SERTIT, P.O. Box 814, N-1306 Sandv ika, NORWAY
Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no
Sertif iseringsmy ndigheten f or IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SERTIT-077 CR Certification Report
Issue 1.0 22 September 2016
Thinklogical TLX640 Matrix Switch
CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009E VERSION 1.1 01.07.2015
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ARRANGEM E NT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN
THE FIELD OF INFORM ATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a m em ber of the above
Arrangem ent and as s uch this confirm s that the Com m on Cri teria certificate has been
is s ued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangem ent and is the Party’s claim
that the certificate has been is s ued in accordance with the term s of this Arrangem ent
The judgem ents contained in the certificate and Certification Report are thos e of SERTIT
which is s ued it and the evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried out the evaluation. There
is no im plication of acceptance by other Mem bers of the Agreem ent Group of liability in
res pect of thos e judgem ents or for los s s u s tained as a res ult of reliance placed upon
thos e judgem ents by a third party.
The Com m on Criteria Recognition Arrangem ent logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognized under the term s of the CCRA July 2 nd
2014. The
recognition under CCRA is lim ited to cPP related as s urance packages or EAL 2 and
ALC_FLR CC part 3 com ponents .
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEM ENT OF INFORM ATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
EVALUATION CERTIFICATES (SOGIS MRA)
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a m em ber of the above
Agreem ent and as s uch this confirm s that the Com m on Criteria certificate has been
is s ued by or under the authority of a Party to this Agreem ent and is the Party’s claim that
the certificate has been is s ued in accordance with the term s of this Agreem ent
The judgem ents contained in the certificate and Certification Report are thos e of SERTIT
which is s ued it and the evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried out the evaluation. There
is no im plication of acceptance by other Mem bers of the Agreem ent Group of liability in
res pect of thos e judgem ents or for los s s us tained as a res ult of reliance placed upon
thos e judgem ents by a third party.
Mutual recognition under SOGIS MRA applies to com ponents up to EAL 4.
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Contents
Certification Statement 4
1 Abbreviations 5
2 References 6
3 Executive Summary 7
3.1 Introduction 7
3.2 Evaluated Product 7
3.3 TOE scope 7
3.4 Protection Profile Conformance 7
3.5 Assurance Level 7
3.6 Security Policy 7
3.7 Security Claims 8
3.8 Threats Countered 8
3.9 Threats and Attacks not Countered 8
3.10 Environmental Assumptions and
Dependencies 8
3.11 Security Objectives for the TOE 8
3.12 Security Objects for the environment 9
3.13 Security Functional Components 9
3.14 Security Function Policy 9
3.15 Evaluation Conduct 10
3.16 General Points 10
4 Evaluation Findings 11
4.1 Introduction 12
4.2 Delivery 12
4.3 Installation and Guidance Docume ntation 12
4.4 Misuse 12
4.5 Vulnerability Analysis 13
4.6 Developer’s Tests 13
4.7 Evaluators’ Tests 13
5 Evaluation Outcome 14
5.1 Certification Result 14
5.2 Recommendations 14
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration 15
TOE Identification 15
TOE Documentation 15
TOE Configuration 15
Environmental Configuration 17
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1 Abbreviations
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation(ISO/IEC 15408)
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria
Certificates in the Field of Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EOR Evaluation Observation Report
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification
Scheme for IT Security
EWP Evaluation Work Plan
ISO/IEC 15408 Information technology –- Security techniques –- Evaluation
criteria for IT security
SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SOGIS MRA SOGIS Mutual Recognition Agreement
SPM Security Policy Model
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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2 References
[1] Thinklogical TLX640 Matrix Switch Security Target Document
Version 1.4, January 2016.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB-2012-09-001,
Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2: Security functional components, CCMB-2012-09-002,
Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3: Security assurance components, CCMB-2012-09-003,
Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[5] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 9.0, 02 April
2013.
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version
3.1 R4, September 2012.
[7] NO-5152147_ Evaluation Technical Report_v1.1 20 September
2016.
[8] TLX640 router KVM Matrix Switch Product Manual Rev. A
[9] TLX640 10G Matrix Switch QUICK-START GUIDE As used with
Thinklogical’s Q-Series & TLX Video Extension Systems
[10] TLX 640 Matrix Router Design Specification 1.2
[11] Changing a Routers' IP Address Rev. A
[12] Thinklogical System Management Portfolio Configurator Hot Key
Manager -On-Screen Display System Management Interface Drag &
Drop Product Manual Rev. A
[13] VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.1
[14] Using the VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.0
[15] ALC.DEL_1_0.doc v1.0 Thinklogicals delivery procedure 06/01/10
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3 Executive Summary
3.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security
evaluation of Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch (for version see chapter
3.2), and is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security of the product for their particular requirements.
Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1] which specifies the functional, environmental and
assurance evaluation components.
3.2 Evaluated Product
The version of the product evaluated Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch in
the following configurations:
ƒ TLX640 Matrix Switch Chassis (TLX-MSC-000640 Rev B)
- TLX640 Matrix Switch Data Input and Output Card, 20 Ports, SFP+,
Multi-Mode (TLX-MSD-M00020 Rev C), Single Mode (TLX-MSD-S00020
Rev C)
- Velocity Matrix Switch 640 Data Input and Output Card, 20 Ports,
SFP+, Multi-Mode (VXM-DIOR20 Rev A), Single-Mode (VXM-DIOS20
Rev A)
This product is also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation
(TOE). The developer was Thinklogical
Details of the evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s supporting
guidance documentation, are given in Annex A.
3.3 TOE scope
The TOE scope is described in the Security Target [1] chapter 2.
3.4 Protection Profile Conformance
The Security Target[1] did not claim conformance to any protection profile.
3.5 Assurance Level
The Security Target[1] specified the assurance components for the
evaluation. Predefined evaluation assurance level EAL 4 was used. Common
Criteria Part 3[4] describes the scale of assurance given by predefined
assurance levels EAL1 to EAL7. An overview of CC is given in CC Part 1 [2].
3.6 Security Policy
The TOE security policies are detailed in the Security Target[1].
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There are no Organizational Security Policies or rules with which the TOE
must comply.
3.7 Security Claims
The Security Target[1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the
threats which these objectives counter and security functional components
and security functions to elaborate the objectives. All of the SFR’s are taken
from CC Part 2[3]; use of this standard facilitates comparison with other
evaluated products.
3.8 Threats Countered
ƒ T.INSTALL The TOE may be delivered and installed in a manner which
violates the security policy.
ƒ T.ATTACK An attack on the TOE may violate the security policy.
ƒ T.RESIDUAL Residual data may be transferred between different
port groups in violation of data separation security policy.
ƒ T.STATE State information may be transferred to a port group other
than the intended one.
3.9 Threats and Attacks not Countered
No threats or attacks that are not countered are described.
3.10 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies
ƒ A.PHYSICAL The switch, the transmitters, the receivers, the
optical connections from the Switch to the transmitters and receivers
and the wired network connections from the Switch to the
administrators are physically secure.
ƒ A.EMISSIO N The TOE meets the appropriate national
requirements (in the country where used) for conducted/radiated
electromagnetic emissions. [In the United States, Part 15 of the FCC
Rules for Class B digital devices.
ƒ A.MANAGE The TOE is installed and managed in accordance with the
manufacturer’s directions.
ƒ A.NOEVIL The TOE users and administrators are non-hostile and
follow all usage guidance.
ƒ A.SCENARIO Vulnerabi liti es associated with attached devices are a concern
of the application scenario and not of the TOE.
3.11 Security Objectives for the TOE
ƒ O.CONF The TOE shall not violate the confidentiality of information
which it processes. Information generated within any peripheral
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set/computer connection shall not be accessible by any other
peripheral set/computer connection.
ƒ O.CONNECT No information shall be shared between switched
computers and peripheral sets via the TOE in violation of Data
Separation SFP.
3.12 Security Objects for the environment
ƒ OE.EMISSIO N The TOE shall meet the appropriate national
requirements (in the country where used) for conducted/radiated
electromagnetic emissions. [In the United States, Part 15 of the FCC
Rules for Class B digital devices.
ƒ OE.MANAGE The TOE shall be installed and managed in
accordance with the manufacturer’s directions.
ƒ OE.NOEVIL The authorized user shall be non-hostile and follow all
usage guidance.
ƒ OE.PHYSICAL The Switch, the transmitters, the receivers, the
optical connections from the Switch to the transmitters and receivers
and the wired network connections from the TOE to the administrators
shall be physically secure.
ƒ OE.SCENARIO Vulnerabilities associated with attached devices or
their connections to the TOE, shall be a concern of the application
scenario and not of the TOE.
3.13 Security Functional Components
ƒ FDP_ETC.1 Export of User Data Without Security Attributes
ƒ FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
ƒ FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
ƒ FDP_ITC.1 Import of User Data Without Security Attributes
3.14 Security Function Policy
The TOE enforces secure separation of information flows corresponding to
different switched connections. The corresponding Data Separation Security
Policy is the main security feature of the TOE.
Data Separation Security Function Policy states that data shall flow between
Transmitter Port group A and Receiver Port group B if and only if a deliberate
logical connection has been established to connect A to B. There shall be no
data flow between any pair of Transmitter Port Groups or Receiver Port
Groups. There shall be no data flow between Transmitter Port Groups or
Receiver Port Groups and any other physical port on the Switch.
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3.15 Evaluation Conduct
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT
Document SD001E[5]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian
Certification Authority for IT Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this
Certification Report, SERTIT is a member of the Arrangement on the
Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the Field of Information
Technology Security (CCRA), and the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the
effectiveness of the TOE in meeting its Security Target[1], which prospective
consumers are advised to read. To ensure that the Security Target [1] gave
an appropriate baseline for a CC evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The
TOE was then evaluated against this baseline. Both parts of the evaluation
were performed in accordance with CC Part 3[4] and the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM)[6].
SERTIT monitored the evaluation which was carried out by the Norconsult AS
Commercial Evaluation Facility (EVIT). The evaluation was completed when
the EVIT submitted the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)[7] to SERTIT in 20
September 2016. SERTIT then produced this Certification Report.
3.16 General Points
The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in the Security
Target[1] with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by
the Security Target[1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in
Annex A. Prospective consumers are advised to check that this matches their
identified requirements and give due consideration to the recommendations
and caveats of this report.
Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security
vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only
reflect the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the
responsibility of users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any
security vulnerabilities have been discovered since the date shown in this
report. This Certification Report is not an endorsement of the IT product by
SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
Certification Report, and no warranty of the IT product by SERTIT or any
other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report
is either expressed or implied.
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4 Evaluation Findings
The evaluators examined the following assurance classes and components
taken from CC Part 3[4]. These classes comprise the EAL 4 assurance
package.
Assurance class Assurance components
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of
the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
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All assurance classes were found to be satisfactory and were awarded an
overall “pass” verdict.
4.1 Introduction
The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security
Target[1]. The results of this work were reported in the ETR [7] under the CC
Part 3[4] headings. The following sections note considerations that are of
particular relevance to either consumers or those involved with subsequent
assurance maintenance and re-evaluation of the TOE.
4.2 Delivery
On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the
evaluated version has been supplied, and to check that the security of the
TOE has not been compromised in delivery.
The procedure for physical distribution of the TOE is described in
Thinklogicals delivery procedure[15].
This procedure describes how the TOE is shipped from Thinklogicals
warehouse via Federal Express, UPS or DHL to the customer.
The procedure explains that all tracking and shipment information are
logged, and upon delivery of the TOE a signature is required
Each shipment is noted with dimension and weight, and hard copies of each
shipment are held in Thinklogicals Sales Order folder.
4.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation
A description of the secure installation of the TOE and the secure
preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives in the ST[1] can be found in the guidance documents.
The guidance documentation also describes the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TOE. It provides instructions and guidelines for
the secure use of the TOE, it addresses secure procedures for all modes of
operation, facilitates prevention and detection of insecure TOE states .
A list of all guidance documents evaluated can be found in Annex A.
4.4 Misuse
There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that
could possibly compromise confidential information. The user should always
follow the guidance for the TOE in order to ensure that the TOE operates in a
secure manner.
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The guidance documents adequately describe the mode of operation of the
TOE, all assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements
for external security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consumer to
effectively use the TOE's security functions.
4.5 Vulnerability Analysis
The evaluators’ vulnerability analysis was based on both public domain
sources and the visibility of the TOE given by the evaluation process and
evaluation process of previous versions of the TOE.
The evaluators have devised a set of tests to tes t potential vulnerabilities to
the TOE. The tests were performed at the developer’s site in Milford,
Connecticut in October 2015.
The result of the vulnerability analysis is that the TOE in its evaluated
configuration and in its intended environment has no exploitable
vulnerabilities.
4.6 Developer’s Tests
The evaluators’ assessment of the developer´s tests shows that the
developer´s tests cover all the TSFIs and all SFRs.
The evaluators have confirmed the developer have correctly performed and
documented the tests according to the test documentation.
4.7 Evaluators’ Tests
The evaluators have independently tested a sample of the developer´s tests
and verified that the TOE behaves as specified. Confidence in the
developer's test results is gained by performing a sample of the developer's
tests.
The evaluators tests were conducted at the developer’s site in Milford,
Connecticut in October 2015.
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5 Evaluation Outcome
5.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the ETR[7], produced by the evaluators, and the
conduct of the evaluation, as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has
determined that Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch (version see chapter 4.2)
meets the Common Criteria Part 3 conformant components of Evaluation
Assurance Level EAL 4 for the specified Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
functionality, in the specified environment, when running on platforms
specified in Annex A.
5.2 Recommendations
Prospective consumers of Thinklogical TLX 640 Matrix Switch (version see
chapter 4.2) should understand the specific sc ope of the certification by
reading this report in conjunction with the Security Target [1]. The TOE
should be used in accordance with a number of environmental considerations
as specified in the Security Target.
Only the evaluated TOE configuration should be installed. This is specified in
Annex A with further relevant information given above in Section 3.3 “TOE
Scope” and Section 4 “Evaluation Findings”.
The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance
documentation included in the evaluated configuration.
The above “Evaluation Findings” include a number of recommendations
relating to the secure receipt, installation, configuration and operation of the
TOE.
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Annex A: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Identification
The TOE consists of:
ƒ TLX640 Matrix Switch Chassis (TLX-MSC-000640 Rev B)
- TLX640 Matrix Switch Data Input and Output Card, 20 Ports, SFP+,
Multi-Mode (TLX-MSD-M00020 Rev C), Single Mode (TLX-MSD-S00020
Rev C)
- Velocity Matrix Switch 640 Data Input and Output Card, 20 Ports,
SFP+, Multi-Mode (VXM-DIOR20 Rev A), Single-Mode (VXM-DIOS20
Rev A)
TOE Documentation
The supporting guidance documents evaluated were:
[a] TLX640 router KVM Matrix Switch Product Manual Rev. A
[b] TLX640 10G Matrix Switch QUICK-START GUIDE As used with
Thinklogical’s Q-Series & TLX Video Extension Systems
[c] TLX 640 Matrix Router Design Specification 1.2
[d] Changing a Routers' IP Address Rev. A
[e] Thinklogical System Management Portfolio Configurator Hot Key
Manager -On-Screen Display System Management Interface Drag &
Drop Product Manual Rev. A
[f] VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.1
[g] Using the VxRouter ASCII Interface 4.0
Further discussion of the supporting guidance material is given in Section 4.3
“Installation and Guidance Documentation”.
TOE Configuration
The following configuration was used for testing:
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The figure shows the TLX48 Router KVM Matrix Switch in an evaluated
configuration. An equivalent layout is the evaluated configuration for the
TLX640 Router KVM Matrix Switch.
Tools used during the evaluation:
ƒ Microsoft Office 2013
ƒ Microsoft Hyperterminal
ƒ Oracle VM VirtualBox
ƒ Kali Linux
ƒ Noyes optical power meter, Model OPM 4-1D, Serialnumber
1W11NL001
ƒ Putty Terminal Emulator
ƒ WinSCP
ƒ Oscilloscope Tektronic DSA72504D, asset number 1147321
ƒ Microsoft Telnet
ƒ TLX640 Connect Test 1 A.xls
ƒ TLX640 Connect Test 2 PR2.xls
ƒ TLX640 Connect Test 3 PR2.xls
ƒ TLX640 Connect Test 4 PR1.xls
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Environmental Configuration
The TOE is a fiber optic switch that uses multi-mode or single-mode fiber
optics to transmit and receive a digital video pulse stream without alteration
or interpretation of the original signal. The TOE provides remote connectio ns
from a set of shared computers to a set of shared peripherals. The switching
capability of the TOE is used to connect ports on a peripheral set to multiple
computers. The TOE provides a capability to dynamically change the
switching configuration.
For use in an evaluated configuration, the TOE must be located in a
physically secure environment to which only authorized administrators has
access. Similarly, the server used to manage the TOE must be physically
protected and have suitable identification/auth entication mechanism to
ensure that only trusted administrators have access .