National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11263-2022
Dated: June 9, 2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome F Myers
Swapna Katikaneni
Alex Korobchuk
Dale Schroeder
Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Matai Spivey
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 2
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 4
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 4
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 6
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Privacy ................................................................................................................ 6
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 8
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 9
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 11
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 11
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 11
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 11
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 12
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 12
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 12
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 12
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 13
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 13
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 13
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 13
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 14
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
2
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Knox File Encryption solution
provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in June 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection
Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 01 March 2019 (PP_APP_v1.3) with the PP-
Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019 (MOD_FE_V1.0).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung Knox File
Encryption 1.4 Security Target, Version 0.3, May 25, 2022 and analysis performed by the
Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
3
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 01 March 2019
(PP_APP_v1.3) with the PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July
2019 (MOD_FE_V1.0)
ST Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Security
Target, Version 0.3, May 25, 2022
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4, Version 0.2,
May 25, 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jerome F Myers
Swapna Katikaneni
Alex Korobchuk
Dale Schroeder
Aerospace Corporation
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
4
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is a software service built into Samsung Android 12 with Knox 3.8 to provide file
encryption. Samsung Knox File Encryption is designed to provide a second encryption layer
similar to and on top of the FBE layer for the entire device.
The Knox File Encryption service runs in the background and utilizes Samsung Android
cryptographic modules to provide file encryption services. The service is designed to run
without any user intervention as all files will be encrypted automatically.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is software built into Samsung Knox. The TOE is designed as a framework for
providing file encryption for files on the device. The software is comprised of four major
components: the DualDAR Service, the DualDAR Client, the DualDAR Driver and
cryptographic modules. Management of the TOE is provided through normal device
administration functions; the TOE does not provide any configuration or management
capabilities itself but relies on the platform to provide both UI (such as for password entry
or management and MDM control). Administration is limited to enabling the File Encryption
feature and when used to encrypt the whole device, some credential settings for the service.
The boundary of files being encrypted is called the File Encryption Boundary (FEB). Once
the FEB has been set, either by creating a File Encryption-enabled work profile or by setting
the entire device for encryption, the service for encrypting/decrypting files is the same. The
specific version listed for DualDAR denotes the FEB that can be set. Setting the FEB for the
whole device requires v1.4.1, while either version can set the FEB to the work profile.
The components provide the following functions within the TOE:
• DualDAR Service: manages the implementation of the configuration and
monitoring system status for the lock state
• DualDAR Client: handles access to the Master Key (unlock and wipe)
• DualDAR Driver: handles the encryption/decryption I/O of files with the Master
Key unlocked by the DualDAR Client
• Cryptographic Modules: handle the cryptographic operations of the TOE (Samsung
Kernel Cryptographic Module and Samsung SCrypto)
Depending on the FEB configuration, the TOE either utilizes the Knox work profile
authentication or provides its own authentication to unlock the 256-bit Master Key. Once the
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
5
Master Key is unlocked the DualDAR Driver can read an encrypted file to unlock the
individual 128-bit FEK1
. The unlocked FEK is then used to decrypt the contents. When using
a Knox work profile, all open files will be closed and all unlocked FEKs and the Master Key
will be cleared from memory (this is handled by the DualDAR Service) when the profile
becomes locked. When not using a Knox work profile, the administrator can specify an
inactivity period to force a device restart to close all open files and clear all FEKs and the
Master Key.
By default (and in this configuration), the DualDAR Driver utilizes the Samsung Kernel
Cryptographic Module of the device for AES-CBC-1282
to decrypt/encrypt the contents of
the file. The FEK is encrypted with AES-GCM using the 256-bit Master Key. All keys are
generated using platform-provided DRBG functions and the Master key is 256-bit while the
FEKs are 128-bits.
The TOE does not provide or utilize any communications services, nor does the TOE
transmit or receive data or keys from remote systems.
Samsung provides a SDK which can be used to integrate a third-party encryption library to
be used by the DualDAR Service and Driver but this configuration is not included as part of
this evaluation.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a software application running on a mobile device. The mobile device platform
provides a host Operating System and a Trusted Execution Environment.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Privacy
6. Protection of the TSF
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE runs as part of Samsung Android 12 with Knox 3.8 and includes several
cryptographic libraries for encryption/decryption/cryptographic hashing functions for
securing file contents and TOE keys.
1
FEKs are 256-bits long but have 128-bits of strength as the DRBG generating them has 128-bit security
strength.
2
FEKs are 256-bits long, so FE uses AES-CBC-256, but this is categorized as AES-CBC-128 effective
strength
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
6
4.2 User data protection
Depending on the FEB configuration, the TOE either protects all user data within the Knox
work profile or the entire device by providing an automatic encryption service for all stored
files; applications do not have to be made aware of the Knox File Encryption service to be
protected. All keys are either AES 128-bit (FEKs) or 256-bit (for Master key), using AES-
GCM for FEK protection and AES-CBC for file content protection.
4.3 Identification and authentication
Depending on the FEB configuration, the TOE either utilizes the authentication services
provided by the Knox work profile or its own authentication dialog to unlock the Master
Key. Unsuccessful authentication will prevent the Master Key from being unlocked, and
hence no encrypted files can be accessed.
4.4 Security management
The services provided by the TOE are not available until either a Knox File Encryption has
been enabled. Authentication management and the work profile lock settings are handled by
the Knox work profile management and are generic for all Knox work profile configurations.
When the whole device is configured for encryption authentication settings are handled by a
combination of the device authentication settings and additional Knox File Encryption
settings. In either case, these settings cannot be managed directly on the device but must be
configured from the MDM.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information over any network interfaces
nor does it request access to any applications that may contain such information.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE relies on the physical boundary of the evaluated platform as well as the Samsung
Android operating system for the protection of the TOE’s components.
The TOE relies on the Samsung Android operating system to provide updates as the software
is incorporated as part of the device image. The version of the Knox File Encryption software
can be seen in the About Device page with the Knox version information (as the DualDAR
version).
The TOE is a Samsung component, and all code is maintained solely by Samsung. Only
documented APIs available in Samsung Android (which includes the Knox work profile and
Samsung cryptographic libraries) are used.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information over any network interfaces.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 01 March 2019
(PP_APP_v1.3) with the PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019
(MOD_FE_V1.0)
That information has not been reproduced here and the PP_APP_v1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
PP_APP_v1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Application Software Protection Profile with the File
Encryption Module and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. Note that
setting the File Encryption Boundary( FEB) for the whole device requires v1.4.1,
while v1.4 or v1.4.1 can set the FEB to the work profile.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific File
Encryption Application models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as
evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the PP_APP_v1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
8
• Integration of any third-party encryption libraries that can be used by the DualDAR
Service and Driver through an SDK other than the evaluated configuration are not
included as part of this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Samsung File Encryption 1.4 Administrator Guide, Version 1.4, November 15, 2021
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Samsung
Knox File Encryption, Version 0.2, May 25, 2022 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation
Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the PP_APP_v1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 including the
tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.2 lists the tested
devices. The evaluator used the following test configuration:
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
9
The TOE was fully tested on a Samsung Galaxy S10, S20, S21, and S22. The evaluator
used the following test tools: Windows, Linux, Putty, adb, HxD, and Samsung developed
test programs.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 (the version
is listed as “DualDAR”) on the following devices:
Device Name
Model
Number
Chipset
Vendor
CPU
Android
Version
TEE OS
Knox
Version
DualDAR
Version
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G SM-S908B Samsung Exynos 2200 12 TEEGRIS 4.3 3.8 1.4.1
Galaxy S22 5G SM-S901U Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8
Gen 1 Mobile
Platform
12 QSEE 5.12 3.8 1.4.1
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G SM-G998B Samsung Exynos 2100 12 TEEGRIS 4.2 3.8 1.4.0
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G SM-G998U Qualcomm Snapdragon 888 12 QSEE 5.11 3.8 1.4.0
Galaxy S20+ 5G SM-G986B Samsung Exynos 990 12 TEEGRIS 4.1 3.8 1.4.0
Galaxy S20+ 5G SM-G986U Qualcomm Snapdragon 865 12 QSEE 5.8 3.8 1.4.0
Galaxy S10e SM-G970F Samsung Exynos 9820 12 TEEGRIS 3.1 3.8 1.4.0
Galaxy S10+ SM-G975U Qualcomm Snapdragon 855 12 QSEE 5.2 3.8 1.4.0
In addition to the evaluated devices, the following device models are claimed as equivalent
with a note about the differences between the evaluated device and the equivalent models.
Evaluated Device CPU Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G Exynos 2200 Galaxy S22+ 5G All devices have same software
environments (Android, Kernel, TEE)
Galaxy S22 5G
Galaxy S22 5G Snapdragon 898 Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G All devices have same software
environments (Android, Kernel, TEE)
Galaxy S22+ 5G
Galaxy Tab S8 Ultra
Galaxy Tab S8+
Galaxy Tab S8
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G Exynos 2100 Galaxy S21+ 5G All devices have same software
environments (Android, Kernel, TEE)
Galaxy S21 5G
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G Snapdragon 888 Galaxy S21+ 5G All devices have same software
environments (Android, Kernel, TEE)
Galaxy S21 5G
Galaxy S21 5G FE
Galaxy Z Fold3 5G
Galaxy Z Flip3 5G
Galaxy S20+ 5G Exynos 990 Galaxy Note20 Ultra 5G All devices have same software
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
10
Galaxy Note20 Ultra LTE environments (Android, Kernel, TEE)
Galaxy Note20 5G
Galaxy Note20 LTE
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G
Galaxy S20+ LTE
Galaxy S20 5G
Galaxy S20 LTE
Galaxy S20 FE
Galaxy S20+ 5G Snapdragon 865 Galaxy Z Fold2 5G All devices have same software
environments (Android, Kernel, TEE)
Galaxy Note20 Ultra 5G
Galaxy Note20 5G
Galaxy Tab S7+
Galaxy Tab S7
Galaxy Z Flip 5G
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G
Galaxy S20 5G
Galaxy S20 FE
Galaxy S10e Exynos 9820 Galaxy S10+ All devices have same software
environments (Android, Kernel, TEE)
Note10 (Samsung) devices have
Exynos 9825 CPU
Galaxy S10 5G
Galaxy S10
Galaxy Note10+ 5G
(Samsung)
Galaxy Note10+ (Samsung)
Galaxy Note10 5G
(Samsung)
Galaxy S10+ Snapdragon 855 Galaxy Note10+ 5G All devices have same software
environments (Android, Kernel, TEE)
Galaxy Note10+
Galaxy Note10
Galaxy Tab S6
Galaxy S10 5G
Galaxy S10
Galaxy S10e
Galaxy Fold 5G
Galaxy Fold
Galaxy Z Flip
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
11
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Knox File
Encryption TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
PP_APP_v1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the PP_APP_v1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 related to
the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
12
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the PP_APP_v1.3/MOD_FE_V1.0 and recorded
the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover
any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 5/25/2022 with the following search terms: "Samsung
S10", "Samsung S20", "Samsung S21", "Samsung S22", "Knox", "DualDAR",
"BoringSSL", "containercore", and "Android".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
13
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Samsung File Encryption 1.4
Administrator Guide, Version 1.4. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or
later were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product
was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the
operational environment, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File
Encryption 1.4 Security Target, Version 0.3, May 25, 2022.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Validation Report Version 0.2, May 25, 2022
14
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 01 March 2019
(PP_APP_v1.3)
[5] PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019 (MOD_FE_V1.0).
[6] Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4 Security Target,
Version 0.3, May 25, 2022 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4, Version 0.2, May
25, 2022 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.4, Version 0.2, May 25,
2022 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption, Version 0.2, May
25, 2022 (ETR)