC_COMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_COMP.1.2E PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.4 ADV_TDS.4.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.4.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_FSP.5.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2 ADV_INT.2.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2.2E PASS
Certification Report Page 21
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ADV_COMP.1 ADV_COMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.3 ATE_DPT.3.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
ATE_COMP.1 ATE_COMP.1.1E PASS PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.3 AVA_VAN.3.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.3.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.3.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.3.4E PASS
AVA_COMP.1 AVA_COMP.1.1E PASS PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
⚫ The Guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and all security recommendations
have to be considered. All aspects of Assumptions, Threats and Organizational
Security Policies in the ST [9][10] not covered by the TOE itself need to be
fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
⚫ As the TOE supports S3D384E Revision 2 as the IC chip platform, it is
recommended to refer to the user’s manual provided along with the TOE and
check the identification information of the TOE.
⚫ When secure messaging is not applied during personalization phase according
to the policy of the Personalization Agent, it is strongly recommended that the
physical, procedural and personal security measures are in place in order to
Certification Report Page 22
ensure confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data during
personalization phase.
⚫ It has to be ensured that MRZ data which are used to derive BAC
authentication keys provides sufficient entropy to withstand related attacks.
⚫ The TOE supports both SAC and BAC to ensure global interoperability. Thus,
the Inspection System SHOULD use SAC instead of BAC.
⚫ Note that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack potential.
If nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip
Authentication before getting access to data (except EF.DG14), as this
mechanism is resistant to high potential attacks.
⚫ When accepting the TOE, it is recommended that the TOE user shall verify the
integrity of the Flash code and data according the user’s manual provided
along with the TOE.
11. Security Target
KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on S3D384E Security Target V2.3,
September 22, 2025 [9] is included in this report by reference. For the purpose of
publication, it is provided as sanitized version [10] according to the CCRA supporting
document ST sanitizing for publication [19].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
CC Common Criteria
DG Data Group
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IS Inspection System
BIS BAC/SAC supporting Inspection System
EIS EAC supporting Inspection System
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
Certification Report Page 23
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
AA
(Active Authentication)
The security mechanism with which the IC chip
demonstrates its genuine to the IS by signing random
number transmitted from the IS and the IS verifies
genuine of the IC chip through verification with the
signed values
Application Protocol
Data Unit (APDU)
Standard communication messaging protocol between a
card accepting device and a smart card. The structure of
the APDU is defined by ISO/IEC 7816-4
BAC
(Basic Access Control)
The security mechanism that implements the symmetric
key‐based entity authentication protocol for mutual
authentication of the MRTD chip and the IS (BIS) and
the symmetric key‐based key distribution protocol to
generate the session keys necessary in establishing the
secure messaging for the MRTD chip and the IS
DS (Document Signer)
Certificate
The certificate of the Personalization agent signed with
the digital signature generation key of the PA‐PKI root
CA used by the IS to verify the SOD of the PA security
mechanism
EAC (Extended Access
Control)
The security mechanisms consisted with the EAC‐CA for
chip authentication and the EAC‐TA for the IS
authentication in order to enable only the EAC
supporting Inspection System (EIS) to read the biometric
data of the ePassport holder for access control to the
biometric data of the ePassport holder stored in the
MRTD chip
ePassport The passport embedded the contactless IC chip in which
identity and other data of the ePassport holder stored in
accordance with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the International Standard
Certification Report Page 24
Organization (ISO)
IS
(Inspection System)
As an information system that implements optical MRZ
reading function and the security mechanisms (PA, BAC,
SAC, EAC and AA, etc.) to support the MRTD
inspection, the IS consists with a terminal that
establishes the RF communication with the IC chip and
the system that transmits commands to the IC chip
through this terminal and processes responses for the
commands
LDS
(Logical Data Structure)
Logical data structure defined in the ICAO document in
order to store the user data in the MRTD chip
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document, e.g. passport, visa
or official document of identity accepted for travel
purposes
MRTD Application Program for loaded in the MRTD chip that is
programmed by the LDS of the ICAO document and
provides security mechanisms of BAC, SAC, PA and
EAC, etc.
MRTD Chip The contactless IC chip that includes the MRTD
application and the IC chip operating system necessary
in operation of the MRTD application and that supports
communications protocol by ISO/IEC 14443
PA
(Passive Authentication)
The security mechanism to demonstrate that identity
data recorded in the MRTD has not been forgery and
corruption as the IS with the DS certificate verifies the
digital signature in the SOD and hash value of user data
in accordance with read‐right of the MRTD access
control policy
Personalization Agent The agent receives the ePassport identity data from the
Reception organization and generates the SOD by
digital signature on the data. After recording them in the
IC chip, the personalization agent generates TSF data
and stores it in the secure memory of the IC chip. The
agent also operates PA‐PKI and/ or EAC‐PKI
SAC
(Supplemental Access
The security mechanism is supplementary to BAC. The
SAC performs mutual authentication for the MRTD chip
Certification Report Page 25
Control) and the IS (BIS) to access control of user data of the
MRTD and establishes the secure messaging for the
MRTD chip and the IS
SOD
(Document Security Object)
The SOD refers to the ePassport user data recorded in
the Personalization phase by the Personalization agent
that is signed by the Personalization agent with the
digital signature generation key
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022
Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-001 ~ CCMB-2022-11-005, November 2022.
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
[2]
[3]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
CC:2022 Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-006, November 2022.
Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release
1), Version 1.1, CCMB-2024-07-002, July 2024
[4] Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Guidelines (Ministry of Science
and ICT Guidance No. 2022-61, October 31, 2022)
[5] Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Regulation (Ministry of Science
and ICT·ITSCC, May 17, 2021)
[6] Doc9303 Machine Readable Travel Documents Seventh Edition, International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2015
[7] Technical Guideline TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Version 2.20, Bundesamtfür
Sicherheitinder Informationstechnik (BSI), February 2015
[8] TTA-CCE-24-002 KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on S3D384E
Evaluation Technical Report V1.3, September 25, 2025
[9] KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on S3D384E Security Target
V2.3, September 22, 2025 (Confidential Version)
Certification Report Page 26
[10] KCOS e-Passport Version 5.1 – BAC and AA on S3D384E Security Target Lite
V1.1, September 22, 2025 (Sanitized Version)
[11] Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application
and Basic Access Control Version 1.10, BSI-CC-PP-0055, March 2009
[12] Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2024/02-R01 S3D384E/S3D352E/S3D300E/
S3D264E/S3D232E/S3K384E (S3D384E_20240730), December 18, 2024,
ANSSI
[13] Security Target Lite of S3D384E/S3D352E/S3D300E/S3D264E/S3D232E/
S3K384E Version 2.1, August 5, 2024
[14] Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 34, Version 3,
BSI, March 9, 2009
[15] Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices Version 1.6,
JIL, April 2024
[16] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards Version 3.2.1, JIL, February
2024
[17] The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits for CC:2022 Version 4.0, JIL, April
2024
[18] Minimum ITSEF Requirements for Security Evaluation of Smart cards and
similar devices Version 2.1, JIL, February 2022
[19] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[20] ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts
[21] ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards – Contactless ICCs - Proximity cards
[22] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices extended to Secure Sub-Systems in SoC, Version 2.1, JIL, July 2021
[23] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices extended to Secure Sub-Systems in SoC - Appendix 1, Version 2.1,
JIL, July 2021