TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-03
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Certification Report
DocuSign QSCD for local signing version 1.2.0.7
Sponsor and developer: DocuSign
Ha’arava Str.1
Giv’at Shmuel
Israel
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300052-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300052-01
Author(s): Wim Ton
Date: 30 January 2024
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300052-01-CR, dated 30 January 2024
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
DocuSign QSCD for local signing version 1.2.0.7. The developer of the DocuSign QSCD for local
signing version 1.2.0.7 is DocuSign located in Giv’at Shmuel, Israel and they also act as the sponsor
of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers
when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The DocuSign QSCD is a digital signature product intended to be used as a local Qualified
Signature/Seal Creation Device (QSigCD or QSealCD) in a secure operational environment.
The DocuSign QSCD Appliance is a network attached Appliance consisting of computer hardware,
hardware for tamper resistance, hardened operating system, internal database and the Appliance
server software.
The threat environment the TOE is designed for is one of high threat of network compromise, and low
threat of physical compromise (for example, a Certification Authority facility with a high degree of
physical protection, but an operational requirement to be connected to an untrusted network such as
the internet).
The environment is assumed to prevent prolonged unauthorised physical access to the TOE (including
theft).
The evaluation of the TOE has been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V and was completed on 2024-
01-30 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the DocuSign QSCD for local signing version
1.2.0.7, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which
the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the DocuSign QSCD for
local signing version 1.2.0.7 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the
security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300052-01-CR, dated 30 January 2024
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the DocuSign QSCD for local signing version
1.2.0.7 from DocuSign located in Giv’at Shmuel, Israel.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware DocuSign QSCD Appliance 2.0.0.0
Software DocuSign QSCD for local signing 1.2.0.7
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the DocuSign QSCD
for local signing version 1.2.0.7. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a digital signature product intended to be used as a local Qualified Signature/Seal
Creation Device (QSigCD or QSealCD).
The TOE creates digital signatures, using RSA with a modulus size of 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits.
The TOE securely generates, stores, and destroys keys for signing. Signing keys are assigned by the
“SSA admin” to dedicated users, “Signers”
The TOE uses RBAC, with the roles of:
• Appliance Administrator
• Users Administrator
• SSA Admin (signer administrator)
• Signer
The TOE authenticates a signing request before executing it.
The TOE uses TLS to communicate securely with all external systems.
The TOE logs relevant events to an external server.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
Note that EN 419221-5 Protection Profile [EN419221-5] claims the environment for the TOE protects
against loss or theft of the TOE, deters and detects physical tampering, protects against attacks based
on emanations of the TOE, and protects against unauthorised software and configuration changes on
the TOE and the hardware appliance in which it is contained (“OE.Env Protected operating
environment”).
The ST follows the PP and also claims OE.Env, thus the environment in which the TOE is used must
ensure the above protection.
Any threats violating these objectives for the environment are not considered.
Page: 7/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300052-01-CR, dated 30 January 2024
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2.4 Architectural Information
Figure 1 TOE boundary
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Figure 2 Logical architecture of the TOE.
The TOE is a network attached appliance consisting of computer hardware, hardware for tamper
resistance and random number generation, a hardened operating system, an internal database, and
the appliance server software.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
DocuSign QSCD Appliance Administrator Guide Version 1.2.0.7
DocuSign QSCD Appliance Developer Guide Version 1.2.0.7
QSCD Appliance Preparative Procedures Administrator
Guide Version
1.2.0.7
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
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2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
Automatic test cases performed by the developer include both positive and negative tests that are
performed for all the TSFIs. Both negative tests and positive tests include the validation step of
verifying the test purpose. In particular, the test approach for negative tests contains the following:
• Test the command with the incorrect parameters
• Test the command by sending it to the incorrect URI
• Test the command with an incorrect/expired token
• Test the TOE via sending multiple commands at the same time
Manual test cases cover the TOE physical interfaces and interfaces that have not been tested via the
automatic tests.
The evaluators witnessed a selection of the developer tests, as well as execution of a small number of
test cases designed by the evaluator
5 automated developer tests for the parts of the TOE that where changed since the last evaluation and
that are relevant for security, are repeated by the evaluator.
The evaluator created additional test cases to confirm the version of the TOE and for the new features
of the TOE:
• JWT in addition to the existing SAML format for authentication and signing.
• Increased the possible number of key-shares for the master key.
• Updates to the network interfaces
• The TOE restarts after the temperature returns to the allowable range.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The penetration testing concentrated on the new JWT interface.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 2 weeks. During that test campaign, all of the
total time was spent on software attacks. 50% was spent on existing penetration tests, 50% on new
penetration tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The tests are executed on the TOE in a normal operational state:
• The TOE is not tampered.
• The TOE is the production version.
• The TOE is in operational mode.
Several instances of the TOE (in the configuration as specified in 2.1) were used in parallel to speed
up the test program.
The tests were performed at the developer’s premises and the evaluator witnessed the tests remotely.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
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2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been reused, but vulnerability
analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
Test designs of the earlier version of the TOE have been reused, but additional test cases to confirm
the version of the TOE and for the new features of the TOE have been added.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by reuse of the audit report [SITE-AUDIT] of the previous evaluation.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number DocuSign QSCD for local signing
version 1.2.0.7.The user can see the hardware- and software version of the TOE on the LCD display
on the front of the TOE hardware and in the response to the connect request.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and the Site Audit Report [SITE-AUDIT].
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the DocuSign QSCD for local
signing version 1.2.0.7, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the
security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none
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3 Security Target
The DocuSign QSCD for local signing Security Target, Version 4.3.8, 5 October 2023 [ST] is included
here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
ACL Access Control List
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BAC Basic Access Control
CA Certification Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
DTBS Data To Be Signed
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
eMRTD electronic MRTD
GCM Galois Counter Mode
IDP Identity Provider
IPS Intrusion Prevention Systems I
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
JWT Java Web Token
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
MAC Message Authentication Code
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
NTP Network Time Protocol
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PUK PIN Unblocking Key
QSCD Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Device
RBAC Role Based Access Control
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RNG Random Number Generator
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAD Signature Activation Data
SAM Signature Activation Mode.
SCA Signature Creation Application
SCD Signature Creation Device
SCP Secure Channel Protocol
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Secure Messaging
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
SSA Server Signing Application
SSD Solid State Disk
SVD Signature Verification Device
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
VLAN Virtual LAN
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[PP] EN 419 221-5:2018, Protection Profiles for TSP Cryptographic Modules –
Part 5 Cryptographic Module for Trust Services, v1.0, registered under the
reference ANSSI-CC-PP-2016/05-M01, 18 May 2020
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “DocuSign QSCD for local signing version
1.2.0.7" – EAL4+, 23-RPT-1200, Version 5.1, 30 January 2024
[JIL-AAPHD] Application of Attack Potential to Hardware Devices with Security Boxes,
Version 3.0, July 2020
[SITE-AUDIT] Site Audit Checklist / Report DocuSign Israël, 22-RPT-881, Version 4.0, 23
January 2023
[JIL-AMHD] Attack Methods for Hardware Devices with Security Boxes, Version 3.0,
February 2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[ST] DocuSign QSCD for local signing Security Target, Version 4.3.8, 5 October
2023
(This is the end of this report.)