BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009
for
SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13 HW a13 /
FW 03.17.0008.00
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-327 V4.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009
Trusted Platform Module
SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13 HW a13 / FW 03.17.0008.00
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Schutzprofil PC Client Specific Trusted Platform
Module TPM Family 1.2; Level 2; Version 1.1,
BSI-PP-0030-2008
Functionality: PP strict conformant;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1
AVA_VAN.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 November 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................21
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................21
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................21
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................22
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................23
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_VAN.4 and ALC_FLR.1 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13 HW a13 / FW 03.17.0008.00 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13 HW a13 / FW 03.17.0008.00
was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 14
October 2009. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009 Certification Report
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13 HW a13 / FW 03.17.0008.00 has been included
in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1 - 12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009
1 Executive Summary
The TOE is a Security IC with integrated firmware (operating system) and guidance
documentation ([12], [13], [14], [15] and [16] including [17] and [18]).
The SLB9635TT1.2 Trusted Platform Module, called TPM or SLB9635TT1.2 in the
following text, is an integrated circuit and software platform that provides computer
manufacturers with the core components of a subsystem used to assure authenticity,
integrity and confidentiality in e-commerce and internet communications within a Trusted
Computing Platform. The SLB9635TT1.2 is a complete solution implementing the version
1.2 of the TCG Trusted Platform Module Main, Specification Version 1.2 [11] and the TCG
PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification, Version 1.2 Final, Revision 1.00 [15].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile PC Client Specific Trusted Platform Module Family 1.2; Level 2, Version
1.1, BSI-CC-PP-0030-2008, [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
Portion of TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
SF_CRY - Cryptographic
Support
There are several functions within the TOE related to cryptographic
support: generation of random numbers, generation of asymmetric key
pairs, RSA digital signature (generation and verification), data encryption
and decryption, key destruction, the generation of hash values and the
generation and verification of MAC values.
SF_I&A - Authentication
and Identification
The TPM provides four protocols for authentication and identification to
authorize the use of entities without revealing the authorization data
(AuthData) on the network or the connection to the TPM. The basic
premise is to prove knowledge of a shared secret. This shared secret is
the identification and authentication data, which is called authorization data
in the TPM Main Specification.
The TOE supports the management of TSF data by restricting the ability to
modify and create the authentication data to different roles (e.g. TPM
owner, User under physical presence, Entity owner, authorized user)
based on different rules and restricting the ability to reset the TPM
dictionary attack mitigation mechanism and the creation of migration
tickets to the TPM owner, by using access control mechanisms during the
command processing.
The TOE associate user security attributes (e.g. authData, locality, physical
presence, authorization handle and shared secret if the subject is a OSAP
session and authorization associated with the delegation blob if the subject
is a DSAP session) with subjects acting on the behalf of that user. The
TOE enforces different rules, implemented in the appropriate command, on
the initial association and governing changes of user security attributes
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009 Certification Report
Portion of TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
with subjects acting on the behalf of users.
SF_ACC – Access Control The TOE provides the security function policies TPM Mode Control SFP
(MCT_SFP), Delegation SFP (Del_SFP), Key Management SFP
(KeyM_SFP), Key Migration SFP (KMig_SFP), Measurement And
Reporting SFP (M&R_SFP), Non-volatile Storage SFP (NVS_FSP),
Monotonic Counter SFP (MC-SFP), Export and Import of Data (EID_SFP)
and Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol SFP (DAA_SFP) to protect the
sensitive subjects, objects and operations of the TOE. The security policies
are described in section 8.2 and in the PP [7], section 6.1.
SF_GEN – General The TOE provides the roles: TPM owner, Entity owner, Delegated entity,
Entity user, User using operatorAuth and “World” and associates users
with roles. The role is bound always on specific authentication token
The TOE performs the following management functions: - Management of
the TPM modes of operation, - Management of Delegation Tables and
Family Tables, - Management of security attributes of keys, - Management
of security attributes of PCR, - Management of security attributes of NV
storage areas, - Management of security attributes of monotonic counters
and - Reset the Action Flag of TPM dictionary attack mitigation
mechanism.
The TOE provides an authentication functionality to consistently interpret
authentication reference data of the TPM owner, delegated entities, owner
of entities, user of entities and User using operatorAuth, when shared
between the TSF and another trusted IT product and uses roles when
interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
The TOE provides the transmission and reception of user data in
encrypted manner, to protect the user data from unauthorized disclosure.
The TOE provides the transmission and reception of user data in
encrypted and signed manner, to protect the user data from undiscovered
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors (only required for
sessions).
The TOE provides the generation of an audit record of the event Transport
session including different information (e.g. type and outcome of event).
The TOE provides reliable time stamps as number of ticks since start of
the tick session.
The TOE provides the generation of evidence of origin for transmitted data
at the request of the originator and is able to verify the evidence of origin of
transmitted data to recipient, by calculation and verifying a digital signature
of the data.
SF_P&T – Protection and
Test
The TOE preserves a secure state when a failure of any crypto operations
including RSA encryption, RSA decryption, SHA-1, RNG, RSA signature
generation, HMAC generation or failure of any commands or internal
operations (including AES and Tripple-DES encryption/ decryption) and
authorization occurs.
The TOE supports a suite of self tests during startup and at the request of
an authorized user to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF and to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
The TOE supports the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol.
The TOE resists physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Table 1: Portions of TOE Security Functionality
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For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.1 at which the portions of
the TOE Security Functionality as depicted in Table 1 correspond to the SF (Security
Features) in Security Target [6].
The assets to be protected by a TOE are defined in the Protection Profile [7], chapter
1.3.4. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6], chapter 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as specified in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13 HW a13 / FW 03.17.0008.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Security IC with integrated
firmware (operating system)
SLB9635TT1.2 /
m1566a13 HW a13 / FW
03.17.0008.00, ROM
CRC 9AE5
Packaged module
2 DOC Trusted Computing Group
TPM Main Specification [11]
Version 1.2, Revision 94 Hardcopy and pdf-file
3 DOC TCG PC Client Specific TPM
Interface Specification (TIS) for
TPM Family 1.2; Level 2 [15]
Version 1.2 FINAL,
Revision 1.00
Hardcopy and pdf-file
4 DOC TPM SLB9635TT1.2 TCG Rev
103 Trusted Platform Module
Databook [16]
Version 1.3 Hardcopy and pdf-file
5 DOC Errata and Updates for TPM
V1.2 SLB9635TT1.2 [17]
Version 3.2 Hardcopy and pdf-file
6 DOC Basic Platform Manufacturer
Guideline for TPM 1.2 [18]
Version 1.0 Hardcopy and pdf-file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the Security IC is done in the following manner:
1. The customer picks up the TOE directly in Großostheim (DC-E), Singapore (DC-A),
Wuxi (DC-C), Tokyo (DC-J) or Hayward (DC-U).
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After a positive check of the proof of the identity of the recipient (the customer has to
announce the recipient and Infineon Technologies checks the identity of the recipient
controlling the consignment notes and the passport of the recipient) is done, the TOE is
delivered to the recipient (e.g. Transport Company of the customer). The recipient has to
sign an acknowledgement of receipt that contains the date of the delivery, the number of
parts, the specific product name (TOE) and the name of the recipient. The customer can
choose the transport company and is responsible for the transport security.
2. The distribution centers (DC-E for Europe, DC-C for China, DC-A for Asia, DC-J for
Japan and DC-U for the United States) send the TOE to the customer.
The transport is secured by the following process:
For the transport only evaluated haulage companies are used, which are chosen by the
Infineon Technologies AG. The assessment and approvement of the used haulage
companies is done by a department of the Infineon Technologies AG.
The sender informs the receiver (other DC or customer) that a delivery was started. After
the delivery was received the delivery is checked according to the consignment notes. If
any delay or failure occurs the receiver has to inform the sender about this fact. This
process is integrated in an electronic process and controlled by the system Assist4.
Manipulation of the TOE is not possible without destroying it.
The transport of the TOE from the distribution center to the customer is done with the
same process used for the transport between the DCs.
The assessment and approvement of the used haulage companies is done by a
department of the Infineon Technologies AG.
A processing step during production testing incorporates the chip-individual features into
the hardware of the TOE. The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its serial
number. The serial number comprises the lot number, the wafer number and the
coordinates of the chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced
unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development.
The delivery of the TOE related documentation is done from the Infineon Technologies
department AE at the site München-Campeon (MchC).
All confidential electronic documents are delivered encrypted by using PGP tools within an
already established PKI, so the confidentiality and integrity of the documentation is
ensured during the whole life cycle because only the good recipient is able to decrypt the
code. The detection of modification is reached by the functionality of the PGP tools.
Deliverables send in paper form are personalised as described in [10], chapter 3, and only
send on request by the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer. This personalisation
consists of a serial number which is printed as a watermark in the document. This serial
number is administered by Infineon and linked to the customer the document is delivered
to. Furthermore the envelopes are secured by a seal and signature.
All paper documents are send personalised (if they are not personally handed over) as
described in [10], chapter 3, in two envelopes, plus seal and signature one marked with
“personally”. With these procedures an integer and confidential transfer is guaranteed.
TOE identification
The user identifies the evaluated TOE by the data code printed on the chip package [17],
chapter 2, and the FW version “03.17” and ROM CRC “9AE5” which can be read out as
described in the guidance documentation [18], Annex D. The HW version of the TOE can
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be unambiguously identified by the FW version “03.17” and ROM CRC “9AE5” as listed in
[17], chapter 2.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security management,
● Cryptographic support,
● TPM Operational Modes,
● Identification, Authentication and Binding,
● Delegation,
● Key management,
● Key Migration,
● Measurement and Reporting,
● Non-volatile Storage,
● Counter,
● Data Import and Export,
● Direct Anonymous Attestation and TSF Protection.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Configuration, Locality, Physical Presence, Integrity of Sealed Data Blobs,
Credential, Measurement and Direct Anonymous Attestation. Details can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 4.3, and Protection Profile [7], chapter 5.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is the “Infineon SLB9635TT1.2 Trusted Platform Module, which comprises the
hardware of the security controller, type SLB9635TT1.2, and the associated firmware
required for operation provided in ROM and EEPROM.
All hardware parts constituting the TOE are listed below:
● Security logic (SEC)
● Microcontroller type ECO2000 (CPU) with the subcomponents memory encryption and
decryption unit (MED), memory management unit (MMU) and 256 bytes of internal
RAM(IRAM)
● External memory comprising:
○ 12 kByte extended RAM (XRAM)
○ 196 kByte user ROM, including the routines for chip management (RMS)
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○ 8 KB test ROM containing the test routines (STS), and
○ a total of 68 kByte non-volatile memory (EEPROM)
● Random number generator (RNG)
● Checksum module (CRC)
● Interrupt module (INT)
● Timer (TIM)
● Address and data bus (BUS)
● ACE for long integer modulo calculations, which are used in asymmetric algorithms like
RSA
● DES accelerator (DDC) used for fast calculations of the DES algorithm
● Low Pin Count interface (LPC)
● Hash accelerator (HASH) for the algorithms SHA-1
● Tick Counter
● Input logic (INP)
The entire firmware of the TOE consists of two different parts. The one is the operating
system called firmware in the following document. The firmware includes operating system
and the Endorsement Key and is used to operate the IC. The firmware includes also the
capability for updating the protected capabilities once the TOE is in the field
(TPM_FieldUpgrade). Note that it is possible to update an old TPM firmware version e.g.
v3.16 to a certified firmware version v3.17.0008.00.
The other is the Self Test Software (STS). The STS routines are stored in the especially
protected test ROM and are not accessible for the user software (application).
The entire firmware of the TOE is comprised of:
● I/O-Interface
● Transportation
● TPM-Dispatcher
● State-Machine
● Authorization
● Dictionary Attack Logic
● TPM-Command
● HASH
● HMAC
● 3DES
● AES
● RSA2048
● MGF1
● Memory
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● Security
● Archive
● Test
● Tick Counter
● DAA
● RND
● PCR
● Field-Upgrade
● TcpaFlags
● Locality
● Key Class
● System Startup
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Description of the Test configuration
The test configuration used for independent testing is as follows:
● PC with Intel Pentium 4 CPU 2.8 GHZ, 1 GB RAM
● Windows 2000 Service Pack 4
● ifxtpm.dll driver with date 6th August 2008
● TOE with hardware tag SLB9635TT12, GE913KIV (corresponds to HW a13 according
to [18], chapter 2); firmware 03.17.0008.00 and ROM CRC 9AE5
The test environment to repeat developer tests consists of
● PC with Intel Pentium 4 CPU, 2.8 GHz
● Windows XP Professional Service Pack 3
● TOE with hardware tag SLB9635TT12, GE913KIV (corresponds to HW a13 according
to [18], chapter 2); with firmware 03.17.0008.00 and ROM CRC 9AE5
I) Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The developer tests of the Infineon SLB9635TT1.2/m1566a13 are separated in several
categories:
● Technology development
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009 Certification Report
○ Production technology development and testing
The process technology for the products is defined and its properties ensured by
testing
● Circuit development
○ Design verification by simulation
The simulation checks if the design under development produces the intended
behaviour
○ Qualification testing (test mode for full access to parameters)
After sample production it is tested if the device fulfils the specification (whole
range of parameters is verified)
○ Verification testing (user mode)
Tests functionality available to the user
○ Security evaluation
The resistance against relevant attack scenarios is tested
● Production testing
○ Initial testing
Functionality of the IC is tested
○ Final testing
Functionality testing under stress conditions, sensor calibration and user mode
activation
The overall goal of the tests is to show that the TOE implements the TSF as described by
the security target, the functional specification and the design documentation. As shown in
the test categories above, testing covers the different configurations of the TOE. The
software tests cover the TOE in an activated state, which represents the usual state in
which the TOE is used by end users.
II) Independent Testing according to ATE_IND (Evaluator Tests)
Subset size chosen
The evaluator performed twelve automated tests using a Java-based test system. Each
security feature defined in the [6], chapter 8, was covered with at least one test. The
testing included positive and negative tests.
Selection criteria for the interfaces that compose the subset
The following test strategy was applied for independent testing:
● Cover all security features of the TOE with at least one test.
● Specifically target the cryptographic features of the TOE.
● If possible, design test cases in a way that they test behaviour which is not specifically
covered by a developer test. Also, skip some features which are considered to be
sufficiently covered by developer tests.
Interfaces tested
The following interfaces were directly stimulated by the tests:
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● INT 2.1
● INT 2.2
● INT 2.3
● INT 2.4
● INT 2.5
Developer tests performed
The evaluators independently repeated a subset of the developer tests. This subset
includes all automated tests in [19]. It covers all security functions and contains a large
part of all developer tests.
The sample results in a total number of 132921 checked test instructions in the developer
test cases.
Verdict for the activity
During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing, the TOE operated as specified. Therefore the
TOE passed the evaluators testing. The tests confirm the TOE functionality as described in
the developer documents.
III) Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN (Evaluator Tests)
The penetration testing was performed using developer’s testing tools and the test
environment of the evaluation body.
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Moderate was
actually successful.
Penetration testing approach
The penetration tests consist of manual and automated tests. The manual tests were
executed using the DLLTest.exe tool provided by the developer. The automated tests were
either executed using the developer’s test suite with modified test scripts or proprietary test
suite/ tools of the evaluation lab.
TOE test configurations
For tests of the TOE firmware the following test resources were used:
● Test tool by TÜViT to implement most of the test cases
● Java J2SE JRE version 5.0
● Windows 2000
● Installed and working driver for the TOE: “ifxtpm.dll” library in Windows system32
directory
● DLLTest.exe tool provided by the developer to execute raw packets/byte strings
● Additional Software: Microsoft Windows XP Professional, Version 2002, Service Pack
3, developer’s test suite for TOE
For LFI, side channel attacks and DPA measurements the following test resources were
used in the by the evaluator in the technical security laboratory of the evaluation lab:
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● Oscilloscope and Laser equipment
● Proprietary measuring/analysing software
● Standard PC
SFRs penetration tested
The following TSF interfaces have been tested:
● SF_CRY (INT 2.1)
● SF_I&A (INT 2.2)
● SF_ACC (INT 2.3)
● SF_GEN (INT 2.4)
● SF_P&T (INT 2.5)
All Security Features of the TOE have been addressed by penetration testing.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The configuration under
evaluation has the identification SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13 HW a13 / FW 03.17.0008.00,
ROM CRC 9AE5.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.4 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: PC Client Specific Trusted Platform Module Family 1.2; Level
2, Version 1.1, BSI-CC-PP-0030-2008 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1
AVA_VAN.4
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
● RSA signature scheme with cryptographic key sizes 512, 1024, 2048 bits according to
[20],
● RSA encryption scheme with cryptographic key sizes 512, 1024, 2048 bits according to
[20],
● encryption scheme 3DES with cryptographic mode of operation CBC and with
cryptographic key sizes 112 bits and 168 bits according to [21],
● encryption scheme AES with cryptographic mode of operation CTR and with
cryptographic key size 128 bits according to [22],
● encryption scheme TPM_ALG_XOR with MGF1 [20] and with cryptographic key size of
variable bit length according to TPM main specification [13],
● hash function SHA-1 according to [23],
● authentication scheme HMAC with hash algorithm SHA-1 [23] and with cryptographic
key size 160 bits according to [24].
This holds for the following security features:
● SF_CRY - Cryptographic Support
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). According to [11] the algorithms are suitable for
using in services required for a TPM in the TCG Trusted Platform Module Main
Specification, version 1.2, [12], [13], [14] and additional services that are optional in the
main TPM specification but mandatory in the PC client specific interface specification [15].
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
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BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CTR Counter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Attack
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FW Firmware
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HW Hardware
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MGF Mask Generation Function
RNG Random Number Generator
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Feature
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
SW Software
TCG Trusted Computing Group
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
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Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of
the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 1, September 2006
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 2, September 2007
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 2, September 2007
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 2, September 2007
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0573, Version 1.0, September 28, 2009, Security
Target of SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13, Infineon Technologies AG
[7] Protection Profile PC Client Specific Trusted Platform Module Family 1.2; Level 2,
BSI-CC-PP-0030-2008, Version 1.1, July 10, 2008, Trusted Computing Group
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, November 18, 2009, ETR Summary, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE (confidential document):
SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13, FW_Configurationlist, Version 0.3, 2009-09-28
SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13, Configuration Management Scope (ALC_SCP),
Version 0.2 2009-09-29
[10] Security Management SMS Allgemeiner Teil, Version 9.0, September 01, 2004
[11] Trusted Computing Group TPM Main Specification, consisting of [12], [13] and [14]
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 6, 07 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins
deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[12] TPM Main Part 1 Design Principles, Specification Version 1.2, Revision 94, 29
March 2006, Trusted Computing Group, Incorporated
[13] TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures, Specification Version 1.2, Revision 94, 29 March
2006, Trusted Computing Group, Incorporated
[14] TPM Main Part 3 Commands, Specification Version 1.2, Revision 94, 29 March
2006, Trusted Computing Group, Incorporated
[15] TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification (TIS) for TPM Family 1.2; Level
2, Version 1.2 FINAL, Revision 1.00, July 11, 2005
[16] TPM SLB9635TT1.2 TCG Rev 103 Trusted Platform Module Databook Version 1.3
January 22, 2008, Infineon Technologies AG
[17] Errata and Updates for TPM V1.2 SLB9635TT1.2, Version 3.2, September 2009,
Infineon Technologies AG
[18] Basic Platform Manufacturer Guideline for TPM 1.2, Version 1.0, July 24, 2009,
Infineon Technologies AG
[19] Test Plan TPM 1.2 ROM3 3.17.0008.00, Version 1.2, September 24, 2009, Infineon
Technologies AG (confidential document)
[20] PKCS #1 v2.0: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, October 1, 1998
[21] FIPS PUB 46-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES), October 25, 1999, U.S.
Department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Information Technology Laboratory (ITL)
[22] FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 26, 2001, U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Information Technology Laboratory (ITL)
[23] FIPS PUB 180-2, Secure Hash Standard, August 1, 2002, U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology
Laboratory (ITL)
[24] RFC 2104: HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
[25] IEEE P1363-2000, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography, Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (note reaffirmation PAR is actual running)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 9.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex A.
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decompositon.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“ The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 2 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 3: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 39
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0573-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product SLB9635TT1.2 / m1566a13 HW a13 / FW 03.17.0008.00 (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 20 November 2009, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site Adress Function
Altis-Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc.
European Technology Center
Boulevard John Kennedy 224
91105 Corbeil Essonnes
France
Mask Center
Amkor Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philipines
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philipines
Module Mounting
Augsburg Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
Bukarest Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6
Sector 2
020335 Bucharest,
Romania
Development
Dresden Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
Production
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Site Adress Function
Dresden-
Toppan
Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Mask Center
Graz / Villach/
Klagenfurt
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
Development
Großostheim
Infineon Technology AG
DCE
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 - Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Distribution Center
Hayward Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
U.S.A.
Distribution Center
Lustenau
New Logic Technologies AG
- A Wipro Company,
Millenium Park 6,
6890 Lustenau,
Austria
Development
Munich Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Infineon Technologies AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 München (Perlach)
Germany
Development
Regensburg-
West
Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Smartrac Technology GmbH,
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Module Mounting
Inlay antenna mounting
Distribution Center
Singapore Exel Singapore Pte Ltd
DHL Exel Supply Chian
81, ALPS Avenue
Singapore 498803
Distribution Center
Singapore
Kallang
Infineon Technologies AG
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module Mounting
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Site Adress Function
Tokyo Kintetsu World Express, Inc.
Tokyo Import Logistics Center
Narita Terminal
Tokyo
Japan
Distribution Center
Wuxi Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
Module Mounting
Distribution Center
Table 4: Identification of deliveries
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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