TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
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info@nl.tuv.com
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Version
2022-01
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Certification Report
Arm Integrated Secure Element CryptoIsland-300P, version
1.0
Sponsor and developer: Arm Limited
110 Fulbourn Road,
Cambridge, CB1 9NJ
UK
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0397801-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0397801
Author(s): Denise Cater and Jordi Mujal
Date: 17 August 2022
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 10
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 10
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 11
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.9 Evaluation Results 11
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Arm
Integrated Secure Element CryptoIsland-300P, version 1.0. The developer of the Arm Integrated
Secure Element CryptoIsland-300P, version 1.0 is Arm Limited located in Cambridge, UK and they
also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
The TOE (referenced as CI-300P) is a security enclave to be integrated into a SoC. The security
enclave is a Hard Macro synthesized independently of other components of the SoC in combination
with a Hard Macro for MRAM. It provides an isolated execution environment for executing sensitive
processes and handling sensitive data, which can be used for various applications, where devices
operate in a hostile environment and require a high-level of security, such as cellular subscriber
identification, Smart Cards, user credentials storage, and payment. Its main usage is for Integrated
SIMs.
The TOE is not itself a security enclave instantiated in hardware, but rather it is the Hard Macro
of the security enclave to be integrated into an SoC.
The evaluation and certification of this TOE was performed to support reuse of the secure enclave into
an SoC that is targeting conformance to [PP0084] as well as [PP-0117] to fulfil the composition
requirements [COMP].
In accordance with [PP0117] integration guidance is provided for the TOE. The users of the TOE,
developers of the SoC, must strictly follow the guidance and must successfully pass a
(composite) evaluation of this secure enclave TOE integrated in an SoC in order for the SoC
product to claim EAL4+ and/or AVA_VAN.5 resistance. The testing was performed on a test
vehicle, rather than on a sample of an instantiated TOE, as further detailed in section 2.6.3 of this
report.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 17 August 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Arm Integrated Secure Element CryptoIsland-
300P, version 1.0, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level)
at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Arm Integrated
Secure Element CryptoIsland-300P, version 1.0 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw reporting procedures), ATE_DPT.2 (Testing: security enforcing
modules) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Arm Integrated Secure Element CryptoIsland-
300P, version 1.0 from Arm Limited located in Cambridge, UK.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery item
type
Identifier Version
Hardware
CI-300P Hard Macro2
Layout marking:
cl145:r0p0
Digital identification:
PID: D2 B0 0b 04
CID: 0D F0 05 B1
MRAM Hard Macro4
MRAM_eFlash_128K
x144_2019q4v1
or
MRAM_eFlash_384K
x144_2019q4v1
Layout
Phantom View
CI-300P Hard Macro phantom view3 cl145:r0p0
MRAM Hard Macro phantom view4
MRAM_eFlash_128K
x144_PA_2019q4v1
or
MRAM_eFlash_384K
x144_PA_2019q4v1
Firmware &
Software
FSB 1.1.1.0
SSB 1.1.1.4
FUT 1.3
Runtime Library 1.1.5_1.0_1.0.6
In addition, the following manufacturing tools are delivered with the TOE:
Delivery item
type
Identifier
Version
Manufacturing
tools
CryptoIsland Provisioning Tools r0p0-01eac0
CryptoIsland HW Testing Tools r0p0-01eac0
CryptoIsland Disablement Tool r0p0-00eac0
CryptoIsland Characterization Tools r0p0-01eac0
2 For use by an SoC developer who has a secure development environment
3 For use by an SoC developer who does not have a secure development environment
4 Depending on the agreement the SoC developer has with GlobalFoundries
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To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Arm Integrated
Secure Element CryptoIsland-300P, version 1.0. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this
report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST-lite], Chapter 2.6.
2.2 Security Policy
CI-300P provides hardware-supported cryptographic services (available via a Secure cryptographic
library) with fault-injection and side-channel protection:
• Random number generation
• AES key generation and destruction, as well as encryption, decryption, and authentication
• ECC key generation and destruction, as well as signature generation and verification and raw key
agreement
• Hash
• Key derivation
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST-lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The TOE is a security enclave to be integrated into a SoC. The security enclave is a Hard Macro
synthesized independently of other components of the SoC in combination with a Hard Macro for
MRAM.
The evaluation and certification of this TOE was performed to support reuse of the secure enclave into
an SoC that is targeting conformance to [PP0084] as well as [PP-0117] to fulfil the composition
requirements [COMP].
The TOE is not itself a security enclave instantiated in hardware, but rather it is the Hard Macro
of the security enclave to be integrated into an SoC.
During integration of the secure enclave into an SoC, vulnerability analysis and testing of the
integrated secure enclave must be performed. The [ETRfI] and the guidance (particularly the
integration guidance [AGD_IIG]) will support efficient reuse.
See [ST-lite] chapters 4.3 and 4.4 for details regarding policies and assumptions that are to be
addressed by the environment.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
below:
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The TOE has the following features:
• The TOE is an isolated execution environment with its own CPU and memory subsystem. It
manages its own life-cycle state that determines a security policy. Lifecycle management allows
disabling test and debug features when the device is deployed.
• The TOE can run an application from Non-secure external non-volatile memory (MRAM). Running
such an application is protected by MSU, which is a secured encrypted and authenticated cache.
• To protect application data residing in the external Non-secure memory against rollback, the TOE
provides a non-volatile monotonic counter. The counter resides in the NVR sector of the MRAM.
• The TOE is equipped with physical protection against tampering, perturbation, and side channel
leakage:
o An active shield that protects against physical probing and provides side channel protection by
generating electro-magnetic noise.
o Environmental sensors for checking operating conditions.
o Dedicated sensors for light detection.
o Reset tree protection and others.
• The TOE provides parity protection for data processed by the processor, memories, and
interconnects. The critical registers are protected by redundancy.
• The TOE performs memory encryption for internal RAMs (TRAM and PKA RAM) and address
scrambling for TRAM.
• Cryptographic engines are protected by digital means (for example, masking), as well as with a
Secure Power Convertor.
• Attacks are detected by any of these means are managed by an Alarm Management System,
which routes the alarms to pre-defined safe responses aimed to prevent system operation under
attacks.
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• To verify that only a secure application runs on the device, the TOE provides Secure boot services
achieved through a series of bootloaders (FSB, SSB). In addition, the device allows secure
firmware update in the field.
• Access to various memory regions is controlled through MPU. In general, runtime firmware
running on the device is considered Secure, while one internal TOE asset (device unique identity,
HUK) is not accessible to the runtime firmware.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Reference Name Version
[AGD_PRE] Arm® CryptoIsland™-300P Preparative Guidance 0000-04,
31 March 2022
[AGD_OPE] Arm® CryptoIsland™-300P Operational Guidance 0000-06,
20 June 2022
[SDM] Arm® CryptoIsland™-300P Software Developers
Manual
0000-03
[AGD_SRN] Arm® CryptoIsland™- 300P Software Release Note 4.0
[AGD_TRM] Arm® CryptoIsland™- 300P Technical
Reference Manual
0000-06,
15 April 2021
[AGD_IIG] Arm® CryptoIsland™- 300P Hard Macro
Implementation and Integration Guide
0001-06,
17 September 2021
[AGD_PTG] Arm® CryptoIsland™- 300P Hard Macro Production
Test Guide
0001-05,
17 September 2021
[AGD_MPR] Arm® CryptoIsland™- 300P Hard Macro
Qualification and Performance Report
02,
30 September 2021
[AGD_MAN] Arm® CryptoIsland™- 300P Manufacturing Guide 0000-02,
31 March 2022
[AGD_HRN] Arm® CryptoIsland™- 300P Hard Macro Release
Note
1.0
[AGD_PEN] Arm® CryptoIsland™- 300P Hard Macro Product
Errata Notice
Version 1.0
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
Developer testing in development phase comprises unit and integration testing on design simulations,
but also tests on physical components alone and integrated into the full chip. Software is tested also at
several layers, including a full test run at the target hardware. Test environment includes Mentor
Graphics Tessent and Cadence Virtuoso / Spectre Simulator tools as well as Arm dedicated test
boards.
Validation testing on the final designed product is done at several layers, ranging from hardware, via
all software layers, towards testing of the final TOE. Testing of software layers is automated using
Jenkins.
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During production, testing of the TOE integrated as part of an SOC is performed and parts of the test
results are written into memory of the TOE, along with specific calibration values needed for optimal
operation.
The evaluators witnessed a subset of the developer tests. The subset of tests was selected to cover
various test suites, various functional aspects of the TOE, as well as areas where the code coverage
approach has limitations (e.g. crypto operations). TOE identification is part of the witnessing session,
as well as the methods in which code coverage has been calculated, both for software and hardware
building blocks of the TOE.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV, ALC, ATE and AGD the evaluator
considers whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or
specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE. During
this attack-oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge gained
from all evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional) potential vulnerabilities.
This analysis will be using the attack methods in [JIL-AP] and [JIL-3S-SoC].
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes
and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these
potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed by
penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 28 weeks. During that test campaign, 27% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 64% on side-channel testing, and 9% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
performed on a test vehicle that was consistent with the TOE components described in the [ST].
The TOE was tested in the following configurations:
• Hardware: CI-300P Hard Macro version cI145:r0p0
• Firmware: FSB v1.1.1.0, SSB v1.1.1.4, FUT v1.3
• Software: Runtime Library v1.1.5_1.0_1.0.6
• Test vehicle: Svalinn A1 SoC
• Test OS: Exerciser v5.9 or v5.9.2
This test configuration does not contain the MRAM that is present in the TOE. The tests were
carried out on the mentioned test vehicle, which contains SRAM. The analysis of the results has taken
into consideration that in the test vehicle MRAM is represented by SRAM.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The algorithmic security level exceeds 100 bits for all evaluated cryptographic functionality as required
for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
For (composite) evaluations of the TOE integrated in an SoC, please consult the [ETRfI] for details.
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2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and production of
the TOE, by use of three site certificate and Site Technical Audit Reports. Two of these site relate to
the manufacturing phase 3 as defined in [PP 0117]. The third is of a data center supporting the
hardware development.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Arm Integrated Secure Element
CryptoIsland-300P, version 1.0. The details of the Hard Marco (GDS files) and software/firmware
versions are provided in [ST-lite] chapter 2.5.1, Table 2-1.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support evaluations of the TOE integrated in
an SoC according to [PP-0117], based on [COMP], a derived document [ETRfI] was provided and
approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this
TOE is integrated in an evaluation of an SoC.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Arm Integrated Secure
Element CryptoIsland-300P, version 1.0, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to
meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2, ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security
Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP-0117].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None
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3 Security Target
The Arm® CryptoIsland™-300P Integrated Secure Element Security Target, Document ID 102871,
Issue 6.0, July 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ETRfI Evaluation Technical Report for Integration
FSB First Stage Bootloader
FUT Firmware Update Tool
HUK Hardware Unique Key
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
LCS Life Cycle States
MPU Memory Protection Unit
MRAM Magnetoresistive Random-Access Memory
MSU Memory Secure Unit
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
NVR Non-Volatile Registers
PKA Public Key Accelerator
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random-Access Memory
RTL Resistor-Transistor Logic
3S Secure Sub-System
SoC System-on-Chip
SPC Secure Power Converter
SSB Second Stage Bootloader
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRAM Trusted Random-Access Memory
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Arm Integrated Secure Element CryptoIsland-
300P v1.0 – EAL4+, 21-RPT-756, v5.0, 11 August 2022
[ETRfI] Evaluation Technical Report for Integration of Arm Integrated Secure Element
CryptoIsland-300P v1.0 – EAL4+ DRAFT, 22-RPT-608, v4.0, 11 August 2022
[JIL-3S-SoC] Guidance for Vulnerability Analysis and Penetration Testing of a Secure Sub-
System within a System-on-Chip, Version 2.0 Release 4, June 2021
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[JIL-SRFPDCL] Security requirements for post-delivery code loading, Joint Interpretation
Library, Version 1.0, February 2016
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP-0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version
1.0, 13 January 2014, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[PP-0117] Secure Sub-System in System-on-Chip (3S in SoC) Protection Profile, Version
1.5, 28 Feb 2022, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0117-2022
[ST] Arm® CryptoIsland™-300P Integrated Secure Element Security Target,
Document ID 102871, Issue 6.0, July 2022
[ST-lite] Arm® CryptoIsland™-300P Integrated Secure Element Security Target Lite,
Document ID 107611, Issue 2.0, July 2022
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)