National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 –
Spring
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11445-2024
Dated: March 27, 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Spring Validation Report Version 0.1, March 4, 2024
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Swapna Katikaneni
Jerome Myers
Mike Quintos
Dave Thompson
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 1
2 Identification........................................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ....................................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Description............................................................................................................. 3
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ............................................................................................... 3
3.3 TOE Architecture............................................................................................................ 3
3.4 Physical Boundaries........................................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Cryptographic support .................................................................................................... 5
4.2 User data protection........................................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication..................................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management...................................................................................................... 5
4.5 Privacy ............................................................................................................................ 5
4.6 Protection of the TSF...................................................................................................... 5
4.7 Trusted path/channels ..................................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ................................................................................... 6
6 Documentation........................................................................................................................ 7
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................................. 7
7.1 Developer Testing........................................................................................................... 7
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ........................................................................... 7
8 Evaluated Configuration......................................................................................................... 7
9 Results of the Evaluation ...................................................................................................... 10
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)...................................................................... 10
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ........................................................................ 10
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)........................................................... 11
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ............................................... 11
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ........................... 11
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)................................................................... 11
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.................................................................................... 12
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................................. 12
11 Security Target...................................................................................................................... 12
12 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 12
13 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 13
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Knox File Encryption solution provided by
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
April 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The
evaluation determined that the product is compliant with both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
and Part 3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile for
Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021 (ASPP14) with the PP-Module for File
Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019 (FE10).
The TOE is the Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive
versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security
Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of
the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 - Spring Security Target, version 0.2, March 1,
2024 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
The sources of key documents referred to in this report are included in the Bibliography.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment
Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Application Software and File Encryption, Version 1.1, 07
April 2022 (CFG_APP-FE_v1.1) which includes the Base PP: Protection Profile
for Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021 (ASPP14) with the PP-
Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019 (FE10)
ST Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 - Spring
Security Target, version 0.2, March 1, 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0, version
0.2, March 27, 2024
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended, CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Swapna Katikaneni, Jerome Myers, Mike Quintos, Dave Thompson
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0. The TOE is a service
built into Samsung Knox that can provide an additional layer of file encryption when configured.
This is available on devices with Android 14 and Knox 3.10.
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is a software service built into Samsung Android 14 with Knox 3.10 to provide file
encryption. Samsung Knox File Encryption is designed to provide a second encryption layer
similar to and on top of the file-based encryption (FBE) layer for the entire device. The Knox
File Encryption service runs in the background and utilizes Samsung Android cryptographic
modules to provide file encryption services. The service is designed to run without any user
intervention as all files will be encrypted automatically.
Knox File Encryption can be configured to encrypt files only in a Knox work profile or it can
alternately be configured to encrypt the entire device. When configured as part of a Knox work
profile, the service relies on the Knox work profile to provide the user’s password for
authentication (the password entered for the work profile), and then encrypts all files stored in
the Knox work profile. When configured to encrypt all contents of the device, Knox File
Encryption provides an authentication prompt (separate from the device lock screen). In this
configuration all files stored on the device will be encrypted.
The Master Key (MKDD) is protected by a Trusted App inside TrustZone by the user’s
password. Each encrypted file is protected by a uniquely generated FEK which is encrypted by
the Master Key as a KEK. The administrator can specify a period of inactivity after which the
Master Key and all FEKs are wiped from memory to fully lock the encrypted files.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The TOE is software built into Samsung Knox. The TOE is designed as a framework for
providing file encryption for files on the device. The software is comprised of four major
components: the DualDAR Service, the DualDAR Client, the DualDAR Driver and
cryptographic modules. Management of the TOE is provided through normal device
administration functions; the TOE does not provide any configuration or management
capabilities itself but relies on the platform to provide both a user interface (UI) (such as for
password entry or management and Mobile Device Management (MDM) control).
Administration is limited to enabling the File Encryption feature.
The boundary of files being encrypted is called the File Encryption Boundary (FEB). Once the
FEB has been set, by creating a File Encryption-enabled work profile, the service for
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encrypting/decrypting files is the same. The specific version listed for DualDAR denotes the
FEB that can be set.
The components provide the following functions within the TOE:
• DualDAR Service: manages the implementation of the configuration and monitoring
system status for the lock state
• DualDAR Client: handles access to the Master Key (unlock and wipe)
• DualDAR Driver: handles the encryption/decryption I/O of files with the Master Key
unlocked by the DualDAR Client
• Cryptographic Modules: handles the cryptographic operations of the TOE (Samsung
Kernel Cryptographic Module and Samsung SCrypto)
Depending on the FEB configuration, the TOE either utilizes the Knox work profile
authentication or provides its own authentication to unlock the 256-bit Master Key. Once the
Master Key is unlocked the DualDAR Driver can read an encrypted file to unlock its 256-bit
FEK. The unlocked FEK is then used to decrypt the contents. When locking a Knox work
profile, all open files will be closed and all unlocked FEKs and the Master Key will be cleared
from memory (this is handled by the DualDAR Service) . When not using a Knox work profile,
the administrator can specify an inactivity period to force a device restart that closes all open
files and clears all FEKs and the Master Key.
By default (and in this configuration), the DualDAR Driver utilizes the Samsung Kernel
Cryptographic Module of the device for AES-CBC-256 to decrypt/encrypt the contents of the
file. The FEK is encrypted with AES-GCM using the 256-bit Master Key. All keys are generated
using platform-provided Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) functions and are 256-
bit.
The TOE does not provide or utilize any communications services, nor does the TOE transmit or
receive data or keys from remote systems.
Samsung provides a Software Development Kit (SDK) which can be used to integrate a third-
party encryption library to be used by the DualDAR Service and Driver, but this configuration is
not included as part of this evaluation.
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a software application running on a mobile device. The mobile device platform
provides a host Operating System and a Trusted Execution Environment.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Privacy
6. Protection of the TOE Security Functions (TSF)
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7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE runs as part of Samsung Android 14 with Knox 3.10 and includes several
cryptographic libraries for encryption/decryption/cryptographic hashing functions for securing
file contents and TOE keys.
4.2 User data protection
Depending on the FEB configuration, the TOE either protects all user data within the Knox work
profile or the entire device by providing an automatic encryption service for all stored files.
Applications do not have to be made aware of the Knox File Encryption service to be protected.
All keys are AES 256-bit, using AES-GCM for FEK protection and AES-CBC for file content
protection.
4.3 Identification and authentication
Depending on the FEB configuration, the TOE either utilizes the authentication services
provided by the Knox work profile or its own authentication dialog to unlock the Master Key.
Unsuccessful authentication will prevent the Master Key from being unlocked, and hence no
encrypted files can be accessed.
4.4 Security management
The services provided by the TOE are not available until Knox File Encryption has been enabled.
Authentication management and the work profile lock settings are handled by the Knox work
profile management and are generic for all Knox work profile configurations. When the whole
device is configured for encryption authentication, settings are handled by a combination of the
device authentication settings and additional Knox File Encryption settings. In either case, these
settings cannot be managed directly on the device but must be configured from the MDM.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information over any network interfaces nor
does it request access to any applications that may contain such information.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE relies on the physical boundary of the evaluated platform as well as the Samsung
Android operating system for the protection of the TOE’s components.
The TOE relies on the Samsung Android operating system to provide updates while the software
is incorporated as part of the device image. The version of the Knox File Encryption software
can be seen in the About Device page of the mobile device with the Knox version information (as
the DualDAR version).
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The TOE is a Samsung component, and all code is maintained solely by Samsung. Only
documented APIs available in Samsung Android (which includes the Knox work profile and
Samsung cryptographic libraries) are used.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information over any network interfaces.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021
• PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019
That information has not been reproduced here and the ASPP14/FE10 should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
ASPP14/FE10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices must be assessed separately, and no further conclusions should be drawn about their
effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the Application Software Protection Profile with the File Encryption Module
and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific File
Encryption Application models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as
evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
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• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ASPP14/FE10 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional
security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following are sources of TOE guidance:
• Samsung File Encryption 1.6.0 Administrator Guide, Version 1.6, March 1, 2024
• EDM Guidance, User Guides, and other information for the various evaluated products,
as shown in Section 1.5.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in
the Administrator Guide. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guides from
the NIAP website, to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Samsung Knox File
Encryption, Version 0.2, March 27, 2024 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance
Activity Report (AAR), available on the product’s page in the NIAP Product Compliant List.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification document
and ran the tests specified in the ASPP14/FE10 including the tests associated with optional
requirements. Section 1.1 of the AAR lists the tested devices. Section 3.4 of the AAR provides
a list of test tools and has a diagram of the test environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The following table shows the model numbers of the mobile devices tested during evaluation of
Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 (the version is listed as “DualDAR”):
Device Name Chipset Vendor SoC Arch Kernel Build Number
Galaxy S24
Ultra 5G
Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 ARMv8 6.1 UP1A.231005.007
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Device Name Chipset Vendor SoC Arch Kernel Build Number
Galaxy S24 5G Samsung Exynos 2300 ARMv8 6.1 UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S23
Ultra 5G
Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 2
Mobile Platform
ARMv8 5.15 UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S22
Ultra 5G
Samsung Exynos 2200 ARMv8 5.10 UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S22 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 1
Mobile Platform
ARMv8 5.10 UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S21
Ultra 5G
Samsung Exynos 2100 ARMv8 5.4 UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy S21
Ultra 5G
Qualcomm Snapdragon 888 ARMv8 5.4 UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy XCover6
Pro
Qualcomm Snapdragon 778G ARMv8 5.4 UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy Tab
Active5
Samsung Exynos1380 ARMv8 5.15 UP1A.231005.007
Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the following device models are claimed as equivalent, each
with a note about the differences between the evaluated device and the equivalent models.
Evaluated
Device
SoC
Equivalent
Devices
Differences
Galaxy S24
Ultra 5G
Snapdragon 8 Gen 3
Galaxy S24+ 5G
S24 Ultra > S24+ > S24 in terms of
display size
Galaxy S24 5G
Galaxy S24 5G Exynos 2300 Galaxy S24+ 5G
S24 Ultra > S24+ > S24 in terms of
display size
Galaxy S23
Ultra 5G
Snapdragon 8 Gen 2
Galaxy S23+ 5G
S23 Ultra > S23+ > S23 in terms of
display size
Galaxy S23 5G
Galaxy Z Fold5 5G
Z Fold5 5G & Z Flip5 5G have power
button fingerprint sensor
Galaxy Z Flip5 5G
Galaxy Tab S9
Ultra
Tab S9 devices are tablets (no voice
calling) with S Pen
Galaxy Tab S9+
Tab S9 Ultra > Tab S9+ > Tab S9 in
terms of display size
Galaxy Tab S9
Tab S9 Ultra & Tab S9+ have under
screen image fingerprint sensor
Tab S9 has power button fingerprint
sensor
Galaxy S23 5G
Galaxy S22
Ultra 5G
Exynos 2200
Galaxy S22+ 5G
S22 Ultra > S22+ > S22 in terms of
display size
Galaxy S22 5G
S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra
5G Wi-Fi chip
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Evaluated
Device
SoC
Equivalent
Devices
Differences
Galaxy S23 FE
Galaxy S22 5G
S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra
5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S22 5G Snapdragon 8 Gen 1
Galaxy S22 Ultra
5G
S22 Ultra > S22+ > S22 in terms of
display size
Galaxy S22+ 5G
S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra
5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy Tab S8
Ultra
Tab S8 devices are tablets (no voice
calling) with S Pen
Galaxy Tab S8+
Tab S8 Ultra > Tab S8+ > Tab S8 in
terms of display size
Galaxy Tab S8
Tab S8 Ultra & Tab S8+ have under
screen image fingerprint sensor
Tab S8 has power button fingerprint
sensor
Galaxy Z Flip4 5G
Z Flip4 & Z Fold4 have 2 displays &
folding display
Galaxy Z Fold4 5G
Z Flip4 & Z Fold4 have power button
fingerprint sensor
Galaxy S23 FE
Galaxy S22+ 5G
S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra
5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy Tab S8
Ultra
Tab S8 devices are tablets (no voice
calling) with S Pen
Galaxy Tab S8+
Tab S8 Ultra > Tab S8+ > Tab S7 in
terms of display size
Galaxy Tab S8
Tab S8 Ultra & Tab S8+ have under
screen image fingerprint sensor
Tab S8 has power button fingerprint
sensor
Galaxy Z Flip4 5G
Z Flip4 & Z Fold4 have 2 displays &
folding display
Galaxy Z Fold4 5G
Z Fold4 > Z Flip4 in terms of display
size
Galaxy S21
Ultra 5G
Exynos 2100
Galaxy S21+ 5G
S21 Ultra > S21+ > S21 > S21 FE in
terms of display size
Galaxy S21 5G
S21+ & S21 devices have S20+ 5G
Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S21
Ultra 5G
Snapdragon 888
Galaxy S21+ 5G
S21 Ultra > S21+ > S21 > S21 FE in
terms of display size
Galaxy S21 5G
S21+ & S21 devices have S20+ 5G
Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S21 5G FE
Z Fold3 5G & Z Flip3 5G have 2
displays & folding display
Galaxy Z Fold3 5G
Z Fold3 5G & Z Flip3 5G have power
button fingerprint sensor
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Evaluated
Device
SoC
Equivalent
Devices
Differences
Galaxy Z Flip3 5G
Z Fold3 & Z Flip3 have S22 Ultra
Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy
XCover6 Pro
Snapdragon 778G
Galaxy Tab
Active4 Pro
Tab Active4 Pro is tablet and have
bigger screen size
Galaxy Tab
Active5
Exynos 1380 N/A
Equivalent Devices
The evaluation applies to the above hardware and software when configured in accordance with
the documentation identified in Section 6 of this report.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of performing the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and
are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Knox File Encryption TOE
to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the ASPP14/FE10.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 products
that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that
support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the ASPP14/FE10 related to the examination of the information
contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
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accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the ASPP14/FE10 and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 03/27/2024 with the following search terms: “Galaxy S24”,
“Galaxy S24+”, “SM-S928”, “SM-S926”, “SM-S921”, “Galaxy S23”, “Galaxy S23+”, “SM-
S918”, “SM-S916”, “SM-S911”, “SM-S711”, “Galaxy S22”, “Galaxy S22+”, “SM-G908”,
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“SM-G906”, “SM-G901”, “Galaxy S21”, “Galaxy S21+”, “SM-G998”, “SM-G996”, “SM-
G991”, “SM-G990”, “Galaxy XCover6 Pro”, “SM-G736”, “Galaxy Tab Active5”, “SM-X300”,
“SM-X306”, “SM-X308”, “Galaxy Z Fold5”, “SM-F946”, “Galaxy Z Flip5”, “SM-F731”,
“Galaxy Tab S9”, “SM-X916”, “SM-X910”, “SM-X716”, “SM-X710”, “Galaxy Tab S9+”,
“SM-X818”, “SM-X816”, “SM-X810”, “Galaxy Tab S8”, “SM-X900”, “SM-X708”, “SM-
X706”, “SM-X700”, “Galaxy Tab S8+”, “SM-X808”, “SM-X806”, “SM-X800”, “Galaxy Z
Flip4”, “SM-F721”, “Galaxy Z Fold4”, “SM-F936”, “Galaxy Z Fold3”, “SM-F926”, “Galaxy Z
Flip3”, “SM-F711”, “Galaxy Tab Active4”, “SM-T636”, “SM-T638”, “SM-T630”, “Knox”,
“BoringSSL”, “Android”, “DualDAR”, “containercore”.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the
claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
All validator comments and recommendations are adequately addressed in the Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope section
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File
Encryption 1.6.0 - Spring Security Target, Version 0.2, March 1, 2024.
12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are
justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the
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Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more
TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile-Configuration for Application Software, File Encryption, and File
Encryption Enterprise Management, Version 1.0, 30 July 2019. https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/MMO/PP/CFG_APP-FE-FEEM_V1.0.pdf.
[5] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021
(PP_APP_v1.4), https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/PP_APP_v1.4.pdf.
[6] PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 30 July 2019 (APP-FE-FEEM_V1.0),
https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/MOD_FEEM_V1.0.pdf.
[7] Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 - Spring Security
Target, Version 0.2, March 1, 2024 (ST). Available on the product’s page in the NIAP
Product Compliant List (https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Product/index.cfm).
[8] Samsung File Encryption 1.6.0 Administrator Guide, Version 1.6, March 1 2024.
Available on the product’s page in the NIAP Product Compliant List (https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/Product/index.cfm).
[9] Assurance Activity Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0, Version 0.2, March
27, 2024 (AAR).
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[10] Detailed Test Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0, Version 0.2, March 27,
2024 (DTR).
[11] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File
Encryption, Version 0.2, March 27, 2024 (ETR).