Apple macOS 26 Tahoe
Security Target
Version: 1.1
Status: Final
Date: 2026-07-02
Validation ID: 11695
Classification: Public
Prepared for: Apple Inc.
Prepared by: atsec information security corporation
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Trademarks
Apple’s trademarks applicable to this document are listed in https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-
property/trademark/appletmlist.html
Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or service marks of others.
Copyright
© 2026 Apple Inc., One Apple Park Way, Cupertino, CA 95014
All rights reserved.
Legal Notice
This document is provided AS IS with no express or implied warranties. Use the information in this
document at your own risk.
This document may be reproduced or distributed in any form without prior permission provided the
copyright notice is retained on all copies. Modified versions of this document may be freely distributed
provided that they are clearly identified as such, and this copyright is included intact.
Revision History
Version Date Author(s) Changes to Previous Revision
1.0 2026-02-25 atsec First version
1.1 2026-07-02 atsec Address validator comments
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 7
1.1 SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................7
1.2 TOE IDENTIFICATION.........................................................................................................................................7
1.3 TOE TYPE ........................................................................................................................................................7
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................7
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................................................7
1.5.1 Architecture ............................................................................................................................................7
1.5.2 TOE Physical Boundary.........................................................................................................................8
1.5.3 TOE Security Functionality ...................................................................................................................8
1.5.3.1 Security Audit.....................................................................................................................................................8
1.5.3.2 Cryptographic Support.....................................................................................................................................8
1.5.3.3 User Data Protection.........................................................................................................................................8
1.5.3.4 Identification and Authentication ....................................................................................................................9
1.5.3.5 Security Management.......................................................................................................................................9
1.5.3.6 Protection of the TSF........................................................................................................................................9
1.5.3.7 TOE Access........................................................................................................................................................9
1.5.3.8 Trusted Path/Channels.....................................................................................................................................9
1.5.4 TOE Guidance ........................................................................................................................................9
1.5.5 TOE Operational Environment............................................................................................................10
2 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM........................................................................................................ 11
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION..............................................................................................14
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.............................................................................................................15
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION.....................................................................................16
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................17
6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................... 17
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU) ............................................................................................................................ 17
6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 - Audit Data Generation...............................................................................................................17
6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.1/BT – Audit Data Generation (Bluetooth) ...................................................................................17
6.1.1.3 FAU_GEN.1/WLAN – Audit Data Generation (Wireless LAN) ..................................................................... 19
6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)............................................................................................................ 20
6.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation (Refined).............................................................................20
6.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.1/WPA Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2/WPA3 Connections)...20
6.1.2.3 FCS_CKM.2 - Cryptographic Key Establishment........................................................................................ 21
6.1.2.4 FCS_CKM.2/WLAN - Cryptographic Key Distribution (Group Temporal Key for WLAN)....................... 21
6.1.2.5 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 - Cryptographic Key Destruction................................................................................... 21
6.1.2.6 FCS_CKM_EXT.8 - Bluetooth Key Generation............................................................................................22
6.1.2.7 FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT - Cryptographic Operation (Encryption/Decryption)...........................................22
6.1.2.8 FCS_COP.1/HASH - Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)..........................................................................22
6.1.2.9 FCS_COP.1/SIGN - Cryptographic Operation (Signing).............................................................................23
6.1.2.10 FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC - Cryptographic Operation (Keyed-Hash Message Authentication)..............23
6.1.2.11 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 - Random Bit Generation.................................................................................................23
6.1.2.12 FCS_STO_EXT.1 - Storage of Sensitive Data ............................................................................................24
6.1.2.13 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 - TLS Protocol...................................................................................................................24
6.1.2.14 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 - TLS Client Protocol.....................................................................................................24
6.1.2.15 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN - TLS Client Protocol (EAP-TLS for WLAN) ...................................................25
6.1.2.16 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 - TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication........................................................25
6.1.2.17 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN - TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
.......................................................................................................................................................................................25
6.1.2.18 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 - TLS Client Support for Renegotiation......................................................................26
6.1.2.19 FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 - TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension ............................................26
6.1.2.20 FCS_WPA_EXT.1 - Supported WPA Versions...........................................................................................26
6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP) ............................................................................................................... 26
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6.1.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 - Access Controls for Protecting User Data ...................................................................26
6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)............................................................................................. 26
6.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 - Authentication failure handling .................................................................................................26
6.1.4.2 FIA_BLT_EXT.1 - Bluetooth User Authorization..........................................................................................27
6.1.4.3 FIA_BLT_EXT.2 - Bluetooth Mutual Authentication....................................................................................27
6.1.4.4 FIA_BLT_EXT.3 - Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections.............................................................27
6.1.4.5 FIA_BLT_EXT.4 - Secure Simple Pairing......................................................................................................27
6.1.4.6 FIA_BLT_EXT.6 - Trusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization..............................................................28
6.1.4.7 FIA_BLT_EXT.7 - Untrusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization...........................................................28
6.1.4.8 FIA_PAE_EXT.1 - Port Access Entity Authentication..................................................................................28
6.1.4.9 FIA_UAU.5 - Multiple Authentication Mechanisms.....................................................................................28
6.1.4.10 FIA_X509_EXT.1 - X.509 Certificate Validation .......................................................................................28
6.1.4.11 FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN - X.509 Certificate Validation............................................................................29
6.1.4.12 FIA_X509_EXT.2 - X.509 Certificate Authentication...............................................................................30
6.1.4.13 FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN - X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS for WLAN) .............................30
6.1.4.14 FIA_X509_EXT.6 - X.509 Certificate Storage and Management ...........................................................30
6.1.5 Security Management (FMT)..............................................................................................................31
6.1.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 - Management of Security Functions Behavior............................................................. 31
6.1.5.2 FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT - Management of Security Functions Behavior ...................................................... 31
6.1.5.3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 - Specification of Management Functions .................................................................... 31
6.1.5.4 FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT - Specification of Management Functions ..............................................................32
6.1.5.5 FMT_SMF.1/WLAN - Specification of Management Functions (WLAN Client)........................................33
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)............................................................................................................... 34
6.1.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 - Access Controls...............................................................................................................34
6.1.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 - Address Space Layout Randomization.......................................................................34
6.1.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 - Stack Buffer Overflow Protection...............................................................................34
6.1.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 – Boot Integrity...................................................................................................................35
6.1.6.5 FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN - TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (WLAN Client)..............................35
6.1.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 - Trusted Update...............................................................................................................35
6.1.6.7 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 - Trusted Update for Application Software....................................................................35
6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)............................................................................................................................... 36
6.1.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 - Default TOE Access Banners...................................................................................................36
6.1.7.2 FTA_WSE_EXT.1 - Wireless Network Access..............................................................................................36
6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP).............................................................................................................. 36
6.1.8.1 FTP_BLT_EXT.1 - Bluetooth Encryption.......................................................................................................36
6.1.8.2 FTP_BLT_EXT.2 - Persistence of Bluetooth Encryption ............................................................................36
6.1.8.3 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR - Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (BR/EDR)..........................................................36
6.1.8.4 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE - Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (LE) ...................................................................37
6.1.8.5 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 - Trusted Channel Communication...................................................................................37
6.1.8.6 FTP_ITC.1/WLAN - Trusted Channel Communication (Wireless LAN).....................................................37
6.1.8.7 FTP_TRP.1 - Trusted Path..............................................................................................................................38
6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................... 38
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION............................................................................................... 39
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY ..................................................................................................................... 39
7.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)............................................................................................................................ 39
7.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)............................................................................................................ 39
7.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 - Cryptographic Key Generation, FCS_CKM.1/WPA - Cryptographic Key Generation
(Symmetric Keys for WPA2/WPA3 Connections) ....................................................................................................42
7.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 - Cryptographic Key Establishment ........................................................................................43
7.1.2.3 FCS_CKM.2/WLAN - Cryptographic Key Distribution (Group Temporal Key for WLAN) .......................43
7.1.2.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 - Cryptographic Key Destruction...................................................................................43
7.1.2.5 FCS_CKM_EXT.8 - Bluetooth Key Generation ............................................................................................43
7.1.2.6 FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT - Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption...........................................44
7.1.2.7 FCS_COP.1/HASH - Cryptographic Operation - Hashing...........................................................................44
7.1.2.8 FCS_COP.1/SIGN - Cryptographic Operation - Signing .............................................................................44
7.1.2.9 FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC - Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication................44
7.1.2.10 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 - Random Bit Generation ................................................................................................44
7.1.2.11 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data................................................................................................44
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7.1.2.12 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 - TLS Protocol, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 - TLS Client Protocol, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 - TLS
Client Support for Mutual Authentication, FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 - TLS Client Support for Renegotiation,
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 – TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension ..........................................................44
7.1.2.13 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN TLS - Client Protocol (EAP-TLS for WLAN), FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN - TLS
Client Support for Supported Groups Extension (EAP-TLS for WLAN).................................................................45
7.1.2.14 FCS_WPA_EXT.1 - Supported WPA Versions ...........................................................................................45
7.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP) ............................................................................................................... 45
7.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)............................................................................................. 46
7.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 - Authentication Failure Handling................................................................................................46
7.1.4.2 FIA_BLT_EXT.1 - Bluetooth User Authorization ..........................................................................................46
7.1.4.3 FIA_BLT_EXT.2 - Bluetooth Mutual Authentication....................................................................................46
7.1.4.4 FIA_BLT_EXT.3 - Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections .............................................................47
7.1.4.5 FIA_BLT_EXT.4 - Secure Simple Pairing......................................................................................................47
7.1.4.6 FIA_BLT_EXT.6 - Trusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization, FIA_BLT_EXT.7 - Untrusted Bluetooth
Device User Authorization ..........................................................................................................................................47
7.1.4.7 FIA_PAE_EXT.1 - Port Access Entity Authentication ..................................................................................48
7.1.4.8 FIA_UAU.5 - Multiple Authentication Mechanisms.....................................................................................48
7.1.4.9 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 - Certificate Validation, FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN X.509 - Certificate
Validation ......................................................................................................................................................................48
7.1.4.10 FIA_X509_EXT.2 - X.509 Certificate Authentication, FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN - X.509 Certificate
Authentication (EAP-TLS for WLAN).........................................................................................................................48
7.1.4.11 FIA_X509_EXT.6 - X.509 Certificate Storage and Management ............................................................49
7.1.5 Security Management (FMT)............................................................................................................. 49
7.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ............................................................................................................... 49
7.1.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 - Access Controls...............................................................................................................49
7.1.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 - Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)..........................................................50
7.1.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 - Stack Buffer Overflow Protection...............................................................................50
7.1.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 - Boot Integrity, FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN - TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
(WLAN Client)...............................................................................................................................................................50
7.1.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 - Trusted Update, FPT_TUD_EXT.2 - Trusted Update for Application Software...... 51
7.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)................................................................................................................................51
7.1.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 - Default TOE Access Banners................................................................................................... 51
7.1.7.2 FTA_WSE_EXT.1 - Wireless Network Access.............................................................................................. 51
7.1.8 Trusted Path (FTP)...............................................................................................................................52
7.1.8.1 FTP_BLT_EXT.1 - Bluetooth Encryption .......................................................................................................52
7.1.8.2 FTP_BLT_EXT.2 - Persistence of Bluetooth Encryption.............................................................................52
7.1.8.3 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR - Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (BR/EDR), FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE - Bluetooth
Encryption Parameters (LE)........................................................................................................................................52
7.1.8.4 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 - Trusted Channel Communication, FTP_ITC.1/WLAN - Trusted Channel
Communication (Wireless LAN) .................................................................................................................................52
7.1.8.5 FTP_TRP.1 - Trusted Path..............................................................................................................................52
7.2 ALC_TSU_EXT.1 - TIMELY SECURITY UPDATES............................................................................................52
A. DEVICES COVERED BY THIS EVALUATION........................................................................ 54
B. ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY............................................................................... 56
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List of Tables
Table 1: TOE Operational Environment................................................................................................................10
Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions for PP_OS_V4.3 ...........................................................................................11
Table 3: NIAP Technical Decisions for MOD_BT_V1.0....................................................................................... 12
Table 4: NIAP Technical Decisions for MOD_WLANC_V1.0.............................................................................. 12
Table 5: NIAP Technical Decisions for PKG_TLS_V1.1.......................................................................................13
Table 6: Auditable Events (Bluetooth).................................................................................................................18
Table 7: Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements (WLAN) ....................................................................19
Table 8: Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements (WLAN) ........................................................ 20
Table 9: TOE Management Functions.................................................................................................................31
Table 10: Management Functions (Bluetooth)...................................................................................................32
Table 11: Management Functions (WLAN) ........................................................................................................ 33
Table 12: Assurance Requirements .................................................................................................................... 38
Table 13: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (USR cryptographic implementation) ...............................41
Table 14: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (KRN cryptographic implementation)...............................41
Table 15: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SKS cryptographic implementation)............................... 42
Table 16: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SE cryptographic implementation) ................................. 42
Table 17: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (BC cryptographic implementation)................................. 42
Table 18: Hardware Platforms............................................................................................................................. 54
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1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target Identification
Title: Apple macOS 26 Tahoe Security Target
Version: 1.1
Status: Final
Date: 2026-07-02
Sponsor: Apple Inc.
Developer: Apple Inc.
Validation Body: NIAP
Validation ID: 11695
Keywords: Operating System, macOS, Apple silicon
1.2 TOE Identification
The TOE is Apple macOS 26 Tahoe.
1.3 TOE Type
The TOE type is a general-purpose operating system and provides wireless LAN and Bluetooth
functionality.
1.4 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Apple macOS 26 Tahoe, which is a general purpose operating system
running on the Apple Mac computers with Apple silicon.
The TOE is a Unix-based operating system built on top of the XNU kernel. The TOE implements standard
Unix facilities, provides both command-line and graphical user interfaces, supports Bluetooth
communication, and includes Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) client functionality. A portion of the
Bluetooth and WLAN functionalities is implemented in hardware (Broadcom chip).
The tested version of the TOE is macOS 26.3.
1.5 TOE Description
This section provides a general description of the TOE, including architecture, physical boundaries,
security functions, and relevant TOE documentation.
1.5.1 Architecture
The TOE is a general purpose operating system running on the Apple Mac computers with Apple silicon.
The Mac computers covered in this evaluation contain the Secure Enclave, a dedicated secure subsystem
integrated into the Apple silicon.
Utilizing a dedicated processor (Secure Enclave Processor, or SEP), the Secure Enclave is isolated from
the main processor to provide an extra layer of security designed to keep sensitive data secure. The SEP
executes the SEP Operating System (sepOS), which is based on a customized version of the L4
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microkernel. sepOS is included with macOS and is within the TOE boundary. The Secure Enclave supports
the TOE for secure boot, and the generation of secure random data used in cryptographic key generation.
The executing TOE is divided into user space and kernel space. User space contains processes that
execute in their own protected memory space and access services provided by the kernel. Kernel space
contains the macOS kernel (including device drivers and kernel extensions) that also executes in its own
protected memory space. The kernel enforces process separation, provides processes with controlled
access to hardware devices, and implements many other OS features. The SEP is only accessible by the
macOS kernel.
The TOE hardware platforms include a third-party chip that implements Bluetooth and wireless LAN
functionality. The chip model depends on the hardware platforms listed in Appendix A.
1.5.2 TOE Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE is the installation image which includes both macOS and sepOS. The
TOE hardware platforms covered by this evaluation are listed in Appendix A.
1.5.3 TOE Security Functionality
The TOE provides the security functions required by the conformance claims defined in Section 2.
1.5.3.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shut-down functions, and all auditable events as
specified by the conformance claims defined in Section 2. Audit events are generated for the following
audit functions:
• Authentication events (Success/Failure)
• Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and unsuccessful security, audit, and
configuration changes)
• Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure)
• Administrator or root-level access events (Success/Failure)
Each audit record contains the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and outcome (success or failure) of the event.
1.5.3.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE includes version 26 of the Apple corecrypto cryptographic implementations and is supported by
the onboard Apple Secure Enclave hardware for performing user space, kernel space, and Secure Enclave
cryptographic operations. In addition, it uses a hardware-based noise source for entropy generation.
The TOE implements Transport Layer Security version 1.2 (TLS 1.2) for secure communications with
remote servers. The TOE claims conformance to Functional Package for Transport Layer Security v1.1
(PKG_TLS_V1.1), which does not cover TLS version 1.3. Therefore, TLS version 1.3 is out of scope of the
evaluation, and this document focuses on TLS version 1.2.
The Bluetooth hardware implements the AES-CCM-128 cryptographic functionality used when connecting
to remote Bluetooth devices. The TOE implements Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA2 and WPA3) to secure
802.11 wireless traffic protected using AES-CCMP-256 and AES-GCMP-256 cryptographic algorithms.
Relevant Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates are shown in Section 7.1.2.
1.5.3.3 User Data Protection
The TOE implements access controls that prevent unprivileged users from accessing files and directories
owned by other users.
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1.5.3.4 Identification and Authentication
All users must be authenticated to the TOE prior to carrying out any management actions. The TOE
supports:
• Password-based authentication.
• Authentication based on username and a PIN that releases the asymmetric key stored in OE-
protected storage.
The TOE will deny further user authentication once a defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts have been reached.
For Bluetooth, the TOE supports Secure Simple Pairing (SSP). It requires user authorization and mutual
authentication during pairing. It also discards pairing attempts and session initialization from Bluetooth
devices to which an active session already exists. The TOE requires explicit user authorization when pairing
with an untrusted device.
External entities connecting to the TOE via a secure protocol (e.g., TLS, Extensible Authentication Protocol
TLS (EAP-TLS)) can be authenticated using X.509v3 certificates. X.509v3 certificates can be imported in
the keychain by the administrator.
1.5.3.5 Security Management
The TOE can perform management functions. The administrator has full access to carry out all
management functions, whereas the user has limited privileges.
1.5.3.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements the following protection of TOE Security Functionality:
• Access controls for critical components.
• Address space layout randomization (ASLR) with 16 bits of entropy.
• Stack-based buffer overflow protection.
• Verification of integrity of the bootchain and operating system executable code.
• Trusted software updates using digital signatures.
1.5.3.7 TOE Access
Before establishing a user session, the TOE can display an advisory warning message regarding
unauthorized use of the OS. Access to the TOE via a wireless network is controlled by administrator defined
policy.
1.5.3.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports TLS 1.2 for trusted channel communications. The TOE uses TLS to securely
communicate with the Apple Update Server. Applications may invoke the TOE-provided TLS to securely
communicate with remote servers. The TOE enforces encryption when transmitting data over Bluetooth
and terminates the connection if the connected device stops encrypting. The TOE uses EAP-TLS for
authentication and WPA for data encryption when connecting to a wireless access point as the WLAN
client.
1.5.4 TOE Guidance
The following TOE guidance document in PDF format is publicly available on the NIAP Product Compliance
List (PCL) alongside this Security Target:
Apple macOS 26 Tahoe Common Criteria Guide (CCGUIDE)
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1.5.5 TOE Operational Environment
The following environmental components interoperate with the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
Table 1: TOE Operational Environment
Component Description
Hardware platform Apple Mac computers listed in Appendix A
Apple Update Server Server that allows the TOE to download updates
External TLS server (optional) Applications on the TOE may initiate TLS sessions to external TLS servers
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2 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target (ST) is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 extended. Common Criteria (CC) version
3.1 revision 5 is the basis for this conformance claim.
This ST claims exact conformance to the following Protection Profiles (PPs) and Functional Packages:
• PP-Configuration for General Purpose Operating System, Bluetooth, and Wireless Local Area
Network Clients, Version 1.0 (CFG_GPOS_BT_WLANC_V1.0).
This PP-Configuration includes the following components:
o Base-PP: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3
(PP_OS_V4.3);
o PP-Module: PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0 (MOD_BT_V1.0); and
o PP-Module: PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0 (MOD_WLANC_V1.0).
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1 (PKG_TLS_V1.1).
The following table contains the NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) for the Protection Profile for General
Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3 (PP_OS_V4.3) at the time of the evaluation and a statement of
applicability to the evaluation.
Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions for PP_OS_V4.3
TD Description Applicable
?
Non-applicability Rationale
TD1005 Corrections in PP_OS_V4.3 Yes
TD0958 Correction to Referenced PPs in FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Yes
TD0955 Adding FIPS 186-5 in PP_OS_V4.3 Yes
TD0930 Clarification when CTR_DRBG is Selected for
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 in PP_OS_V4.3
Yes
TD0914 Addition of PKG_TLS_V2.0 to Conformance Claims No The ST claims conformance to
PKG_TLS_V1.1, not
PKG_TLS_V2.0.
TD0906 Clarification to List of Examples in FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 Yes
TD0904 Addition of MOD_VPNC_V2.5 to Conformance Claims No The ST does not claim
MOD_VPNC_V2.5.
TD0844 Addition of Assurance Package for Flaw Remediation
V1.0 Conformance Claim
No The ST does not claim Assurance
Package for Flaw Remediation
V1.0.
TD0839 Clarification for Local Administration in FTP_TRP.1.3 Yes
TD0821 Corrections to ECD for PP_OS_V4.3 Yes
TD0812 Updated CC Conformance Claims in PP_OS_v4.3 Yes
TD0789 Correction to TLS Selection in FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 Yes
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TD0773 Updates to FIA_X509_EXT.1 for Exception Processing
and Test Conditions
Yes
TD0713 Functional Package SFR mappings to objectives Yes
TD0712 Support for Bluetooth Standard 5.3 Yes
TD0701 Incomplete selection reference in FCS_CKM_EXT.4
TSS activities
Yes
TD0696 Removal of 160 bit selection from FCS_COP.1/HASH &
FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC
Yes
TD0691 OSPP 4.3 Conditional authentication testing Yes
TD0675 Make FPT_W^X_EXT.1 Optional Yes
The following table contains the TDs for the PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0 (MOD_BT_V1.0) at the
time of the evaluation and a statement of applicability to the evaluation.
Table 3: NIAP Technical Decisions for MOD_BT_V1.0
TD Description Applicable? Non-applicability Rationale
TD0707 Formatting corrections for MOD_BT_V1.0 Yes
TD0685 BT missing multiple SFR-to-Obj mappings Yes
TD0671 Bluetooth PP-Module updated to allow for new PP and
PP-Module Versions
Yes
TD0650 Conformance claim sections updated to allow for
MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
No This evaluation does not include
MOD_VPNC_V2.3 or V2.4.
TD0645 Bluetooth audit details Yes
TD0640 Handling BT devices that do not support encryption Yes
TD0600 Conformance claim sections updated to allow for
MOD_VPNC_V2.3
No This evaluation does not include
MOD_VPNC_V2.3.
The following table contains the TDs for the PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0
(MOD_WLANC_V1.0) at the time of the evaluation and a statement of applicability to the evaluation.
Table 4: NIAP Technical Decisions for MOD_WLANC_V1.0
TD Description Applicable? Non-applicability Rationale
TD0920 Clarification for FMT_SMF.1/WLAN Table 3 Yes
TD0916 Updates to FCS_CKM.1/WPA and FCS_CKM.2/GTK
Tests for MOD_WLANC
Yes
TD0837 Updates to WLAN Client PP-Module allow-lists Yes
TD0797 Addition of FCS_WPA_EXT to ECD Yes
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TD0710 WPA version restrictions Yes
TD0703 Removal of FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN evaluation
activities for revocation checking
Yes
TD0667 Move Set Wireless Freq Band to Optional/Objective Yes
The following table contains the TDs for the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version
1.1 (PKG_TLS_V1.1) at the time of the evaluation and a statement of applicability to the evaluation.
Table 5: NIAP Technical Decisions for PKG_TLS_V1.1
NIAP TD Description Applicable? Non-applicability Rationale
TD0779 Updated Session Resumption Support in TLS package
V1.1
No The TOE does not contain TLS
server functionality.
TD0770 TLSS.2 connection with no client cert No The TOE does not contain TLS
server functionality.
TD0739 PKG_TLS_V1.1 has 2 different publication dates Yes
TD0726 Corrections to (D)TLSS SFRs in TLS 1.1 FP No The TOE does not contain
(D)TLS server functionality.
TD0513 CA Certificate loading Yes
TD0499 Testing with pinned certificates Yes
TD0469 Modification of test activity for FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test
4.1
No The TOE does not contain TLS
server functionality.
TD0442 Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS Package Yes
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3 Security Problem Definition
The threats, assumptions, and organizational security policies (OSPs) are defined in the documents
specified in Section 2 "CC Conformance Claim". This Security Target includes by reference the Security
Problem Definition (composed of threats, assumptions, and organizational security policies) from
PP_OS_V4.3, MOD_BT_V1.0, and MOD_WLANC_V1.0.
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4 Security Objectives
The Security Objectives for the TOE and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment are defined
in the documents specified in Section 2 "CC Conformance Claim". This Security Target includes by
reference the Security Objectives from PP_OS_V4.3, MOD_BT_V1.0, and MOD_WLANC_V1.0.
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5 Extended Components Definition
All extended SFR components are defined in the PP/PP-Module/Package claimed in Section 2.
One extended SAR component, ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates, is defined in PP_OS_V4.3.
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6 Security Requirements
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
The following conventions are used to indicate the operations performed within the ST on security
requirement components:
• Selections are shown in bold text and are surrounded by square brackets.
• Assignments are shown in italic text and are surrounded by square brackets. The assignments
within a selection are shown in bold italics.
• Iterations are identified by appending a suffix to the original SFR.
• Refinements added to the text are shown in underlined text, deletions are shown as strikethrough
text.
6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 - Audit Data Generation
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FAU_GEN.1.1 The OS shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a. Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c.
o Authentication events (Success/Failure);
o Use of privileged/special rights events (Successful and
unsuccessful security, audit, and configuration changes);
o Privilege or role escalation events (Success/Failure);
o [
§ Administrator or root-level access events
(Success/Failure)
].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The OS shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [none].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1
6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.1/BT – Audit Data Generation (Bluetooth)
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
Applied TDs: TD0707, TD0645
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FAU_GEN.1.1/BT The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
b. All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit
c. Specifically defined auditable events in the Auditable Events table.
FAU_GEN.1.2/BT The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a. Date and time of the event
b. Type of event
c. Subject identity
d. The outcome (success or failure) of the event
e. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, Additional information in
the Auditable Events table.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1
Table 6: Auditable Events (Bluetooth)
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_CKM_EXT.8 None.
FIA_BLT_EXT.1 Failed user authorization of Bluetooth
device.
User authorization decision (e.g., user rejected
connection, incorrect pin entry).
Failed user authorization for local
Bluetooth Service.
[complete] BD_ADDR and [no other information].
Bluetooth profile. Identity of local service with
[service ID].
FIA_BLT_EXT.2 Initiation of Bluetooth connection. [complete] BD_ADDR and [no other information].
Failure of Bluetooth connection. Reason for failure.
FIA_BLT_EXT.3
(optional)
Duplicate connection attempt. [selection: complete, last [assignment: integer
greater than or equal to 2 ] octets of the] BD_ADDR
of connection attempt
FIA_BLT_EXT.4 None.
FIA_BLT_EXT.5 None.
FIA_BLT_EXT.6 None.
FIA_BLT_EXT.7 None.
FTP_BLT_EXT.1 None.
FTP_BLT_EXT.2 None.
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR None.
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FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE None.
Application Note:
FIA_BLT_EXT.3 is crossed out because the rejection is performed at the HCI layer.
FIA_BLT_EXT.5 is crossed out because it is not claimed in the ST.
6.1.1.3 FAU_GEN.1/WLAN – Audit Data Generation (Wireless LAN)
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FAU_GEN.1.1/WLAN The TSF shall [implement functionality] to generate an audit record of the
following auditable events:
a. Startup and shutdown of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events for not specified level of audit; and
c. all auditable events for mandatory SFRs specified in Table 2 Table 7 and
selected SFRs in Table 5 Table 8.
FAU_GEN.1.2/WLAN The [TSF] shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, (if relevant)
the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP-Module/ST, Additional Audit
Record Contents as specified in Table 2 Table 7 and selected SFRs in
Table 5 Table 8.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.1
Table 7: Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements (WLAN)
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1/WLAN No events specified. N/A
FCS_CKM.1/WPA No events specified. N/A
FCS_CKM.2/WLAN No events specified. N/A
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN Failure to establish an EAP-TLS session. • Reason for failure.
• Non-TOE endpoint of connection.
Establishment/termination of an EAP-TLS
session.
Non-TOE endpoint of connection.
FCS_WPA_EXT.1 No events specified. N/A
FIA_PAE_EXT.1 No events specified. N/A
FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN Failure to validate X.509v3 certificate. Reason for failure of validation.
FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN No events specified. N/A
FIA_X509_EXT.6 Attempts to load certificates. None.
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Attempts to revoke certificates. None.
FMT_SMF.1/WLAN No events specified. N/A
FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN Execution of this set of TSF self-tests. None.
[None]. [None].
FTA_WSE_EXT.1 All attempts to connect to access points. • For each access point record the
[Complete SSID and MAC] of the MAC
Address
• Success and failures (including reason
for failure).
FTP_ITC.1/WLAN All attempts to establish a trusted
channel.
Identification of the non-TOE endpoint of
the channel.
Table 8: Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements (WLAN)
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN No events specified N/A
6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation (Refined)
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0712, TD0955
FCS_CKM.1.1 The OS shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 3072-bit or
greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-5, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", Appendix A.1
• ECC schemes using "NIST curves" P-384 and [P-256, P-521]
that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-5, "Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)", Appendix A.2
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.1
6.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.1/WPA Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for
WPA2/WPA3 Connections)
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FCS_CKM.1/WPA The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm PRF-384 and [PRF-704] (as
defined in IEEE 802.11-2012) and specified key sizes 256 bits and [no other
key sizes] using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
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TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.1
6.1.2.3 FCS_CKM.2 - Cryptographic Key Establishment
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FCS_CKM.2.1 The OS shall implement functionality to perform cryptographic key
establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment
method: [
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the
following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC
8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2"
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the
following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.2
6.1.2.4 FCS_CKM.2/WLAN - Cryptographic Key Distribution (Group Temporal
Key for WLAN)
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FCS_CKM.2/WLAN The TSF shall decrypt Group Temporal Key in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method AES Key Wrap (as defined in RFC 3394)
in an EAPOL-Key frame (as defined in IEEE 802.11-2012 for the packet format
and timing considerations) and does not expose the cryptographic keys.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.3
6.1.2.5 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 - Cryptographic Key Destruction
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The OS shall destroy cryptographic keys and key material in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key destruction method [
• For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [
o single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]
]
• For non-volatile memory that consists of [
o the invocation of an interface provided by the underlying
platform that [
§ instructs the underlying platform to destroy the
abstraction that represents the key
]
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]
] .
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.2 The OS shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.4
6.1.2.6 FCS_CKM_EXT.8 - Bluetooth Key Generation
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FCS_CKM_EXT.8.1 The TSF shall generate public/private ECDH key pairs every [new connection
attempt].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.5
6.1.2.7 FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT - Cryptographic Operation
(Encryption/Decryption)
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0712
FCS_COP.1.1/ENCRYPT The OS shall perform encryption/decryption services for data in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• AES-CTR (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A)
] and [
• AES Key Wrap (KW) (as defined in NIST SP 800-38F)
• AES-CCMP-256 (as defined in NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE
802.11ac-2013)
• AES-GCMP-256 (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D and IEEE
802.11ac-2013)
• AES-CCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38C)
• AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)
] and cryptographic key sizes 256-bit and [128-bit].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.6
6.1.2.8 FCS_COP.1/HASH - Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0696
FCS_COP.1.1/HASH The OS shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [
• SHA-256
• SHA-384
• SHA-512
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] and message digest sizes [
• 256 bits
• 384 bits
• 512 bits
] that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.7
6.1.2.9 FCS_COP.1/SIGN - Cryptographic Operation (Signing)
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0955
FCS_COP.1.1/SIGN The OS shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and
verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [3072-bit or
greater] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-5, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", Section 4
• ECDSA schemes using "NIST curves" P-384 and [P-521] that
meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-5, "Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)", Section 5, SP 800-186 Section 3
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.8
6.1.2.10 FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC - Cryptographic Operation (Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication)
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0696
FCS_COP.1.1/
KEYHMAC
The OS shall perform keyed-hash message authentication services in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-256, SHA-384]
with key sizes [256 bits, 384 bits] and message digest sizes [256 bits, 384
bits] that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code and FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure Hash Standard.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.9
6.1.2.11 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 - Random Bit Generation
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The OS shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services
in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [
• CTR_DRBG (AES)
] .
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FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG used by the OS shall be seeded by an entropy source
that accumulates entropy from a [
• platform-based noise source
] with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security
strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will
generate.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.10
6.1.2.12 FCS_STO_EXT.1 - Storage of Sensitive Data
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 The OS shall implement functionality to encrypt sensitive data stored in non-
volatile storage and provide interfaces to applications to invoke this
functionality.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.11
6.1.2.13 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 - TLS Protocol
Origin: PKG_TLS_V1.1
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [
• TLS as a client
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.12
6.1.2.14 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 - TLS Client Protocol
Origin: PKG_TLS_V1.1
Applied TDs: TD0442
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS
versions] as a client that supports the cipher suites [
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as
defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined
in RFC 5289
] and also supports functionality for [
• mutual authentication,
• session renegotiation,
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference
identifier according to RFC 6125.
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FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is
invalid [
o except when override is authorized
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.12
6.1.2.15 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN - TLS Client Protocol (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1/
WLAN
The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] in
support of the EAP-TLS protocol as specified in RFC 5216 supporting the
following cipher suites: [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5288,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as
defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined
in RFC 5289
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2/
WLAN
The TSF shall generate random values used in the EAP-TLS exchange using
the RBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3/
WLAN
The TSF shall use X509 v3 certificates as specified in FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4/
WLAN
The TSF shall verify that the server certificate presented includes the Server
Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.5/
WLAN
The TSF shall allow an authorized administrator to configure the list of CAs that
are allowed to sign authentication server certificates that are accepted by the
TOE.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.13
6.1.2.16 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 - TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
Origin: PKG_TLS_V1.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The product shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.12
6.1.2.17 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN - TLS Client Support for Supported Groups
Extension (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
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FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1/
WLAN
The TSF shall present the Supported Groups extension in the Client Hello with
the following NIST curves: [secp384r1, secp521r1].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.13
6.1.2.18 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 - TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
Origin: PKG_TLS_V1.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4.1 The product shall support secure renegotiation through use of the
“renegotiation_info” TLS extension in accordance with RFC 5746.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.12
6.1.2.19 FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 - TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
Origin: PKG_TLS_V1.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5.1 The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello
with the supported groups [
• secp384r1,
• secp521r1,
].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.12
6.1.2.20 FCS_WPA_EXT.1 - Supported WPA Versions
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FCS_WPA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall support WPA3 and [WPA2] security type.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.2.14
6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.1.3.1 FDP_ACF_EXT.1 - Access Controls for Protecting User Data
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1 The OS shall implement access controls which can prohibit unprivileged users
from accessing files and directories owned by other users.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.3
6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 - Authentication failure handling
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0691
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FIA_AFL.1.1 The OS shall detect when [
• an administrator configurable positive integer within [1-50]
] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to events with [
• authentication based on user name and password
• authentication based on user name and a PIN that releases an
asymmetric key stored in OE-protected storage
] .
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts for an
account has been met, the OS shall: [deny subsequent authentication
attempts].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.1
6.1.4.2 FIA_BLT_EXT.1 - Bluetooth User Authorization
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FIA_BLT_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before pairing with a remote
Bluetooth device.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.2
6.1.4.3 FIA_BLT_EXT.2 - Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FIA_BLT_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall require Bluetooth mutual authentication between devices prior
to any data transfer over the Bluetooth link.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.3
6.1.4.4 FIA_BLT_EXT.3 - Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FIA_BLT_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall discard pairing and session initialization attempts from a
Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR) to which an active session already
exists.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.4
6.1.4.5 FIA_BLT_EXT.4 - Secure Simple Pairing
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FIA_BLT_EXT.4.1 The TOE shall support Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing, both in the host and
the controller.
FIA_BLT_EXT.4.2 The TOE shall support Secure Simple Pairing during the pairing process.
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TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.5
6.1.4.6 FIA_BLT_EXT.6 - Trusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FIA_BLT_EXT.6.1 The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before granting trusted remote
devices access to services associated with the following Bluetooth profiles:
[none].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.6
6.1.4.7 FIA_BLT_EXT.7 - Untrusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FIA_BLT_EXT.7.1 The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before granting untrusted
remote devices access to services associated with the following Bluetooth
profiles: [all].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.6
6.1.4.8 FIA_PAE_EXT.1 - Port Access Entity Authentication
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FIA_PAE_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE)
in the “Supplicant” role.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.7
6.1.4.9 FIA_UAU.5 - Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0691
FIA_UAU.5.1 The OS shall provide the following authentication mechanisms [
• authentication based on username and password
• authentication based on username and a PIN that releases an
asymmetric key stored in OE-protected storage
] to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The OS shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
[authentication based on username and a password/PIN that releases a set of
keys stored in the TOE to unwrap locally stored files].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.8
6.1.4.10 FIA_X509_EXT.1 - X.509 Certificate Validation
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
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FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The OS shall implement functionality to validate certificates in accordance with
the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate
• The OS shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA
certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
• The TSF shall validate that any CA certificate includes "Certificate
Signing" as a purpose the key usage field
• The OS shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using
[OCSP as specified in RFC 6960] with [no exceptions]
• The OS shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the
following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code
integrity verification shall have the Code Signing Purpose (id-
kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server
Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in
the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client
Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in
the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and
signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have
the OCSP Signing Purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)
in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC
Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field. (conditional)
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The OS shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.9
6.1.4.11 FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN - X.509 Certificate Validation
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/
WLAN
The TSF shall validate certificates for EAP-TLS in accordance with the
following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
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• The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust
Anchor Database
• The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of
the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for
all CA certificates
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the
following rules:
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server
Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in
the extendedKeyUsage field
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client
Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in
the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/
WLAN
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.9
6.1.4.12 FIA_X509_EXT.2 - X.509 Certificate Authentication
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0789
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The OS shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [TLS] connections.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.10
6.1.4.13 FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN - X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS
for WLAN)
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1/
WLAN
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for EAP-TLS exchanges.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.10
6.1.4.14 FIA_X509_EXT.6 - X.509 Certificate Storage and Management
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FIA_X509_EXT.6.1 The TSF shall [store and protect] certificate(s) from unauthorized deletion
and modification.
FIA_X509_EXT.6.2 The TSF shall [provide the capability for authorized administrators to
load X.509v3 certificates into the TOE] for use by the TSF.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.4.11
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6.1.5 Security Management (FMT)
6.1.5.1 FMT_MOF_EXT.1 - Management of Security Functions Behavior
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD1005
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1 The OS shall restrict the ability to perform the function indicated in the
"Administrator" column in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 to the administrator.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.5
6.1.5.2 FMT_MOF_EXT.1/BT - Management of Security Functions Behavior
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1/BT The OS shall restrict the ability to perform the function indicated in the
"Administrator" column in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/BT to the administrator.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.5
6.1.5.3 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 - Specification of Management Functions
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD1005
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1 The OS shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
Table 9: TOE Management Functions
# Management Function Administrator User
1 Enable/disable [screen lock] M -
2 Configure [screen lock] inactivity timeout M -
3 Import keys/secrets into the secure key storage - M
4 Configure local audit storage capacity M -
5 Configure minimum password length M -
6 Configure minimum number of special characters in password M -
7 Configure minimum number of numeric characters in password M -
8 Configure minimum number of uppercase characters in password M -
9 Configure minimum number of lowercase characters in password M -
10 Configure lockout policy for unsuccessful authentication attempts through [limiting
number of attempts during a time period]
M -
11 Configure host-based firewall M -
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12 Configure name/address of directory server with which to bind - -
13 Configure name/address of remote management server from which to receive
management settings
- -
14 Configure name/address of audit/logging server to which to send audit/logging
records
- -
15 Configure audit rules M -
16 Configure name/address of network time server M -
17 Enable/disable automatic software update M -
18 Configure Wi-Fi interface - M
19 Enable/disable Bluetooth interface - M
20 Enable/disable [no other external interfaces] - -
21 [No other management functions to be provided by the TSF] - -
Application Note:
M: Supported by the specified role.
Grey/hyphen: Not supported by the specified role.
The use of ‘M’ and ‘-‘ as indicator markers follows TD1005.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.5
6.1.5.4 FMT_SMF_EXT.1/BT - Specification of Management Functions
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/BT The OS shall be capable of performing the following Bluetooth management
functions:
Table 10: Management Functions (Bluetooth)
Function Administrator User
BT-1. Configure the Bluetooth trusted channel.
• Disable/enable the Discoverable (for BR/EDR) and Advertising (for LE) modes;
X X
BT-2. Change the Bluetooth device name (separately for BR/EDR and LE); - -
BT-3. Provide separate controls for turning the BR/EDR and LE radios on and off; - -
BT-4. Allow/disallow the following additional wireless technologies to be used with
Bluetooth: [selection: Wi-Fi, NFC, [assignment: other wireless technologies]];
- -
BT-5. Configure allowable methods of Out of Band pairing (for BR/EDR and LE); - -
BT-6. Disable/enable the Discoverable (for BR/EDR) and Advertising (for LE) modes
separately;
- -
BT-7. Disable/enable the Connectable mode (for BR/EDR and LE); - -
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BT-8. Disable/enable the Bluetooth [assignment: list of Bluetooth service and/or profiles
available on the OS (for BR/EDR and LE)];
- -
BT-9. Specify minimum level of security for each pairing (for BR/EDR and LE); - -
Application Note:
X: Supported by the specified role.
Grey/hyphen: Not supported by the specified role.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.5
6.1.5.5 FMT_SMF.1/WLAN - Specification of Management Functions (WLAN
Client)
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
Applied TDs: TD0667, TD0920
FMT_SMF.1.1/WLAN The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
TSS Link: Section 7.1.5
Table 11: Management Functions (WLAN)
# Management Function Impl Admin User
WL-1 configure security policy for each wireless network:
• [specify the CA(s) from which the TSF will accept WLAN
authentication server certificate(s)],
• security type,
• authentication protocol,
• client credentials to be used for authentication
M M -
WL-2 specify wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the TSF may connect M M -
WL-3 enable/disable disable wireless network bridging capability (for example,
bridging a connection between the WLAN and cellular radios to function as
a hotspot) authenticated by [passcode]
M M -
WL-4 enable/disable certificate revocation list checking - - -
WL-5 disable ad hoc wireless client-to-client connection capability M M M
WL-6 disable roaming capability - - -
WL-7 enable/disable IEEE 802.1X pre-authentication - - -
WL-8 loading X.509 certificates into the TOE M M -
WL-9 revoke X.509 certificates loaded into the TOE M M -
WL-10 enable/disable and configure PMK caching:
• set the amount of time (in minutes) for which PMK entries are cached
• set the maximum number of PMK entries that can be cached
- - -
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WL-11 configure security policy for each wireless network: set wireless frequency
band to [selection: 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz, 6 GHz]
- - -
Application Note:
M: Supported by the specified role or implemented in the TOE.
Grey/hyphen: Not supported by the specified role or not implemented in the TOE.
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 - Access Controls
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.1 The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from
modifying:
• Kernel and its drivers/modules
• Security audit logs
• Shared libraries
• System executables
• System configuration files
• [
o TSF data
o Applications
].
FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2 The OS shall implement access controls which prohibit unprivileged users from
reading:
• Security audit logs
• System-wide credential repositories
• [no other objects].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.6.1
6.1.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 - Address Space Layout Randomization
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FPT_ASLR_EXT.1.1 The OS shall always randomize process address space memory locations with
[[16]] bits of entropy except for [no exception].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.6.2
6.1.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 - Stack Buffer Overflow Protection
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FPT_SBOP_EXT.1.1 The OS shall [employ stack-based buffer overflow protections].
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TSS Link: Section 7.1.6.3
6.1.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 – Boot Integrity
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The OS shall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the OS kernel and
[
• no other executable code
] prior to its execution through the use of [
• a digital signature using a hardware-protected asymmetric key
] .
TSS Link: Section 7.1.6.4
6.1.6.5 FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN - TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
(WLAN Client)
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FPT_TST_EXT.3.1/
WLAN
The [TOE] shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXT.3.2/
WLAN
The [TOE] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF
executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the TSF-
provided cryptographic services.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.6.4
6.1.6.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 - Trusted Update
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to the OS software itself
and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1/SIGN to
validate the authenticity of the response.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The OS shall [cryptographically verify] updates to itself using a digital
signature prior to installation using schemes specified in FCS_COP.1/SIGN.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.6.5
6.1.6.7 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 - Trusted Update for Application Software
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The OS shall provide the ability to check for updates to application software
and shall use a digital signature scheme specified in FCS_COP.1/SIGN to
validate the authenticity of the response.
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FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The OS shall cryptographically verify the integrity of updates to applications
using a digital signature specified by FCS_COP.1/SIGN prior to installation.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.6.5
6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)
6.1.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 - Default TOE Access Banners
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing a user session, the OS shall display an advisory warning
message regarding unauthorized use of the OS.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.7.1
6.1.7.2 FTA_WSE_EXT.1 - Wireless Network Access
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FTA_WSE_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to attempt connections only to wireless networks
specified as acceptable networks as configured by the administrator in
FMT_SMF.1.1/WLAN.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.7.2
6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)
6.1.8.1 FTP_BLT_EXT.1 - Bluetooth Encryption
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FTP_BLT_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the use of encryption when transmitting data over the
Bluetooth trusted channel for BR/EDR and [LE].
FTP_BLT_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall use key pairs per FCS_CKM_EXT.8 for Bluetooth encryption.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.8.1
6.1.8.2 FTP_BLT_EXT.2 - Persistence of Bluetooth Encryption
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FTP_BLT_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall [terminate the connection] if the remote device stops
encryption while connected to the TOE.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.8.2
6.1.8.3 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR - Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (BR/EDR)
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
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FTP_BLT_EXT.3.1/BR The TSF shall set the minimum encryption key size to [128 bits] for BR/EDR
and not negotiate encryption key sizes smaller than the minimum size.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.8.3
6.1.8.4 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE - Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (LE)
Origin: MOD_BT_V1.0
FTP_BLT_EXT.3.1/LE The TSF shall set the minimum encryption key size to [128 bits] for LE and not
negotiate encryption key sizes smaller than the minimum size.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.8.3
6.1.8.5 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 - Trusted Channel Communication
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0789, TD0958
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 The OS shall use [
• TLS as conforming to the Functional Package for Transport
Layer Security (TLS) as a [client]
] and [
• no other protocols
] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT
entities supporting the following capabilities: [[Apple Update Server,
application initiated TLS]] that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of
modification of the channel data.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.8.4
6.1.8.6 FTP_ITC.1/WLAN - Trusted Channel Communication (Wireless LAN)
Origin: MOD_WLANC_V1.0
FTP_ITC.1.1/WLAN The TSF shall use 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to provide a trusted
communication channel between itself and a wireless access point that is
logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/WLAN The TSF shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/WLAN The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for wireless
access point connections.
TSS Link: Section 7.1.8.4
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6.1.8.7 FTP_TRP.1 - Trusted Path
Origin: PP_OS_V4.3
Applied TDs: TD0839
FTP_TRP.1.1 The OS shall provide a communication path between itself and [local] users
that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its endpoints and protection of the communicated data from
modification, disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 The OS shall permit [local users] to initiate communication via the trusted
path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The OS shall require use of the trusted path for [initial user authentication].
TSS Link: Section 7.1.8.5
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) are included by reference from PP_OS_V4.3. The table
below summarizes the SARs for TOE evaluation.
Table 12: Assurance Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Components
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life-cycle Support (ALC) Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Timely security updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
As per the conformance claims defined in Section 2, the TOE supports the following security features:
• Security audit
• Cryptographic support
• User data protection
• Identification and authentication
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE access
• Trusted path/channels
7.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)
The TOE generates audit records using Apple Unified Logging. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE
employs auditd to log the auditable events specified in OS_PP_V4.3 and uses the Apple Unified logging to
generate Bluetooth and WLAN audit records. The TOE includes the built-in utilities praudit and auditreduce
for accessing audit records generated by auditd, and the log utility for accessing audit records generated
by the Apple Unified Logging system.
The praudit command is used to make the binary output of the auditreduce command readable. The praudit
command reads audit records in binary format from standard input and displays the records in multiple
formats, such as XML.
The audit record XML format is:
<record><argument/><path/><attribute/><subject/><text/><return/><identi
ty/></record>
The <record> tag specifies the beginning and end of an audit record. The <argument> tag specifies the
command line arguments. The <path> tag indicates the filesystem object path name. The <attribute> tag
indicates access control attributes. The <subject> tag indicates the subject (e.g., user) triggering the audit
event. The <text> tag contains the audit event description. The <return> tag specifies the outcome of the
audited event. The <identity> tag indicates the code-signing information of the component generating the
audit event.
An audit record generated by the Apple Unified Logging system looks like this:
timestamp thread type activity pid ttl message
The timestamp indicates when the event occurred. The process and framework are used to represent the
process name and the specific framework within that process that generated the log message. The pid
identifies the specific process that generated the entry. The level (ttl) determines the severity of the
message and whether the system persists it to disk. The message component includes specific information
about the event, such as related tasks, along with a human-readable description.
7.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE uses the following cryptographic implementations:
• USR: Apple corecrypto 26 [Apple silicon, User, Software, SL1]
• KRN: Apple corecrypto 26 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software, SL1]
• SKS: Apple corecrypto 26 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]
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• SE: Secure Enclave hardware onboard Apple silicon
• BC: Broadcom Crypto Hardware Module
The USR, KRN, and SKS cryptographic libraries execute on the following operational environments:
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Pro
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Max
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Ultra
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Pro
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Max
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Ultra
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4 Pro
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4 Max
• macOS Tahoe 26 on Apple M Series (ARMv9.3-A) M5
The SE cryptographic implementation executes on the following operational environments:
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Pro
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Max
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M2 Ultra
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Pro
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Max
• Apple M Series (ARMv8.6-A) M3 Ultra
• Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4
• Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4 Pro
• Apple M Series (ARMv9.2-A) M4 Max
• Apple M Series (ARMv9.3-A) M5
The BC cryptographic implementation executes on the following operational environments:
• Crypto Hardware Module aes_core_gcm.vhd
• Crypto Hardware Module aes_core_gcm_simult_enc_mic.vhd
• Mentor Questa Sim-64 2021.2_1
The tables below show the cryptographic services used by the TOE and provided by the cryptographic
implementations, describing the algorithms, their supported key sizes, applicable standard and purpose.
The tables also include the certificates obtained from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
(CAVP) in the evaluated configuration for each of the cryptographic algorithms.
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Table 13: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (USR cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_CKM.1 RSA Modulus: 3072, 4096 bits [FIPS186-5] A7643
ECC Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 [FIPS186-5] A7643
FCS_CKM.2 RSA Key
Establishment
Modulus: 3072, 4096 bits [RFC8017] CCTL
Tested
KAS-ECC-SSC Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 [SP800-56Ar3] A7641
FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT AES-KW 256 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38F] A7639
AES-GCM 256 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38D] A7642
FCS_COP.1/HASH SHA2-256 Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4] A7644
SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
A7645
FCS_COP.1/SIGN RSA SigGen Modulus: 3072, 4096 bits
Hash: SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS
[FIPS186-5] A7643
RSA SigVer Modulus: 3072, 4096 bits
Hash: SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS
[FIPS186-5] A7643
ECDSA SigGen Curves: P-384, P-521
Hash: SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
[FIPS186-5] A7643
ECDSA SigVer Curves: P-384, P-521
Hash: SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
[FIPS186-5] A7643
FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC HMAC-SHA-256, Byte-oriented mode [FIPS198-1] A7644
HMAC-SHA-384 A7645
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG AES-256 [SP800-90Ar1] A7642
Table 14: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (KRN cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_COP.1/HASH SHA2-384 Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4] A7637
FCS_COP.1/SIGN RSA SigVer Modulus: 4096 bits [FIPS186-5] A7635
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Hash: SHA2-384
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG AES-256 [SP800-90Ar1] A7634
Table 15: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SKS cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_COP.1/HASH SHA2-384 Byte-oriented mode [FIPS180-4] A7652
FCS_COP.1/SIGN RSA SigVer Modulus: 4096 bits
Hash: SHA2-384
Padding: PKCS#1 v1.5
[FIPS186-5] A7652
Table 16: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (SE cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG AES-256 [SP800-90Ar1] A3490, A6548, A6924
Table 17: Mapping of SFRs to CAVP certificates (BC cryptographic implementation)
SFR Algorithm Capabilities Standard CAVP cert.
FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT AES-CTR 256 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38A] AES 5926, AES 5927
AES-CCM 128 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38C] AES 5926, AES 5927,
A1932
AES-CCM 256 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38C] AES 5952, AES 5953,
A1932
AES-GCM 256 bits
encrypt, decrypt
[SP800-38D] AES 5926, AES 5927,
A1932
7.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 - Cryptographic Key Generation, FCS_CKM.1/WPA -
Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2/WPA3
Connections)
The TOE supports generation of 3072-bit and 4096-bit RSA keys for use in TLS and EAP-TLS sessions.
The TOE provides ECC key generation for use in TLS sessions and EAP-TLS sessions. It generates
ephemeral keys using the P-384 and P-521 curves during ECDH key establishment. Bluetooth SSP uses
ephemeral ECDH curve P-256 for key establishment.
The TOE generates symmetric keys for WLAN connections in accordance with PRF-384 and PRF-704 as
defined in IEEE 802.11-2012 and updated by IEEE 802.11ac-2013. It is used for the generation of 256-bit
AES keys. The AES-CCMP-256 and AES-GCMP-256 cryptographic algorithms are used to secure the
WLAN data traffic.
The developer employs internal testing and independent external testing to ensure that the TOE
implementation conforms to cryptographic standards. Each Wi-Fi chip integrated into the TOE hardware
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platforms is covered by a Wi-Fi Alliance certificate. Additionally, the developer performs extensive internal
testing (approximately 4800 test cases) covering a wide range of Wi-Fi features, from general
interoperability to cryptographic support. The cryptographic testing includes verification of algorithms
(AES-CCMP-256, AES-GCMP-256) and security protocols (WPA2 and WPA3) against the Wi-Fi
standards.
7.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 - Cryptographic Key Establishment
RSA-based key establishment is used in EAP-TLS sessions when ciphersuites with RSA key exchange are
negotiated. The TOE acts as the sender for RSA-based key establishment schemes.
Elliptic curve-based key establishment (P-384 and P-521) is used in TLS and EAP-TLS sessions when
ciphersuites with ECDHE key exchange are negotiated. Bluetooth SSP initialization also uses elliptic curve-
based key establishment (P-256).
7.1.2.3 FCS_CKM.2/WLAN - Cryptographic Key Distribution (Group Temporal
Key for WLAN)
The TOE performs Group Temporal Key (GTK) unwrapping in accordance with the following key
distribution method: AES Key Wrap (as defined in RFC 3394) in an Extensible Authentication Protocol over
LAN (EAPOL) key frame (as defined in IEEE 802.11-2012).
7.1.2.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 - Cryptographic Key Destruction
The TOE includes the Keychain Access app that allows users the ability to add, remove, and manage
certificates, shared secrets, and private keys. Please see Section 7.1.2.11 for the details of Keychain
Access. Each keychain item is protected with an individual Data Encryption Key (DEK). The metadata of all
keychain items is collectively encrypted with another DEK (the metadata key).
Each DEK is wrapped by the Secure Enclave using a class key acting as the Key Encryption Key (KEK) as
requested by the creator of the keychain item. The KEK remains inside the Secure Enclave. The KEKs are
wrapped by a key derived from the user’s password as described in Section 7.1.4.8.
All DEKs and KEKs are always stored in wrapped (encrypted) form in non-volatile storage. The unwrapped
copy of the key is solely held in volatile memory for the duration that key is required to unwrap the DEK (for
KEKs) or to decrypt the data (for DEKs).
TLS and EAP-TLS private keys and certificates are stored encrypted in the keychain. Session keys are
generated during the TLS / EAP-TLS handshake process and are introduced into volatile memory for the
duration of the session. These keys are used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted over the TLS / EAP-
TLS connection. Session keys are zeroized when no longer needed.
Bluetooth SSP private keys and DEKs are not stored persistently. Rather, the Bluetooth “Link Key” is stored
encrypted in the keychain. The Link Key is used to derive the DEK.
The TOE does not store the Pairwise Master Key (PMK), Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), or Group Temporal
Key (GTK) in non-volatile storage.
Wrapped keys held in non-volatile storage (KEK and DEK) are deleted by invoking an interface provided
by the underlying platform that destroys the abstraction that represents the key. Keys held in volatile
memory are destroyed via single overwrite consisting of zeroes.
Once the cryptographic operations are complete (at the end of the TLS session, Bluetooth connection, or
WLAN connection), ephemeral keys are securely destroyed via overwriting them with zeros in volatile
memory.
7.1.2.5 FCS_CKM_EXT.8 - Bluetooth Key Generation
The TOE generates a new ECDH key pair for every new Bluetooth connection attempt. Static ECDH key
pairs are not permitted.
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7.1.2.6 FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT - Cryptographic Operation -
Encryption/Decryption
The TOE supports AES encryption using 128-bit and 256-bit keys. The 128-bit key is only used with AES-
CCM for Bluetooth functions.
7.1.2.7 FCS_COP.1/HASH - Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
Hashing algorithms are used for signature generation and verification, and HMAC. Table 13, Table 14 and
Table 15 identify the hash functions used by the signature algorithms.
7.1.2.8 FCS_COP.1/SIGN - Cryptographic Operation - Signing
The TOE performs signature generation and verification as described in Section 6.1.2.9.
7.1.2.9 FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC - Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication
The TOE performs keyed-hash message authentication as described in Section 6.1.2.10.
7.1.2.10 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 - Random Bit Generation
The TOE performs random bit generation as described in Section 6.1.2.11 and the proprietary Entropy
Assessment Report.
7.1.2.11 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Sensitive Data
The TOE offers an encrypted database, called keychain, to securely store sensitive data. Users can access
the keychain by opening the Keychain Access app in /Applications/Utilities/. An initial default keychain is
created for each user, though users can create other keychains for specific purposes. In addition to user
keychains, the TOE relies on a number of system-level keychains that maintain authentication assets that
are not user specific, such as network credentials and public key infrastructure (PKI) identities.
The TOE stores the following sensitive data in the keychain:
• Trusted certificate authorities for establishing TLS or EAP-TLS sessions.
• Private keys for establishing TLS or EAP-TLS sessions.
• Bluetooth Link Keys to manage the pairing and secure communication with Bluetooth devices.
• WLAN passwords to authenticate the TOE itself when connecting to wireless access points.
The keychain items are encrypted using two different AES-256-GCM keys: a table key (metadata), and a
per-row key (secret key). Keychain metadata (all attributes other than kSecValue) is encrypted with the
metadata key while the secret value (kSecValueData) is encrypted with the secret key. Both keys are
wrapped by KEKs stored in the Secure Enclave. The metadata key is cached in the application processor
to allow fast queries of the keychain.
7.1.2.12 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 - TLS Protocol, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 - TLS Client Protocol,
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 - TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication,
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 - TLS Client Support for Renegotiation,
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 – TLS Client Support for Supported Groups
Extension
The TOE implements TLS 1.2 and rejects all earlier TLS versions. The TOE supports the following TLS 1.2
ciphersuites:
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
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The TOE establishes the reference identifier by parsing the Domain Name System (DNS) Name or IP
address for the configured TLS server. The reference identifier is matched against the presented identifier
in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension. The TOE requires the SAN to be present in the server’s
certificate for proper validation. The TOE supports wildcards in the presented identifier of DNS type.
The TOE does not support Universal Resource Identifier (URI) reference identifiers or DNS Service (SRV)
reference identifiers.
The TOE supports certificate pinning using the TLS framework. However, existing TLS clients in the TOE,
such as the Safari browser, do not support certificate pinning. EAP-TLS also does not support certificate
pinning.
If the TLS framework is used, the didReceiveChallenge method in URLSession is called when a session first
establishes a connection to a remote TLS server. This method allows applications to override the default
trust handling of TLS server certificates. The TOE does not store these override decisions. EAP-TLS does
not allow server certificate exceptions.
The TOE supports mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
The TOE supports the Supported Groups Extension by default with the following supported groups:
secp384r1 and secp521r1.
TOE implements TLS session secure renegotiation in accordance with RFC 5746.
7.1.2.13 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN TLS - Client Protocol (EAP-TLS for WLAN),
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2/WLAN - TLS Client Support for Supported Groups
Extension (EAP-TLS for WLAN)
For the EAP-TLS client, the TOE implements TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346). The TOE
supports the following ciphersuites:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
The TOE establishes the reference identifier by parsing the DNS Name for the configured TLS server. The
reference identifier is matched against the CN or the SAN. The TOE does not support wildcards in the DNS
name of the server certificate. The TOE does not support URI reference identifiers, SRV reference
identifiers, or IP address reference identifiers.
The TOE supports the Supported Groups Extension by default with the following supported groups:
secp384r1 and secp521r1.
7.1.2.14 FCS_WPA_EXT.1 - Supported WPA Versions
The TOE supports Wi-Fi Protected Access as described in Section 6.1.2.20.
7.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
The TOE includes the following file system security schemes providing access control to user data:
sandbox entitlements, access control lists (ACLs), Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) file flags, and
standard Unix permissions.
These security schemes fit together as follows (rules are processed in the following order):
• If the app's sandbox forbids the requested access, the request is denied.
• If an ACL exists on the file, it is evaluated to determine access rights.
• If a BSD file flag prohibits the operation, the operation is denied.
• Finally, the Unix permissions are evaluated to determine access rights:
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o If the user ID matches the owner of the file, the "owner" permissions are used.
o Otherwise, if the group ID matches the group for the file, the "group" permissions are used.
o Otherwise, the "other" permissions are used.
Sandbox Entitlements
The TOE supports the use of a sandbox to limit an app's ability to access files. These limits override any
permissions the app might otherwise have. Sandbox limits are subtractive, not additive. Therefore, the file
system permissions represent the maximum access an app might be allowed if its sandbox also permits
that access.
ACLs
The TOE supports ACLs, which provide more fine-grained access control to files and directories than the
Unix permissions. For example, ACLs allow the system administrator to specify that a specific user can
append new contents to a file but cannot modify the existing contents of the file.
An ACL consists of an ordered list of access control entries (ACE), each of which associates a user or group
with a set of permissions and specifies whether each permission is allowed or denied. The TOE supports
ACL inheritance such that the files and subdirectories created within a directory can inherit the ACL of the
parent directory.
BSD File Flags
As a BSD-derived system, the TOE supports the BSD file flags, which provide additional security control
over files and directories. For example, the file owner can use the BSD file flag "uchange" to specify that a
file cannot be deleted. The BSD file flags override the Unix permissions.
Standard Unix Permissions
The UNIX permission settings for a file or directory are a 9-bit string that is often represented as a three-
digit octal value. The “owner,” “group,” and “other” bit sets contain three bits respectively: read, write,
execute (rwx for short), indicating separate read, write, and execute permissions for the "owner," "group,"
and "other".
The "owner" permissions apply to the user who owns the file or directory. The "group" permissions apply
to all users who belong to the group associated with the file or directory. The "other" permissions apply to
all remaining users.
7.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
7.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 - Authentication Failure Handling
The TOE handles authentication failures as described in Section 6.1.4.1.
7.1.4.2 FIA_BLT_EXT.1 - Bluetooth User Authorization
Explicit user authorization is required for both pairing and removing a Bluetooth device from the TOE's
device list.
During the pairing time, another device (or the TOE) can send a pairing request. Commonly, a six-digit
number is displayed on both sides, which must be manually matched by a user (i.e., the PIN is shown and
the user must accept it before the pairing completes). If one device does not support this automatic
exchange of a PIN, a window for entering a manual PIN is shown. That PIN must match on both sides. This
also applies to applications that use Bluetooth. Finally, the user could also affirm the remote device name
depending on the remote Bluetooth device.
7.1.4.3 FIA_BLT_EXT.2 - Bluetooth Mutual Authentication
The TOE's Bluetooth device driver prevents data transfer via Bluetooth until pairing has fully completed
and the devices have mutually authenticated. The TOE requires manual authorization from the user during
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the pairing process, through showing the user a system dialog (e.g., PIN request, confirmation). The TOE
provides no APIs for programmatically bypassing the system pairing dialogs.
The TOE supports the Object Exchange (OBEX) protocol, which runs over the Radio Frequency
Communication (RFCOMM) protocol, which in turn runs on top of the Logical Link Control and Adaptation
Layer Protocol (L2CAP). The TOE also supports the Audio/Video Control Transport Protocol (AVCTP), the
Audio/Video Distribution Transport Protocol (AVDTP), the Service Discovery Protocol (SDP), and the
Attribute Protocol (ATT).
7.1.4.4 FIA_BLT_EXT.3 - Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections
Bluetooth devices may not establish more than one connection. Multiple connection attempts (i.e., pairing
and session initialization attempts) from the same BD_ADDR for an established connection will be
discarded.
The process for starting a Bluetooth connection covers the handling of duplicates in the Bluetooth layers
of the TOE devices. Depending on the Bluetooth chip, it could either be the macOS Bluetooth controller or
software orchestrating the process with support from the Link Manager Protocol (LMP) or the Host
Controller Interface (HCI) layer.
The process is as follows:
1. Connection List: A connection list is maintained to track all active Bluetooth connections by device
identifier (BD_ADDR).
2. Pre-Connection Validation: When an incoming Bluetooth connection request arrives at the LMP
or HCI layer, the device invokes a callback that queries the connection list before the connection
is accepted.
3. Duplicate Detection: The layer managing the Bluetooth connections (LMP or HCI) performs a
lookup in the connection list using the device’s BD_ADDR.
4. Rejection: If the lookup returns true (i.e., the device is already connected), that layer rejects the
connection request before completing the connection establishment.
7.1.4.5 FIA_BLT_EXT.4 - Secure Simple Pairing
Devices that want to pair with the TOE via Bluetooth can use Secure Simple Pairing (SSP). The TOE
implements SSP, which is the 2nd generation of the security key exchange scheme to use ECDH-based
key exchange using NIST curve P-256. Message integrity and data protection are supported with the use
of AES and 128-bit keys.
7.1.4.6 FIA_BLT_EXT.6 - Trusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization,
FIA_BLT_EXT.7 - Untrusted Bluetooth Device User Authorization
The TOE supports Bluetooth including Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR) and Low Energy (LE) with
the following Bluetooth profiles:
• Hands-Free Profile (HFP 1.8)
• Advanced Audio Distribution Profile (A2DP 1.3)
• Audio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP 1.5, AVRCP 1.6)
• Human Interface Device Profile (HID)
• Generic Attribute Profile (GATT)
• Serial Port Profile (SPP 1.2)
The TOE automatically authorizes the remote Bluetooth device during pairing for all Bluetooth profiles the
remote device announces to support during the pairing operation. This approach avoids user confusion
between the following two cases:
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• a paired device to which the TOE is connected and authorized and thus can communicate with,
and
• a device to which the TOE is connected but not yet authorized with which the TOE cannot yet
communicate.
To de-authorize a device, the user would unpair the device. The TOE establishes a "trusted relationship"
with an authorized device at the time of pairing. The only difference in behavior between a trusted device
and an untrusted device is that the untrusted device must first be manually authorized through the pairing
process.
7.1.4.7 FIA_PAE_EXT.1 - Port Access Entity Authentication
The TOE supports port-based network access control as described in Section 6.1.4.8.
7.1.4.8 FIA_UAU.5 - Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
The TOE supports authentication based on username/password and username/smart card.
For password-based authentication, the user account requires a username and a password credential. To
initiate the authentication process, the user enters their username and is prompted for a password. A 256-
bit key is derived from the user password using the Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2)
with SHA-256. This key is then used to unwrap (decrypt) the user’s key bags using AES-KW. If the output
key from the PBKDF2 function successfully unwraps the user’s key bags, the user is authenticated and
granted access; otherwise, the user is denied access.
For smart card authentication, the user’s smart card must first be registered with the TOE and be
associated with the user. Upon registration, the smart card is provisioned with a digital certificate and an
encryption key. When the user inserts the smart card to authenticate, the user enters the associated PIN
to unlock and access the certificate and encryption key. Once unlocked, a signing operation is performed
by the card and the TOE verifies the signature using the paired certificate for authentication. The
encryption key is then used to unwrap the user’s key bags.
7.1.4.9 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 - Certificate Validation, FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN
X.509 - Certificate Validation
When an X.509v3 certificate is presented for authentication, the TOE verifies the certificate path as
described in Sections 6.1.4.10 and 6.1.4.11.
X.509v3 certificates are validated when imported into the keychain, during session establishment with a
TLS or EAP-TLS server, and prior to presenting a certificate to the server during TLS or EAP-TLS mutual
authentications.
7.1.4.10 FIA_X509_EXT.2 - X.509 Certificate Authentication,
FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN - X.509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS
for WLAN)
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates for performing mutual authentication for TLS connections. The TOE
also uses X.509v3 certificates to support authentication for 802.1X EAP-TLS exchanges.
The TOE stores digital certificates in the keychain. The keychain contains a set of pre-installed Certification
Authority (CA) certificates, and additional trusted CA certificates or client certificates can be imported by
users or applications.
Each certificate stored in the keychain is associated with a trust policy. A trust policy specifies whether a
certificate is trusted, and for which intended purposes. A certificate may be valid for certain uses (e.g.,
Extensible Authentication) but not for others (e.g., Code Signing). By configuring the trust policy, users can
control whether a certificate is considered trustworthy and define the conditions under which it may be
used.
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7.1.4.11 FIA_X509_EXT.6 - X.509 Certificate Storage and Management
The TOE ensures that all certificates on the system are securely stored and protected from unauthorized
deletion or modification. The certificates are stored in an encrypted database, called keychain.
Keychain items are encrypted with AES-256-GCM, which provides both confidentiality and integrity
protection. The user is required to enter the correct Administrator password before modifying the system-
level keychains, such as loading certificates into the keychain.
7.1.5 Security Management (FMT)
Functions requiring Administrator access require the user to enter the correct Administrator password
before allowing the user to modify the function.
For functions that can be performed by both the Administrator and user roles, if the Administrator overrides
the user ability to change the function, the TOE enforces these restrictions by requiring the user to enter
the correct Administrator password before allowing the user to modify the function.
The TOE supports both Bluetooth BR/EDR and LE, can make use of Secure Simple Pairing for security, and
supports the Bluetooth profiles listed in Section 7.1.4.6.
The TOE supports all Bluetooth Security Modes and Levels to ensure compatibility and interoperability with
a wide range of Bluetooth devices. By default, the TOE will first attempt to negotiate the use of Security
Mode 1 Level 4 to provide the most robust security. However, if the peer device does not support Mode 1
Level 4, the TOE will negotiate the highest mode and level supported by the peer device including Security
Mode 1 (any level), Security Mode 2 (any level), Security Mode 3 (any level), and Security Mode 4 (levels
0;1;2).
7.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
7.1.6.1 FPT_ACF_EXT.1 - Access Controls
System Integrity Protection restricts the root user account and limits the actions that the root user can
perform on protected parts of the Mac operating system. System Integrity Protection protects the following
parts of the system from unauthorized modification:
a. Kernel drivers/modules:
i. /System/Library/Extensions/
b. Shared libraries:
i. /usr/lib
ii. /Library/Frameworks
iii. /System/Library/Frameworks
iv. /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks
c. System executables:
i. /usr/bin
d. Applications
i. /Applications - Apps that are installed with the TOE but updated independently
ii. /System/Applications
iii. /System/Library/CoreServices
System Integrity Protection is designed to allow modification of these protected parts only by processes
that are signed by Apple and have special entitlements to write to system files, such as Apple software
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updates and Apple installers. Apps downloaded from the App Store already work with System Integrity
Protection.
Standard file permissions are used to protect the following from unauthorized modification:
a. Security audit logs:
i. /var/audit
ii. /var/db/diagnostics
b. System configuration files:
i. /private/etc
ii. /Library/Preferences
c. TSF data:
i. /var
ii. /var/folders/ - user-specific TSF data. A user has permission to modify their own data
d. System-wide credentials repositories:
i. /Library/Keychains/, encrypted using /var/db/SystemKey
e. Applications:
i. /Applications - Apps installed by a traditional installer and Apps copied into /Applications
7.1.6.2 FPT_ASLR_EXT.1 - Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
The TOE implements address space layout randomization as described in Section 6.1.6.2.
7.1.6.3 FPT_SBOP_EXT.1 - Stack Buffer Overflow Protection
The TOE protects all TOE binaries from stack-based buffer overflow attacks using:
• ASLR to randomize locations on the stack, preventing attackers from jumping to specific data that
has been written to the stack.
• Stack canaries to detect if the stack has been overwritten when returning from a function.
All TOE binaries are compiled with stack-based overflow protections enabled; however, not all compiled
binaries contain stack canaries for one or more of the following reasons:
• Type 1: The compiler can optimize away stack usage (which macOS heavily relies on for
performance reasons).
• Type 2: Some binaries are just small entry points that rely on system frameworks for all of their
functionality. There, the binary itself is going to be really small (less than ~1000 instructions,
sometimes as small as 10 instructions), so is much less likely to need stack protection.
• Type 3: There are very short program/functions that do not access the stack (and just forward to
system frameworks to perform the real work).
• Type 4: There are tiny binaries (very few instructions) with a single trivial function that do not need
stack protections or tiny wrappers that do not make use of the stack.
• Type 5: Some binaries do not access the stack in any kind of vulnerable way.
7.1.6.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1 - Boot Integrity, FPT_TST_EXT.3/WLAN - TSF
Cryptographic Functionality Testing (WLAN Client)
The boot process on Apple silicon devices is as follows:
1) The processor loads the Boot ROM.
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2) The Boot ROM validates the Low-Level Bootloader (LLB) signature using the Apple Root CA public
key.
3) LLB validates system-paired firmware signatures.
4) LLB validates iBoot stage 2 signature.
5) iBoot stage 2 validates the macOS-paired firmware, Boot Kernel Collection, Auxiliary Kernel
Collection (if applicable), system trust cache, and signed system volume signatures.
6) The TOE (macOS) begins execution.
The boot process for sepOS is as follows:
1) iBoot assigns a dedicated region of memory to the Secure Enclave.
2) The processor sends the sepOS image to the Secure Enclave Processor, which is executing the
Secure Enclave Boot ROM.
3) The Secure Enclave Processor checks the digital signature of the sepOS image.
4) If the signature is deemed valid, sepOS begins execution.
The Boot ROM is immutable code, referred to as the hardware root of trust. It is laid down during chip
fabrication and is audited for vulnerabilities and implicitly trusted. The Boot ROM code contains the Apple
Root CA public key, which is used to verify the digital signatures of the bootchain.
The TOE performs software integrity testing on the runtime image of each implemented cryptographic
module using HMAC-SHA2-256 to calculate a value that is compared with the value stored in the module,
computed at compilation time. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic
services are provided and data output is prohibited, rendering the module non-operational.
The WLAN client relies on cryptographic functionality implemented by the “BC” chip identified in Section
7.1.2 which is embedded in the underlying platform. The TOE verifies that the chip has successfully
completed its own self-tests prior to the TSF attempting to use the implementation. While this does present
a dependency on the host platform in assessing the assurance provided by these self-tests, the vendor of
the TOE OS is also responsible for the host platform, thus providing a high level of assurance that the
checks are sufficient to ensure the correct functioning of the TSF.
Software comprising the WLAN client functionality is cryptographically checked against a static reference
hash to ensure it has not been modified. The static reference hash is stored in the secure bootchain, cannot
be modified by unauthorized means, and can be relied upon. This mechanism ensures that any
unauthorized modification to the stored code will be detected prior to execution, thereby demonstrating
that the integrity of the TSF executable code has not been compromised.
7.1.6.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 - Trusted Update, FPT_TUD_EXT.2 - Trusted Update for
Application Software
The TOE allows the user to check for and install OS updates using the Software Update setting pane or the
command line interface.
7.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)
7.1.7.1 FTA_TAB.1 - Default TOE Access Banners
The TOE implements access banners as described in Section 6.1.7.1.
7.1.7.2 FTA_WSE_EXT.1 - Wireless Network Access
The administrator can restrict the wireless networks to which the TOE connects through specifying a list
of Known Networks (identified by SSID) and configuring the TOE to require an administrator password to
switch to a different WLAN network.
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7.1.8 Trusted Path (FTP)
7.1.8.1 FTP_BLT_EXT.1 - Bluetooth Encryption
The TOE supports Bluetooth Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR) and Low Energy (LE). Encryption is
enabled by default.
Devices that want to pair with the TOE via Bluetooth are required by the TOE to use Secure Simple Pairing,
which uses ECDH key exchange and AES for data encryption.
7.1.8.2 FTP_BLT_EXT.2 - Persistence of Bluetooth Encryption
If the remote Bluetooth device stops encrypting while connected to the TOE, the TOE terminates the
connection.
7.1.8.3 FTP_BLT_EXT.3/BR - Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (BR/EDR),
FTP_BLT_EXT.3/LE - Bluetooth Encryption Parameters (LE)
Although the Bluetooth standard supports the use of 128-bit AES with minimum 8-bit key size to maximum
128-bit key size, the TOE does not support any key sizes smaller than 128-bit; thus, smaller key sizes
cannot be negotiated.
7.1.8.4 FTP_ITC_EXT.1 - Trusted Channel Communication, FTP_ITC.1/WLAN -
Trusted Channel Communication (Wireless LAN)
The TOE ensures trusted communications between itself and a wireless access point by implementing
802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS protocols using FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN. This communication
channel is logically distinct from other communication channels and ensures the identification of its end
points and that all channel data is protected against modification and disclosure.
7.1.8.5 FTP_TRP.1 - Trusted Path
The TOE provides a trusted path between itself and local users that provides assured identification of its
endpoints. The trusted path is restricted to physical access only and is initiated by the local user. Local
access is protected by the user’s authentication credentials which require physical interaction by an
authorized human.
7.2 ALC_TSU_EXT.1 - Timely Security Updates
Security issues reported to Apple are screened and categorized by severity level, and a report is
established. Most reports are resolved within 90 days. More severe issues are prioritized for earlier
resolution. Security updates for validated vulnerabilities will be scheduled on target releases based on
severity.
Apple does not disclose, discuss, or confirm security issues until an investigation has occurred and patches
or releases are generally available. Once an issue has been confirmed and a security update has been made
available, references containing technical details are made available and Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVEs) are released. Security updates are made available via the Apple Update Server the same
day that security issues are announced. Therefore, there are 0 days between public disclosure of a
vulnerability and public availability of the TOE security update patching this vulnerability.
Apple publishes security notifications and announcements on the web at "Apple security releases" page
(https://support.apple.com/100100). That page provides the information about security updates including
the specific CVEs addressed by each update. The security notifications and announcements are also
distributed through the Security-announce mailing list (https://lists.apple.com/mailman3/lists/security-
announce.lists.apple.com/).
The instructions of reporting security issues are available on the web at "Report a security or privacy
vulnerability" page (https://support.apple.com/en-us/102549). Users can report security issues related to
the TOE on the web at Apple Security Research (https://security.apple.com/). Alternatively, they can send
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email to "product-security@apple.com", using Apple Product Security PGP key
(https://support.apple.com/en-us/102148) to encrypt the email.
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A. Devices Covered by this Evaluation
The evaluated configuration includes the following Apple devices:
Table 18: Hardware Platforms
Marketing Name Model Model Identifier Processor
(Micro Architecture)
Security
Chip
BT Version
(BT/Wi-Fi
Chip)
2025
MacBook Pro (14-inch, M5) A3434 Mac17,2 M5 (ARMv9.3-A) SEP v3.0 5.3 (4388)
MacBook Air (15-inch, M4,
2025)
A3241 Mac16,13 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
MacBook Air (13-inch, M4,
2025)
A3240 Mac16,12 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac Studio (2025) A3143 Mac16,9 M4 Max (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac Studio (2025) A3389 Mac15,14 M3 Ultra (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
2024
MacBook Pro (14-inch, 2024) A3401 Mac16,8 M4 Pro (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
A3185 Mac16,6 M4 Max (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
A3112 Mac16,1 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
MacBook Pro (16-inch, 2024) A3403 Mac16,7 M4 Pro (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
A3186 Mac16,5 M4 Max (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
iMac (24-inch, 2024, Two
ports)
A3137 Mac16,3 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
A3247 Mac16,2 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac mini (2024) A3239 Mac16,11 M4 Pro (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
A3238 Mac16,10 M4 (ARMv9.2-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
MacBook Air (15-inch, M3,
2024)
A3114 Mac15,13 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
MacBook Air (13-inch, M3,
2024)
A3113 Mac15,12 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
2023
MacBook Pro (14-inch, Nov
2023)
A2992 Mac15,10 M3 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac15,8 M3 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac15,6 M3 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
A2918 Mac15,3 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Apple macOS 26 Tahoe Security Target
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MacBook Pro (16-inch, Nov
2023)
A2991 Mac15,11 M3 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac15,9 M3 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac15,7 M3 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
iMac (24-inch, 2023, Four
ports)
A2873 Mac15,5 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
iMac (24-inch, 2023, Two
ports)
A2874 Mac15,4 M3 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac Pro (-/Rack 2023) A2786 Mac14,8 M2 Ultra (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
MacBook Air (15-inch, 2023) A2941 Mac14,15 M2 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4387)
Mac Studio (2023) A2901 Mac14,14 M2 Ultra (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac14,13 M2 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
MacBook Pro (16-inch, 2023) A2780 Mac14,6 M2 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac14,10 M2 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
MacBook Pro (14-inch, 2023) A2779 Mac14,5 M2 Max (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac14,9 M2 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac mini (M2 Pro, 2023) A2816 Mac14,12 M2 Pro (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
Mac mini (M2, 2023) A2686 Mac14,3 M2 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4388)
2022
MacBook Pro (13-inch, M2,
2022)
A2338 Mac14,7 M2 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.0 (4378)
MacBook Air (M2, 2022) A2681 Mac14,2 M2 (ARMv8.6-A) SEP v2.0 5.3 (4387)
Apple macOS 26 Tahoe Security Target
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B. Abbreviations and Terminology
ACE
Access Control Entry
ACL
Access Control List
A2DP
Advanced Audio Distribution Profile
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
API
Application Programming Interface
app
Application
ASLR
Address Space Layout Randomization
ATT
Attribute Protocol
AVDTP
Audio/Video Distribution Transport Protocol
AVRCP
Audio/Video Remote Control Profile
BD_ADDR
Bluetooth Device Address
BR/EDR
Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate
CA
Certificate Authority
CAVP
Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC
Common Criteria
CCGUIDE
Common Criteria Guide
CCM
Counter with CBC-MAC
CCMP
CCM Protocol
CMC
Apple macOS 26 Tahoe Security Target
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Certificate Management over CMS
CMS
Cryptographic Message Syntax
CTR
Counter (a mode of AES)
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DEK
Data Encryption Key
DNS
Domain Name System
DRBG
Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS
Digital Signature Standard
EAP
Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAPOL
Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN
ECC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDHE
ECDH Ephemeral
EKU
extendedKeyUsage
EST
Enrollment over Secure Transport
FIPS
Federal Information Processing Standards
GATT
Generic Attribute Profile
GCM
Galois/Counter Mode
GCMP
GCM Protocol
GPOS
General Purpose Operating System
Apple macOS 26 Tahoe Security Target
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GTK
Group Temporal Key
HCI
Host Controller Interface
HFP
Hands-Free Profile
HID
Human Interface Device Profile
HMAC
Hash-based Message Authentication Code
ID
Identifier or Identity
IEEE
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IP
Internet Protocol
KAS
Key Agreement Scheme
KEK
Key Encryption Key
KW
Key Wrap
L2CAP
Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol
LE
Low Energy
LLB
Low-Level Bootloader
LMP
Link Manager Protocol
MAC
Message Authentication Code
NFC
Near Field Communication
NIAP
National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technology
OBEX
Apple macOS 26 Tahoe Security Target
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Object Exchange
OCSP
Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID
Object Identifier
OS
Operating System
OSP
Organizational Security Policy
PBKDF
Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PGP
Pretty Good Privacy
PIN
Personal Identification Number
PKCS
Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PKI
Public Key Infrastructure
PMK
Pairwise Master Key
PP
Protection Profile
PRF
Pseudorandom Function
PSS
Probabilistic Signature Scheme
PTK
Pairwise Transient Key
RA
Registration Authority
RBG
Random Bit Generator
RFC
Request For Comments
RFCOMM
Radio Frequency Communication
ROM
Read Only Memory
Apple macOS 26 Tahoe Security Target
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RSA
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAN
Subject Alternative Name
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SDP
Service Discovery Protocol
SEP
Secure Enclave Processor
sepOS
SEP Operating System
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm
SKS
Secure Key Store
SL
Security Level (FIPS 140-3)
SRV
DNS Service
SSID
Service Set Identifier
SSP
Secure Simple Pairing
ST
Security Target
TD
Technical Decision
TLS
Transport Layer Security
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
URI
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Universal Resource Identifier
WLAN
Wireless Local Area Network
WLANC
Wireless Local Area Network Client
WPA
Wi-Fi Protected Access
XNU
X is Not Unix