TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-06
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Certification Report
ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo X
Sponsor and developer: IDEMIA
2 place Samuel de Champlain
92400 Courbevoie
France
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300123-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 2300123-01
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 22 December 2023
Number of pages: 14
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 10
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
Page: 3/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300123-01-CR, dated 22 December 2023
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300123-01-CR, dated 22 December 2023
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of ID-A v1.1
on ID-One Cosmo X. The developer of ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo X is IDEMIA located in
Courbevoie, France and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE consists of an applet upon a Java Card platform designed to provide identification,
authentication and advanced signature creation functionality for national ID cards, health cards and
corporate cards.
The TOE can be used to create advanced or qualified signature in the sense of [EU-REG] in its
Qualified Signature Creation Device (QSCD) configuration and complies with the Identification
Authentication Signature for European Citizen Card IAS ECC v2 specification [IAS ECC].
The TOE supports wired communication, through the IC contacts exposed to the outside, as well as
wireless communication through an antenna connected to the IC. The TOE may be used on several
physical form factors: modules within an inlay, or eCover; in a contact, contactless or dual plastic card.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 22 December 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo X, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo X are
advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis), and ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw
remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
The TOE is stated as a Qualified Signature Creation Device and Qualified Seal Creation Device for 3
SSCD Configurations (SSCD Config #1, SSCD Config #2 and SSCD Config #3), as defined is the
[ST], for the purposes of electronic identification and trust services as detailed by the [EU-REG]. The
evaluation by SGS Brightsight B.V included an examination of the TOE according to the eIDAS Dutch
Conformity Assessment Process Version 6 0.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300123-01-CR, dated 22 December 2023
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo X from IDEMIA
located in Courbevoie, France.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
Infineon Security Controller
IFX_CCI_00002Dh
IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah,
IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h,
IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h,
IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h,
IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh,
IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh,
IFX_CCI_00004Eh T11
Platform ID-One Cosmo X Platform
Code SAAAAR: 093363 + patch 099E71
Code SAAAAR: 093364 + patches 099441
and 099E21
Code SAAAAR: 093366
Software ID-A v1.1 Config 1 Code SAAAAR: 419261FF 01010000 0101
Config 2 Code SAAAAR: 419261FF 01010000 0201
Config 3 Code SAAAAR: 419261FF 01010000 0101
Config 4 Code SAAAAR: 419261FF 01010000 0201
Config 5 Code SAAAAR: 419261FF 01010000 0301
Common Package Config 1 Code SAAAAR: 417641FF 01000000 0201
Config 2 Code SAAAAR: 417641FF 01000000 0201
Config 3 Code SAAAAR: 417641FF 01000000 0301
Config 4 Code SAAAAR: 417641FF 01000000 0301
Config 5 Code SAAAAR: 417641FF 01000000 0301
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the ID-A v1.1 on ID-
One Cosmo X. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following features:
• Authentication mechanisms: The TOE supports the following authentication mechanisms:
User authentication (PIN), Symmetric and Asymmetric Role authentication, Terminal
Authentication v2, Symmetric and Asymmetric Device authentication, Chip Authentication v2,
PACE protocol, GP authentication in phase 6 (personaliser) and 7 (TOE admin) and
Combined Device/Role authentication.
• Cryptographic operations: The TOE supports high-level cryptographic operations (key
generation, symmetric and asymmetric encryption and decryption, signature creation,
destruction of cryptographic keys and random number generation). The implementation is
mainly based on the Security Functionalities provided by the platform.
• Trusted Channel function: The TOE supports secure communication channel to verify
authenticity and integrity as well as securing confidentiality of user data between the TOE and
other devices connected.
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• Access Control function: The TOE supports access to objects (files, directories, data and
secrets) stored in the ID-A file system. It ensures secure management of secrets such as
cryptographic keys.
• Data Storage function: The TOE supports secure storage of manufacturing data, pre-
personalisation data and personalisation data. This covers also the secure storage of
SCD/SVD and RAD.
• Integrity function: The TOE supports the verification of the integrity of sensitive user data
and the integrity of the DTBS/R.
• Electronic Services: The TOE supports several electronic services: Client/Server
authentication, Digital signature, Encryption key decipherment and Symmetric encryption and
decryption.
• Keys and PINs management: The TOE supports the handling of cryptographic data objects,
such as keys and PINs.
• Single Sign on feature (SSO): The TOE may also behave as a Single Sign on (SSO). It
provides access points to any other applet willing to use authentication services based on a
PIN.
• Features from the Platform: The TOE leverages the security features from the certified
platform i.e., protection against environmental conditions and physical manipulation, security
domains isolation supported by the Java Card platform and Cryptographic operations.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 7.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
Page: 8/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300123-01-CR, dated 22 December 2023
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The TOE is composed of the following elements:
• Infineon SLC37 microcontroller including the firmware for booting and low level functionality of
the microcontroller e.g. writing to flash memory as well as software for implementing
cryptographic operations.
• The ID-One Cosmo X Java Card platform, which can be split into the following components:
o Software for implementing a Java Card Virtual Machine, a Java Card Runtime
Environment and a Java Card Application Programming Interface.
o Software for implementing content management.
o Support for PACE secure channel establishment.
• The ID-A v1.1 applet, which can be produced in 5 configurations:
o Config 1: ID-A Applet without support for Asymmetric Role and Device Authentication.
o Config 2: ID-A Applet with support for Asymmetric Role and Device Authentication.
o Config 3: ID-A Applet without support for Asymmetric Role and Device Authentication
and with functional biometric authentication.
o Config 4: ID-A Applet with support for Asymmetric Role and Device Authentication
and with functional biometric authentication.
o Config 5: ID-A Applet without support for Asymmetric Role and Device Authentication
and with functional biometric authentication and PIN sharing.
• The associated guidance documentation.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
IDEMIA, ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo X, AGD_OPE, FQR : 401 9412 Issue 4
IDEMIA, ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo X, AGD_PRE, FQR : 401 9411 Issue 5
Page: 9/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300123-01-CR, dated 22 December 2023
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The TOE was tested thoroughly by the developer covering all the security functions and aspects of the
TSF.
The following developer tests were witnessed and used to sample and check the actual test results:
• Tests related to the PIN authentication mechanism.
• Tests related to test RSA and RSA-PSS signature creation for different combinations of key
lengths and digest algorithms.
• Tests related to test ECC signature creation for different combinations of key lengths and
digest algorithms.
• Tests related to Device Authentication Asymmetric scheme.
• Tests related to Device Authentication Asymmetric with privacy protection scheme.
• Tests related to Device Authentication Symmetric scheme.
• Tests related to Role Authentication asymmetric scheme.
• Tests related to Role Authentication symmetric scheme.
• Tests related to Client/Server Authentication functionality.
• Tests related to Key generation functionality.
• Tests related to Digital signature under a secure channel.
• Tests related to Encryption key decipherment functionality.
• Tests related to EACv2 secure channel functionality.
• Tests related to PACE secure channel functionality.
• Tests related to Key import functionality.
Additionally, some negative tests were executed with specific TOE configurations not supporting the
tested functionality
All tests gave the expected outcome.
The evaluator selected a small sample of tests to verify the correctness of the developer testing. For
the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples. The evaluator devised
and executed a set of tests aiming to verify the correctness of the TOE verification process, the User
Authentication, Digital signature authentication and Device Authentication.
All tests gave the expected outcome.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted as follows:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis the protection of the TOE was analysed using the
knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of
(additional) potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to the attack
methods in [JIL-AM]. During this assessment part the technical report [PLT-ETRfC] and [PLT-
CERT] of the underlying platform was used in the analysis.
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• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities were not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities were
addressed by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that were deemed
appropriate.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested using Config 4 as representative for all configurations.
The Evaluators provided an equivalency argumentation for why the configuration used was valid for all
configurations.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 7 Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo X as
described in the identification part of this report, section 2.1.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo
X, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant and to meet the requirements of EAL 5
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘strict’ conformance to the Protection Profiles [EN419211-2], [EN419211-
3], [EN419211-4], [EN419211-5], [EN 419211-6].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks
Page: 11/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300123-01-CR, dated 22 December 2023
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In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
Page: 12/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300123-01-CR, dated 22 December 2023
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3 Security Target
The ID-A v1.1 on Cosmo X - Security Target, FQR 110 A1E3, Ed 2, 26 October 2023 [ST] is included
here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
Include the list of acronyms from the ETR that have been included in this Certification Report and then
check that this list is complete and in alphabetical order.
DCAP Dutch Conformity Assessment Process
DTBS Data to be signed
DTBS/R Data to be signed or its unique representation
ITSEF Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
QSCD Qualified Signature Creation Device
SCD Signature Creation Data
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
SVD Signature Verification Data
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 13/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300123-01-CR, dated 22 December 2023
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[EN419211-2] EN 419211-2:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 2: Device with key generation, V2.0.1, registered under the reference BSI-
CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02
[EN419211-3] EN 419211-3:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 3: Device with key import, V1.0.2, registered under the reference BSI-CC-
PP-0075-2012-MA-01
[EN419211-4] EN 419211-4:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device —
Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to
certificate generation application, V1.0.1, registered under reference BSI-CC-
PP-0071-2012-MA-01
[EN419211-5] EN 419211-5:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to
signature creation application, V1.0.1, registered under the reference BSI-CC-
PP-0072-2012-MA-01
[EN 419211-6] EN 419211-6:2014, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device –
Part 6: Extension for device with key import and trusted channel to signature-
creation application, V1.0.4 registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0076-
2013-MA-01
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “ID-A v1.1 on ID-One Cosmo X” – EAL5+, 23-
RPT-959, Version 2.0, 13 December 2023
[EU-REG] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust
services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing
Directive 1999/93/EC
[PLT-CERT] ID-One Cosmo X Platform, NSCIB-CC-2300050-01, Version 1, 15 June 2023
[PLT-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition ID-One Cosmo X v2.0 – EAL6+,
24-RPT-664, version 2.0, dated 13 June 2023
[PLT-ST] Public Security Target ID-ONE COSMO X EAL6+, FQR 110 A23D, Edition 1,
02 June 2023
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November 2022
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
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[ST] ID-A v1.1 on Cosmo X - Security Target, FQR 110 A1E3, Ed 2, 26 October
2023
[ST-lite] ID-A v1.1 on Cosmo X - Public Security Target, FQR 110 A1E4, Ed 2, 26
October 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)