Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 17FMV8490-21:1
HEMLIG/
enligt Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen
(2009:400)
2019-06-17
Country of origin: Sweden
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Lexmark MFP wHD 2017
Issue: 1.0, 2019-jun-17
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Lexmark MFP wHD 2017 2017
17FMV8490-21: Draft 0.1 2019-06-17
CSEC-37-1898 2 (23)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Usage Assumptions 8
4.2 Environmental Assumptions 8
4.3 Clarification of Scope 8
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 13
7 IT Product Testing 14
7.1 Developer Testing 14
7.2 Evaluator Testing 14
7.3 Penetration Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 16
9 Results of the Evaluation 18
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 20
11 Glossary 21
12 Bibliography 22
Appendix A Scheme Versions 23
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 23
A.2 Scheme Notes 23
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the firmware of Lexmark’s Multi Function Devices
(Printers): Lexmark CX622h, CX625h, CX921, CX922, CX923, CX924, MX522,
MX622h, MX721h, MX722h, MX822, and MX826. The TOE running on one of the
supported specified hardware models constitutes a Multi-Function Printer (MFP). All
MFP are equipped with hard drive.
Firmware versions:
 CXTMH.052.025: CX921, CX922, CX923, CX924
 CXTZJ.052.025: CX622h, CX625h
 MXTGM.052.025: MX522, MX622h
 MXTGW.052.025: MX721h, MX722h, MX822, MX826
Demonstrable conformance is claimed to PP Identification: 2600.1, Protection Profile
for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A, version 1.0, dated January 2009
with the including packages:
 PRT, SFR Package for Print Functions,
 SCN, SFR Package for Scan Functions,
 CPY, SFR Package for Copy Functions,
 FAX, SFR Package for Fax Functions and
 SMI, SFR Package for Shared-medium Interface Functions
The Security Target (ST) claims demonstrable conformance to the Security Problem
Definition (APE_SPD), Security Objectives (APE_OBJ), Extended Components Def-
initions (APE_ECD), and the Common Security Functional Requirements
(APE_REQ) of the referenced PP.
The TOE performs the functions F.PRT, F.SCN, F.CPY, F.FAX, and F.SMI as de-
fined in the referenced PP and claims demonstrable conformance to the augmented
SFR packages defined for each of these functions.
There are six assumptions made in the ST regarding the secure usage and environment
of the MFD. The TOE rely on these being met in order to be able to counter the six
threats, and to fulfill the four organizational security policy (OSP) in the ST. The as-
sumptions, the threats and the organizational security policies are described in chapter
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB and EWA-Canada. The evalua-
tion was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version
3.1, release 5, and the Common Methodology for IT security Evaluation, version 3.1,
release 5. The evaluation was performed at the evaluation assurance level EAL3,
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also
accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025
for Common Criteria evaluation. EWA-Canada operates as a Foreign location for
Combitech AB within scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certifi-
cation Scheme.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target, and have been reached in agree-
ment with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodology
for evaluation assurance level:
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 EAL 3 + ALC_FLR.3.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2017017
Name and version of the
certified IT product
Firmware for Multi-Functional Devices (Printers)
Lexmark CX622h, CX625h, CX921, CX922,
CX923, CX924, MX522, MX622h, MX721h,
MX722h, MX822, and MX826. All equipped with
hard disk.
Firmware versions:
- CXTMH.052.025: CX921, CX922, CX923, CX924
- CXTZJ.052.025: CX622h, CX625h
- MXTGM.052.025: MX522, MX622h
- MXTGW.052.025: MX721h, MX722h, MX822,
MX826
Security Target Identification Lexmark CX622h, CX625h, CX921, CX922,
CX923, CX924, MX522, MX622h, MX721h,
MX722h, MX822, and MX826 Multi-Function
Printers Security Target, Lexmark International, Inc.,
2019-01-23, version 1.11
EAL EAL3+ ALC_FLR.3
CCRA recognition for components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.3 only
Sponsor Lexmark International Technologies S.A.
Developer Lexmark International Inc.
ITSEF Combitech AB and EWA-Canada
Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5
CEM version 3.1, revision 5
QMS version 1.22.3
Scheme Notes Release 14.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA
Certification date 2019-06-19
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3 Security Policy
The TOE consists of nine security functions. Below is a short description of each of
them. For more information, see Security Target [ST]
Audit Generation
The TOE generates audit event records for security-relevant events and transmits them
to a remote IT system using the syslog protocol.
Identification and Authentication
When a touch panel or web session is initiated, the user is implicitly assumed to be the
Guest (default) user. Per the evaluated configuration, the permissions for this user
must be configured such that no access to TSF data or functions is allowed other than
print job submission (job submission is authorized regardless of what user is logged
in). Therefore, the user must successfully log in as a different user before any TSF da-
ta or functions other than print job submission may be accessed.
The TOE supports I&A with a per-user selection of Username/Password Accounts
(processed by the TOE) or integration with an external LDAP server (in the operation-
al environment). Smart Card authentication may also be specified for users of the
touch panel.
Access Control
Access controls configured for functions (e.g. fax usage) and menu access are en-
forced by the TOE.
Management
Through web browser and touch panel sessions, authorized administrators may con-
figure access controls and perform other TOE management functions.
Fax Separation
The TOE ensures that only fax traffic is sent or received via the attached phone line.
Incoming traffic is processed as fax data only; no management access or other data ac-
cess is permitted. In the evaluated configuration, the only source for outgoing faxes is
the scanner.
Hard Disk Encryption
All user data submitted to the TOE and stored on the hard disk is encrypted to protect
its confidentiality in the event the hard drive was to be removed from the MFP.
Disk Wiping
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE automatically overwrites disk blocks used to
store user data as soon as the data is no longer required. The mechanism used to per-
form the overwrite complies with NIST SP800-88 (dated September 2006), and the
DSS "Clearing and Sanitization Matrix" (C&SM) updated March 21, 2008 that is in-
cluded in the Industrial Security Field Operations (ISFO) Process Manual for the Cer-
tification and Accreditation of Classified Systems under the National Industrial Secu-
rity Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), Revision 3 (June 2011).
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Secure Communication
The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of all information exchanged over
the attached network by using IPSec with ESP for all network communication. Cryp-
tographic keys may be generated by the TOE or pre-shared keys may be entered by
the administrator.
Self Test
During initial start-up, the TOE performs self tests on its cryptographic components
and the integrity of the configuration data.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The following assumption about the usage are made:
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and proce-
dures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s
guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accord-
ance with those policies and procedures
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for mali-
cious purposes.
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of
their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and proce-
dures.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The following assumption about the environment are made:
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment
that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE
A.IPSEC IPSec with ESP is used between the TOE and all remote IT systems with
which it communicates over the network using IPv4 and/or IPv6.
A.VIPER The Lexmark Secure Element provides entropy of adequate quality for se-
cure operation of the TOE’s DRBG.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
Four categories of threat agents are defined:
 Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE.
 Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE func-
tions for which they are not authorized.
 Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in
ways for which they are not authorized.
 Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the
TOE to unanticipated threats.
The identified threats against the TOE are listed below:
 T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
 T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
 T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
 T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
Four Organisational Security Policies are defined.
 P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security, records
that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created,
maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be
reviewed by authorized personnel
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 P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external in-
terfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE
and its IT environment.
 P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in
the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
 P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security,
Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.
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5 Architectural Information
The following TOE model is adapted from the Protection Profile, ref. [PP].
The TOE is comprised of the following subsystems:
Operating System
The Operating System subsystem provides standard operating system services such as
file system, process management, timers and memory management. In the evaluated
configuration this subsystem is also responsible for ensuring that all user data saved
on the hard disk is encrypted, disk wiping is performed when files holding user data
are deleted, and supporting administrator-initiated disk wiping. The memory manage-
ment functionality zeroizes buffers in memory upon deallocation.
The Operating System subsystem executes a series of self-tests of the MFP upon each
start-up of the system. This subsystem also maintains the system time, which is used
to insert timestamps into audit records when they are generated.
GUI Manager
The GUI Manager subsystem handles all interactions with local users via the touch
screen and keypad. This subsystem retrieves (from the Object Store subsystem) and
displays the appropriate information on the touch screen and processes input from the
touch screen and keypad. When configuration changes are made, the updated infor-
mation is sent to the Object Store subsystem to be saved and acted on.
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User Authentication
The User Authentication subsystem handles all validation of user credentials and au-
thorizations, whether the validation is performed locally or remotely. When creden-
tials or authorization checks are received from the GUI Manager or Web Server sub-
systems, User Authentication retrieves information from Object Store to determine if
local, remote, or PKI validation should be performed.
Object Store
The Object Store subsystem is responsible for managing the storage of configuration
parameters, forwarding audit records between the generating subsystem and the Audit
subsystem, and forwarding user jobs between the receiving subsystem and the destina-
tion subsystem. This subsystem also maintains a list of pending user jobs.
Audit
The Audit subsystem is responsible for formatting audit information into the standard
Syslog format, inserting a timestamp, and forwarding the audit records to the config-
ured Syslog server. If NTP is configured, this subsystem also interacts with the con-
figured NTP server(s) to maintain the system time.
Network Interface
The Network Interface subsystem is responsible for all interactions with the Network
Interface Card and provides all the processing of network protocol layers that are
common to multiple software subsystems (e.g. TCP, IP, IPSec). This subsystem inter-
acts with remote IT systems via the network protocols. Since cryptography is required
for several of the network protocols to establish trusted channels, this subsystem par-
ticipates in key management functions and invokes the Crypto Library subsystem to
perform cryptographic operations. All communication with remote IT systems is re-
quired to use IPSec.
Print
The Print subsystem processes received print jobs from the network interface, scanner
and fax line (via the Object Store subsystem). Received network print jobs are queued
to be deleted after the print job expiration timeout if they do not contain a PJL SET
USERNAME statement. Audit information is generated as jobs are received, indicat-
ing the job is created. The user jobs are converted to raster images and queued for
printing. The list of user jobs waiting to be printed is communicated to the Object
Store subsystem. Audit information is generated as jobs are completed.
Scan Manager
The Scan Manager subsystem is responsible for controlling the operation of the scan-
ner hardware and formatting the scanned images into an appropriate format. This sub-
system invokes the Operating System subsystem to save the user data on the hard
drive in encrypted form. The format may be an email message with an attachment for
scan-to-email operations or scan-to-fax operations (when fax server is configured), or
raster image for copy operations or scan-to-fax operations (when analog fax is config-
ured). The currently logged in user on the touch screen is the user associated with the
job. Once formatted, the user job is sent to the Object Store subsystem for delivery to
the destination subsystem.
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Email
The Email subsystem is responsible for forwarding user jobs to a remote IT system via
SMTP. In the evaluated configuration, the user jobs may have originated from a scan-
to-email operation or a scan-to-fax operation with the fax server configured. The Op-
erating System subsystem is invoked to open the file containing the user data and de-
crypt it. When the user job has been forwarded, the Operating System subsystem is in-
voked to delete the file containing the user data and wipe the area of the hard disk on
which the data was stored. Audit information is generated upon job completion and
forwarded to the Audit subsystem via the Object Store subsystem
Web Server
The Web Server subsystem is responsible for providing user access to TOE functions
from remote IT systems via browser sessions. This subsystem retrieves (from the Ob-
ject Store subsystem) and presents the appropriate information for display. When con-
figuration changes are made, the updated information is sent to the Object Store sub-
system to be saved and acted on.
Fax
The Fax subsystem is responsible for controlling the operation of the fax modem
hardware. For incoming faxes, this subsystem invokes the Operating System subsys-
tem to save the user data as a raster image on the hard drive in encrypted form. Unpro-
cessed data is never accepted by this subsystem and the evaluated configuration does
not permit unprocessed data received via the fax line to be forwarded out the Network
Interface Card. The touch screen user that releases the held faxes is the user associated
with the job. Once complete, the user job is sent to the Object Store subsystem for de-
livery to the Print subsystem.
Crypto Library
The Crypto Library subsystem provides cryptographic algorithm support used by other
subsystems to perform cryptographic operations. The operations supported include en-
cryption, decryption, hashing, message authentication coding, digital signatures and
random number generation.
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6 Documentation
The physical scope of the TOE also includes the following guidance documentation:
 Lexmark Common Criteria Installation Supplement and Administrator Guide
 Lexmark Embedded Web Server Administrator's Guide
 Lexmark CX620 Series User's Guide
 Lexmark CX920, CX921, CX922, CX923, CX924, CX927 User's Guide
 Lexmark MX520 Series User's Guide
 Lexmark MX620 Series User's Guide
 Lexmark MX720 Series User's Guide
 Lexmark MX820 Series User's Guide
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer performed manual tests. The developer’s testing covers the security
functional behavior of all TSFIs and SFRs as well as the interactions of the subsys-
tems. The developer’s testing comprised all firmware and all printer models.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator’s independent tests were chosen to complement the developer’s manual
tests in order to complement the cover of the security functional behavior of the TSFIs
and SFRs. The evaluator repeated developer’s test cases and performed individual and
penetration test cases. The tests included:
 TOE Installation
 Identification and Authentication
 Access Control and Management
 Fax Separation
 Hard Disk Encryption
 Trusted Channel
 Repetition of Developer’s Testing
The evaluator used a similar test configuration as the developer consisting of:
 TOE: CX922, CX625h, MX622h, and MX822
 Workstation: Windows client used to send print jobs to the TOE, open browser
sessions to manage the TOE, and to exchange email with the Email Server.
 Primary Domain Controller: Windows server providing Active Directory, DNS,
Kerberos, GSSAPI, PKI and NTP services
 Email Server: SMTP server capable of receiving email from the TOE and for-
warding it to a user on Workstation
 Syslog Server: Capable of receiving and displaying Syslog messages from the
TOE
 Network Monitor: Used to display and analyse network traffic
 Fax: Analog fax machine
 IP Network
 Phone network
The tests were run manually from the MFP’s touch screen, the Embedded Web Server,
and the workstation. The actual results of all test cases were consistent with the ex-
pected test results and all tests were judged to pass.
7.3 Penetration Testing
The following types of vulnerability tests were performed:
 Port scan
 Vulnerability scan
 PNG fuzzing
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 Hard disk encryption
 Communication protocol compliance
 IKE/IPSec scanning
Port scans were run after installation and configuration had been done according the
guidance documentation. The purpose was to check that no unexpected ports were
opened unfiltered and no unexpected services available. The Nmap (www.nmap.org)
port scan tool was used. Four different modes were used: TCP Connect, TCP SYN,
UDP, and IP protocol scans. All possible 65535 ports were scanned for TCP/UDP.
A scanning tool for network vulnerabilities were run. No high severity issues were
found.
A fuzzing tool were used to randomly change the content of a PNG image. The fuzzed
images were sent to the MFP for printing.
The hard disk was examined to verify that all user data stored for held printing, scan-
ning, and incoming fax is encrypted.
It was verified that all traffic to and from the Primary Domain Controller was using
IPSec in ESP mode. It was also verified that no down negotiating to weaker algo-
rithms than specified for the trusted channel, [ST] table 18, is possible.
The IPSec protocol were scanned using an IKE/IPSec scanning tool to reveal unspeci-
fied primitives, key lengths, etc.
Search in public sources did not revealed any exploitable or residual vulnerabilities in
the TOE including its third party software libraries.
All penetration testing had negative outcome, i.e. no vulnerabilities were found.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
In the Security Target [ST] section “1.10 Evaluated Configuration” there are 31 stated
configuration options that apply to the evaluated configuration of the TOE. These con-
figuration options need to be set correctly in order to use the evaluated version.
Dependencies to Other Hardware, Firmware and Software
The TOE is the firmware of an MFP. The MFP hardware must be one of the models
supported for the firmware versions specified for the TOE. To be fully operational,
any combination of the following items may be connected to the MFP:
- A LAN for network connectivity. The TOE supports IPv4 and IPv6.
- A telephone line for fax capability.
- IT systems that submit print jobs to the MFP via the network using standard print
protocols.
- IT systems that send and/or receive faxes via the telephone line.
- An IT system acting as the remote syslog recipient of audit event records sent from
the TOE.
- LDAP server to support Identification and Authentication (I&A). This component is
optional depending on the type(s) of I&A mechanisms used.
- Card reader and cards to support Smart Card authentication using Common Access
Card (CAC), Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards or Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPRNet) cards. This component is optional depending on the
type(s) of I&A mechanisms used. The supported card readers are:
a. Identiv uTrust 2700 F Contact Smart Card Reader & Identiv uTrust 2700 R Contact
Smart Card Reader
b. Omnikey 3121 SmartCard Reader
c. Any other Omnikey SmartCard Readers that share the same USB Vendor IDs and
Product IDs with the Omnikey 3121 (example Omnikey 3021)
d. SCM SCR 331
e. SCM SCR 3310v2
Excluded from the TOE Evaluated Configuration
The following features of the TOE are outside of or not allowed in the evaluated con-
figuration.
 Support for
 Optional network interfaces.
 Optional parallel or serial interfaces.
 USB ports on the MFPs that perform document processing functions.
 Option card for downloadable emulators.
 Other I&A mechanisms than Internal Accounts, LDAP+GSSAPI on a per-user ba-
sis, and Smart Card authentication.
 Other eSF, Java applications, than
 Smart Card Authentication,
 Smart Card Authentication Client,
 Display Customization
 Secure Email
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 Secure Held Jobs
 PIV Smart Card Driver (if PIV cards are used)
 CAC Smart Card Driver (if CAC cards are used)”, and
 SIPRNet Smart Card Driver (if SIPRNet cards are used)
 Fax forwarding.
 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
 Internet Printing Protocol (IPP).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family Name Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Life-cycle support ALC PASS
Authrisation controls ALC_CMC.3 PASS
Implementation representation CM Coverage ALC_CMS.3 PASS
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Systematic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.3 PASS
Development ADV PASS
Security Architecture description ADV_ARC.1 PASS
Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Architectural design ADV_TDS.2 PASS
Guidance documents AGD PASS
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: Basic design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
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Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None
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11 Glossary
CAC Common Access Card
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security,
document describing the methodology used in Common Cri-
teria evaluations
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
GSSAPI Generic Security Services Application Program Interface
I&A Identification & Authentication
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to
operate within a evaluation and certification scheme
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MFD Multi-Function Device
MFP Multi-Function Printer
NTP Network Time Protocol
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PIV Personal Identity Verification
PJL Printer Job Language
PP Protection Profile
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements
and specifications , used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
USB Universal Serial Bus
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Lexmark MFP wHD 2017 2017
17FMV8490-21: Draft 0.1 2019-06-17
CSEC-37-1898 22 (23)
12 Bibliography
[CCp1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-001
[CCp2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002
[CCp3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Securi-
ty Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-
2017-04-004
[ST] Lexmark CX622h, CX625h, CX921, CX922, CX923,
CX924, MX522, MX622h, MX721h, MX722h, MX822,
and MX826 Multi-Function Printers Security Target,
Lexmark International, Inc., 2019-01-23, document version
1.11
[PP] 2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operation-
al Environment A, dated January 2009, version 1.0
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Lexmark MFP wHD 2017 2017
17FMV8490-21: Draft 0.1 2019-06-17
CSEC-37-1898 23 (23)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme has been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
1.21.1 2018-03-09 Original version
1.21.2 2018-03-09 None
1.21.3 2018-05-24 None
1.21.4 2018-09-13 None
1.21.5 2018-11-19 None
1.22 2019-02-01 None
1.22.1 2019-03-08 None
1.22.2 2019-05-02 None
1.22.3 2019-05-20 None
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme
Note
Version Title Applicability
SN-15 3.0 Demonstration of test coverage
SN-18 2.0 Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target