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STMICROELECTRONICS
COMMON CRITERIA FOR IT SECURITY EVALUATION
TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULES
ST33TPHF2X
TPM FIRMWARE
1.256,1.257 & 2.256
AND
ST33GTPMA
TPM FIRMWARE
3.256 & 6.256
SECURITY TARGET
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DOCUMENT REVISION
Version Date Author Modifications
01-00 22/07/2019 Olivier Collart First release.
01-01 26/07/2019 Olivier Collart Include evaluator’s comments
01-01p 26/07/2019 Olivier Collart Public release
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION (ASE_INT) ............................................................................................................... 5
1.1 ST REFERENCE .............................................................................................................................. 5
1.2 PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................................... 5
2 TOE DESCRIPTION............................................................................................................................. 6
2.1 TOE REFERENCE............................................................................................................................ 6
2.2 TARGET OF EVALUATION OVERVIEW................................................................................................. 6
2.2.1 TOE Usage and Security Features....................................................................................... 7
2.3 TOE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................... 10
2.3.1 TOE hardware description.................................................................................................. 10
2.3.2 TOE firmware description ................................................................................................... 12
2.3.3 TOE guidance documentation............................................................................................ 13
2.3.4 Forms of delivery ................................................................................................................ 13
2.4 TOE LIFECYCLE............................................................................................................................ 14
3 CONFORMANCE CLAIM (ASE_CCL) .............................................................................................. 15
3.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM ............................................................................................................ 15
3.2 PP CLAIM..................................................................................................................................... 15
3.3 PACKAGE CLAIM............................................................................................................................ 15
3.4 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE........................................................................................................... 15
3.5 APPLICATION NOTES ..................................................................................................................... 15
4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION (ASE_SPD)............................................................................. 16
4.1 ASSETS........................................................................................................................................ 16
4.2 THREATS...................................................................................................................................... 16
4.3 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES........................................................................................... 16
4.4 ASSUMPTIONS .............................................................................................................................. 16
5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................................. 17
5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE............................................................................................ 17
5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................... 17
5.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE.................................................................................................. 17
5.4 ANSSI NOTE 6 SECURITY OBJECTIVES EQUIVALENCE .................................................................... 18
6 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION (ASE_ECD) ................................................................... 19
7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (ASE_REQ)....................................................................................... 20
7.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS LISTED BY THE TPM 2.0 PROTECTION PROFILE.................. 20
7.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE .................................................................. 20
7.2.1 Extended component FCS_RNG.1 .................................................................................... 33
7.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................... 34
7.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE........................................................................................... 35
7.4.1 Sufficiency of SFR .............................................................................................................. 35
7.4.2 Dependency rationale......................................................................................................... 35
7.5 SECURITY ASSURANCE RATIONALE ................................................................................................ 35
8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.................................................................................................... 36
8.1 TOE SECURITY FEATURES............................................................................................................ 36
8.1.1 SF_CRY - Cryptographic Support ...................................................................................... 36
8.1.2 SF_I&A - Identification and Authentication ......................................................................... 38
8.1.3 SF_G&T - General and Test............................................................................................... 39
8.1.4 SF_OBH - Object Hierarchy ............................................................................................... 41
8.1.5 SF_TOP - TOE Operation .................................................................................................. 43
8.1.6 Assignment of Security Functional Requirements.............................................................. 45
9 ACRONYMS....................................................................................................................................... 48
APPENDIX A REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 50
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List of Tables
TABLE 1: TARGET OF EVALUATION: ST33TPHF2X REFERENCE ........................................................................ 6
TABLE 2: TARGET OF EVALUATION: ST33GTPMA REFERENCE ......................................................................... 6
TABLE 3: USER DOCUMENTATION .................................................................................................................. 13
TABLE 4: ANSSI NOTE 6 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE .......................................................................... 18
TABLE 5: SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE...................................................................... 34
List of Figures
FIGURE 1: ST33HTPH/ST33GTPMA0 BLOCK DIAGRAM................................................................................ 10
FIGURE 2: F2X FIRMWARE BLOCK DIAGRAM.................................................................................................... 12
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1 INTRODUCTION (ASE_INT)
This section contains the necessary information to identify the Security Target (ST). This
information may be used to cross-reference this document.
1.1 ST Reference
This security target is referenced with the following information:
• Filename: ST33TPHF2X_GTPMA_ST
• Revision: 01.01p
• Internal documentation system reference: SSS_ST33TPHF2X_GTPMA_ST_18_001
• Date: July 26th 2019
This security target is strictly conformant to the TPM Protection Profile PC Client Specific
Trusted Platform Module Family 2.0 level 0 Revision 1.38, Version 1.1, [ANSSI-CC-PP-
2018/03] [12].
1.2 Purpose
This document presents the Security Target (ST) of the Target of Evaluation covering both
products ST33TPHF2X and ST33GTPMA.
The product references and definitions of the TOE are provided in Chapter 2.
A list of acronyms is provided in Chapter 9
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2 TOE DESCRIPTION
2.1 TOE reference
Table 1: Target of evaluation: ST33TPHF2X reference
Product Hardware Hardware Version
(Ext.Int)
Firmware Version
Major.Minor1
(decimal2)
ST33TPHF2XSPI ST33HTPH A.C 0x00 0x01.0x01 0x00
(decimal 01.256)
ST33TPHF2XSPI ST33HTPH A.C 0x00 0x01.0x01 0x01
(decimal 01.257)
ST33TPHF2XI2C ST33HTPH A.C 0x00 0x02.0x01 0x00
(decimal 02.256)
Table 2: Target of evaluation: ST33GTPMA reference
Product Hardware Hardware Version
(Ext.Int)
Firmware Version
Major.Minor3
(decimal4)
ST33GTPMASPI ST33G1M2A0 F.G 0x00 0x03.0x01 0x00
(decimal 03.256)
ST33GTPMAI2C ST33G1M2A0 F.G 0x00 0x06.0x01 0x00
(decimal 06.256)
The chip packaging is not included in the TOE.
2.2 Target of evaluation Overview
The products ST33TPHF2XSPI and ST33TPHF2XI2C are TPM 2.0 products targeting PC,
server platforms and embedded systems.
The products ST33GTPMASPI and ST33GTPMAI2C are also TPM 2.0 products targeting
automotive and industrial systems.
The product ST33TPHF2XSPI and ST33GTPMASPI implement an SPI interface as defined
in [11].
The product ST33TPHF2XI2C and ST33GTPMAI2C implement an I²C interface as defined in
[11].
For all products, the product interface is configured by the firmware and is irreversibly locked
after the first firmware factory loading.
The security target describes the target of evaluation (TOE) named ST33TPHF2X or
ST33GTPMA and provides a product summary.
1 The firmware major and minor versions may be retrieved from the TOE with the command
TPM2_GetCapability [8], in the response field TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1 and formatted
with the value 0x00 0x01 0x01 0x00/01 or 0x00 0x02 0x01 0x00 according to [10], Table 1.
2 Some tools may report the version in decimal value. In that case, the version retrieved is 1.256/257 or
2.256.
3 The firmware major and minor versions may be retrieved from the TOE with the command
TPM2_GetCapability [8], in the response field TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1 and formatted
with the value 0x00 0x03 0x01 0x00 or 0x00 0x06 0x01 0x00 according to [10], Table 1.
4 Some tools may report the version in decimal value. In that case, the version retrieved is 3.256 or 6.256.
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The TOE are devices that implement the functions defined in the TCG Trusted Platform
Module Library Specification, version 2.0, [6], [7], [8], [9] and the PC Client Specific Platform
TPM Profile for TPM 2.0 [10]. The TCG Trusted Platform Module Library specification
describes the design principles, the TPM structures, the TPM commands and supporting
routines for the commands. The PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile for TPM 2.0
specification describes the additional features and communication interfaces that must be
implemented by a TPM for a PC Client platform.
The product line ST33GTPMA is also compliant with the PC Client Specific Platform TPM
Profile for TPM 2.0 [10] for the communication interfaces to leverage the drivers and
software stacks already available.
The TOE consists of
• TPM hardware,
• TPM firmware,
• TPM guidance documentation.
The TOE components are described in 2.3
2.2.1 TOE Usage and Security Features
The TPM library specification describes the TPM protections in terms of Protected
Capabilities and Protected Objects. A Protected Capability is an operation that must be
correctly performed for a TPM to be trusted and therefore is in the scope of the CC
evaluation as part of the TOE security functionality (TSF). A Protected Object is data that
must be protected for a TPM operation to be trusted. The TSF performs all operations with
Protected Objects inside the TPM. The TSF protects the confidentiality of Protected Objects
when exported from the TPM and checks the integrity of Protected objects when imported
into the TPM. The TOE provides physical protection for Protected Objects residing in the
TPM.
The TPM provides methods for collecting and reporting identities of hardware and software
components of a computer system platform. The computer system report generated by the
trusted computing base (TCB) the TPM is part of allows determination of expected behaviour
and from that expectation of trust in the computer system platform.
There are commonly three Roots of Trust in a trusted platform; a root of trust for
measurement (RTM), root of trust for reporting (RTR) and root of trust for storage (RTS). In
TCG systems roots of trust are components that must be trusted because misbehaviour
might not be detected. The RTM is a computing engine capable of making inherently reliable
integrity measurements and maintaining an accurate summary of values of integrity digests
and the sequence of digests. The RTR is a computing engine capable of reliably reporting
information held by the RTM. The RTS provides secure storage for a practically unlimited
number of private keys or other data by means of exporting and importing encrypted data.
Support for the Root of Trust for Measurement
The TPM supports the integrity measurement of the trusted platform by calculation and
reporting of measurement digests of measured values. Typically the RTM is controlled by the
Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) as the starting point of the measurement. The
measurement values are representations of embedded data or program code scanned and
provided to the TPM by the measurement agent. The TPM supports cryptographic hashing
of measured values and calculates the measurement digest by extending the value of a PCR
with a calculated or provided hash value. The PCRs are shielded locations of the TPM which
can be reset by TPM reset or a trusted process, written only through measurement digest
extensions and read.
Root of Trust for Reporting
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The EK and the corresponding Endorsement Certificates define the trusted platform
identities for RTR. The ST33TPHF2X and ST33GTPMA are shipped with EKs and for each
EK, a Certificate of the Authenticity of this EK is also provided. The EK may be bound to the
Platform via Platform Certificate, providing assurance from the certification body of the
physical binding and connection through a trusted path between the platform (the RTM) and
the genuine TPM (the RTR). The attestation of the EK and the Platform Certificates builds
the base for attestation of other keys and measurements.
Root of Trust for Storage
The TPM holds the Storage Primary Seed (SPS) and generates Storage Root Keys (SRK)
from SPS. The SRK are roots of Protected Storage Hierarchies associated with a TPM. The
storage keys in these hierarchies are used for symmetric encryption and signing of other
keys and data together with their security attributes. The resulting encrypted file, which
contains header information in addition to the data or the key, is called a BLOB (Binary Large
Object) and is output by the TPM and can be loaded in the TPM when needed. The private
keys generated on the TPM can be stored outside the TPM (encrypted) in a way that allows
the TPM to use them later without ever exposing such keys in the clear outside the TPM.
The TPM uses symmetric cryptographic algorithms to encrypt data and keys and may
implement cryptographic algorithms of equivalent strength.
Platform Key Hierarchy
The TPM may hold a Platform Primary Seed (PPS) and generate Platform Keys from PPS.
The platform key hierarchy is controlled by the Platform Firmware. The PPS is generated by
the TOE.
Other Security Services and Features
The TOE provides cryptographic services for hashing, asymmetric encryption and
decryption, asymmetric signing and signature verification, symmetric encryption and
decryption, symmetric signing and signature verification by means of and key generation.
Hash functions SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA_384, SHA3_256 and SHA3_384 are provided as
cryptographic service to external entities for measurements and used internally for user
authentication, signing and key derivation. A TOE is required to implement asymmetric
algorithms, where the current specification supports RSA with 2048 bits for digital signature,
secret sharing and encryption and ECC algorithms with P-256, P-384 and BN-256 curves for
digital signatures and secret sharing. The TOE provides symmetric encryption and
decryption of AES-128 192 and 256 in CFB, CTR, OFB, CBC and ECB modes. The TOE
implements symmetric signing and signature verification by means of HMAC. The TOE
generates two types of keys: Ordinary keys are generated using the random number
generator to seed the key computation. Primary Keys are derived from a Primary Seed and
key parameters by means of a key derivation function.
The TPM stores persistent state associated with the TPM in NV memory and provides NV
memory as a shielded location for data of external entities. The platform and entities
authorised by the TPM owner controls allocation and use of the provided NV memory. The
access control may include the need for authentication of the user, delegations, PCR values
and other controls.
The TSF also includes random number generation, self-test and physical protection.
Generation and import of the Endorsement key pair and certificate
The Endorsement Key (EK) and associated EK certificate (EK credential) are stored in the
TPM during the manufacturing process at the TOE lifecycle phase “Manufacturing”.
Each TOE supports three Endorsement keys
• One 2048-bit RSA key pair
• One 256-bit ECC key pair generated with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P256.
• One 384-bit ECC key pair generated with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P384
Each Endorsement key is generated by a HSM (Hardware Security Module) and then stored
encrypted on a key server.
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The Endorsement Key certificate is generated also by a HSM that stores the
STMicroelectronics intermediate CA (Certification Authority) keys. The certificates are stored
on a certificate server. CA keys are stored outside the HSM in backup encrypted with a 3-
DES key. This backup key is generated under dual control by 3 different security officers.
The RSA EK are certified by an intermediate CA 2048-bit key.
The ECC_NIST_P256 EKs and ECC_NIST_P384 EKs are certified by two specific
intermediate CAs using a NIST_P384 key.
Both certificates comply with the templates defined in the TCG specification for TPM 2.0 EK
certificates [46].
The importation of the EK and EK certificate in the TOE is done by the personalization
infrastructure that requests EK and EK certificate to the key and certificate servers. The
personalization infrastructure decrypts the EK private key and writes it encrypted on the chip
with the EK certificate.
The key server, certificate server, HSM and the personalization infrastructure are all located
within the secure production area of the TOE.
The STMicroelectronics intermediate certificates are described in the document TPM EK
Certificate – Chip and EK authenticity verification [44].
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2.3 TOE Description
2.3.1 TOE hardware description
The TOE includes two hardware platforms based on the same architecture:
• ST33HTPH
• ST33G1M2A0
The ST33HTPH and ST33G1M2A0 are a serial access microcontrollers designed for Trusted
Platform Module applications that incorporates the generation of ARM processors for
embedded secure systems. Its SecurCore® SC300™ 32-bit RISC core is built on the
Cortex™ M3 core with additional security features to help to protect against advanced forms
of attacks.
Figure 1: ST33HTPH/ST33GTPMA0 block diagram
Both hardware support an SPI interface compliant with [11] for integration with controllers
and system drivers.
Both hardware include general purpose Input/Output pins to support a driver implementation
compliant with the I²C interface and the protocol defined in the TCG standard [11].
Both hardware include the following security features:
• Active shield
• Memory protection unit (MPU)
• Monitoring of environmental parameters through security sensors
• Code/Data Signature for Protection against fault attacks
• ISO 3309 CRC calculation block
• AIS-31 Class PTG2 compliant true random generator (TRNG)
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• the EDES peripheral provides a secure DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm
implementation,
• the AES peripheral provides a secure AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
algorithm implementation, and
• the NESCRYPT crypto-processor efficiently supports the public key algorithm.
• Three timers for TPM Clock and TPM Time management
• The ST ROM is located in non-volatile memory protected by a firewall. This ST
firmware includes:
• A test program used to validate the TOE production (OST)
• A set of boot and flash management services
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2.3.2 TOE firmware description
The firmware architecture “F2X” is common to all products included in the TOE. The FW is
composed of three independent blocks:
• A non-upgradable code block located in ROM & flash memories (orange box)
• Core memory loader (CML) in charge of verifying integrity of the TPM
instance to be executed.
• Two independent code blocks upgradable via secure field upgrade mechanism
(TPM instances #1 and #2). They are composed of:
• TPM2.0 commands code
• TPM2.0 core
• Memory management and low-level services
• Cryptographic library (NesLib 6.3.3 for ST33)
From the two code block instances, only one is executed.
The two-instance code architecture provides two resilience features.
• Fault tolerant firmware upgrade: if the firmware loading process is
interrupted, the loading instance remains fully functional. The TPM doesn’t
enter any limited mode.
• Self recovery: in case of firmware integrity error of one instance, the second
instance becomes active.
Figure 2: F2X firmware block diagram
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2.3.3 TOE guidance documentation
The following documents must be used by the TOE user in order to configure and operate
the TOE.
Table 3: User Documentation
User Documentation Version Date Ref
TPM Library Part 1: Architecture, Specification Version
2.0, Revision 1.38
Revision
1.38
September
2016
[6]
TPM Library Part 2: Architecture, Specification Version
2.0, Revision 1.38
Revision
1.38
September
2016
[7]
TPM Library Part 3: Architecture, Specification Version
2.0, Revision 1.38
Revision
1.38
September
2016
[8]
TPM Library Part 4: Architecture, Specification Version
2.0, Revision 1.38
Revision
1.38
September
2016
[9]
Errata version 1.4 for TCG TPM library version 2.0
revision 1.38
version 1.4 January 2018 [10]
TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile for TPM
2.0 (PTP), Family “2.0”, Level 00 Revision 1.03
Revision
1.03
May 2017 [11]
Errata version 1.1 for TCG PC Client Specific Platform
TPM Profile for TPM 2.0 version 1.03
1.1 May 2017 [48]
TCG EK credential profile for TPM Family 2.0 Level 0.
Specification Version 2.1 Revision 13,
Revision
13
December 10
2018
[46]
ST33TPHF2XSPI datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0
device with an SPI interface
V2 April 2019 [39]
ST33TPHF2XSPI datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0
device with an SPI interface
V3 July 2019 [39]
ST33TPHF2XI2C datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0
device with an I2C interface
V1 July 2019 [40]
ST33GTPMASPI datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0
device with an SPI interface
V3 July 2019 [42]
ST33GTPMAI2C datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0
device with an I2C interface
V3 July 2019 [43]
TPM EK Certificate – Chip and EK authenticity
verification (2.0)
2.0 March 2016 [44]
ST TPM 2.0 - Security recommendations 1.2 October 2016 [45]
2.3.4 Forms of delivery
The TOE is delivered in form of complete chips which include the hardware, the firmware,
the Endorsement Primary Keys and certificates, and the guidance documentation. The TOE
is finished and the extended test features are removed.
The TOE is delivered in different packages (e.g. TSSOP and VQFN). The product behaviour
and the ordering codes are described in the product datasheets [39], [40], [42] and [43].
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2.4 TOE lifecycle
The life cycle of the TOE as part of this evaluation includes
• phase 1 “Development” and
• phase 2 “Manufacturing”
as defined in the PP [12].
The phase 1 that includes TPM development involves the sites of
• ST ROUSSET (FRANCE)
• ST ANGMO KIO (SINGAPORE)
for the hardware development activities and
• ST ROUSSET (FRANCE)
• ST RENNES (FRANCE)
• ST ZAVENTEM (BELGIUM)
for the embedded software development activities.
The phase 2 that includes the die manufacturing and the EK and EK certificate injections
involves the sites of
• ST CROLLES (FRANCE) (Manufacturing)
• ST ROUSSET (FRANCE) (Test Manufacturing and EK/EK certificate injection)
• ST TOA PAYOH (SINGAPORE) (Test Manufacturing and EK/EK certificate injection)
The phase 2 ends with the delivery of the TOE.
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3 CONFORMANCE CLAIM (ASE_CCL)
3.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target is conformant to the Common Criteria version 3.1 R5.
This security target claims to be Common Criteria version 3.1 R5
• Part 1 conformant,
• Part 2 extended and
• Part 3 conformant.
The extended Security Function Requirement is the one defined in the protection profile.
3.2 PP Claim
This security target is in strict conformance to the PC Client Specific Trusted Platform
Module Family 2.0 level 0 Revision 1.38, Version 1.1, released by the Trusted Computing
Group dated 13 June 2018.
The protection profile is registered and certified by the “Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des
Systèmes d’Information” (ANSSI) under the reference [ANSSI-CC-PP-2018/03].
3.3 Package claim
This security target does not claim conformance to a package of the PP [12].
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL4 augmented with
• ALC_FLR.1 and
• AVA_VAN.5
defined in CC Part 3.
3.4 Conformance Rationale
This security target claims strict conformance to only one PP.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a complete solution implementing the TCG Trusted
Platform Module main specifications Version 2.0 level 0 revision 1.38 ([6], [7] ,[8] and [9])
and the TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile Specification, Version 1.03 [11][12] as
defined in the PP [12] section 2.2.1. So the TOE is consistent with the TOE type in the PP
[12].
The security problem definition of this security target is consistent with the statement of
the security problem definition in the PP [12], as the security target claims strict conformance
to the PP [12] and no other threats, organizational security policies and assumptions are
added.
The security objectives of this security target are consistent with the statement of the
security objectives in the PP as the security target claims strict conformance to the PP and
no other security objectives are added.
The security requirements of this security target are consistent with the statement of the
security requirements in the PP [12] as the security target claims strict conformance to the
PP [12]. All assignments and selections of the security functional requirements are done in
the PP [12] and in this security target section 7.2.
3.5 Application notes
The evidences that the PP [12] is compliant with the application note [38] released by the
ANSSI (French CC Certification scheme) and defining security requirements for post-delivery
code loading are provided in this security target.
The functional requirement FCS_RNG.1 is a refinement of the FCS_RNG.1 defined in the
PP [12] according to ―Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS)
respectively - Functionality classes for random number generators [36].
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4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION (ASE_SPD)
The contents of the PP [12] applies to this chapter without any restriction or addition.
4.1 Assets
The assets of the TOE are defined in the PP [12] section 4.1 Assets. These assets have to
be protected while being executed as well as when the TOE is not in operation.
4.2 Threats
The threats to security are defined in the PP [12], section 4.2 Threats. No other threats are
added.
4.3 Organisational Security Policies
The organisational security policies are defined in the PP [12], section 4.3 Organisational
Security Policies, no other organisational security policies are added
4.4 Assumptions
The TOE environment is highly variable. In general, the TOE is assumed to be in an
uncontrolled environment with no guarantee of the TOE’s physical security.
The TOE assumptions to the IT environment are defined in the PP [12], section 4.4
Assumptions, no other assumptions are added.
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5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This section shows the security objectives which are relevant for the TOE. For this section
the PP [12] can be applied completely.
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The security objectives of the TOE are defined and described in the PP [12], section 5.1
Security Objectives for the TOE.
The security objectives from the Note 6, “Security requirements for post-delivery code
loading” [38] released by ANSSI are also included in the TOE security objectives.
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The security objectives for the operational environment are described in the PP [12], section
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment, no other security objectives for the
operational environment are added
5.3 Security Objective Rationale
The security objectives rationale is described in the PP [12], section 5.3 Security Objective
Rationale.
The ANSSI Note 6 security objectives rationale is described in 5.4
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5.4 ANSSI note 6 Security Objectives Equivalence
Table 4: ANSSI Note 6 Security objectives rationale
Objectives
Note 6
Description Security Objective or SFR equivalence
O.Secure_Load_ACode The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and
integrity of the loaded Additional Code.
The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can
be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an
Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE.
Covered by SFR
FDP_ACF.1.2/States, iteration 2 from PP [12]
Covered by SFR
FDP_ACF.1.3/States iterations 1 & 2 from this
security target
O.Secure_AC_Activation Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall
be performed at the same time in an Atomic way.
All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final
TOE shall be completed before activation.
If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final
TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption, or incident which prevents the
forming of the final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state of fail
secure.
Covered by SFR
FDP_ACF.1.2/States iteration 3
O.TOE_Identification The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The
TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory
and guarantees the integrity of these data.
After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the identification Data of the
Final TOE allows identifications of the initial TOE and Additional Code. The
user shall be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Additional Code(s)
which are embedded in the Final TOE.
Covered by SFR
FCO_NRO.1.2/M&R iteration 6
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6 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION (ASE_ECD)
The extended component “FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers” is defined in the PP
[12], section 6.1. No other extended component are added in this security target.
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7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (ASE_REQ)
7.1 Security Functional Requirements listed by the TPM 2.0 Protection Profile
The security functional requirements (SFRs) for the TOE are defined in the PP [12] section
7.1. All assignments and selections of the Security Functional Requirements are done in the
PP with the exception of the following SFRs that required to be completed in the security
target.
7.2 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for: security attributes of
keys, PCRs, NV storage areas, counters and firmware.
FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA Cryptographic key generation (primary keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKRSA The TSF shall generate cryptographic primary RSA keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA key generator and specified
cryptographic key sizes 2048 bits that meet the following: TPM library specification [6],
[7], [8] in combination with [SP800-108], and [IEEE1363], [RFC 3447].
FCS_CKM.1/PKECC Cryptographic key generation (primary keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKECC The TSF shall generate cryptographic primary ECC keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECC key generator and specified
cryptographic key sizes 256 and 384 bits that meet the following: TPM library
specification [6], [7], [8], in combination with [SP800-108].
FCS_CKM.1/PKAES Cryptographic key generation (primary keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKAES The TSF shall generate cryptographic primary symmetric keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm AES key generator and specified
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cryptographic key sizes 128, 192 & 256 bits, that meet the following: TPM library
specification [6], [7], [8] in combination with [SP800-108], .
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation (RSA keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA The TSF shall generate cryptographic RSA keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA key generator and specified cryptographic
key sizes 2048 bits that meet the following: TPM library specification [6], [7], [8], [RFC
3447] and [IEEE1363].
FCS_CKM.1/ECC Cryptographic key generation (ECC keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECC The TSF shall generate cryptographic ECC keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm ECC key generator and specified cryptographic
key sizes 256 and 384 bits that meet the following: TPM library specification [6], [7], [8].
FCS_CKM.1/SYMM Cryptographic key generation (symmetric keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/SYMM The TSF shall generate cryptographic symmetric keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm AES key generator and specified
cryptographic key sizes 128, 192 & 256 bits that meet the following: TPM library
specification [6], [7], [8].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method key overwriting and NV memory zeroization that meets the
following: none.
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FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation (symmetric encryption/decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AES The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES in the mode CFB, CTR, OFB, CBC and ECB and
cryptographic key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits that meet the following: [FIPS 197] and
[SP 800-38A]
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation (hash function)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hash value calculation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384 and cryptographic key sizes
none that meet the following: FIPS 180-4.
FCS_COP.1/SHA3 Cryptographic operation (hash function)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA3 The TSF shall perform hash value calculation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA3-256 and SHA3-384 and cryptographic key sizes none that
meet the following: FIPS 202.
FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA Cryptographic operation (HMAC calculation)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/HMAC/SHA The TSF shall perform HMAC value generation and verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC with SHA-1, SHA-256 and
SHA-384 and cryptographic key sizes 160, 256 and 384 bits that meet the following:
[FIPS 198-1] [24].
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FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA3 Cryptographic operation (HMAC calculation)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/HMAC/SHA3 The TSF shall perform HMAC value generation and verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC with SHA3-256 and SHA3-
384 and cryptographic key sizes 256 and 384 bits that meet the following: [FIPS 198-1]
[24].
FCS_COP.1/RSASign Cryptographic operation (RSA signature generation/verification)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSASign The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSASSA_PKCS1v1_5, RSASSA_PSS and
cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit that meet the following: PKCS#1v2.1 [RFC 3447].
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA Cryptographic operation (ECC signature generation/verification)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 and
TPM_ECC_NIST_P384 and TPM_ECC_BN_P256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 and
384 bits that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4 [22].
FCS_COP.1/ECDAA Cryptographic operation (ECDAA commit)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDAA The TSF shall perform signature generation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDAA with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P256, and
TPM_ECC_BN_P256 and TPM_ECC_NIST_P384 and cryptographic key sizes 256 and
384 that meet the following: [FIPS 186-4] for curves TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 and
TPM_ECC_NIST_P384 and [ISO/IEC 15946-5] for curve TPM_ECC_BN_P256.
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FCS_COP.1/ECDEC Cryptographic operation (decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDEC The TSF shall perform decryption of ECC key in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDH with curve TPM_ECC_NIST_P256,
TPM_ECC_NIST_P384 and TPM_ECC_BN_P256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 and
384 bits that meet the following: TPM library specification [6], [7], [8] and [SP 800-56A]
[28].
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
(1) to execute indication _TPM_Hash_Start, _TPM_Hash_Data and _TPM_Hash_End,
(2) to execute commands that do not require authentication,
(3) to access objects where the entity owner has defined no authentication requirements
(authValue, authPolicy),
(4) none
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user, e.g. self-test.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests
at the request of the authorised user “World”
(1) the TPM2_SelfTest command and of selected algorithms using the
TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest command,
at the conditions
(1) Initialisation state after reset and before the reception of the first command,
(2) prior to execution of a command using a not self-tested function,
none
to demonstrate the correct operation of sensitive parts of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of the
TSF.
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FPT_FLS.1/FS Failure with preservation of secure state (fail state)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1/FS The TSF shall preserve a secure state by entering the Fail state when the following types
of failures occur:
(1) If during TPM Restart or TPM Resume, the TPM fails to restore the state saved at
the last Shutdown(STATE), the TPM shall enter Failure Mode and return
TPM_RC_FAILURE.
(2) failure detected by TPM2_ContextLoad when the decrypted value of sequence is
compared to the stored value created by TPM2_ContextSave(),
(3) failure detected by self-test according to FPT_TST.1,
(4) failure of execution flow control and hardware failure
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
FDP_ACC.2/States Complete access control (operational states)
Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.2.1/States The TSF shall enforce the TPM State Control SFP on all subjects and objects
and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2/States The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the
TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
FDP_ACF.1/States Security attribute based access control (operational states)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/States The TSF shall enforce the TPM State Control SFP to objects based on the
following
Subjects as defined in Table 7 5 :
(1) Platform firmware with the security attributes platformAuth, platformPolicy and
physical presence if supported by the TOE,
(2) all other subjects; their security attributes are irrelevant for this SFP,
Objects as defined in Table 8 and Table 96:
(1) Shutdown BLOB with the security attribute validation status,
(2) Firmware update data with security attributes signature of the TPM manufacturer
and digest,
(3) all other objects; their security attributes are irrelevant for this SFP.
FDP_ACF.1.2/States The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) The Platform firmware is authorised to change the TPM state to FUM if the
authenticity of the first digest or the signature could be successfully verified.
5 See Table 7 in Protection Profile [12]
6 See Table 8 and 9 in Protection Profile [12]
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(2) While in FUM state the platform firmware is authorised to import or activate
firmware data only after successful verification of its integrity and authenticity (see
FDP_UIT.1/States).
(3) The FUM state shall only be left when the TOE is reset after successful loading of
the firmware data.
(4) In the Init state the subject “World” is authorised to execute the commands
TPM2_HashSequenceStart, TPM2_SequenceUpdate, TPM2_EventSequence-
Complete, TPM2_SequenceComplete, TPM2_PCR_Extend, TPM2_Startup,
TPM2_SelfTest, TPM2_GetRandom, TPM2_HierarchyControl, TPM2_Hierarchy-
ChangeAuth, TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy, TPM2_GetCapability, TPM2_NV_Read, and
the sequence _TPM_Hash_Start, _TPM_Hash_Data, and _TPM_Hash_End.
(5) In the Init state every subject is authorised to process the Resume operation on
the Shutdown BLOB with state transition to Operational.
(6) In the Init state every subject is authorised to process the Restart operation on
the Shutdown BLOB with state transition to Operational.
(7) In the Init state, if no Shutdown BLOB was generated or if the Shutdown BLOB is
invalid (see attribute “Validation status”) every subject is authorised to process the
TPM2_Startup command. In case of the parameter TPM_SU_CLEAR the TPM shall
change the state to Operational and initialise its internal operational variables to
default initialisation values (Reset), otherwise the TPM shall return an error and stay
in the same state.
(8) In the Operational state, nobody is authorised to execute the command
TPM2_Startup. For all other subjects, objects and operations, the access control
rules of the Access Control SFP shall apply (see FDP_ACF.1/AC).
(9) The Operational state shall change to Self-Test state if one of the commands
TPM2_Selftest or TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest is executed or when a test of a
dedicated functionality is required (see FPT_TST.1). In the Self-Test state, nobody is
authorised to execute any other TPM command.
(10) The Self-Test state shall be left only after finishing the intended test of the
dedicated functionality. In case of a successful test result the state shall change to
Operational, otherwise to Fail.
(11) In the Fail state, every subject is authorised to execute the commands
TPM2_GetTestResult and TPM2_GetCapability.
(12) In the Fail state the subject World is authorised to send a _TPM_Init indication
with state change to Init.
(13) Any subject is authorised to prepare the TPM for a power cycle using the
TPM2_Shutdown command and to create a shutdown BLOB by
TPM2_Shutdown(TPM_SU_STATE).
FDP_ACF.1.3/States The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
(1) the TPM authorises to enter FUM state if the firmware update data major version
is equal to the major version of the loaded firmware
(2) the TPM authorises to enter FUM state if the firmware update data minor version
is strictly bigger than the minor version of the loaded firmware
FDP_ACF.1.4/States The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
(1) Once the TPM receives a TPM2_SelfTest command and before completion of all
tests, the TPM shall return TPM_RC_TESTING for any command that uses a
command that requires a test.
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FMT_MSA.1/States Management of security attributes (operational states)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/States TSF shall enforce the TPM state control SFP to restrict the ability to modify the
security attributes TPM state
(1) FUM to Platform firmware,
(2) other than FUM to any role.
FMT_MSA.3/States Static attribute initialisation (operational states)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1/States The TSF shall enforce the TPM state control SFP to provide restrictive default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/States The TSF shall allow nobody to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
FDP_UIT.1/States Data exchange integrity (operational states)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1/States The TSF shall enforce the TPM state control SFP to receive firmware update
data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion, replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/States The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of firmware update data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion, replay has occurred.
FDP_ACC.1/Hier Subset access control (object hierarchy)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/Hier The TSF shall enforce the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP on
Subjects
(1) Platform firmware,
(2) Platform Owner,
(3) Privacy administrator,
(4) Lockout administrator,
(5) USER,
(6) World
Objects
(5) PPS,
(6) EPS,
(7) SPS,
(8) PPO,
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(9) EK,
(10) SRK
(11) Null Seed,
(12) object in a TPM hierarchy
Operations
(1) TPM2_CreatePrimary,
(2) TPM2_CreateLoaded
(3) TPM2_HierarchyControl,
(4) TPM2_Clear,
(5) TPM2_ClearControl,
(6) TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth,
(7) TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy,
(8) TPM2_Load,
(9) TPM2_LoadExternal,
(10) TPM2_ReadPublic,
(11) Use
(12) TPM2_ChangeEPS
(13) TPM2_ChangePPS
(14) TPM2_RestoreEK
FDP_ACF.1/Hier Security attribute based access control (object hierarchy)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/Hier The TSF shall enforce the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP to objects based on the
following:
Subjects:
(1) Platform firmware with security attribute authorisation state gained by
authentication with platformAuth or platformPolicy,
(2) Platform Owner with security attribute authorisation state gained by
authentication with ownerAuth or ownerPolicy,
(3) Privacy administrator with security attribute authorisation state gained by
authentication with endorsementAuth or endorsementPolicy,
(4) Lockout administrator with security attribute authorisation state,
(5) USER with authentication state gained with userAuth or authPolicy,
(6) World with no security attributes,
Objects:
(1) EPS,
(2) PPS,
(3) SPS,
(4) EK,
(5) PPO,
(6) SRK,
(7) Null Seed,
(8) object in a TPM hierarchy with security attributes: state of the hierarchy,
fixedParent, fixedTpm
FDP_ACF.1.2/Hier The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) The subject World is authorised to create an EPS whenever the TPM is powered
on and no EPS is present.
(2) The subject World is authorised to create an PPS whenever the TPM is powered
on and no PPS is present.
(3) The subject World is authorised to create an SPS whenever the TPM is powered
on and no SPS is present.
(4) The subject World is authorised to create a Null Seed whenever the TPM is reset.
(5) The Platform firmware with platformAuth, platformPolicy or physical presence if
supported by the TOE and the lockout administrator with lockoutAuth is authorised to
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change the SPS to a new value from the RNG (TPM2_Clear). The physical presence
is not required if it is not supported by the TOE or disabled for the TPM2_Clear
command.
(6) The Platform firmware is authorised to create a Platform Primary Object under
PPS. The physical presence is not required if it is not if supported by the TOE or
disabled for TPM2_CreatePrimary or TPM2_CreateLoaded command.
(7) The Platform Owner is authorised to create a primary object (SRK) under SPS.
(8) The privacy administrator is authorised to create a primary object (EK) under
EPS.
(9) The subject World is authorised to create temporary objects for no hierarchy
(using the Null Seed).
(10) The Platform firmware with platformAuth, platformPolicy or physical presence if
supported by the TOE and the lockout administrator with lockoutAuth are authorised
to remove all TPM context associated with a specific owner (TPM2_Clear). The
physical presence is not required if it is not supported by the TOE or disabled for the
TPM2_ClearControl command.
(11) The Platform firmware with platformAuth, platformPolicy or physical presence if
supported by the TOE and the lockout administrator with lockoutAuth are authorised
to disable and enable the execution of TPM2_Clear by the command
TPM2_ClearControl. The physical presence is not required if it is not supported by
the TOE or disabled for the TPM2_ClearControl command.
(12) The Platform firmware with platformAuth, platformPolicy or physical presence if
supported by the TOE, the Platform Owner, the privacy administrator and the lockout
administrator are authorised to change the authorisation secret for a hierarchy or
lockout (TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth). The physical presence is not required if it is
not supported by the TOE or disabled for the TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth
command.
(13) The Platform firmware with platformAuth, platformPolicy or physical presence, if
supported by the TOE the Platform Owner and the privacy administrator are
authorised to set the authorisation policy for the platform hierarchy (platformPolicy),
the storage hierarchy (ownerPolicy) and the endorsement hierarchy
(endorsementPolicy) using the command TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy. The physical
presence is not required if it is not supported by the TOE or disabled for the
TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy command.
(14) The Platform firmware is authorized to replace the current EPS with a value from
RNG, disable EKs loaded by the TPM Vendor and to set the endorsement hierarchy
controls to their default values (TPM2_ChangeEPS).
(15) The Platform firmware is authorized to replace the current PPS with a value from
RNG and to set the platformPolicy to the default value (TPM2_ChangePPS)
(16) The Platform firmware is authorized to replace the current EPS with a value from
RNG, to restore the EKs loaded by the TPM vendor and to set the endorsement
hierarchy controls to their default values (TPM2_RestoreEK). The EKs are restored
from the EKs values loaded by the TPM vendor in phase 2 (manufacturing and
delivery) defined for case 1 in the Protection Profile [12] . The restored values are
used to generate the EKs when the command TPM2_CreatePrimary uses the default
creation templates defined in the TOE user guidance
FDP_ACF.1.3/Hier The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/Hier The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
(1) No subject is authorised to use any object of a hierarchy if the corresponding
hierarchy is disabled (i.e phEnable for platform hierarchy is CLEAR, shEnable for
Storage hierarchy is CLEAR, ehEnable for EPS hierarchy is CLEAR).
FMT_MSA.1/Hier Management of security attributes (object hierarchy)
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/Hier TSF shall enforce the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP to restrict the ability to modify
the security attributes fixedTPM and fixedParent to nobody.
FMT_MSA.3/Hier Static attribute initialisation (object hierarchy)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1/Hier The TSF shall enforce the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP to provide restrictive
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/Hier The TSF shall allow the creator of an object in a TPM hierarchy to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
FMT_MSA.4/Hier Security attribute value inheritance (hierarchy)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.4.1/Hier The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes:
(1) The Platform firmware with platformAuth, platformPolicy or physical presence if
supported by the TOE is authorised to enable and to disable the use of the platform
hierarchy and its associated NV storage (TPM2_HierarchyControl changing phEnable
or phEnableNV). The physical presence is not required if it is not supported by the
TOE or disabled for the TPM2_HierarchyControl command.
(2) The Platform firmware with platformAuth, platformPolicy or physical presence if
supported by the TOE and Platform Owner with ownerAuth or ownerPolicy are
authorised to enable and to disable the use of a Storage hierarchy
(TPM2_HierarchyControl changing shEnable). The physical presence is not required
if it is not supported by the TOE or disabled for the TPM2_HierarchyControl
command.
(3) The Platform firmware with platformAuth, platformPolicy or physical presence if
supported by the TOE and privacy administrator with endorsementAuth or
endorsementPolicy are authorised to enable and to disable the use of a Endorsement
hierarchy (TPM2_HierarchyControl changing ehEnable). The physical presence is not
required if it is not supported by the TOE or disabled for the TPM2_HierarchyControl
command.
(4) The only way to enable platform hierarchy is power-on of the TPM.
(5) The Platform firmware with platformAuth, platformPolicy, or physical presence if
supported by the TOE is authorised to enable the use of the Endorsement hierarchy
and the Storage hierarchy (TPM2_HierarchyControl). The physical presence is not
required if it is not supported by the TOE or disabled for the TPM2_HierarchyControl
command
FDP_ACF.1/ACSecurity attribute based access control (access control)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/ACThe TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following
Subjects:
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(1) Platform firmware with security attribute authorisation state gained by
authentication with platformAuth, platformPolicy or physical presence if supported by
the TOE,
(2) Platform firmware with security attribute authorisation state gained by
authentication with ownerAuth or ownerPolicy,
(3) Privacy administrator with security attribute authorisation state gained by
authentication with endorsementAuth or endorsementPolicy,
(4) Lockout administrator with security attribute authorisation state,
(5) USER with authentication state gained with userAuth or authPolicy,
(6) DUP with authentication state gained with authPolicy,
(7) ADMIN with authentication state gained with userAuth or authPolicy,
(8) World with no security attributes,
Objects:
(1) User key with security attributes TPM_ALG_ID, TPMA_OBJECT,
(2) TPM objects,
(3) Clock with security attributes: resetCount, restartCount, safe-flag,
(4) Data with security attribute “externally provided”.
FDP_ACF.1.2/ACThe TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) The Platform firmware platformAuth, platformPolicy or with physical presence if
supported by the TOE and the Platform Owner are authorised to control the
persistence of loadable objects in TPM memory (TPM2_EvictControl). The physical
presence is not required if it is not supported by the TOE or disabled for
TPM2_EvictControl command.
(2) The Platform firmware platformAuth, platformPolicy or with physical presence if
supported by the TOE and the Platform Owner are authorised to advance the value
and to adjust the rate of advance of the TPMs clock (TPM2_ClockSet,
TPM2_ClockRateAdjust). The physical presence is not required if it is not supported
by the TOE or disabled for the TPM2_ClockSet respective TPM2_ClockRateAdjust
command.
(3) Any subject is authorised to get the current value of time, clock, resetCount and
restartCount (TPM2_ReadClock).
(4) A subject with the role USER endorsed by the Privacy administrator or the
keyHandle identifier of a loaded key that can perform digital signatures is authorised
to get the current value of time and clock (TPM2_GetTime)
(5) No subject is authorised to set the clock to a value less than the current value of
clock using the TPM2_ClockSet command.
(6) No subject is authorised to set the clock to a value greater than its maximum
value (0xFFFF000000000000) using the TPM2_ClockSet command.
(7) A subject with the role USER is authorised to generate digital signatures using
the command TPM2_Sign for externally provided data (hash). The user authorisation
shall be done based on the required authorisation of the key that will perform signing.
The key attributes shall allow the signing operation for externally provided data.
(8) Any subject is authorised to verify digital signatures using the command
TPM2_VerifySignature.
(9) Any subject is authorised to request data from the random number generator
using the command TPM2_GetRandom.
(10) Any subject is authorised to add additional information to the state of the random
number generator using the command TPM2_StirRandom.
(11) Any subject is authorised to perform RSA encryption using the command
TPM2_RSA_Encrypt for externally provided data. The key attributes shall allow the
encrypt operation for externally provided data.
(12) A subject with the role USER is authorised to perform RSA decryption using the
command TPM2_RSA_Decrypt for externally provided data. The user authorisation
shall be done based on the required authorisation of the key that will be used for
decryption. The key attributes shall allow the decrypt operation for externally provided
data.
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(13) Any subject is authorised to generate ECC ephemeral key pairs using the
command TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen.
(14) A subject with the role USER is authorised to recover a value that is used in ECC
based key sharing protocols using the command TPM2_ECDH_ZGen. The user
authorisation shall be done based on the required authorisation of the involved
private key.
(15) Any subject is authorised to request the parameters of an identified ECC curve
using the command TPM2_ECC_Parameters.
(16) The subject USER is authorised to start a HMAC sequence using the command
TPM2_HMAC_Start.
(17) The subject World is authorised to start a hash or event sequence using the
command TPM2_HashSequenceStart.
(18) The subject USER is authorised to add data to a hash, event or HMAC sequence
using the command TPM2_SequenceUpdate.
(19) The subject USER is authorised to add the last part of data (if any) to a hash or
HMAC sequence using the command TPM2_SequenceComplete.
(20) The subject USER is authorised to add the last part of data (if any) to an event
sequence using the command TPM2_EventSequenceComplete.
(21) Any subject is authorised to perform hash operations on a data buffer using the
command TPM2_Hash.
(22) A subject with the role USER is authorised to perform HMAC operations on a
data buffer. The user authorisation shall be done based on the required authorisation
of the involved symmetric key.
(23) A subject with the role USER is authorised to generate HMACs using the
command TPM2_HMAC for externally provided data (hash). The user authorisation
shall be done based on the required authorisation of the key that will perform the
HMAC. The key attributes shall allow the signing operation for externally provided
data.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ACThe TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none
FDP_ACF.1.4/ACThe TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
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7.2.1 Extended component FCS_RNG.1
The protection profile [12] defines the extended family Random Number Generation
(FCS_RNG) of the class FCS (Cryptographic support) in order to describe the generation of
random numbers for cryptographic purposes.
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a deterministic random number generator that implements: NIST
SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG. [29]
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet: Statistical test suites cannot
practically distinguish the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.
In order to comply with the requirements defined in the standard AIS 20 [36], a refinement of
the SFR FCS_RNG is provided below:
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a deterministic random number generator AIS20
Class DRG.3 according to [36] that implements:
(DRG.3.1) if initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 as
random source, the internal state of the RNG shall have at least 100 bit
of min-entropy and implements NIST SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG [29] and
FIPS 180-4 [22].
(DRG.3.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy
(DRG.3.3) The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is
known
FCS_RNG.1.2
(DRG.3.4)
(DRG.3.5)
The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet
The RNG initialized with a random seed before the first use of the RNG
after each product power up and reseeded after 232 requests generates
output for more than 234 strings of bit length 128 that are mutually
different with probability of w>1-2-16
Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers
from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must
pass FIPS 140-2 statistical test suite.
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7.3 Security assurance requirements
The Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) for the TOE are the assurance components of
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) as defined in CC part 3 and augmented with
ALC_FLR.1 and AVA_VAN.5.
The security assurance requirements defined in Table 5 are defined in section 7.2 of the PP
[12] with the exception of the vulnerability assessment assurance component augmented to
AVA_VAN.5 whereas the PP [12] mandates AVA_VAN.4.
Table 5: Security assurance requirements for the TOE
Assurance Class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flow remediation - augmented
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Methodical vulnerability analysis - augmented
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7.4 Security Requirements rationale
The security requirements rationale of the TOE are defined and described in the PP [12],
section 7.3 Security Requirements rationale.
7.4.1 Sufficiency of SFR
The SFRs FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA, FCS_CKM.1/PKECC and FCS_CKM.1/PKAES fulfil the
same objectives as the SFR FCS_CKM.1/PK defined in the PP [12] Table 11.
The SFRs FCS_COP.1/SHA3 fulfils the same objectives as the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA
defined in the PP [12] Table 11.
The SFRs FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA and FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA3 fulfil the same objectives
as the SFR FCS_COP.1/HMAC defined in the PP [12] Table 11.
7.4.2 Dependency rationale
The SFRs FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA, FCS_CKM.1/PKECC and FCS_CKM.1/PKAES fulfil the
same dependency rationale as the SFR FCS_CKM.1/PK defined in the PP [12] Table 12.
The SFRs FCS_COP.1/SHA3 fulfil the same dependency rationale as the SFR
FCS_COP.1/SHA defined in the PP [12] Table 12.
The SFRs FCS_COP.1/HMAC and FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA3 fulfil the same dependency
rationale as the SFR FCS_COP.1/HMAC defined in the PP [12] Table 12.
7.5 Security Assurance rationale
The security assurance requirements rationale of the TOE are defined and described in the
section 7.3 Assurance rationale.
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8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
The product overview is described in section 2.2.
In the following section, the security functionality and the assurance measures of the TOE
are described.
8.1 TOE Security Features
This section contains the definition and description of the security features (SF) of the TOE.
The TOE provides five security features (SF) to meet the security functional requirements.
The security features are:
• SF_CRY: Cryptographic Support
• SF_I&A: Identification and Authentication
• SF_G&T General and Test
• SF_OBH Object Hierarchy
• SF_TOP TOE Operation
8.1.1 SF_CRY - Cryptographic Support
There are several functions within the TOE related to cryptographic support: generation of
random numbers, generation of asymmetric key pairs, RSA and ECC digital signature
(generation and verification), RSA, ECC and AES data encryption and decryption, key
destruction, the generation of hash values and the generation and verification of MAC
values.
The TOE supports the generation of cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA key generator and ECC key generator and
specified cryptographic key sizes RSA 2048 bits that meet the following: [33] and optional
[31] and ECC with key sizes of 256 and 384 bits that meet [6], [7], [8],and optional [31].
RSA key generator:
• Endorsement Key generated with default template defined in [46] is securely written
in the TOE during the manufacturing process
• Other keys are generated according to [6], [7], [8] using the DRBG as random
generator
ECC key generator
• Endorsement Key generated with default template defined in [46] is securely written
in the TOE during the manufacturing process
• Other keys are generated according to [6], [7], [8] using the DRBG as random
generator
The covered security functional requirements are FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA,
FCS_CKM.1/PKECC, FCS_CKM.1/RSA and FCS_CKM.1/ECC.
The TOE supports the generation of symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with the
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm AES key generator and specified
cryptographic key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits that meet [6], [7], [8] and optional [31].
The covered security functional requirements are FCS_CKM.1/PKAES and
FCS_CKM.1/SYMM.
The TOE supports the destruction of cryptographic keys by erasure of volatile memory areas
containing cryptographic keys in accordance with FIPS PUB 140-2 [20].
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_CKM.4.
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The TOE performs the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm AES in the CFB, CTR, OFB, CBC, ECB modes and cryptographic
key size of 128, 192 and 256 bits that meet [FIPS 197] and [SP 800-38A].
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/AES. The TOE performs the
hash value calculation in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1,
SHA-256 and SHA-384 that meets [FIPS 180-4] beside SHA3-256 and SHA3-384 that meet
[FIPS 202] .
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/SHA.
The TOE performs HMAC value calculation and verification in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm HMAC with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA3-256 and SHA3-384
and cryptographic key sizes 160, 256 and 384 bits that meet [FIPS 198-1] and [FIPS 180-4]
The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA and
FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA3.
The TOE performs asymmetric encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA without padding, RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, RSAES-OAEP and
cryptographic key sizes 2048 bits that meet [RFC 3447].
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/RSAED.
The TOE performs signature generation and signature verification in accordance with the
specified cryptographic algorithm RSASA_PKCS1v1_5, RSASSA_PSS and cryptographic
key sizes 2048 bits that meet [RFC 3447].
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/RSASign.
The TOE performs signature generation and signature verification in accordance with the
specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with curves TPM_ECC_NIST_P256,
TPM_ECC_NIST_P384 and TPM_ECC_BN_P256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 and 384
bits that meet TPM library specification [TPM2.0 Part1 r138] section C.4.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/ECDSA.
The TOE performs signature generation in accordance with the specified cryptographic
algorithm ECDAA with curves TPM_ECC_NIST_P256, TPM_ECC_NIST_P384 and
TPM_ECC_BN_P256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 and 384 bits that meet TPM library
specification [TPM2.0 Part1 r138], section C4.2.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/ECDAA.
The TOE performs decryption of ECC key in accordance with the specified cryptographic
algorithm ECDH with curves TPM_ECC_BN_P256, TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 and
TPM_ECC_NIST_P384 and cryptographic key sizes 256 and 384 bits that meet TPM library
specification [6], [7], [8] and [SP 800-56A] section 6.1.1.2.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/ECDEC.
The TOE provides a deterministic random number generator (DRBG) including a true
random generator, which is used for the seeding of the DRBG, to provide the random
numbers. The TOE provides random numbers that fulfils the requirements from the
functional class DRG.3 of [AIS 20] and [SP 800-90Ar1]. The DRBG is based on a
HASH_DRBG with SHA256.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_RNG.1.
The SF_CRY Cryptographic Support covers the following security functional requirements:
• FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA,
• FCS_CKM.1/PKECC,
• FCS_CKM.1/PKAES,
• FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
• FCS_CKM.1/ECC,
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• FCS_CKM.1/SYMM,
• FCS_CKM.4,
• FCS_COP.1/AES,FCS_COP.1/SHA,
• FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA,
• FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA3
• FCS_COP.1/RSAED,
• FCS_COP.1/RSASign,
• FCS_COP.1/ECDSA,
• FCS_COP.1/ECDAA,
• FCS_COP.1/ECDEC and
• FCS_RNG.1.
8.1.2 SF_I&A - Identification and Authentication
The TPM provides two mechanisms for the identification and authentication capability to
authorize the use of a Protected Object and Protected Capability. Note that the TCG TPM
Library specification refers to the identification and authentication process and access
control as authorization. The first authentication mechanisms is the proof of knowledge of a
shared secret (password or secret for HMAC) assigned to the entity as authValue. The
second mechanism is the authentication of the user and verification of an intended state of
the TPM and its environment encoded in authPolicy and assigned to the entity.
The TOE provides a mechanism to generate secrets that meet uniform distribution of
random variable generating the value, and is able to enforce the use of TSF generated
secrets for nonce values for authorization sessions unknown authValues
The covered security functional requirement is FIA_SOS.2.
The TOE use different rules to set the value of security attributes. The covered security
functional requirement is FMT_MSA.4/AUTH.
The TOE provides the management functionality of the TSF data by user authorization. The
covered security functional requirement is FMT_MTD.1/AUTH.
TOE detects when the maximal tries of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur for
objects and NV Index where DA is active and blocks the authorizations for a defined time.
The covered security functional requirement is FIA_AFL.1/Recover.
The TOE detects when one unsuccessful authentication attempt occurs using lockoutAuth in
the command TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset and blocks the
TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset command for a defined time.
The covered security functional requirement is FIA_AFL.1/Lockout.
The TOE detects when a defined number of successful authentication events exceeds
pinLimit for an NV index with the attribute TPM_NT_PIN_PASS and blocks further
authorization events.
The covered security functional requirement is FIA_AFL.1/PINPASS.
The TOE detects when a defined number of unsuccessful authentication events exceeds
pinLimit for an NV index with the attribute TPM_NT_PIN_FAIL and blocks further
authorization events.
The covered security functional requirement is FIA_AFL.1/PINFAIL.
The TOE allows access to a defined number of commands and objects for the user to be
performed before the user is authenticated/identified.
The covered security functional requirements are FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1.
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The TOE provides different authentication mechanisms to support user authentication and
authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the different rules. The TOE provides
re- authentication of the user for multiple command processing.
The covered security functional requirements are FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6.
The TOE associate security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user. The
TOE enforces different rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects
acting on the behalf of users and enforces different rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users.
The covered security functional requirement is FIA_USB.1.
The SF_I&A - Identification and Authentication covers the following security functional
requirements:
• FIA_SOS.2,
• FIA_MSA.4/AUTH,
• FMT_MTD.1/AUTH,
• FIA_AFL.1/Recover,
• FIA_AFL.1/Lockout,
• FIA_AFL.1/PINPASS
• FIA_AFL.1/PINFAIL
• FIA_UID.1,
• FIA_UAU.1,
• FIA_UAU.5,
• FIA_UAU.6 and
• FIA_USB.1.
8.1.3 SF_G&T - General and Test
The TOE provides the roles: Platform firmware, Platform owner, Privacy Administrator,
Lockout Administrator, User, Admin, DUP and World and associates users with roles. The
roles are enforced within the TOE because there are specific commands and specific keys
bond to different token.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_SMR.1. The TOE performs different
management functions.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_SMF.1.
The TOE ensures that only secure values are accepted for security attributes. The covered
security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.2.
The TOE provides reliable time stamps as number of milliseconds the TOE has been
powered since initialization of the Clock value.
The covered security functional requirement is FPT_STM.1
The TOE ensures that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable
upon the deallocation of the resource from defined objects.
The covered security functional requirement is FDP_RIP.1.
The TOE supports a suite of self tests during startup and at the request of an authorized
user world to demonstrate the correct operation of sensitive parts of the TSF and to verify
the integrity of stored TSF executable code and parts of TSF data.
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The covered security functional requirement is FPT_TST.1.
The TOE preserves a secure state by entering the Fail state when a failure during TPM
Restart or Resume occurs, a failure is detected by TPM2_ContecxtLoad or the self test, of
any crypto operations including RSA encryption, RSA decryption, AES encryption, AES
decryption, SHA-1, RNG, RSA signature generation, HMAC generation or failure of any
commands or internal operations and authorization occurs.
The covered security functional requirement is FPT_FLS.1/FS.
The TOE preserves a secure state by shutdown, when detecting a physical attack or an
environmental condition which is out of spec value.
The covered security functional requirement is FPT_FLS.1/SD.
The TOE resists physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding
automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
The TOE supports the following functions for protection against and detection of physical
manipulation and probing:
• Protection by an active shield that commands an automatic reaction on die integrity
violation detection.
• Preventative mechanisms are implemented in order to mitigate the risk of
information disclosure or unauthorized modification
• Bus encryption
• Memories scrambling and encryption
• Mechanisms for operation execution concealment
• Clock frequency modification and jittering
• Intrinsic countermeasures for cryptographic algorithm against side channel attacks
like timing attacks (TA), SPA and DPA.
• Detection of abnormal behavior of the following operational conditions:
• High voltage supply
• Glitches
• Detection of abnormal TOE behavior:
• MPU error
• TRNG failure
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_ITT.1.
The SF_G&T - General and Test covers the following security functional requirements:
• FMT_SMR.1,
• FMT_SMF.1,
• FMT_MSA.2,
• FPT_STM.1,
• FDP_RIP.1,
• FPT_TST.1,
• FPT_FLS.1/FS,
• FPT_FLS.1/SD and
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• FPT_PHP.3
• FDP_ITT.1
• FPT_ITT.1
8.1.4 SF_OBH - Object Hierarchy
The TOE supports different states during his lifecycle as described in [TPM2.0 PP] section
7.1.4.1 -TPM Operational States in detail.
The TOE enforces the TPM State Control SFP on all subjects and objects and all operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. The TOE ensure that all operations
between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered
by an access control SFP and enforces different access control rules on controlled subjects
and objects.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.2/States and
FDP_ACF.1/States.
The TOE enforce the TPM state control SFP to restrict the ability to modify the security
attributes TPM state and to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are
used to enforce the SFP. The TOE enforce the TPM state control SFP to receive firmware
update data in a manner protected from errors and determines on receipt of firmware update
data, whether error has occurred.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/States, FMT_MSA.3/States
and FDP_UIT.1/States.
The TOE supports three different hierarchies, the platform hierarchy, the storage hierarchy
and the endorsement hierarchy. The root of each TPM hierarchy is defined by a primary
seed which is a random value persistently stored in the TOE. A hierarchy may be disabled.
The TOE monitors user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for data
modifications and modification of hierarchy on all objects, based on the different attributes.
The covered security functional requirement is FDP_SDI.1.
The TOE enforces the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP on defined subjects, objects and
operations and enforces different rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed and deny access of subjects to objects based on
different rules.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/Hier and FDP_ACF.1/Hier.
The TOE enforces the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP to not allow the modification of the
security attributes fixedTPM and fixedParent.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.1/Hier.
The TOE enforces the TPM Object Hierarchy SFP to provide restrictive default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP and allows the creator of an object in a
TPM hierarchy to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.3/Hier.
The TOE enforces different rules to set the value of security attributes. The covered security
functional requirement is FMT_MSA.4/Hier.
The TOE allows the import and export of data as an object of a hierarchy.
The TOE enforces the Data Export and Import SFP on subjects, objects and operations. The
Data Export and Import SFP enforce different rules to determine if an operation between a
controlled subject and controlled object is allowed.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/ExIm and FDP_ACF.1/ExIm.
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The TOE enforce the Data Export and Import SFP to restrict the ability to use the security
attribute authorization data to every subject, to provide restrictive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP and to prevent to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/ExIm and FMT_MSA.3/ExIm
The TOE enforces the Data Export and Import SFP when exporting user data, controlled
under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE and to export the user data with the user data's
associated security attributes. The TOE ensure that the security attributes, when exported
outside the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data and different
rules are enforced when user data is exported from the TOE.
The covered security functional requirement is FDP_ETC.2/ExIm.
The TOE enforces the Data Export and Import SFP when importing user data, controlled
under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE. The correct interpretation, association and use of the
security attributes associated with the imported user data are ensured and different rules are
enforced when user data is imported from outside the TOE.
The covered security functional requirement is FDP_ITC.2/ExIm.
The TOE enforces the Data Export and Import SFP to transmit user data in a manner
protected from unauthorised disclosure and to transmit and receive user data in a manner
protected from modification errors. The TOE is able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification has occurred.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_UCT.1/ExIm and FDP_UIT.1/ExIm.
The TOE enforces the Measurement and Reporting SFP on subjects, objects and
operations. The Measurement and Reporting SFP enforce different rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/M&R and FDP_ACF.1/M&R.
The TOE enforces the Measurement and Reporting SFP to restrict the ability to modify the
security attributes PCR attributes, PCR extension algorithm and used hash algorithm to the
subject Platform firmware, to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are
used to enforce the SFP, and to prevent to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/M&R and FMT_MSA.3/M&R.
The TOE is able to generate evidence of origin for transmitted attestation structure and
object creation tickets at the request of the originator and provide a capability to verify the
evidence of origin of information to recipient given as soon as the recipient can verify the
signature and has confidence to the key that is used to sign.
The covered security functional requirement is FCO_NRO.1/M&R.
The SF_OBH - Object Hierarchy covers the following security functional requirements:
• FDP_ACC.2/States,
• FDP_ACF.1/States,
• FMT_MSA.1/States,
• FMT_MSA.3/States,
• FDP_UIT.1/States,
• FDP_SDI.1,
• FDP_ACC.1/Hier,
• FDP_ACF.1/Hier,
• FMT_MSA.1/Hier,
• FMT_MSA.3/Hier,
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• FMT_MSA.4/Hier,
• FDP_ACC.1/ExIm,
• FDP_ACF.1/ExIm,
• FMT_MSA.1/ExIm,
• FMT_MSA.3/ExIm,
• FDP_ETC.2/ExIm,
• FDP_ITC.2/ExIm,
• FDP_UCT.1/ExIm,
• FDP_UIT.1/ExIm,
• FDP_ACC.1/M&R,
• FDP_ACF.1/M&R,
• FMT_MSA.1/M&R,
• FMT_MSA.3/M&R and
• FCO_NRO.1/M&R
8.1.5 SF_TOP - TOE Operation
The TOE enforces the Access Control SFP on different subjects, objects and operations and
enforces different rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed. The TOE explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
different additional rules and explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
different additional rules.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/AC and FDP_ACF.1/AC
The TOE enforces the Access Control SFP to restrict the ability to query and modify different
security attributes to specific subjects, to provide restrictive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP and to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or information is created.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/AC and FMT_MSA.3/AC.
The TOE enforces the Access Control SFP to transmit user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure. The TOE provides a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure. The TOE initiates communication via the trusted channel and
permits another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_UCT.1/AC and FTP_ITC.1/AC.
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TPM2_Clear to the
subjects Platform firmware and Lockout administrator.
The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MOF.1/AC.
The TSF shall enforce the NVM SFP on different subjects, objects and operations and
enforces different rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/NVM and FDP_ACF.1/NVM.
The TOE enforces the NVM SFP to restrict the ability to query and modify the security
attribute NV index attributes to the authorized role of the subject that executes the NVM
related command and to provide restrictive default values when an object or information is
created. The TOE prohibits to override the default values with alternative initial values when
an object or information is created. The TOE enforces different rules to set the value of
security attributes and restrict the ability to modify the authorization secret (authValue) for a
NV index to the subject ADMIN.
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The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/NVM, FMT_MSA.3/NVM,
FMT_MSA.4/NVM and FMT_MTD.1/NVM.
The TOE enforces the NVM SFP when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, and
ignores any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the
TOE. Additionally the TOE enforces different rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE. The TOE enforces the NVM SFP when exporting user
data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ITC.1/NVM and FDP_ETC.1/NVM.
The TOE enforces the Credential SFP on different subjects, objects and operations and
enforces different rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1/Cre and FDP_ACF.1/Cre.
The TOE enforces the Credential SFP to provide restrictive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP and prevents to override the default values when
an object or information is created. The TOE enforces the Credential SFP to restrict the
ability to use the security attributes HMAC in the credential BLOB to the subject USER.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_MSA.1/Cre and FMT_MSA.3/Cre.
The TOE generates evidence of origin for transmitted TPM objects at the request of the
originator and relates the information whether the object is resident in an authentic TPM of
the originator of the information, and the name and the public area of the TPM object of the
information to which the evidence applies. The TOE provides a capability to verify the
evidence of origin of information to the initiator given based on a credential BLOB that was
generated by the credential provider.
The covered security functional requirement is FCO_NRO.1/Cre
The SF_TOE - TOE Operationǁ covers the following security functional requirements:
• FDP_ACC.1/AC,
• FDP_ACF.1/AC,
• FMT_MSA.1/AC,
• FMT_MSA.3/AC,
• FDP_UCT.1/AC,
• FTP_ITC.1/AC,
• FMT_MOF.1/AC,
• FDP_ACC.1/NVM,
• FDP_ACF.1/NVM,
• FMT_MSA.1/NVM,
• FMT_MSA.3/NVM,
• FMT_MSA.4/NVM,
• FMT_MTD.1/NVM,
• FDP_ITC.1/NVM,
• FDP_ETC.1/NVM,
• FDP_ACC.1/Cre,
• FDP_ACF.1/Cre,
• FMT_MSA.1/Cre,
• FMT_MSA.3/Cre and
• FCO_NRO.1/Cre
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8.1.6 Assignment of Security Functional Requirements
Security Functional
Requirement
SF_
CRY
SF_
I&A
SF_
G&T
SF_
OBH
SF_
TOP
FMT_SMR.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_MSA.2 X
FPT_STM.1 X
FDP_RIP.1 X
FCS_RNG.1 X
FCS_CKM.1/PKRSA X
FCS_CKM.1/PKECC X
FCS_CKM.1/PKAES X
FCS_CKM.1/RSA X
FCS_CKM.1/ECC X
FCS_CKM.1/SYMM X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1/AES X
FCS_COP.1/SHA X
FCS_COP.1/SHA3 X
FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA X
FCS_COP.1/HMAC/SHA3 X
FCS_COP.1/RSAED X
FCS_COP.1/RSASign X
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA X
FCS_COP.1/ECDAA X
FCS_COP.1/ECDEC X
FIA_SOS.2 X
FMT_MSA.4/AUTH X
FMT_MTD.1/AUTH X
FIA_AFL.1/Recover X
FIA_AFL.1/Lockout X
FIA_AFL.1/PINPASS X
FIA_AFL.1/PINFAIL X
FIA_UID.1 X
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FIA_UAU.1 X
FIA_UAU.5 X
FIA_UAU.6 X
FIA_USB.1 X
FPT_TST.1 X
FPT_FLS.1/FS X
FPT_FLS.1/SD X
FPT_PHP.3 X
FDP_ITT.1
X
FPT_ITT.1
X
FDP_ACC.2/States X
FDP_ACF.1/States X
FMT_MSA.1/States X
FMT_MSA.3/States X
FDP_UIT.1/States X
FDP_SDI.1 X
FDP_ACC.1/Hier X
FDP_ACF.1/Hier X
FMT_MSA.1/Hier X
FMT_MSA.3/Hier X
FMT_MSA.4/Hier X
FDP_ACC.1/ExIm X
FDP_ACF.1/ExIm X
FMT_MSA.1/ExIm X
FMT_MSA.3/ExIm X
FDP_ETC.2/ExIm X
FDP_ITC.2/ExIm X
FDP_UCT.1/ExIm X
FDP_UIT.1/ExIm X
FDP_ACC.1/M&R X
FDP_ACF.1/M&R X
FMT_MSA.1/M&R X
FMT_MSA.3/M&R X
FCO_NRO.1/M&R X
FDP_ACC.1/AC X
FDP_ACF.1/AC X
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FMT_MSA.1/AC X
FMT_MSA.3/AC X
FDP_UCT.1/AC X
FTP_ITC.1/AC X
FMT_MOF.1/AC X
FDP_ACC.1/NVM X
FDP_ACF.1/NVM X
FMT_MSA.1/NVM X
FMT_MSA.3/NVM X
FMT_MSA.4/NVM X
FMT_MTD.1/NVM X
FDP_ITC.1/NVM X
FDP_ETC.1/NVM X
FDP_ACC.1/Cre X
FDP_ACF.1/Cre X
FMT_MSA.1/Cre X
FMT_MSA.3/Cre X
FCO_NRO.1/Cre X
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9 ACRONYMS
For the purposes of this document, the acronyms given in CC Parts 2 and 3 and the following apply.
Acronym Description
AFL Application Flash Loader
AuthData Authentication Data or Authorisation Data, depending on the context
CA Certificate Authority
CFB Cipher Feedback mode
CML Code Memory Loader
CRTM Core Root of Trust for Measurement
CTR Counter-mode encryption
DA Dictionary Attack
DAA Direct Autonomous Attestation
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAL evaluated assurance level
ECB Electric Cookbook
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDAA ECC-based Direct Anonymous Attestation
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EK Endorsement Key
EPS Endorsement Primary Seed
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FU Field Upgrade
FUM Field Upgrade mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HW Hardware Interface
I/O Input/Output
IV Initialisation Vector
KDF key derivation function
MMIO Memory Mapped I/O
MPU Memory Protecting Unit
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NV Non-volatile
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PCR platform configuration register(s)
PK Primary Key
PP Physical Presence, Protection Profile
PPO Platform Primary Object
PPS Platform Primary Seed
PRIVEK Private Endorsement Key
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PUBEK Public Endorsement Key
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Algorithm for public-key cryptography. The letters R, S, and A represent the initials of the first public describers
of the algorithm Rivest, Shamir and Adleman.
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Acronym Description
RTM Root of Trust for Measurement
RTR Root of Trust for Reporting
RTS Root of Trust for Storage
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPS Storage Primary Seed
SRK Storage Root Key
TCB Trusted Computing Base
TCG Trusted Computing Group
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TPM_ Prefix for a command defined in TPM 1.2 library specifications
TPM2_ Prefix for a command defined in TPM 2.0 library specifications
UTC Universal Time Clock
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Appendix A REFERENCES
The following materials are to be used in conjunction with or are referenced by this
document.
[1] [CCMB-2017-04-001]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
[2] [CCMB-2017-04-002]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
[3] [CCMB-2017-04-003]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
[4] [CCMB-2017-04-04]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM)
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev 5, April 2017
[5] [TCG Glossary]
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/developers/glossary
[6] [TPM2.0 Part1 r138]
TPM Library Part 1: Architecture, Specification Version 2.0, Revision 1.38,
September 2016, Trusted Computing Group Incorporated
[7] [TPM2.0 Part2 r138]
TPM Library Part 2: TPM Structures, Specification Version 2.0, Revision 1.38,
September 2016, Trusted Computing Group Incorporated
[8] [TPM2.0 Part3 r138]
TPM Library Part 3: Commands, Specification Version 2.0, Revision 1.38,
September 2016, Trusted Computing Group Incorporated
[9] [TPM2.0 Part4 r138]
TPM Library Part 4: Supporting Routines, Specification Version 2.0, Revision 1.38,
September 2016, Trusted Computing Group Incorporated
[10] [TPM2.0 rev138 Err 1.4]
Errata version 1.4 January 8th, 2018 for TCG TPM library Family “2.0” level 0
revision 1.38 September 29th 2016, Trusted Computing Group Incorporated.
[11] [PTP 1.03]
TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile for TPM 2.0 (PTP), Family “2.0”,
Level 00 Revision 1.03, May 2017, Trusted Computing Group Incorporated
[12] [TPM2.0 PP]
PC Client Specific Trusted Platform Module Family 2.0 level 0 Revision 1.38,
Version 1.1 - [ANSSI-CC-PP-2018/03], Trusted Computing Group Incorporated
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[13] [IEEE P1363-2000]
Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography, Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc. (note reaffirmation PAR is actual running)
[14] [ISO/IEC 9796-2]
ISO/IEC 9796-2, Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signature
scheme giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorization based
mechanisms, ISO, 2002.
[15] [ISO/IEC 9797-2]
ISO/IEC 9797-2, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-
function
[16] [ISO/IEC 10116]
ISO/IEC 10116:2006, Information technology — Security techniques — Modes of
operation for an n-bit block cipher
[17] [ISO/IEC 10118-3]
ISO/IEC 10118-3, Information technology — Security techniques — Hash-functions
— Part 3: Dedicated hash function
[18] [ISO/IEC 14888-3]
ISO/IEC 14888-3, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Digital signature
with appendix -- Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms
[19] [ISO/IEC 18033-3]
ISO/IEC 18033-3, Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption
algorithms — Part 3: Block ciphers
[20] [FIPS 140-2]
FIPS Publication 140-2
[21] [FIPS 180-4]
FIPS Publication, Secure Hash standard, NIST, 2002 August 1
[22] [FIPS 186-4]
FIPS Publication, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
[23] [FIPS 197]
FIPS Publication, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 26, 2001
[24] [FIPS 198-1]
FIPS Publication, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), July
2008
[25] [FIPS 202]
FIPS Publication, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based hash and Extendable-
Output Functions, August 2015
[26] [SP 800-17]
NIST Special Publication 800-17: Modes of Operation Validation System (MOVS):
Requirements and Procedures, February 1998
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[27] [SP 800-38A]
NIST Special Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation. December 2001
[28] [SP 800-56A]
NIST Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptology. March 2007
[29] [SP 800-90Ar1]
Recommendation for random number generation using deterministic random bit
generators, NIST, June 2015
[30] [SP800-107]
NIST Special Publication 800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using
Approved Hash Algorithms. August 2012
[31] [SP800-108]
NIST Special Publication 800-108: Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions. October 2009
[32] [RFC 2104]
RFC2104 - HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
[33] [RFC 3447]
IETF RFC 3447, Public key Cryptography Standard, PKCS#1
PKCS#1: v2.0 RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, October 1, 1998
PKCS#1: v2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002
[34] [IEEE1363]
IEEE Std1363 – 2000 Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography
IEEE Std1363a – 2004 Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography
[35] [PKCS#1]
PKCS#1: v2.0 RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, October 1, 1998
[36] [AIS 20]
A proposal for Functionality classes for random number generators Version 3.0 BSI
[37] [RGS B1]
Référentiel Général de Sécurité, version 2.0 Annexe B1. Mécanismes
cryptographiques version 2.03 (21/02/2014)
[38] [ANSSI N6]
Application Note 6 – Security requirements for post-delivery code loading, Version
2.0, January 23rd 2015, ANSSI
[39] [DS ST33TPHF2XSPI]
ST33TPHF2XSPI datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0 device with an SPI interface,
Firmware 1.256, V2, STMicroelectronics
[40] [DS ST33TPHF2XSPI]
ST33TPHF2XSPI datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0 device with an SPI interface,
Firmware 1.257, V3, STMicroelectronics
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[41] [DS ST33TPHF2XI2C]
ST33TPHF2XI2C datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0 device with an I2C interface,
Firmware 2.256, V1, STMicroelectronics
[42] [DS ST33GTPMASPI]
ST33GTPMASPI datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0 device with an SPI interface,
Firmware 3.256, V3, STMicroelectronics
[43] [DS ST33GTPMAI2C]
ST33GTPMAI2C datasheet: Flash-based TPM 2.0 device with an I2C interface,
Firmware 6.256, V3, STMicroelectronics
[44] [EK CERT]
TPM EK Certificate – Chip and EK authenticity verification (2.0),
STMicroelectronics
[45] [SCY REC]
ST TPM 2.0 - Security recommendations (1.2), STMicroelectronics
[46] [TPM2.0 EK CERT]
TCG EK credential profile for TPM Family 2.0 Level 0. Specification Version 2.1
Revision 13, December 10 2018, Trusted Computing Group, Incorporated
[47] [ISO/IEC 15946-5]
ISO/IEC 15946-5, Information technology — Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 5: Elliptic curve generation; Clause 7.3
(Barreto –Naehrig (BN) elliptic curve)
[48] [PTP 1.03 Err1.1]
Errata version 1.1 for TCG PC Client Specific Platform TPM Profile for TPM 2.0
version 1.0 Revision 1.03, May 2017, Trusted Computing Group Incorporated
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