GENERAL BUSINESS USE
TPG0212C
GENERAL BUSINESS USE
Security Target
AT90SC20818RCV / AT90SC20812RCV
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction...............................................................................................................4
1.1 Security target reference.............................................................................................4
1.2 Purpose ......................................................................................................................5
1.3 References .................................................................................................................5
1.4 TOE Overview.............................................................................................................6
1.4.1 TOE Identification............................................................................................6
1.4.2 TOE Definition.................................................................................................7
1.4.3 TOE life cycle ................................................................................................14
2 Conformance Claims ..............................................................................................20
2.1 CC Conformance Claim ............................................................................................20
2.2 Package Claim..........................................................................................................20
2.3 PP Claim...................................................................................................................20
2.4 PP Refinements........................................................................................................20
2.5 PP Additions .............................................................................................................20
2.6 PP Claims Rationale .................................................................................................20
3 Security Problem Definition ...................................................................................22
3.1 Description of Assets ................................................................................................22
3.2 Threats .....................................................................................................................23
3.3 Organisational Security Policies................................................................................24
3.4 Assumptions .............................................................................................................25
4 Security Objectives.................................................................................................28
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE................................................................................28
4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software
development Environment (not part of TOE).............................................................30
4.3 Security Objectives for the operational Environment.................................................32
4.4 Security Objectives Rationale ...................................................................................33
5 Extended Components Definition..........................................................................36
6 IT Security Requirements.......................................................................................37
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE.........................................................38
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE.........................................................50
6.2.1 Refinements of the TOE Assurance Requirements .......................................51
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale..............................................................................51
6.3.1 Rationale for the security functional requirements .........................................51
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6.3.2 Dependencies of security functional requirements.........................................52
7 TOE Summary Specification ..................................................................................54
7.1 Description of TSF Features of the TOE...................................................................54
7.1.1 TSF_TEST Test Interface..............................................................................54
7.1.2 TSF_ENV_PROTECT Environmental Protection..........................................55
7.1.3 TSF_LEAK_PROTECT Leakage Protection.................................................56
7.1.4 TSF_DATA_PROTECT Data Protection.......................................................57
7.1.5 TSF_AUDIT_ACTION Event Audit and Action...............................................58
7.1.6 TSF_RNG Random Number Generator........................................................59
7.1.7 TSF_CRYPTO_HW Hardware Cryptography ...............................................60
7.1.8 TSF_CRYPTO_SW Toolbox Cryptography ..................................................60
7.2 Rationale for TSF......................................................................................................63
7.2.1 Summary of TSF to SFR ...............................................................................63
7.2.2 Note on ADV_ARC.1 .....................................................................................65
8 Annex.......................................................................................................................66
8.1 Glossary of Vocabulary.............................................................................................66
8.2 Literature ..................................................................................................................68
8.3 List of Abbreviations..................................................................................................69
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1 Introduction
1.1 Security target reference
Title: Dakala Security Target
Version number: C
Sponsor: INSIDE SECURE
Evaluation Scheme: France (ANSSI)
Evaluator: LETI CEA France
Version Date Changes Author
A 27 Jun 11 Initial release John Boggie
B 25 Jul 11 Fixed error on front page- wrong classification John Boggie
C 19 Oct 11 Updated for Rev C :
 Updated TOE references from B to C
 Updated Serial number references
 Corrected address of the TCE mask shop
A. McLaren
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1.2 Purpose
1 This document defines the Security Target of the
AT90SC20818RCV/AT90SC20812RCV TOE, and is provided to satisfy the
Assurance Class ASE Security Target Evaluation as defined in Part 3 [CC_PART3] of
the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 3.
1.3 References
2 The table below lists only the documents that are referenced in this Security Target to
give the user further information. Section 1.4 the TOE overview lists the User
Guidance documents applicable to the Security IC Embedded Software Developer.
Section 8.2 lists the Standards used to perform the certification of the TOE.
[COF] Customer Option Form
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1.4 TOE Overview
1.4.1 TOE Identification
3 The Target of Evaluation is a Secure Microcontroller with Cryptographic Software
library. The TOE is identified as shown below:
Identifier (FAU_SAS.1 where applicable)
Part Number AT90SC20818RCV
AT90SC20812RCV a
SN_0 = 0x54 [TD]
Product Identification Number 59U13
Hardware Revision C SN_1 = 0x02 [GEN_TD]
Applicable Inside Toolbox(s) 00.03.1x.xx Family b
00.03.12.00 0x00031200 c
00.03.11.08 0x00031108
00.03.10.02 0x00031002
00.03.14.03 0x00031403
4 The TOE is a Secure Microcontroller (Security IC) that may be used in a variety of
security applications, including, Banking, Identification, PayTV and embedded
systems.
5 The increase in the number and complexity of applications in the market of a Secure
Microcontroller is reflected in the increase of the level of data security required. The
security needs for the TOE can be summarised as being able to counter those who
want to defraud, gain unauthorised access to data and control a system utilising the
TOE. Therefore it is mandatory to:
- maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of the content of the TOE memories
as required by the end application(s)
- maintain the correct execution of the software residing on the TOE
a
Dakala is offered to customers under two part numbers AT90SC20818RCV and AT90SC20812RCV, there is no difference
in either hardware or software between the 2 part numbers, the part number AT90SC20812RCV is purely for marketing
purposes.
b
The Customer has the option to choose any member of the 00.03.1x.xx family of toolboxes, each toolbox is a subset of the
00.03.12.xx toolbox. This ST clearly states the functions applicable to each toolbox. Further information is given in section
1.4.2.2
c
The toolbox identification is output by the TOE when the self test function of the toolbox is called
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6 This requires that the TOE especially maintains the integrity and the confidentiality of
its security functionality.
7 Protected information is in general secret or integrity sensitive data such as Personal
Identification Numbers, Balance Value (Stored Value Cards), and Personal Data
Files. Other protected information data representing the access rights; these include
any cryptographic algorithms and keys needed for accessing and using the services
provided by the system through use of the Security IC.
8 The TOE can be used in smartcard application, a USB token or other devices. The
intended environment is very large; and generally once issued the TOE may be
stored and used anywhere, generally there is no control applied to the TOE and its
operational environment.
1.4.2 TOE Definition
1.4.2.1 TOE Definition Summary
General Features
 High-performance, Low-power 8/16-Bit RISC CPU Core Enhanced RISC Architecture
o 135 Powerful Instructions (Most Executed in a Single Clock Cycle)
 Low-power IDLE and Power-Down Modes
 Bond pad locations Conforming to ISO 7816-2
 Operating Ranges: from 2.70v to 5.50v
 Compliant with EMV 2000 Specifications and CQM
Memory
 176K Bytes of ROM Program Memory including 32K bytes for Inside Toolbox Library
 18K Bytes of EEPROM, including 128 OTP Bytes and 384 Bit-addressable Bytes
o 1 to 64-byte Program/Erase
o 1.25ms Program, 1.25ms Erase
 6K Bytes of RAM Memory (4K bytes of 8/16-Bit RISC CPU RAM, 2K bytes of Ad-
X2TM
RAM, shared with the 8/16-Bit RISC CPU core)
Peripherals
 One I/O port
 One ISO 7816 Controller
o Up to 625 kbps at 5 MHz
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o Compliant with T = 0 and T = 1 Protocols
 Programmable Internal Oscillator (Up to 30 MHz for Ad-X2 and 30MHz for internal
CPU clocks)
 Two 16-bit Timers
 Random Number Generator
 2-level Interrupt Controller
 Hardware DES and Triple DES with DPA/DEMA Resistance (Two Keys)
 Code Signature Module
 CRC16 and 32 Engine (compliant with ISO/IEC 3309)
 32-bit Cryptographic Accelerator (Ad-X2 for public key Operations): RSA, DSA, ECC,
etc.
Security
 Dedicated Hardware Protection Against SPA/DPA/DEMA/SEMA attacks
 Advanced Protection Against Physical Attack
 Environmental Protection Systems
 Voltage Monitor
 Frequency Monitor
 Temperature Monitor
 Glitch Detectors
 Light Protection
 Secure Memory Management / Access Protection
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Security IC Embedded Software Developer Guidance Documents
REF Title Inside
Identifier
Version Note
[TD] AT90SC20818RCV Technical
Datasheet
TPR0458 B Hardware Datasheet
details the FSP
[GEN-TD] AT90SC 0.13 μm products TPR0447 D Hardware Datasheet
details the FSP
[APP_AD-X2] Ad-X2 Datasheet TPR0452 C Ad-X2 Hardware
Datasheet
[APP_SEC] Security Recommendations for
0.13μm products - 2
TPR0456 C General Security
recommendations for
the TOE
[APP_DES] Secure Hardware DES/TDES on
AT90SC 0.13μm products
TPR0400 F Hardware TDES
Recommendations
[APP_CSM] The Code Signature Module for
0.13μm products
TPR0409 C Datasheet for the Code
Signature Module
[APP_RNG] Generating Random numbers to
known standards for 0.13μm
products
TPR0468 C Details how to write an
AIS31 driver using the
hardware and the
AIS31 test routines
from the Inside toolbox
[APP_TBX] Toolbox 00.03.1x.xx on
AT90SCxxxxC
TPR0454 C Toolbox 00.03.1x.xx
Datasheet details the
FSP for the Toolbox
functions
[APP_TBX_SE
C]
Secure use of Tbx 00.03.1x.xx
on AT90SC
TPR0455 C Toolbox 00.03.1x.xx
family Security
recommendations
[WSR] Wafer saw Recommendations TPG0079 B Wafer saw Guidelines
[APP_CUST_T
BX]
Efficient use of Ad-X2 TPR0463 B Guidance for
customers who wish to
use their own
Cryptographic Toolbox
[ACT] SmartACT User’s Manual TPR0134 D Security IC developer
Code entry user
manual
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TOE Life Cycle Addresses
Function Company Location
 IC Design
 Dataprep
 Cryptographic Support
Software Development
Inside Inside Rousset
Zone Industrielle
13106 Rousset Cedex
France
 IC Design Inside Inside
Scottish Technology Park
East Kilbride
G75 0QR
Scotland
 Wafer Fab Lfoundry Lfoundry Rousset
Zone Industrielle
13106 Rousset Cedex
France
 Mask Shop Toppan Europe Toppan Photomasks Europe
01109 Dresden Germany
91105 Corbeil Essonnes Cedex France
 Mask Shop Compugraphics Compugraphics International Limited
Newark Road North
Eastfield Industrial Estate
KY7 4NT
Scotland
 Mask Shop TCE Toppan Chengwha Electronics
1127-3 Hopin Road
Padeh City
Taoyuan
Taiwan 30080
 Test Centre Atmel Atmel Test Centre (ACP)
102 Accuracy Drive Corner Excellence Avenue
Carmetray Industrial Park 1
Canlubang City
4028 Laguna
Philippines
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1.4.2.2 TOE Detailed Description
9 Figure 1 gives an overview of the AT90SC20818RCV device (Dakala)
Figure 1: Block Diagram of the AT90SC20818RCV / AT90SC20812RCV TOE
10 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Secure Microcontroller (Security IC) it is composed
of a processing unit, security components, I/O port, ROM, EEPROM, and RAM
memories.
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11 The TOE will contain software elements during its life cycle. This software falls into 3
distinct categories:
 Test Software
 Cryptographic Support Software
 Security IC Embedded Software
12 Test Software: Test software includes the test programs that are produced as
evidence to support the ATE class for the evaluation of the TOE. INSIDE Engineering
ROM is provided to facilitate testing of the device, this Engineering ROM is applicable
to Phases 2 and 3 of the TOE life Cycle. To further aid testing of the TOE, additional
test programs may be loaded into the EEPROM. In addition to the Test software the
TOE also includes dedicated hardware to perform testing. To allow the ITSEF to
perform testing of the TOE a version of the TOE is delivered with an INSIDE
Engineering ROM (it should be noted this also includes the Cryptographic Support
Software detailed below), and some simple test routines stored in the EEPROM. It
must be noted that this Engineering ROM and associated test software is not
part of the TOE (apart from the Cryptographic Support Software which is part
of the TOE). The entry and abuse of test modes (hardware) must be verified after
TOE Delivery: this is evaluated according to the Common Criteria assurance family
AVA_VAN. Refer to TOE Summary Specification for further information.
13 Cryptographic Support Software (Toolbox): The TOE where applicable also
consists of a Cryptographic Toolbox provided by INSIDE. This Toolbox is part of the
ROM embedded on the TOE within the Secure Core. The user of this document
should refer to the TOE Summary specification of this document for the full details.
The INSIDE Toolbox is considered part of the TOE.
14 Security IC Embedded Software: The final version of the AT90SC20818RCV /
AT90SC20812RCV device also includes embedded software, this final version of the
product is referred to as a Composite Product. The Security IC Embedded Software
can be stored in non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). But some parts of
it (called supplements for the Security IC Embedded Software, refer to [PP]) may also
be stored in non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). All data
managed by the Security IC Embedded Software is called User Data. In addition,
Pre-personalisation Data [PP] belongs to the User Data.
15 The Composite Product comprises
- the TOE
- the Security IC Embedded Software comprising
- Hard-coded Security IC Embedded Software (normally stored in ROM)
- Soft-coded Security IC Embedded Software (normally stored in EEPROM)
and
- User Data (especially personalisation data and other data generated and used by
the Security IC Embedded Software)
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16 The Security IC Embedded Software and the User Data are developed separately
to the hardware TOE by the Inside Customers. Therefore the Security IC
Embedded Software is not part of the TOE.
Note: even though the Security IC Embedded Software is not part of the TOE, the
documentations delivered as evidence for the AGD Class (Guidance
Documentation) aid the developer to ensure the correct operation of the device and
more importantly the security functionality of the device and is therefore part of the
TOE.
1.4.2.3 Cryptographic Toolbox Software
17 The TOE contains a member of the 00.03.1x.xx Inside Toolbox family. The
00.03.1x.xx family consists of 4 variants. The 4 variants are related to each other as
shown.
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18 Toolbox 00.03.12.xx contains the full set of cryptographic functions, 00.03.11.xx is a
subset of 00.03.12.xx. 00.03.10.xx is a subset 00.03.11.xx. 00.03.14.xx is a subset of
00.03.10.xx. Therefore all the functions available in the 00.03.14.xx are available in
00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx and 00.03.12.xx and so on.
19 Therefore, the TOE comprises
- the circuitry of the IC (hardware including the physical memories)
- configuration data, initialisation data related to the IC Dedicated Software and the
behaviour of the security functionality a
- the associated guidance documentation
- Cryptographic Support Software
The TOE is designed, and generated by the TOE Manufacturer
20 The TOE is intended to be used for a Secure Microcontroller product (Security IC),
independent of the physical interface and the way it is packaged. Generally, a
Security IC product may include other optional elements (such as specific hardware
components, batteries, capacitors, antennae) but these are not in the scope of this
Security Target.
21 Note that the Security IC is usually packaged. However the way it is packaged is not
specified here.
1.4.3 TOE life cycle
22 This security Target is fully conformant to the claimed PP, the full details of the
Security IC life cycle is shown in the PP. This Security Target gives a short summary
of the information given in the PP. Information is also given within this Security Target
to expand on the applicable phases of the life cycle of the TOE.
1.4.3.1 Overview of the Composite Product Life Cycle
23 The complex development and manufacturing processes of a Composite Product can
be separated into seven distinct phases. The phases 2 and 3 of the Composite
Product life cycle cover the TOE (IC) development and production:
- The IC Development (Phase 2):
- IC design
- IC Dedicated Software development (Security IC Embedded Software not
part of the TOE and Cryptographic Toolbox Software part of the TOE)
- The IC Manufacturing (Phase 3):
- integration and photomask fabrication
- IC production
a
which may also be coded in specific circuitry of the IC; for a definition refer to [PP]
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- IC testing
- preparation
- Pre-personalisation if necessary
24 In addition, five important stages have to be considered in the Composite Product life
cycle:
- Security IC Embedded Software Development (Phase 1) (not part of the TOE)
- the IC Packaging (Phase 4)
- the Composite Product finishing process, preparation and shipping to the
personalisation line for the Composite Product (Composite Product Integration
Phase 5)
- the Composite Product personalisation and testing stage where the User Data is
loaded into the Security IC's memory (Personalisation Phase 6)
- the Composite Product usage by its issuers and consumers (Operational Usage
Phase 7) which may include loading and other management of applications in the
field
Figure 2: Definition of “TOE Delivery” and responsible Parties
Phase 1:
IC Embedded
Software Development
Phase 2:
IC Development
Phase 3:
IC Manufacturing
Phase 4:
IC Packaging
Phase 5:
Composite Product
Integration
Phase 6:
Personalisation
Phase 7:
Operational Usage
TOE Delivery
TOE
Manufacturer
Composite
Product
Manufacturer
IC Embedded
Software Developer
IC Developer
IC Manufacturer
Personaliser
Composite Product Issuer
Composite Product
Integrator
Consumer of Composite
Product (End-Consumer)
Delivery of
Composite
Product
IC Packaging Manufacturer
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25 The Security IC Embedded Software is developed outside the TOE development in
Phase 1. The TOE is developed in Phase 2 and produced in Phase 3. Then the TOE
can be delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice).
26 In the following the term “TOE Delivery” (refer to Figure 2) is uniquely used to
indicate
- after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or
sawn wafers (dice).
-The Protection Profile uniquely uses the term “TOE Manufacturer” (refer to Figure 2)
which includes the following roles:
- the IC Developer (Phase 2) and
the IC Manufacturer (Phase 3)
The TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice).
27 Hence the “TOE Manufacturer” comprises all roles beginning with Phase 2 and
before “TOE Delivery”. Starting with “TOE Delivery” another party takes over the
control of the TOE.
28 The Protection Profile uniquely uses the term “Composite Product Manufacturer”
which includes all roles (outside TOE development and manufacturing) except the
End-consumer as user of the Composite Product (refer to Figure 2) which are the
following:
- Security IC Embedded Software development (Phase 1)
- the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4)
if the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice)
- the Composite Product Manufacturer (Phase 5) and
the Personaliser (Phase 6).
1.4.3.2 Phases 2 and 3 of the TOE Life Cycle
1.4.3.3 Phase 2 IC Development
29 The development of the TOE is applicable to phase 2 of the life cycle and can be split
into two sections:
- IC design
- Cryptographic Support Software Development
30 IC design: IC design takes place across two locations, the Inside Design Centre in
East Kilbride Scotland (EKB), and the design centre in Rousset France (RFO). The
main project design team is located in EKB but some modules or libraries may
originate in RFO.
31 Cryptographic Support Software Development: The Toolbox development takes
place within the Inside Design Centre in France.
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32 To ensure security of both EKB and RFO, IC design takes place within a secure
environment, access is controlled with full traceability. A dedicated security person is
on site at all times. The IC and Toolbox development is achieved using appropriate
development tools running on a secure network, all access to tools and data are
controlled using appropriate restrictions and passwords, the full details are shown
within the evidence provided for the ALC class. On completion of the design
database, the data is transferred from EKB Design to RFO Dataprep to allow for
generation of the Photomasks used to manufacture the TOE.
1.4.3.4 Phase 3 IC Manufacturing
33 The IC manufacturing falls into three sections
- Dataprep and Mask Shop
- Wafer Fab
- Testing
34 Dataprep and Mask Shop: The design database is delivered from the design centre
to the Dataprep team within Inside Rousset France (RFO). This delivery and
acceptance process and associated outputs are delivered as part of the evidence
provided for the ALC class. The Photomasks used to manufacture the TOE are
created by the Mask Shop. Data is transferred from RFO to the Mask Shop by secure
FTP. Once created the Photomasks are transferred to the Wafer Fab by a secure
approved carrier. This transfer includes tamper evidence and full traceability.
35 Wafer Fab: The TOE is manufactured within the Lfoundry Wafer Fabrication facility
in France. The fabrication process occurs within the secure facility, as with the
protection mechanisms in place in Phase 2 access to the fabrication facility is
restricted. The batches are controlled using a tracking database to ensure that there
is traceability of wafers at all times (including rejected wafers/dies). On completion of
the fabrication process the wafers are transferred to the Atmel test facility for test and
pre-personalisation. Transfer is by a secure carrier, includes tamper evidence, and
has full traceability.
36 Testing: The Atmel Test Centre is located in Laguna Philippines (ACP). This stage of
the process includes production testing (refer to ATE evidence), pre-personalisation,
configuration of the security functionality, wafer thinning and saw. The ACP facility
has a controlled environment, access is restricted with full traceability, and dedicated
security personnel are on site at all times.
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1.4.3.5 Modes of Operation and life Cycle Phases
37 The TOE has three distinct modes of operation
Test Mode This mode is designed to allow authenticated test
engineers access to Test features of the TOE. This mode
of operation is applicable up to the end of Phase 3 of the
life cycle. This mode of operation is disabled by wafer
saw.
Package Mode This mode is designed to allow authenticated test
engineers access to a subset of the Test features of the
TOE. This mode of operation is applicable to the full life
cycle of the TOE.
User Mode This is the Mode of operation that the end Security IC
(composite product) is intended to be used in. This mode
of operation is dependant on the ROM and NVM code
loaded. This mode of operation is available throughout the
life cycle of the TOE.
1.4.3.6 Composite Product Manufacturer Phases of the Life Cycle
38 Although the pertinent phases of the Life cycle associated with the TOE and this
Security Target are Phases 2 and 3; It should be noted that parts of the TOE and this
Security Target relate to Phase 1 of the TOE life Cycle. The user of this document
should note the following:
- Tools and Emulator
- Guidance Documents
- Code Entry (Security IC Embedded Software Delivery)
39 Tools and Emulator: To aid with the development of the Security IC Embedded
Software, specific tools and an emulator configured to simulate the
AT90SC20818RCV and Toolbox can be delivered by Inside. The emulator and tools
are treated with the same level of protection by Inside as the final IC.
40 Guidance Documents: To ensure that the end Composite Product is fully protected
and that the SFR enforcing mechanisms can not be tampered with or bypassed, user
guidance is delivered in Phase 1 to the Security IC Embedded Software Developer.
Delivery procedures are in place to ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive
information contained in this documentation set, including secure courier delivery with
traceability is followed. Also all parties are covered with NDA before any information
is delivered (this also is applicable to Tools and Emulator).
41 Code Entry: Guidance documents and a delivery tool (smartACT) are delivered to
the Security IC Embedded Software Developer. The guidance document [ACT]
describes how to use the smartACT tool and also how to securely transmit the final
code to Inside for embedding on the final device. As part of the code delivery a
Customer Option Form [COF] is also delivered to the Code entry team in EKB, this
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gives details of the options that the customer may choose for the AT90SC20818RCV
/ AT90SC20812RCV device.
42 Guidance Documents and Code Entry documents are also delivered as evidence for
the AGD class, to allow the ITSEF to use these as part of the search for
vulnerabilities during the Vulnerability Assessment part of the evaluation.
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2 Conformance Claims
43 This chapter contains details the conformance claims for the TOE.
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
44 This Security Target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria Version 3.1,
Revision 3, July 2009.
45 Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The
extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in the Protection Profile.
2.2 Package Claim
46 The TOE is evaluated to EAL5 level augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
2.3 PP Claim
47 This Security Target is strictly conformant to the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0035
“Security IC Platform Protection Profile”
2.4 PP Refinements
48 The refinements to the PP within this security target relate to the Cryptographic
Operations. The refinements and additions are taken from “Smartcard Integrated
Circuit Augmentations” Version 1.0, March 2002, registered under the German
Certification Scheme BSI-AUG-2002 [AUG].
49 Refinements are made to the following Security objectives for the environment:
 OE.Plat-Appl
 OE.Resp-Appl
2.5 PP Additions
50 The following organisational security policies, security objectives, and security
functional requirements have been added.
 P.Add-Functions
 A.Key-Function
 O.Add-Functions
 FCS_COP.1
2.6 PP Claims Rationale
51 The differences between this Security Target and the BSI-PP-0035, that is the
addition of:
 Organisational Security Policy
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 Assumptions
 Security Objectives for the TOE
 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
52 Do not affect the conformance claim of this Security Target. The Rationale for the
additions is given in section 6 and section 7 of the full Security Target.
53 For each addition the appropriate section clearly shows the addition, that is, section
3, Section 4 and section 6.
54 Although the PP recommends a EAL4 certification level with augmentations, the TOE
claims an EAL5 plus certification level. This ST maintains the conformance to BSI-
PP-0035, the rationale for this is given in section 6.2.1.
55 All the Protection Profile requirements have been shown to be satisfied.
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3 Security Problem Definition
56 This chapter describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is
intended to be used. As this security target is conformant to BSI-PP-0035, this
section contains only the relevant details and a summary where applicable. For
complete details refer to the Protection Profile.
3.1 Description of Assets
Assets regarding the Threats
57 The assets (related to standard functionality) to be protected are
- the User Data
- the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation
- the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software
58 The user (consumer) of the TOE places value upon the assets related to high-level
security concerns:
SC1 integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being
executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories)
SC2 confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories)
SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security
IC Embedded Software
59 According to this Protection Profile there is the following high-level security concern
related to security service:
SC4 deficiency of random numbers.
60 To be able to protect these assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality.
Therefore critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information
includes:
- logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and
configuration data
- Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test
and characterisation related data, material for software development support, and
photomasks
Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the
above assets.
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3.2 Threats
61 The threats are listed in PP-BSI-0035, only a summary is provided in this Security
target.
62 The standard threats to the TOE are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Standard Threats
63 The threats relating to specific security services are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Threats related to security service
64 The Security IC Embedded Software may be required to contribute to preventing the
threats. At least it must not undermine the security provided by the TOE. For detail
refer to the assumptions regarding the Security IC Embedded Software specified in
Section 110H3.4
65 The above security concerns are derived from considering the operational usage by
the end-consumer (Phase 7) since
- Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered
by assumptions and
From PP-BSI-0035-2007
T.RND
T.Malfunction
T.Phys-Probing T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.Phys-Manipulation T.Leak-Inherent
From PP-BSI-0035-2007
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- the development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy.
3.3 Organisational Security Policies
66 The following Figure 5 shows the policies applied in this Security Target.
Figure 5: Policies
67 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” as specified below.
P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
An accurate identification must be established for the TOE.
This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this
unique identification.
68 The accurate identification is introduced at the end of the production test in phase 3.
Therefore the production environment must support this unique identification.
69 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Additional Specific Security
Functionality (P.Add-Functions)” as specified below.
P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality
The TOE shall provide the following specific security
functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software:
- TDES a
- RSA without CRT a
*
a
The function TDES is based on a hardware dedicated part of the TOE and is applicable to all
versions of the TOE
P.Process-TOE
From PP-BSI-0035-2007
P.Add-Functions
From [AUG]
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- RSA with CRT *
- Miller Rabin algorithm *
- Secure Hash (SHA) + b
- ECDSA over Zp ‡ c
- EC-DH over Zp ‡
- ECDSA over GF(2n) ^
d
- EC-DH over GF(2n) ^
3.4 Assumptions
70 Full details of the assumptions are listed in PP-BSI-0035, only a summary is provided
in this Security Target. Full details are given for the additional assumption taken from
[AUG].
71 The following Figure 6 shows the assumptions applied in this Security Target.
Figure 6: Assumptions
a
The functions marked * are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx,
00.03.12.xx
b
The functions marked
+
are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
c
The functions marked
‡
are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
d
The functions marked ^ are applicable to toolbox version 00.03.12.xx
A.Plat-Appl
From PP-BSI-0035-2007
A.Key-Function
From [AUG]
A.Process-Sec-IC
A.Resp-Appl
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72 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-
Sec-IC)” must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as
during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified below.
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of
the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-
consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE
and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible
copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).
This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery (refer to
Section 119H1.4.3) are assumed to be protected appropriately. For a
list of assets to be protected see below.
73 The information and material produced and/or processed by the Security IC
Embedded Software Developer in Phase 1 and by the Composite Product
Manufacturer can be grouped as follows:
- the Security IC Embedded Software including specifications, implementation and
related documentation
- pre-personalisation and personalisation data including specifications of formats
and memory areas, test related data
- the User Data and related documentation
- material for software development support
74 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate
“Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while developing this software in Phase 1
as specified below.
A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
The Security IC Embedded Software is designed so that the
requirements from the following documents are met: (i) TOE
guidance documents (refer to the Common Criteria assurance
class AGD) such as the hardware data sheet, and the hardware
application notes, and (ii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports
relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software as
documented in the certification report.
75 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate
“Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as
specified below.
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
All User Data is owned by the Security IC Embedded Software.
Therefore, it must be assumed that security relevant User Data
(especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC
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Embedded Software as defined for its specific application
context.
76 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate
“Usage of key-dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software
in Phase 1 as specified below.
A.Key-Function Usage of Key-dependent Functions
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the
Security IC Embedded Software in a way that they are not
susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-
Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).
Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when
being executed are part of the Security IC Embedded Software.
In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-
Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which are part of
the TOE and (ii) the processing of User Data including
cryptographic keys.
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4 Security Objectives
77 The full details of the Security Objectives are listed in PP-BSI-0035, only a summary
is provided in this Security target.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
78 The user has the following standard high-level security goals related to the assets:
SG1 maintain the integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software
(when being executed/processed and when being stored in the TOE’s
memories) as well as
SG2 maintain the confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded
Software (when being processed and when being stored in the TOE’s
memories).
The Security IC may not distinguish between User Data which are public
known or kept confidential. Therefore the security IC shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, unless the Security IC
Embedded Software chooses to disclose or modify it.
In particular, integrity of the Security IC Embedded Software means that it is
correctly being executed which includes the correct operation of the TOE’s
functionality. Though the Security IC Embedded Software (normally stored in
the ROM) will in many cases not contain secret data or algorithms, it must be
protected from being disclosed, since for instance knowledge of specific
implementation details may assist an attacker.
SG3 maintain the correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for
the Security IC Embedded Software.
79 These standard high-level security goals in the context of the security problem
definition build the starting point for the definition of security objectives as required by
the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 7). Note that the integrity of the TOE is a means
to reach these objectives.
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Figure 7: Standard Security Objectives
80 According to this Security Target there is the following high-level security goal related
to specific functionality:
SG4 provide true random numbers.
81 The additional high-level security considerations are refined below by defining
security objectives as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 8).
Figure 8: Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality
O.Malfunction
O.Phys-Probing O.Leak-Forced
O.Abuse-Func
O.Phys-Manipulation O.Leak-Inherent
O.Identification
From PP-BSI-0035-2007
O.RND
From PP-BSI-0035-2007
From [AUG]
O.Add-Functions
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Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality (referring to SG4)
82 The TOE shall provide “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)”
[AUG] as specified below.
O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality
The TOE shall provide the following specific security
functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software:
- TDES
a
- RSA without CRT b
*
- RSA with CRT *
- Miller Rabin algorithm *
- Secure Hash (SHA)
+ c
- ECDSA over Zp
‡ d
- EC-DH over Zp ‡
- ECDSA over GF(2n) ^ e
- EC-DH over GF(2n) ^
4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development
Environment (not part of TOE)
83 The development of the Security IC Embedded Software is outside the development
and manufacturing of the TOE (cf. section 1.4.3). The Security IC Embedded
Software defines the operational use of the TOE. This section describes the security
objectives for the operational environment enforced by the Security IC Embedded
Software.
Phase 1
84 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Usage of Hardware Platform
(OE.Plat-Appl)” as specified below.
OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
a
The function TDES is based on a hardware dedicated part of the TOE and is applicable to all
versions of the TOE
b
The functions marked * are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx,
00.03.12.xx
c
The functions marked
+
are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
d
The functions marked
‡
are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
e
The functions marked ^ are applicable to toolbox version 00.03.12.xx
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To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the
Security IC Embedded Software shall be designed so that the
requirements from the following documents are met:
(i) hardware data sheet for the TOE, (ii) data sheet of the IC
Dedicated Software of the TOE, (iii) TOE application notes,
other guidance documents, and (iv) findings of the TOE
evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC Embedded
Software as referenced in the certification report.
The TOE supports cipher schemes as additional specific security functionality. If
required the Security IC Embedded Software shall use the cryptographic services of
the TOE and their interface as specified. When key-dependent functions
implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software are just being executed, the
Security IC Embedded Software must provide protection against disclosure of
confidential data (User Data) stored and/or processed in the TOE by using the
methods described under “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and
“Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)” [AUG].
85 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Treatment of User Data
(OE.Resp-Appl)” as specified below.
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
Security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are
treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as required by
the security needs of the specific application context.
For example the Security IC Embedded Software will not disclose security relevant
User Data to unauthorised users or processes when communicating with a terminal.
By definition, cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. The
Security IC Embedded Software shall treat this data appropriately, use only proper
secret keys (chosen from a large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of
the TOE and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of
the cryptographic operation.
This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The
keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong.
For example, it must be ensured that it is not practical to derive the private key from a
public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported into the TOE
and/or derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This
implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment
[AUG].
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4.3 Security Objectives for the operational Environment
TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
86 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
(OE.Process-Sec-IC)” must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phases
6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified below.
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to
delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to
prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or
unauthorised use).
This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of
Phase 6 (refer to Section 1.4.3) must be protected
appropriately. For a preliminary list of assets to be protected
refer to (Section 3.4, A.Process-Sec-IC).
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4.4 Security Objectives Rationale
87 Table 1 below shows how the assumptions, threats, and organisational security
policies are addressed by the objectives. The text following after the table justifies
this in detail.
Assumption, Threat or
Organisational Security Policy
Security Objective Notes
A.Plat-Appl OE.Plat-Appl Phase 1
A.Resp-Appl OE.Resp-Appl Phase 1
A.Key-Function OE.Resp-Appl
OE.Plat-Appl
Phase 1
P.Process-TOE O.Identification Phase 2 – 3
optional
Phase 4
A.Process-Sec-IC OE.Process-Sec-IC Phase 5 – 6
optional
Phase 4
T.Leak-Inherent O.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys-Probing O.Phys-Probing
T.Malfunction O.Malfunction
T.Phys-Manipulation O.Phys-Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced O.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func O.Abuse-Func
T.RND O.RND
P.Add-Functions O.Add-Functions
Table 1: Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies
88 The justification related to the assumption “Usage of Hardware Platform
(A.Plat-Appl)” is as follows:
89 Since OE.Plat-Appl requires the Security IC Embedded Software developer to
implement those measures assumed in A.Plat-Appl, the assumption is covered by the
objective.
90 The justification related to the assumption “Usage of Key-dependent Functions
(A.Key-Function)” is as follows:
91 Since OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl requires the Security IC Embedded Software
developer to implement those measures assumed in A.Key-Function, the assumption
is covered by the objective.
92 The justification related to the assumption “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” is
as follows:
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93 Since OE.Resp-Appl requires the developer of the Security IC Embedded Software to
implement measures as assumed in A.Resp-Appl, the assumption is covered by the
objective.
94 The justification related to the organisational security policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” is as follows:
95 O.Identification requires that the TOE has to support the possibility of a unique
identification. The unique identification can be stored on the TOE. Since the unique
identification is generated by the production environment, it must support the integrity
of the generated unique identification. The technical and organisational security
measures that ensure the security of the development environment and production
environment are evaluated based on the assurance measures that are part of the
evaluation. For a list of material produced and processed by the TOE Manufacturer
refer to paragraph 60. All listed items and the associated development and
production environments are subject of the evaluation. Therefore, the organisational
security policy P.Process-TOE is covered by this objective, as far as organisational
measures are concerned.
96 The justification related to the assumption “Protection during Packaging, Finishing
and Personalisation (A.Process-Sec-IC)” is as follows:
97 Since OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the Composite Product Manufacturer to
implement those measures assumed in A.Process-Sec-IC, the assumption is covered
by this objective.
98 The justification related to the threats “Inherent Information Leakage
(T.Leak-Inherent)”, “Physical Probing (T.Phys-Probing)”, “Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress (T.Malfunction)”, “Physical Manipulation
(T.Phys-Manipulation)”, “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)“, “Abuse of
Functionality (T.Abuse-Func)” and “Deficiency of Random Numbers (T.RND)” is as
follows:
99 For all threats the corresponding objectives (refer to Table 1) are stated in a way that
directly corresponds to the description of the threat (refer to Section 3.2). It is clear
from the description of each objective (refer to Section 4.1), that the corresponding
threat is removed if the objective is valid. More specifically, in every case the ability to
use the attack method successfully is countered, if the objective holds.
100 The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security
Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” is as follows:
101 Since O.Add-Functions requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific
security functionality as required by P.Add-Functions, the organizational security
policy is covered by the objective.
102 Nevertheless the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing,
O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the
specific security functionality required by P.Add-Functions (Note that these objectives
support that the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way as expected
from P.Add-Functions). Especially O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced refer to the
protection of confidential data (User Data or TSF Data (section 7.1) in general. User
Data are also processed by the specific security functionality required by P.Add-
Functions.
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103 The following text gives details of the clarification added to OE.Plat-Appl. If required
the Security IC Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the
TOE and their interface as specified. In addition, the Security IC Embedded Software
must implement functions which perform operations on keys (if any) in such a
manner that they do not disclose information about confidential data. This addition
ensures that the assumption A.Plat-Appl is still covered by the objective OE-Plat-Appl
although additional functions are being supported according to O.Add-Functions.
104 The following text gives details of the clarification added to OE.Resp-Appl. By
definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys, are defined as User Data.
So, the Security IC Embedded Software will protect such data if required and use
keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic
operation. Strength and confidentiality must be maintained for keys that are imported
and/or derived from other keys. This implies that appropriate key management has to
be realised in the environment. These measures make sure that the assumption
A.Resp-Appl is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp-Appl although
additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Functions.
105 The justification of the additional policy (P.Add-Functions) and assumption (A.Add-
Functions) do not contradict the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for
assumptions, policy and threats defined in the PP and within this Security Target.
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5 Extended Components Definition
106 The extended components:
 FCS_RNG.1
 FMT_LIM.1
 FMT_LIM.2
 FAU_SAS.1
107 Are defined within the Protection Profile [PP] that this Security Target is strictly
conformant to.
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6 IT Security Requirements
108 The standard Security Requirements are shown in Figure 9. These security
components are listed and explained below.
Standard security requirements which
- protect user data and
- also support the other SFRs
Malfunction
Limited Fault
Tolerance
(FRU_FLT.2)
Failure with
preservation of
secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)
Domain
Separation
(ADV_ARC.1)
Leakage
Physical
Manipulation
and Probing
Basic internal
transfer
protection
(FDP_ITT.1)
Basic internal
TSF data
transfer
protection
(FPT_ITT.1)
Subset
information flow
control
(FDP_IFC.1)
Resistance to
Physical Attack
(FPT_PHP.3)
Standard SFR which
- support the TOE’s life-cycle
- and prevent abuse of functions
Abuse of
Functionality
Identification
Limited
capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)
Limited
availability
(FMT_LIM.2)
Audit storage
(FAU_SAS.1)
Figure 9: Standard Security Requirements
109 The Security Functional Requirements related to Specific Functionality are shown in
Figure 10. These security functional components are listed and explained below.
Standard SFR related to Specific Functionality
Random
Numbers
Cryptography
Random
Number
Generation
(FCS_RNG.1)
Cryptographic
Operation
(FCS_COP.1)
Figure 10: Security Functional Requirements related to Specific Functionality
From PP-BSI-0035-2007
From PP-BSI-0035-2007
From [AUG]
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6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
110 In order to define the Security Functional Requirements Part 2 of the Common
Criteria was used. However, some Security Functional Requirements have been
refined (please refer to the Protection Profile [PP]).
Malfunctions
111 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)” as
specified below.
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Hierarchical to: FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance
FRU_FLT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities
when the following failures occur: exposure to operating
conditions which are not detected according to the
requirement Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1) a
.
Dependencies: FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state.
Refinement: The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The
TOE prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined
above.
112 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur: exposure to operating conditions which
may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited
fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a
malfunction could occur b
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
a
The TOE operates in a stable way within this operating window, this is verified during the development and manufacturing
phase of the life cycle. This is verified by the ITSEF during the ATE Assurance Class analysis.
b
TSF_ENV_PROTECT details the operating conditions that are not tolerated by the TOE (namely Voltage and temperature
out of bounds, and frequency following below a defined level). The TOE takes action through TSF_AUDIT_ACTION to
ensure the TOE fails in a secure state.
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Refinement: The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The
TOE prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined
above.
Refinement Note Environmental conditions include but are not limited to
power supply, clock, and other external signals (e.g.
reset signal) necessary for the TOE operation.
Abuse of Functionality
113 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that
limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited
availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be
disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed
and no substantial information about construction of TSF
to be gathered which may enable other attacksa
.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
114 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that
limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be
disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed
and no substantial information about construction of TSF
to be gathered which may enable other attacksb
.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
a
TSF_TEST details the Limited capability and availability policy.
b
TSF_TEST details the Limited capability and availability policy.
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115 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Deliverya
with the capability to store the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-
personalisation Data and/or supplements of the Security IC
Embedded Software
b
in the Non-Volatile Memory.
Physical Manipulation and Probing
116 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical
probing c
to the TSFd
by responding automatically such that
the SFRs are always enforced.
Refinement: The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to
continuously counter physical manipulation and physical
probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on
all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against
these attacks is required ensuring that security functional
requirements are enforced. Hence, “automatic response”
means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at
any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any
time.
Note: The TOE provides the ability to perform an automatic response when a
violation is detected. To allow the Security IC Embedded Software developer to
choose an appropriate response the TOE allows some configuration of this response
mechanism (refer to Full Security Target for details).
a
The code entry process allows the Security IC Embedded Software developer to deliver pre-personalisation data, details
are given in the smartACT manual [ACT]. Some configuration of the TOE is allowed using the [COF].
b
The Security IC Embedded Software Developer may deliver data during the code entry process [ACT].
c
Direct Probing, manipulation by operating the TOE, out with the specified operating conditions [TD].
d
The TSF are detailed in TOE Summary Specification Section.
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Leakage
117 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)”
as specified below.
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy a
to prevent
the disclosure or modification of user data when it is
transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units
of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as
physically-separated parts of the TOE.
118 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
(FPT_ITT.1)” as specified below.
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure or
modification when it is transmitted between separate parts of
the TOE.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units
of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as
separated parts of the TOE.
This requirement is equivalent to FDP_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of
User Data. Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same Data
Processing Policy defined under FDP_IFC.1 below.
a
The user of this document should refer to TSF_LEAK_PROTECT for the SFP: Data Processing Policy
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119 The TOE shall meet the requirement “ Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)”
as specified below:
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policya
on all
confidential data when they are processed or transferred
by the TOE or by the Security IC Embedded Software b
.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
120 The following Security Function Policy (SFP) Data Processing Policy is defined for
the requirement “ Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)”:
User Data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the
Security IC Embedded Software decides to communicate the User Data via an
external interface. The protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without
the distinction of attributes controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software.
Random Numbers
121 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RNG.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator
that implements total failure test of the random source, and
online test capability .
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet AIS31 Class
P2 quality metric.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
a
The user of this document should refer to TSF_LEAK_PROTECT for the SFP: Data Processing Policy
b
The sensitive information that must be protected includes information when transferred from one memory location to
another by the user or Security IC Embedded Software or being operated on by the hardware processors. This information
must be protected as it would allow an attacker to gain knowledge of the functions of the TOE TSF, or gain access to
cryptographic key information.
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Cryptography
122 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic Operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below.
FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform hardware TDES encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm: triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) and
cryptographic key sizes: 112-bit cryptographic key sizes that
meet the following: E-D-E two-key triple-encryption
implementation of the Data Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB
46-3, 25
th
October 1999
a
.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on TDES TDES Crytographic operation based on a hardware
dedicated part of the TOE and is applicable to all
versions of the TOE
a
E-D-E =The simplest variant of TDES operates as follows: DES(k3;DES(k2;DES(k1;M))), where M is the message block to
be encrypted and k1, k2, and k3 are DES keys. This variant is commonly known as EEE because all three DES
operations are encryptions. In order to simplify interoperability between DES and TDES the middle step is usually replaced
with decryption (EDE mode): DES(k3;DES - 1(k2;DES(k1;M))) and so a single DES encryption with key k can be
represented as TDES-EDE with k1 = k2 = k3 = k. The choice of decryption for the middle step does not affect the security
of the algorithm.
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FCS_COP.1/SHA-1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform data signing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm: SHA-1 and cryptographic key
sizes: no cryptographic key size that meet the following:
Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on SHA-1 SHA-1 Crytographic operation is only applicable to
versions of the TOE including the following Inside
Toolboxes: 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
FCS_COP.1/SHA-224 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform data signing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm: SHA-224 and cryptographic
key sizes: no cryptographic key size that meet the following:
Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on SHA-224 SHA-224 Crytographic operation is only applicable to
versions of the TOE including the following Inside
Toolboxes: 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
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FCS_COP.1/SHA-256 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform data signing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm: SHA-256 and cryptographic
key sizes: no cryptographic key size that meet the following:
Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/SHA-384 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform data signing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm: SHA-384 and cryptographic
key sizes: no cryptographic key size that meet the following:
Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on SHA-256 SHA-256 Crytographic operation is only applicable to
versions of the TOE including the following Inside
Toolboxes: 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
Note on SHA-384 SHA-384 Crytographic operation is only applicable to
versions of the TOE including the following Inside
Toolbox: 00.03.12.xx
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FCS_COP.1/SHA-512 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform data signing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm: SHA-512 and cryptographic
key sizes: no cryptographic key size that meet the following:
Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/RSA without CRT Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: RSA
without CRT and cryptographic key sizes: between 96 bits
and 2624 bits that meet the following: PKCS#1 V2.0, 1
st
October, 1998.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on RSA without CRT RSA without CRT Crytographic operation is only
applicable to versions of the TOE including the
following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx,
00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
Note on SHA-512 SHA-512 Crytographic operation is only applicable to
versions of the TOE including the following Inside
Toolbox: 00.03.12.xx
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FCS_COP.1/RSA with CRT Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: RSA with
CRT data and cryptographic key sizes: between 192 bits and
3520 bits that meet the following: PKCS#1 V2.0, 1st
October,
1998.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on RSA with CRT RSA with CRT Crytographic operation is only applicable
to versions of the TOE including the following Inside
Toolboxes: 00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx,
00.03.12.xx
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA over Zp Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: EC-
DSA over Zp and cryptographic key sizes: between 192 bits
and 521 bits that meet the following: FIPS 186-3
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on ECDSA over Zp ECDSA over Zp Crytographic operation is only
applicable to versions of the TOE including the
following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
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FCS_COP.1/EC-DH over Zp Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: EC-DH
over Zp and cryptographic key sizes: between 192 bits and
521 bits that meet the following: ISO 15946-3:2002 for ECDH
standard.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on EC-DH over Zp EC-DH over Zp Crytographic operation is only
applicable to versions of the TOE including the
following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA over GF(2n) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: ECDSA
over GF(2n) and cryptographic key sizes: between 192 bits
and 521 bits that meet the following: FIPS 186-3
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on ECDSA over GF(2n) ECDSA over GF(2n) Crytographic operation is only
applicable to versions of the TOE including the
following Inside Toolbox: 00.03.12.xx
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FCS_COP.1/EC-DH over GF(2n) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: EC-DH
over GF(2n) and cryptographic key sizes: between 192 bits
and 521 bits that meet the following: ISO 15946-3:2002 for
ECDH standard.
Dependencies: (FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note on EC-DH over GF(2n) EC-DH over GF(2n) Crytographic operation is only
applicable to versions of the TOE including the
following Inside Toolbox: 00.03.12.xx
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6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
123 This Security Target is evaluated according to
124 Security Target evaluation (Class ASE)74H
125 The “Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE”, for the evaluation of the Dakala
TOE are those taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5)
and augmented by taking the following components:
ALC_DVS.2, and AVA_VAN.5.
126 The assurance requirements are (augmentation from EAL5+ highlighted)
Class ADV: Development
Architectural design (ADV_ARC.1)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP.5)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP.1)
Well-structured internals (ADV_INT.2)
TOE design (ADV_TDS.4)
Class AGD: Guidance documents
Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative user guidance (AGD_PRE.1)
Class ALC: Life-cycle support
CM capabilities (ALC_CMC.4)
CM scope (ALC_CMS.5)
Delivery (ALC_DEL.1)
Development security (ALC_DVS.2)
Life-cycle definition (ALC_LCD.1)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT.2)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
Derived security requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
Security problem definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Class ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV.2)
Depth (ATE_DPT.3)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN.1)
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Independent testing (ATE_IND.2)
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.5)
6.2.1 Refinements of the TOE Assurance Requirements
127 The Protection Profile BSI-PP-0035 defines refinements to the Security Assurance
requirements defined in CC V3.1 Part 3. The TOE is assessed to EAL5 Level with
additional augmentations which are taken into account in this analysis.
128 The [PP] allows the TOE to be evaluated above the EAL4+ requirements given in the
[PP], therefore the fact that this Security Target is assessed to EAL5 level, it still
maintains the conformance claim to [PP]. The refinements stated in [PP] remain
consistent with the EAL5 package claims of this Security Target.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Rationale for the security functional requirements
129 Table 2 below gives an overview of how the security functional requirements are
combined to meet the security objectives.
Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
O.Leak-Inherent - FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”
- FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”
- FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”
O.Phys-Probing - FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Malfunction - FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance
- FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
O.Phys-Manipulation - FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Leak-Forced All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent
- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1
plus those listed for O.Malfunction and
O.Phys-Manipulation
- FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
O.Abuse-Func - FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
- FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing,
O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced
- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3,
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
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Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
O.Identification - FAU_SAS.1
“Audit storage”
O.RND - FCS_RNG.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing,
O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced
- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3,
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
O.Add-Functions - FCS_COP.1 “Cryptographic Operation”
OE.Plat-Appl not applicable
OE.Resp-Appl not applicable
OE.Process-Sec-IC not applicable
Table 2: Security Requirements versus Security Objectives
130 It should be noted by the user of this Security Target Lite that the justification related
to the security objective “Random Numbers (O.RND)” contains the following note:
131 Depending on the functionality of the TOE the Security IC Embedded Software will
have to support the objective by providing runtime-tests of the random number
generator (for instance by implementing FPT_AMT.1 as defined in [PP]). Together,
these requirements allow the TOE to provide cryptographically good random
numbers and to ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is
available to an attacker.
132 It should be noted by the user of this Security Target Lite that the justification related
to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality” (O.Add-
Functions)” contains the following note:
133 Depending on the functionality of the end composite device the Security IC
Embedded Software will have to support the objective by using the additional
functions as specified by the [CC]. The user data processed by the functions relating
to FCS_COP.1 is protected as defined for the end application. The Embedded
Software will have to support the objective O.Add-Functions by implementing the
security functional requirements below:
 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of User data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import
of user data with security attributes or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
6.3.2 Dependencies of security functional requirements
134 Table 3 below lists the security functional requirements defined in this Security
Target, their dependencies and whether they are satisfied by other security
requirements defined in this Security Target. The text following the table discusses
the remaining cases.
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security
requirements in this PP
FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 Yes
FPT_FLS.1 None No dependency
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Yes
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Yes
FAU_SAS.1 None No dependency
FPT_PHP.3 None No dependency
FDP_ITT.1 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 Yes
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 Refer to full Security Target
FPT_ITT.1 None No dependency
FCS_RNG.1 None No dependency
FCS_COP.1 (FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.4
See section 6.3.1
Table 3: Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements
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7 TOE Summary Specification
135 This section demonstrates how the TOE matches the Security Functional
requirements as detailed in section 6.1 (Security functional Requirements).
136 It gives a description of the TSF elements of the TOE to allow an understanding of
how the security of the TOE matches the SFR of section 6.1, and also how they TOE
protects itself against tampering, interfering and bypass of the TSF Features of the
TOE.
7.1 Description of TSF Features of the TOE
7.1.1 TSF_TEST Test Interface
 Test Mode (TME)
 Serial Number Registers Write
 Test Mode Disable (User Mode)
 Package Mode (PME)
137 The TOE has two engineering test modes Test Mode (TME) and Package Mode
(PME).
138 Test Mode Entry: TME is protected by a Test mode entry condition and is only
accessible to authenticated test engineers.
139 Serial Number Register Write: In test mode it is possible to store pre-
personalisation data etc, also the serial number information is written at this time.
140 Test Mode Disable: TME is permanently disabled by wafer saw.
141 Package Mode Entry: The TOE also offers another test mode called Package Mode
(PME), this is considered as a subset of TME, it does not offer the full access to the
various memories, as is allowed in TME. On entry into Package mode a full NVM
erase is performed, to further protect any sensitive data stored in the TOE. PME is
protected by entry conditions.
SFP: Limited capability and
availability Policy
The TOE Test features are only available to authenticated
Inside engineers with the knowledge of the Test Mode
Entry and Package Mode Entry sequence. Once the wafer
is sawn Test Mode is not available. A subset of the Test
Mode features is available after TEST Mode Disable, but
only to authenticated users with the knowledge of the
Package Mode Entry Sequence.
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7.1.1.1 SFR to TSF Test Interface
7.1.2 TSF_ENV_PROTECT Environmental Protection
 Hardware Protection (Active Shield)
 Voltage Monitor
 Frequency Monitor
 Temperature Monitor
 Light Scan Detector
 Memory Encryption (Scramblers)
 Bus Encryption (Protection)a
 Structure and Layoutb
142 Hardware Protection: The TOE has an active shield that covers the top of the chip,
this provides tamper evidence protection, if violated a flag is raised.
143 Voltage Monitor: The power supply lines to the TOE are monitored to protect the
TOE from the supply going out of bounds.
144 Frequency Monitor: The frequency is monitored to protect the clock falling bellow a
defined level.
145 Temperature Monitor: The operating temperature of the TOE is monitored to
prevent the TOE from being operated out-with the correct operating conditions.
a
The security mechanism Bus Encryption utilises the layout process of the design. This mechanism has no TSFI.
b
The security mechanism Structure and Layout utilises the TOE design technology, and the layout process of the design.
This mechanism has no TSFI.
Abuse of
Function
Identification
FMT_LIM.1 Limited
Capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited
Availability
FAU_SAS.1 Audit
Storage
TSF_TEST
Test Interface
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146 Light Scan Detector: The TOE provides a Light scan Detector (LSD) to protect
against laser (or focused light) scanning of the TOE.
147 Memory encryption: The memories are encrypted and register file are encrypted.
148 Bus Encryption: Layout structures are implemented to make internal bus probing
difficult. The TOE contains no visible bus structures.
149 Structure and Layout: This provides complexity to any attack that involves
identifying specific areas of the TOE.
7.1.2.1 SFR to TSF_ENV_PROTECT
7.1.3 TSF_LEAK_PROTECT Leakage Protection
 Internal Clock (VFO)
 VFO Jitter
 Dummy Interrupt
 Dummy Instruction Generator
 Frequency Divider
 Power Scrambling
 Dummy NVM write
150 Internal Clock: The TOE provides an internal Variable Frequency Oscillator (VFO).
151 VFO Jitter: The VFO frequency offers variances of the frequency through time
(Jitter), to help against side channel leakage analysis.
152 Dummy Interrupt: The TOE can trigger Dummy Interruptss.
153 Dummy Instruction Generator: The TOE can trigger Dummy instructions.
154 Frequency Divider: The VFO clock can be varied.
Physical
Manipulation
and Probing
Malfunction
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to
Physical Attacks
FRU_FLT.2 Limited
Fault Tolerance
TSF_ENV_PROTECT
Environmental
Protection
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155 Power Scrambling: Power scrambling introduces a random component into the
power signature of the chip.
156 Dummy NVM write: This allows the Security IC embedded Software to cause a
dummy write of the NVM.
SFP: Data Processing Policy When processing or moving information within the TOE,
the TOE should not leak any specific information that
would allow an attacker to gain sufficient knowledge to
gain access to secret information stored within the TOE
memories.
7.1.3.1 SFR to TSF_LEAK_PROTECT
7.1.4 TSF_DATA_PROTECT Data Protection
 Secure Memory Management
 CRC
 Code Signature Module
 Parity Checker ROM/Registers
 Register Mirroring
 Enhanced Protection Object (EPO) NVM
 CStack Checker
 Glitch Detectors
Leakage
FDP_ITT.1 Basic
Internal Transfer
Protection
FPT_ITT.1 Basic
Internal TSF Data
Transfer Protection
TSF_LEAK_PROTECT
Leakage Protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
Information Flow
Control
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157 Secure Memory Management: The TOE features a memory access protection
mechanism.
158 CRC: The TOE provides a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC32 or CRC16).
159 Code Signature Module: The TOE provides a Code Signature Module.
160 Parity Checker ROM/Registers: The TOE features parity checking on the ROM,
and 8-/16-bit RISC CPU Registers.
161 Register Mirroring: Some of the internal security registers have been
duplicated/mirrored.
162 Enhanced Protection Object: The NVM read is protected against attempted
perturbations.
163 Cstack Checker: The TOE provides a Cstack Checker.
164 Glitch Detectors: The Glitch Detectors can detect a glitch on the Vcc signal. This
protects against attempted perturbations.
7.1.4.1 SFR to TSF_DATA_PROTECT
7.1.5 TSF_AUDIT_ACTION Event Audit and Action
 Reset System
 Security Registers
165 Reset System: The TOE allows the security IC Embedded Software to select the
response the TOE makes to a security violation. The TOE has several modes when
reacting to a security issue to ensure that the device fails in a safe mode.
166 Security registers: The TOE includes several registers to report failures (violations)
detected by the security mechanisms of the TOE.
TSF_DATA_PROTECT
Data Integrity
Protection
Physical
Manipulation
and Probing
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to
Physical Attacks
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7.1.5.1 SFR to TSF_AUDIT_ACTION
7.1.6 TSF_RNG Random Number Generator
 True RNG
 Random Number Total Failure Bit
 RNGDAS
 RDWDR
167 True RNG: The TOE has an analogue noise source that can be used to provide
random numbers when required by the Security IC Embedded Software.
168 Random Number Total Failure Bit: The TOE sets a flag if the analogue noise
source fails.
169 RNGDAS: The Analogue Noise Source is sampled to create a digitized analogue
source that is accessible to the Security IC Embedded Software through the
RNGDAS register.
170 RDWDR: The digital analogue source from RNGDAS can be post processed. The
result of the post processed data is accessible to the Security IC Embedded Software
through the RDWDR register.
Malfunction
FRU_FLT.2 Limited
Fault Tolerance
TSF_AUDIT_ACTION
Event Audit and
Action
FPT_FLS.1 Failure
with Preservation
of Secure State
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7.1.6.1 SFR to TSF_RNG
7.1.7 TSF_CRYPTO_HW Hardware Cryptography
 Hardware Triple DES
171 Hardware Triple DES: The TOE provides a hardware DES / TDES engine which
enables fast cryptographic computations.
7.1.7.1 SFR to TSF_CRYPTO_HW
7.1.8 TSF_CRYPTO_SW Toolbox Cryptography
 AIS31 Online Test (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
 Secure Hash (SHA) (00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
 RSA (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
Cryptography
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic
Operation
TSF_CRYPTO_HW
Hardware
Cryptography
Random
Numbers
FCS_RNG.1
Random Number
Generation
TSF_RNG
Random Number
Generator
Leakage
FDP_ITT.1 Basic
Internal Transfer
Protection
FPT_ITT.1 Basic
Internal TSF Data
Transfer Protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
Information Flow
Control
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 RSA with CRT (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
 PrimeGen (Miller Rabin) (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
 ECDSA over Zp (00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
 EC-DH over Zp (00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
 ECDSA over GF(2n) (00.03.12.xx)
 EC-DH over GF(2n) (00.03.12.xx)
 Self-Test (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
172 Self-Test: The TOE can perform a test of the crypto toolbox at the request of the
Security IC Embedded Software
173 AIS31 Online Test: The TOE provides the ability to run online tests of the random
numbers provided to the RNGDAS register.
174 Secure Hash: The TOE provides Secure Hash (SHA) data signing capability
175 RSA without CRT: The TOE provides RSA without CRT (Modular Exponentiation)
data encryption decryption functions.
176 RSA with CRT: The TOE provides RSA with CRT data encryption decryption
functions.
177 PrimeGen: The TOE provides RSA cryptographic key generation capability using
Miller Rabin algorithm with confidence criteria (t parameter) between 0 and 255.
178 ECDSA over Zp: The TOE provides ECDSA over Zp cryptographic signature
capability
179 EC-DH over Zp: The TOE provides EC-DH over Zp cryptographic signature
capability
180 ECDSA over GF(2n): The TOE provides ECDSA over GF(2n) cryptographic
signature capability
181 EC-DH over GF(2n): The TOE provides EC-DH over GF(2n) cryptographic signature
capability
182 A summary of which functions are available to which member of the 00.03.1x.xx
family is given below.
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00.03.14.xx 00.03.10.xx 00.03.11.xx 00.03.12.xx
Self-Test Self-Test Self-Test Self-Test
AIS31 Online Test AIS31 Online Test AIS31 Online Test AIS31 Online Test
RSA Without CRT RSA Without CRT RSA Without CRT RSA Without CRT
RSA With CRT RSA With CRT RSA With CRT RSA With CRT
PrimeGen PrimeGen PrimeGen PrimeGen
SHA-1 SHA-1 SHA-1
SHA-224 SHA-224 SHA-224
SHA-256 SHA-256 SHA-256
ECDSA over Zp ECDSA over Zp
EC-DH over Zp EC-DH over Zp
ECDSA over GF(2n)
EC-DH over GF(2n)
SHA-384
SHA-512
7.1.8.1 SFR to TSF_CRYPTO_SW
Random
Numbers
TSF_CRYPTO_SW
Software
Cryptography
Cryptography FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic
Operation
FCS_RNG.1
Random Number
Generation
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7.2 Rationale for TSF
183 This section demonstrates how the TSF contribute and work together to fulfil the SFR
defined in section 6.
7.2.1 Summary of TSF to SFR
184 Table 4 gives an overview of the TSF that contribute to the SFRs.
Security Functional Requirements
Malfunctions
Leakage
Physical
Manipulation
and
Probing
Abuse
of
Functionality
Identification
Random
Number
Generation
Cryptography
FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1
FDP_ITT.1
FPT_ITT.1
FDP_IFC.1
FPT_PHP.3
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_RNG.1
FCS_COP.1
TSF
Features
TSF_TEST X X X
TSF_ENV_PROTECT X X
TSF_LEAK_PROTECT X X X
TSF_DATA_PROTECT X
TSF_AUDIT_ACTION X X
TSF_RNG X X X X
TSF_CRYPTO_HW X
TSF_CRYPTO_SW X X
Table 4 Dependencies of the TOE Security Features
185 Table 5 gives further details on the map of SFR FCS_COP.1 and
TSF_CRYPTO_HW and how this relates to the specific toolbox version.
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FCS_COP.1
requirement
TSF Feature Mechanism This function is only
available on the TOE
with this toolbox
version
/TDES TSF_CRYPTO_HW Triple DES The TOE has a TDES
hardware engine and
therefore is present
independent of Toolbox
/SHA-1 TSF_CRYPTO_SW Secure Hash
(SHA-1)
00.03.10.xx, 00.3.11.xx,
00.03.12.xx
/SHA-224 TSF_CRYPTO_SW Secure Hash
(SHA-224)
00.03.10.xx, 00.3.11.xx,
00.03.12.xx
/SHA-256 TSF_CRYPTO_SW Secure Hash
(SHA-256)
00.03.10.xx, 00.3.11.xx,
00.03.12.xx
/SHA-384 TSF_CRYPTO_SW Secure Hash
(SHA-384)
00.03.12.xx
/SHA-512 TSF_CRYPTO_SW Secure Hash
(SHA-512)
00.03.12.xx
/RSA without
CRT
TSF_CRYPTO_SW RSA Without
CRT
PrimeGen
00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx,
00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/RSA with
CRT
TSF_CRYPTO_SW RSA with
CRT
PrimeGen
00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx,
00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/ECDSA over
Zp
TSF_CRYPTO_SW ECDSA over
Zp
00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/EC-DH over
Zp
TSF_CRYPTO_SW EC-DH over
Zp
00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/ECDSA over
GF(2n)
TSF_CRYPTO_SW ECDSA over
GF(2n)
00.03.12.xx
/EC-DH over
GF(2n)
TSF_CRYPTO_SW EC-DH over
GF(2n)
00.03.12.xx
N/A
(support for
FCS_RNG.1)
TSF_CRYPTO_SW AIS31 Online
test
00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx,
00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
Table 5 Cryptographic Functions Overview
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186 The TOE is a generic hardware IC with cryptographic support software, this allows
the Security IC Embedded Software to use the cryptographic functions detailed in
FCS_COP.1. It should be noted as detailed in the rationale for the dependencies of
FCS_COP.1 that key management including key generation that is the SFR
FCS_CKM.1 are satisfied by the Security IC Embedded Software and not the TOE,
this is especially important for the security mechanism PrimeGen and also
ECDSA/ECDH.
7.2.2 Note on ADV_ARC.1
187 The Assurance component ADV_ARC.1 states that the TOE should be self protected
against any tampering or bypassing of the TSF of the TOE.
188 The TSF Features TSF_ENV_PROTECT, TSF_AUDIT_ACTION and
TSF_DATA_PROTECT contain mechanisms that fully protected the TOE against
any external tamper or bypass.
189 The Security Mechanisms applicable to this protection are:
 Hardware Protection (Active Shield)
 Voltage Monitor
 Temperature Monitor
 Glitch Detectors
 Memory Encryption
 Reset System
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8 Annex
8.1 Glossary of Vocabulary
Application Data All data managed by the Security IC Embedded
Software in the application context. Application data
comprise all data in the final Security IC.
Composite Product Integrator Role installing or finalising the IC Embedded Software
and the applications on platform transforming the TOE
into the un-personalised Composite Product after TOE
delivery.
The TOE Manufacturer may implement IC Embedded
Software delivered by the Security IC Embedded
Software Developer before TOE delivery (e.g. if the IC
Embedded Software is implemented in ROM or is stored
in the non-volatile memory as service provided by the IC
Manufacturer or IC Packaging Manufacturer).
Composite Product Manufacturer The Composite Product Manufacturer has the following
roles (i) the Security IC Embedded Software Developer
(Phase 1), (ii) the Composite Product Integrator
(Phase 5) and (iii) the Personaliser (Phase 6). If the
TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or
sawn wafers (dice) he has the role of the IC Packaging
Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.
The customer of the TOE Manufacturer who receives
the TOE during TOE Delivery. The Composite Product
Manufacturer includes the Security IC Embedded
Software developer and all roles after TOE Delivery up
to Phase 6.
End-consumer User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
IC Dedicated Software IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also
known as IC firmware) and developed by the IC
Developer. Such software is required for testing purpose
(IC Dedicated Test Software) but may provide additional
services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or to
provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Soft-
ware).
IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above)
which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but
which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Dedicated Support Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above)
which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage
of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted
to certain phases.
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Initialisation Data Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to
identify the TOE and to keep track of the Security IC’s
production and further life-cycle phases are considered
as belonging to the TSF data. These data are for
instance used for traceability and for TOE identification
(identification data).
Integrated Circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform
processing and/or memory functions.
Pre-personalisation Data Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is
programmed into the non-volatile memory by the
Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). This data is
for example used for traceability and/or to secure
shipment between phases.
Security IC (as used in this Protection Profile) Composition of the
TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data
and the package (the Security IC carrier).
Security IC Embedded Software Software embedded in a Security IC and normally not
being developed by the IC Designer. The Security IC
Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and
embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3 or in later
phases of the Security IC product life-cycle.
Some part of that software may actually implement a
Security IC application others may provide standard
services. Nevertheless, this distinction doesn’t matter
here so that the Security IC Embedded Software can be
considered as being application dependent whereas the
IC Dedicated Software is definitely not.
Security IC Product Composite product which includes the Security
Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the Embedded
Software and is evaluated as composite target of
evaluation in the sense of the Supporting Document
Test Features All features and functions (implemented by the IC
Dedicated Test Software and/or hardware) which are
designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and
delivered as part of the TOE.
TOE Delivery The period when the TOE is delivered which is either
(i) after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is
delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or
(ii) after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is
delivered in form of packaged products.
TOE Manufacturer The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that all
requirements for the TOE and its development and
production environment are fulfilled.
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The TOE Manufacturer has the following roles: (i) IC
Developer (Phase 2) and (ii) IC Manufacturer (Phase 3).
If the TOE is delivered after Phase 4 in form of
packaged products, he has the role of the (iii) IC
Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the
operation of the TOE. This includes information about
the TOE’s configuration, if any is coded in non-volatile
non-programmable memories (ROM), in specific
circuitry, in non-volatile programmable memories (for
instance E2PROM) or a combination thereof.
User Data All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software
in the application context. User data comprise all data in
the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data.
8.2 Literature
[CC_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[CC_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Part 2:
Evaluation Methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
[JHAS]Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document: Application of Attack
Potential to Smartcards, March 2009, Version 2.7
[COMP] Supporting Document: Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices, CCDB-2007-09-001, Sept. 2007
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI- PP-0035-2007, V1.0
[AIS31] AIS31: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true (physical) random
number generators, Version 3.1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[AUG] Smartcard Integrated Circuit Augmentations Version 1.0, March 2002, registered
under the German Certification Scheme BSI-AUG-2002
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8.3 List of Abbreviations
CC Common Criteria.
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level.
IC Integrated circuit.
IT Information Technology.
PP Protection Profile.
ST Security Target.
TOE Target of Evaluation.
TSC TSF Scope of Control.
TSF TOE Security Functionality.
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