TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
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The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
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TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
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IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2022-02
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Certification Report
Unisoc TEE OS version 2.1.2
Sponsor and developer: Spreadtrum Communications(Shanghai)Co., Ltd
Building 1, Spreadtrum Center, Lane 2288, Zuchongzhi Road
Shanghai
P.R. China
Evaluation facility: Riscure B.V.
Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0492117-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0492117
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 12 December 2023
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 6
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0492117-CR, dated 12 December 2023
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Unisoc
TEE OS version 2.1.2. The developer of the Unisoc TEE OS version 2.1.2 is Spreadtrum
Communications(Shanghai)Co., Ltd located in Shanghai, China and they also act as the sponsor of
the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers
when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE type is a Trusted Operation System (TOS), which is only the software part of the Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE). The TOE hosts a set of Trusted Applications (TA) and provides them
with a set of security services including integrity of execution, secure communication with the Client
Applications (CA) running in the REE, trusted storage and cryptographic algorithms.
The TOE has been evaluated by Riscure B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation was
completed on 12 December with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Unisoc TEE OS version 2.1.2, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Unisoc TEE OS version 2.1.2 are
advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL2 augmented (EAL2+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with AVA_VAN_AP.3 (TEE Vulnerability
Analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Unisoc TEE OS version 2.1.2 from
Spreadtrum Communications(Shanghai)Co., Ltd located in Shanghai, China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software Unisoc TEE OS 2.1.2
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Unisoc TEE OS
version 2.1.2. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following security features:
• Trusted Storage
• User Identification and Authentication
• Protection of Trusted Applications (TA)
• Communication Data Protection between Client Applications (CA) and Trusted Applications
(TA)
• Cryptographic operations support:
o Symmetric AES and DES/TDES
o Asymmetric RSA and ECC
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST-Lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the [ST] has the A.SECURE_HARDWARE_PLATFORM assumption which requires the TOE
environment to provide a secure HW which protects against physical invasive attacks, environmental
stress malfunction attacks and side channel analysis attacks.
Therefore, these types of threats are not considered in the scope of the TOE evaluation and need to
be considered for developing a product solution that integrates the TOE into a larger system including
a hardware platform.
2.4 Architectural Information
The following figure depicts the TOE boundary and the main TOE architecture.
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Unisoc TEE OS - AGD_PRE Preparative Guidelines 0.14
Unisoc TEE OS – AGD_OPE Operational guidelines 0.11
Unisoc TEE OS - Functional Specification guidelines 0.15
Unisoc TEE SDK Guide 2.1
UNISOC Research Download User Guide V1.1 EN 1.1
TA Development Guide on Unisoc TEE 0.2
Driver Install and Uninstall Guide (EN) 1.1
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
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2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification and TSFIs. The testing was
largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were extensively
used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
Considering the security assurance requirements for the AVA_VAN level, the following approach was
considered by the Lab:
• Collect and review information available in the public domain.
• Collect and review information and prior work on the security evaluation evidences.
• Determine viable attack scenarios based on available information.
• Select attacks for the penetration testing phase.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 34 days. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on logical tests. No attacks including exploitation of test features, physical
invasive attacks, side channel analysis or fault Injection were defined as the TOE is not claimed to be
resistant against these types of attacks.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST].
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Unisoc TEE OS version 2.1.2.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Unisoc TEE OS version 2.1.2,
to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended, and to meet the requirements of EAL 2 augmented
with AVA_VAN_AP.3. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in
Security Target [ST].
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2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
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3 Security Target
The Unisoc TEE Security Target, version 0.30, 06 November 2023. [ST] is included here by
reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
CA Client Application
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
REE Rich Execution Environment
TA Trusted Application
TOE Target of Evaluation
TOS Trusted Operation System
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report for Unisoc TEE OS v2.1.2, version 1.1, 11
December 2023
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] Unisoc TEE Security Target, version 0.30, 06 November 2023.
[ST-lite] Unisoc TEE OS Security Target Lite, version 0.30 06 November 20
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)