C072 Certification Report
CENTAGATE v3.0.10-build13
File name: ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Version: v1
Date of document: 6 June 2017
Document classification: PUBLIC
For general inquiry about us or our services,
please email: mycc@cybersecurity.my
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page i of ix
PUBLIC
C072 Certification Report
CENTAGATE v3.0.10-build13
6 June 2017
ISCB Department
CyberSecurity Malaysia
Level 5, Sapura@Mines,
No 7 Jalan Tasik,The Mines Resort City
43300 Seri Kembangan, Selangor, Malaysia
Tel: +603 8992 6888 • Fax: +603 8992 6841
http://www.cybersecurity.my
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page ii of ix
PUBLIC
Document Authorisation
DOCUMENT TITLE: C072 Certification Report
DOCUMENT REFERENCE: ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
ISSUE: v1
DATE: 6 June 2017
DISTRIBUTION: UNCONTROLLED COPY - FOR UNLIMITED USE AND
DISTRIBUTION
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page iii of ix
PUBLIC
Copyright Statement
The copyright of this document, which may contain proprietary information, is the
property of CyberSecurity Malaysia.
The document shall be held in safe custody.
©CYBERSECURITY MALAYSIA, 2017
Registered office:
Level 5, Sapura@Mines
No 7, Jalan Tasik,
The Mines Resort City,
43300 Seri Kembangan
Selangor Malaysia
Registered in Malaysia – Company Limited by Guarantee
Company No. 726630-U
Printed in Malaysia
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page iv of ix
PUBLIC
Foreword
The Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme has been
established under the 9th
Malaysian Plan to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness in quality
assurance of information security based on the Common Criteria (CC) standard and to
build consumers’ confidence towards Malaysian information security products.
The MyCC Scheme is operated by CyberSecurity Malaysia and provides a model for licensed
Malaysian Security Evaluation Facilities (MySEFs) to conduct security evaluations of ICT
products, systems and protection profiles against internationally recognised standards.
The results of these evaluations are certified by the Malaysian Common Criteria
Certification Body (MyCB) Unit, a unit established within Information Security Certification
Body (ISCB) Department, CyberSecurity Malaysia.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the MyCB asserts that the product complies
with the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target. A Security
Target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation
activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions
made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security
requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the
product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 6th
June 2017, and the Security Target (Ref [6]). The certification report, Certificate of product
evaluation and security target are posted on the MyCC Scheme Certified Product Register
(MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria Portal (the official
website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement).
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page v of ix
PUBLIC
Disclaimer
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report and its
associate certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility
established under the Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC)
Scheme (Ref [4]) using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1
revision 4 (Ref [3]), for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
version 3.1 revision 4 (Ref [2]). This certification report and its associated certificate apply
only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the MyCC Scheme and
the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent
with the evidence adduced. This certification report and its associated certificate is not an
endorsement of the IT product by CyberSecurity Malaysia or by any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certification report and its associated certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by CyberSecurity Malaysia or by any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page vi of ix
PUBLIC
Document Change Log
RELEASE DATE PAGES
AFFECTED
REMARKS/CHANGE REFERENCE
d1 18 May 2017 All Initial draft of the certification report
v1 30 May 2017 All Minor changes to make final.
v1 6 June 2017 iv
Changes to the evaluated and certified
date
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page vii of ix
PUBLIC
Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the Malaysian Common Criteria Certification
Body (MyCB) team against the technical evaluation performed by licensed CyberSecurity
Malaysia MySEF (Malaysian Security Evaluation Facility) on CENTAGATE v3.0.10-build13 and
its components as defined in Security Target ([6]), EAL4+ ALC_FLR.2, developed and
sponsored by SecureMetric Technology Sdn. Bhd.
The kick-off meeting was formally commenced on 16th
February 2016 and the technical
evaluation exercise was completed on 17th
May 2017 with the submission of final
Evaluation Technical Report.
CENTAGATE is an enterprise class authentication solution built on JEE technology, that
enforce secure authentication for protected resources such as internal web applications.
It operates through web interfaces and has the functionality that enables three-factor of
authentications and risk-based scoring engine through accessibility of single sign-on
(SSO). It consists of Web Application Server and Mobile Applications that supports Android
and iOS platform.
The scope of evaluation covers major security features such as Security audit, User data
protection, Identification and authentication, Security management, TOE access and
Cryptographic key management.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target ([6]) which identifies
assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, the
security function requirements, and the evaluation assurance level at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Prospective consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with the evaluated configuration, and to
give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
This report confirms the findings of the security evaluation of the TOE to the Common
Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) augmented ALC_FLR.2. This report
confirms that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the relevant criteria and
the requirements of the Malaysia Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC)
Scheme (Ref [4]). This Certification Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE
as evaluated.
The Malaysia Common Criteria Certification Body (MyCB), as the MyCC Scheme Certification
Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the Arrangements on the Recognition of
Common Criteria certificates and the product will be listed in the MyCC Scheme Certified
Products Register (MyCPR) at http://www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria
portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) at
www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that CENTAGATE meet their requirements. It
is recommended that a potential user of the TOE refer to the Security Target (Ref [6]) and
this Certification Report prior to deciding whether to purchase the product.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page viii of ix
PUBLIC
Table of Contents
1 Target of Evaluation...........................................................................1
1.1 TOE Description................................................................................................1
1.2 TOE Identification.............................................................................................2
1.3 Security Policy...................................................................................................3
1.4 TOE Architecture ..............................................................................................3
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries...........................................................................................3
1.4.2 Physical Boundaries .........................................................................................4
1.5 Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................5
1.6 Assumptions.....................................................................................................5
1.6.1 Usage assumptions..........................................................................................6
1.6.2 Environment assumptions ..............................................................................6
1.7 Evaluated Configuration..................................................................................6
1.8 Delivery Procedures .........................................................................................7
1.9 Documentation.................................................................................................7
2 Evaluation..............................................................................................8
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities .........................................................................8
2.1.1 Life-cycle support.............................................................................................8
2.1.2 Development.....................................................................................................8
2.1.3 Guidance documents.......................................................................................9
2.1.4 IT Product Testing............................................................................................9
3 Result of the Evaluation..................................................................13
3.1 Assurance Level Information........................................................................13
3.2 Recommendation ...........................................................................................13
Annex A References ..........................................................................................15
A.1 References.......................................................................................................15
A.2 Terminology....................................................................................................15
A.2.1 Acronyms.........................................................................................................15
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms..........................................................................................16
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page ix of ix
PUBLIC
Index of Tables
Table 1: TOE identification............................................................................................................2
Table 2: List of Acronyms............................................................................................................15
Table 3: Glossary of Terms..........................................................................................................16
Index of Figures
Figure 1: TOE diagram shows the Logical Boundaries of the TOE………………………...4
Figure 2: Physical Boundaries of the TOE………………………………………………………...5
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 1 of 17
PUBLIC
1 Target of Evaluation
1.1 TOE Description
1 CENTAGATE (also known as the TOE) is an enterprise class authentication solution
built on JEE technology, allowing enterprise users to securely perform authentication
before login to the application.
2 It enforces secure authentication for protected resources such as internal web
applications and it also operates through web interfaces and has the functionality that
enables three-factor of authentications and risk-based scoring engine through
accessibility of single-on (SSO).
3 The risk-based scoring engine (also known as Hybrid Risk Scoring Engine) will calculate
each user login attempt to access the protected resources based on defined security
attributes and behaviour of each previous user login attempts.
4 The TOE consists of two major components in its operational environment, stated as
the following:
a) TOE Web Application Server, which is the CENTAGATE v3.0.10-build13; and
b) TOE Mobile Applications, reside on these two platforms: Android (v1.0.10-build1)
and iOS (v1.04-build1)
5 Overall, this security feature detects possible fraud or digital attacks and provides
defend against common authentication attacks with a strong authentication feature
supported by CENTAGATE Advance Mobile components (running on Android
application or iOS application).
6 The TOE security functions defined as part of the TOE scope covered in the evaluation
are stated as below:
a) Security Token Provision;
b) Mobile Protection;
c) Mobile PKI;
d) Hybrid Risk Scoring Engine (Rule-based and Case-based);
e) Cryptographic Module;
f) Key Management System;
g) Authentication Module;
h) Web Administration Module; and
i) Mobile Management Module.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 2 of 17
PUBLIC
1.2 TOE Identification
7 The details of the TOE are identified in Table 1 below.
Table 1: TOE identification
Evaluation Scheme
Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
(MyCC) Scheme.
Project Identifier C072
TOE Name
CENTAGATE, consist of Web Application Server and Mobile
Applications.
TOE Version
Web Application Server: CENTAGATE v3.0.10-build13; and
Mobile Applications: Android (v1.0.10-build1) and iOS
(v1.0.4-build1)
Security Target Title Security Target for CENTAGATE
Security Target Version 3.0
Security Target Date 8 May 2017
Assurance Level EAL4+ Augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4 (Ref
[2])
Methodology
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4 (Ref
[3]).
Protection Profile
Conformance
None.
Common Criteria
Conformance
CC Part 2 Conformant.
CC Part 3 Conformant.
Package conformant to EAL4+ Augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Sponsor and Developer SecureMetric Technology Sdn. Bhd.
Evaluation Facility
CyberSecurity Malaysia MySEF (Malaysian Security
Evaluation Facility).
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 3 of 17
PUBLIC
1.3 Security Policy
8 Hybrid Risk Scoring Engine (Rule-based) as part of the Security Policies can be
configured by the TOE Administrators (CENTAGATE Administrators and/or
CENTAGATE Company Administrators) to suit the TOE operational environment, based
on the security attributes defined in the configuration security policies at such:
Browser Type, Operating System Type, Time, IP Address and Geo-location. The TOE
Administrators can configure the Case-based Security Policies as part of the Hybrid
Risk Scoring Engine, which will provide black list or white list access to the TOE and
protected resources (Applications registered in the TOE, App Tab) by comparing the IP
Address and/or Country of the users. The audit and alerts services ensure that all the
security events that were recorded by the TOE and summary of audit reports are
generated upon request in reporting the overall information.
1.4 TOE Architecture
9 The TOE components as described in scope consist of Web based Application System
and Mobile Applications (Android and iOS). The underlying components of the web
based application system are Hybrid Risk Scoring Engine, Cryptographic Module, Key
Management System, Authentication Module, Web Administration Module and Mobility
Management Module while Mobile Applications consist of Security Token Provision,
Mobile Protection and Mobile PKI as the underlying components as described in the
scope boundaries.
10 The TOE includes both logical and physical boundaries which are described in Section
1.3 of the Security Target (Ref[6]).
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries
11 The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target
(Ref[6]) and includes only the following evaluated security functionality:
a) Security Token Provision (SFR Mapped: Cryptographic Support)
b) Mobile Protection (SFR Mapped: Cryptographic Support)
c) Mobile PKI (SFR Mapped: Identification and Authentication, Security Management,
User Data Protection, Cryptographic Support)
d) Hybrid Risk Scoring Engine (SFR Mapped: Security Audit, Identification and
Authentication, Security Management, TOE Access, User Data Protection)
e) Cryptographic Module (SFR Mapped: Security Management, User Data Protection,
Cryptographic Support)
f) Key Management System (SFR Mapped: Security Management, User Data
Protection, Cryptographic Support)
g) Authentication Module (SFR Mapped: Security Audit, Identification and
Authentication, Security Management, User Data Protection)
h) Web Administration Module (SFR Mapped: Security Audit, Identification and
Authentication, Security Management, TOE Access, User Data Protection)
i) Mobility Management Module (SFR Mapped: Security Management, User Data
Protection, Cryptographic Support)
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 4 of 17
PUBLIC
Figure 1: TOE diagram shows the Logical Boundaries of the TOE
12 Additionally, all underlying hardware and operating system running to support the
TOE operational environment is not part of the scope of the TOE.
1.4.2 Physical Boundaries
13 The web application server consists of Web Application and Core Engine. These two
main components work together to allow TOE authentication process flow to be
executed via any relevant Internet Browser where the hybrid Risk Scoring Engine
module will be performing risk calculation.
14 To enforce any methods of authentications available, the registration process is
required to register all the relevant information and components such as the
credentials of user linked to Advance Mobile Authentication Application.
15 Note that all operations of the TOE inclusive of its installation process, management
of the TOE and handling of the TOE shall be elaborate further in the Guidance
documentations.
TOE Boundary
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 5 of 17
PUBLIC
Figure 2: Physical Boundaries of the TOE
1.5 Clarification of Scope
16 Section 1.4 of this document described the scope of the evaluation which was limited
to those claims made in the Security Target (Ref[6]). The TOE which consists of two
main components, where web application server as the authentication processor and
Advance Mobile Authentication Application as the registration, activation and
authentication module itself.
17 Note that FIDO and OTP Hardware Token is not part of the scope of the TOE. Offline
registration methods only allow binding of OTP Hardware token, where this is out of
the evaluation. SMS service to register the device is also out of scope.
18 Potential consumers of the TOE are advised that some functions and services may not
have been evaluated as part of the components in this evaluation. Potential consumers
of the TOE should carefully consider their requirement for using functions and services
outside of the evaluated configuration.
1.6 Assumptions
19 This section summarises the security aspects of the environment/configuration in
which the IT product is intended to operate. Consumers should understand their own
IT environment and that required for secure operation of the TOE which is defined in
subsequent sections and in the Security Target (Ref[6]).
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 6 of 17
PUBLIC
1.6.1 Usage assumptions
20 The following is the assumption for the TOE usage:
a) The TOE Administrators and CENTAGATE users are non-hostile and trusted to
perform all their duties in a competent manner.
b) Competent TOE Administrators will be assigned to manage the TOE and the
security of the information it contains.
c) It is assumed that all codes used by the TOE for signing which are trusted only will
be executed by the TOE.
d) The TOE Administrators shall ensure the OS Backend Server have been hardened
to counter the perceived threats.
e) Only authorized individuals assigned by the organization will be given access to
the TOE.
1.6.2 Environment assumptions
21 The following is the assumptions of the TOE environment:
a) The environment setup shall provide reliable time stamp to the TOE.
b) The environment will provide a mail server to facilitate alerts for TOE.
c) The environment is configured to block all traffic to the Identity access
management server (TOE) except for traffic required to perform security
functionality.
d) The IT environment will implement gateway filtering; only allowing HTTP and
HTTPS inbound connection traffic to pass through the TOE.
e) The protection shall ensure the TOE will be protected from unauthorized physical
modification and access.
f) Data collected and produced by the TOE shall be protected from unauthorized
deletion or modification.
1.7 Evaluated Configuration
22 The TOE shall be configured according to the Preparative Guidance.
23 The TOE is delivered as an appliance by the developer, and the administrator must
then make the following configuration changes:
a) Ensure that the TOE has an appropriate password for each administrator account;
b) Ensure that TOE management is performed from a secure network on its own
physical interface;
c) Ensure that access to the TOE management network is restricted;
d) The usage of mobile devices that installed with the TOE mobile application shall
be managed accordingly with protection are being applied such as: equipped with
antivirus, operating system is not being rooted/jailbreak (Android/iOS), and PIN
code uses by the TOE Mobile App User shall be random (not in numbering order,
e.g. 123456); and
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 7 of 17
PUBLIC
e) Deploy a trusted VPN to ensure that traffic to the TOE management network cannot
be intercepted in transit.
24 The detailed requirement of evaluated Firmware/Hardware/Software for Web
Application Server and mobile application can be referred in Security Target (Ref[6]) in
Section 1.2.1 Table 4 and Table 5.
1.8 Delivery Procedures
25 The delivery procedure for the TOE is as follows:
a) The TOE shall be prepared by the developer at developers site before sending or
delivering to the client/consumer site.
b) Developer shall prepare the Administrative and User Guidance document for
TOE.
c) Labelling of the TOE are visible and validate through physical checks by the client
during delivery of the TOE.
d) User Acceptance Test (UAT) shall be perform accordingly based on the outline
drafted by the client, upon client requisition.
1.9 Documentation
26 List the documentation and description provided by the developer that the user can
use as guidance to installation:
a) Operational User Guidance Introduction;
b) CENTAGATE Administrator Guide;
c) Rules-Based Policy User Guide;
d) CENTAGATE Company Administrative Guide;
e) CENTAGATE End User Guide;
f) CENTAGATE Mobile Applications User Guide
g) CENTAGATE API;
h) Preparative Procedure;
i) CENTAGATE Web Administration Console (Installation Guide);
j) CENTAGATE Mobile Application Installation Guide;
k) Appliance Installation Guide;
l) CENTAGATE Box Pre-Installation Checklist; and
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 8 of 17
PUBLIC
2 Evaluation
27 The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirement of the Common
Criteria, Version 3.1 Revision 4 (Ref[2]) and the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 Revision 4 (Ref[3]). The evaluation was conducted at
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) with augmented ALC_FLR.2. The evaluation was
performed conformant to the MyCC Scheme Policy (MyCC_P1) (Ref[4]) and MyCC
Scheme Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3) (Ref[5]).
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities
28 The evaluation activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE, including the
following components:
2.1.1 Life-cycle support
29 An analysis of the CENTAGATE configuration management system and associated
documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items
were clearly and uniquely labelled, and that the access control measures as described
in the configuration management documentation are effective in preventing
unauthorized access to the configuration items.
30 It is evaluated that the implemented configuration management system can control
changes to those items that have been placed under configuration management
system. The developer’s configuration management system was also observed during
the site visit, and it was found security flaws under configuration management ensures
that security flaw reports are not lost or forgotten, and allows a developer to track
security flaws to their resolution. This is evaluated to be consistent with the provided
evidence.
31 During the site visit the evaluators examined the development security documentation
and determined that it detailed sufficient security measures for the development
environment to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the CENTAGATE design and
implementation. The evaluators confirmed that the developer used a documented life-
cycle model which provides necessary control over the development and maintenance
of the TOE by using the procedures, tools and techniques described by the life-cycle
model.
32 The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described
all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of CENTAGATE during
distribution to the consumer.
2.1.2 Development
33 The evaluators analysed the CENTAGATE functional specification and design
documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes
the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and modules. The
design described the TOE subsystems to sufficiently determine the TSF boundary, and
provides a description of the TSF internals in terms of modules. It provides a detailed
description of the SFR-enforcing modules and enough information about the SFR-
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 9 of 17
PUBLIC
supporting and SFR-non-interfering modules for the evaluator to determine that the
SFRs are completely and accurately implemented.
34 The evaluators analysed the TOE security architectural description and determined that
the delivery and installation process was secure and the security functions are
protected against tamper and bypass. The evaluators also independently verified that
the correspondence mappings between the design documents were correct.
2.1.3 Guidance documents
35 The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user
guidance, and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously described how to
securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration, and how to use and
administer the product in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational
environment. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational
guidance, and determined that they were complete and sufficiently detailed to result
in a secure configuration.
2.1.4 IT Product Testing
36 Testing at EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 consists of assessing developer tests,
performing independent function test, and performing penetration tests. The
CENTAGATE testing was conducted at CyberSecurity Malaysia MySEF and at the
developer’s site where it was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally
documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing
activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and actual
results are documented in a separate Test Plan Reports.
2.1.4.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
37 The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by
examining their test plans, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the
Evaluation Technical Report (Ref[7]) (not a public document because it contains
information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator).
38 Thirty-nine (39) test case scenarios were developed by the developer to ensure that
each of the security functions were tested. Whilst, for each security functions defined
as part of the scope of TOE has a primary function as its focus; they were all tested in
the approaches of combination of the security functions or as individual components
of its own.
39 The evaluators analysed the developer’s test coverage and depth analysis and found
them to be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified
in the developer’s test documentation and the interfaces in the implementation
representation, functional specification, TOE design and security architecture
description was complete.
2.1.4.2 Independent Functional Testing
40 Independent functional testing is the evaluation conducted by evaluator based on the
information gathered by examining design and guidance documentation, examining
developer’s test documentation, executing a sample of the developer’s test plan, and
creating test cases that augmented the developer tests.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 10 of 17
PUBLIC
41 In addition, the evaluators developed four group of test cases as the independent tests
to verify the behaviour of TOE based on the understanding of evaluators towards the
TOE security functions and components, in which, meeting the requirements of the
consumer products or a component of IT systems. Due to large scope of the TOE,
various scenarios have been developed to ensure the whole scope has been tested.
The developer’s test has been used to develop different test case scenarios to test the
TOE security functions in different ways.
42 All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow
repeatability of the testing procedures and results. Four independent functional tests
were developed and performed by the evaluators to verify the TOE functionality as
follows:
Table 2: Independent Functional Testing
DESCRIPTION
TOE SECURITY
FUNCTIONAL
TSFI RESULT
Examined the
process of the TOE
control access and
privilege for each
user of the TOE.
Advance
Mobile
Authentication
Application
Internal TSFI:
Mobile Token Provisioning
Mobile Protection
Mobile PKI
Hybrid Risk Scoring Engine
Authentication – PKI
Authentication – FIDO
Authentication – SMS
Authentication – OTP/CR OTP
Authentication – QR Code
Authentication – Password
Authentication – Question and Answer
Cryptographic Key Management
Subsystem
Web Administration Subsystem
Mobility Management
External TSFI:
Between CENTAGATE Administrator
and TOE server
Between CENTAGATE Company
Administrator & TOE server
Passed
Examined the
process of the TOE
managed the TSF as
well as managing
the user of the TOE.
Web
Administration
Passed
Examined the
process of the TOE
validate and verify
each TOE user’s
accessibility to the
protected resources
managed by the
TOE.
Hybrid Risk
Scoring Engine
Passed
Examined the
process of the TOE
managed in the
cryptographic
processes in the TSF
Cryptographic
Key
Management
Passed
Examined the
processes of the
TOE managed the
authentication
Authentication Passed
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 11 of 17
PUBLIC
process of the TOE
users
Between CENTAGATE end user and
TOE server
Between TOE Users and TOE Mobile
App
Examined the
processes of the
TOE managed the
TOE User mobile
accessibility
Mobility
Management
Passed
2.1.4.3 Penetration Testing
43 The evaluators performed vulnerability assessment and penetration tests based on an
independent vulnerability analysis of the TOE using the guidance documentation,
functional specification, TOE design, security architecture description, implementation
representation as well as available public information. The evaluators used these tests
results to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker
possessing Enhanced Basic attack potential. The following factors have been taken
into consideration during the penetration tests:
a) Time taken to identify and exploit (elapsed time);
b) Specialist technical expertise required (specialist expertise);
c) Knowledge of the TOE design and operation (knowledge of the TOE);
d) Window of opportunity; and
e) IT hardware/software or other equipment required for exploitation.
44 The penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerability in the anticipated
operating environment. However, the results of the penetration testing note that a
number of additional residual vulnerabilities exist as per stated in section 4.3.6 of
Evaluation Technical Report (Ref[7]) that are dependent on an attacker effort, time,
skill/knowledge, and focused tools/exploits use to gather the TOE and environment
configuration information. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the TOE is use only
in its evaluated configuration and in secure environment.
45 The penetration tests focused on:
a) Scanning;
b) XSS;
c) Sniffing;
d) Injection;
e) Cookies Manipulation;
f) Un-Validated Redirects and Forwards; and
g) Mobility Security Assessment through Static and Dynamic Analysis.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 12 of 17
PUBLIC
2.1.4.4 Testing Results
46 Tests conducted for the CENTAGATE produced the expected results and demonstrated
that the product behaved as specified in its Security Target and functional
specification.
47 Based on the results of penetration testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE is
resistant to an attacker possessing Enhanced Basic attack potential value between 14
to 19.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 13 of 17
PUBLIC
3 Result of the Evaluation
48 After due consideration during the oversight of the execution of the evaluation by the
certifiers and of the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref[7]), the Malaysian Common
Criteria Certification Body certifies the evaluation of CENTAGATE v3.0.10-build13
performed by CyberSecurity Malaysia MySEF.
49 CyberSecurity Malaysia MySEF found that CENTAGATE v3.0.10-build13 upholds the
claims made in the Security Target (Ref[6]) and supporting documentation, and has
met the requirements of the Common Criteria (CC) assurance level EAL4+ ALC_FLR.2.
50 Certification is not a guarantee that a TOE is completely free of exploitable
vulnerabilities. There will remain a small level of risk that exploitable vulnerabilities
remain undiscovered in its claimed security functionality. This risk is reduced as the
certified level of assurance increases for the TOE.
3.1 Assurance Level Information
51 EAL4 provides assurance by a full Security Target (ST) and an analysis of the security
functions in the ST, using a functional and complete interface specification, guidance
documentation, a description of the basic modular design of the TOE, and a subset of
the implementation to understand the security behaviour.
52 The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TOE security functions,
evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification and TOE design,
selective independent confirmation of the developer test results, and a vulnerability
analysis demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with an Enhance Basic
attack potential.
53 EAL4 also provides assurance though the use of development environment controls
and additional TOE configuration management including automation, and evidence of
secure delivery procedures.
3.2 Recommendation
54 Opinions and interpretations expressed herein are outside the scope of SAMM
accreditation.
55 This section list the evaluator recommendations that should be considered in the
deployment of the TOE:
a) Consumer/Client that have intention of purchasing the TOE are recommended to
keep on updating, maintaining, backing up configuration, logs and related
data/files of TOE and performing checks on the TOE regularly to maintain its
secure operational environment. A strict adherence on documentations and
procedures provided by developer to consumer/client are highly recommended.
b) Developer is recommended to provide a good support and information updates to
all his client/consumer on the TOE especially on the security and critical updates
related to the TOE security features and its supporting software running in the
same environment as the TOE.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 14 of 17
PUBLIC
c) Developer is recommended to keep on updating the TOE user guide and relevant
documentations based on latest information and features updates of the TOE.
Thus, consumer/client is aware about the latest updates and information about
the TOE.
d) Consumer/Client are advised to seek any help, assistance or guidance from
developer of the TOE if in any cases of specific requirements shall be configured
onto the TOE to meet certain policies, procedures and security enforcement within
the consumer/client organization; thus, are recommended to seek details
information directly from the developer. Therefore, there should not be any
misconfiguration or malfunctions or insecure operations of the TOE that may affect
consumer/client assets that is protected by the TOE.
e) It is recommended to run the TOE Mobile App on top of non-jailbroken iOS devices
and non-rooted Android devices for better security and protections of malicious
infections.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 15 of 17
PUBLIC
Annex A References
A.1 References
[1] Arrangement on the recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security, July, 2014.
[2] The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] The Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[4] MyCC Scheme Policy (MyCC_P1), v1c, CyberSecurity Malaysia, December 2015.
[5] MyCC Scheme Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3), v1b, December 2015.
[6] Security Target, Security Target for CENTAGATE, Version 3.0, 8 May 2017
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, E045 Evaluation Technical Report CENTAGATE, Version
3.0.10-build13, 15 May 2017
A.2 Terminology
A.2.1 Acronyms
Table 2: List of Acronyms
Acronym Expanded Term
CB Certification Body
CC Common Criteria (ISO/IEC15408)
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology (ISO/IEC 18045)
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organisation for Standardization
ISCB Information Security Certification Body
MyCB Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body
MyCC Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
MyCPR MyCC Scheme Certified Products Register
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 16 of 17
PUBLIC
Acronym Expanded Term
MySEF Malaysian Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms
Table 3: Glossary of Terms
Term Definition and Source
CC International
Interpretation
An interpretation of the CC or CEM issued by the CCMB that
is applicable to all CCRA participants.
Certificate The official representation from the CB of the certification of
a specific version of a product to the Common Criteria.
Certification Body An organisation responsible for carrying out certification
and for overseeing the day-today operation of an Evaluation
and Certification Scheme. Source CCRA
Consumer The organisation that uses the certified product within their
infrastructure.
Developer The organisation that develops the product submitted for CC
evaluation and certification.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product, IT system, or any other
valid target as defined by the scheme, proposed by an
applicant against the standards covered by the scope defined
in its application against the certification criteria specified in
the rules of the scheme. Source CCRA and MS-ISO/IEC Guide
65
Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
The systematic organisation of the functions of evaluation
and certification under the authority of a certification body
in order to ensure that high standards of competence and
impartiality are maintained and that consistency is achieved.
Source CCRA.
PUBLIC
FINAL
C072 Certification Report ISCB-3-RPT-C072-CR-v1
Page 17 of 17
PUBLIC
Term Definition and Source
Interpretation Expert technical judgement, when required, regarding the
meaning or method of application of any technical aspect of
the criteria or the methodology. An interpretation may be
either a national interpretation or a CC international
interpretation.
Certifier The certifier responsible for managing a specific certification
task.
Evaluator The evaluator responsible for managing the technical aspects
of a specific evaluation task.
Maintenance Certificate The update of a Common Criteria certificate to reflect a
specific version of a product that has been maintained under
the MyCC Scheme.
National Interpretation An interpretation of the CC, CEM or MyCC Scheme rules that
is applicable within the MyCC Scheme only.
Security Evaluation Facility An organisation (or business unit of an organisation) that
conducts ICT security evaluation of products and systems
using the CC and CEM in accordance with Evaluation and
Certification Scheme policy
Sponsor The organisation that submits a product for evaluation and
certification under the MyCC Scheme. The sponsor may also
be the developer.
--- END OF DOCUMENT ---