BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
for
CardOS V4.2B FIPS
with Application for Digital Signature
running on Infineon Chips SLE66CX322P and
SLE66CX642P
from
Siemens AG
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.01
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
Smart Card with Signature Application
CardOS V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital Signature
running on Infineon Chips SLE66CX322P and SLE66CX642P
from Siemens AG
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0006-2002
Functionality: PP conformant
plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
AVA_VLA.4, AVA_MSU.3
Common Criteria
Arrangement
for components up
to EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of
the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29. November 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
IV
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition
of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC
for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national
certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised
under the terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies
of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory
nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site:
http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that
this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For
mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are
relevant.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product CardOS V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital Signature running
on Infineon Chips SLE66CX322P and SLE66CX642P has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product CardOS V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital
Signature running on Infineon Chips SLE66CX322P and SLE66CX642P was
conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on
08. October 2007. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Siemens AG.
The product was developed by: Siemens AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of
this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the
Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over
time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack
methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified
product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI
Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a
regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be
extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for
assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified
product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation
does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
A-4
5 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18 and D1 to D-4.
The product CardOS V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital Signature running
on Infineon Chips SLE66CX322P and SLE66CX642P has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form
at the internet address stated above.
7
Siemens AG
Medical Solutions
MED GS SEC DS
Charles-de-Gaulle-Str. 2-3
81737 München, Germany
BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 5
3 Security Policy 8
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
5 Architectural Information 9
6 Documentation 9
7 IT Product Testing 9
8 Evaluated Configuration 10
9 Results of the Evaluation 11
9.1 CC specific results 11
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment 12
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE 13
11 Security Target 13
12 Definitions 14
12.1 Acronyms 14
12.2 Glossary 15
13 Bibliography 17
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The TOE CardOS V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital Signature running on
Infineon Chips SLE66CX322P and SLE66CX642P is a Secure Signature-
Creation Device (SSCD) according to Directive 1999/93/ec of the European
parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework
for electronic signatures [7].
The TOE consists of configured software (OS, packages and signature
application), the underlying hardware (SLE66CX322P/ SLE66CX642P from
Infineon) used to implement the Secure Signature-Creation Device (SSCD) and
the pertaining guidance documentation ’Administrator Guidance CardOS
V4.2B_FIPS’ [11] and ‘User Guidance CardOS V4.2B_FIPS’ [12].
CardOS V4.2B is a multifunctional smart card operating system (OS) supporting
active and passive data protection.
The Security Target [6] is based on the certified Protection Profile BSI-PP-0006-
2002, Version 1.05 [9].
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of [1], part 3
for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation
Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are
outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5. They are selected from Common
Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2
extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF1 User Identification and Authentication
SF2 Access Control
SF3 SCD/SVD Pair Generation
SF4 Signature Creation
SF5 Protection
SF6 Secure Messaging
SF7 SVD Transfer
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific functions
as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.3 is confirmed. The rating of
the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details
see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3. Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms
of assumptions, threats and policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX322P Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) platform including
HMAC package signature application.
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX642P ICC platform including HMAC package signature
application.
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX322P ICC platform without HMAC package signature
application.
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX642P ICC platform without HMAC package signature
application.
The Post- and Preloaded scenarios, described in Chapter 2 are included. More
details about configuration testing are given in chapter 8.
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
CardOS V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital Signature running on
Infineon Chips SLE66CX322P and SLE66CX642P
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Term Release Form of Delivery
1 SW
Operating
System
CardOS V4.2B C809 loaded in ROM /
EEPROM
Pre-loaded variant:
V42B_FIPS_InitScript.py 1.1
V42B_FIPS_InitScript_DF_DS_x.py 1.0
V42B_FIPS_PersScript.py 1.1
V42B_FIPS_PersScript_DF_DS_x .py 1.1
V42B_FIPS_CAScript.py 1.1
V42B_FIPS_CAScript_DF_DS_x.py 1.0
V42B_FIPS_RAScript.py 1.1
V42B_FIPS_RAScript_DF_DS_x.py 1.2
Post-loaded variant
V42B_FIPS_InitScript_Post.py 1.1
V42B_FIPS_LRAScript_Post.py 1.1
V42B_FIPS_LRAScript_Post_DF_DS
_x.py
1.1
All variants
V42B_FIPS_Default_1024.py
V42B_FIPS_Default_1280.py
V42B_FIPS_Default_1536.py
V42B_FIPS_Default_1752.py
2 SW
Application
Digital
Signature
(Application /
Data Structure)
V42B_FIPS_Default_1880.py
1.0
Personalization
Script Files in
Python format, after
whose execution
the ADS will be
loaded in EEPROM
3 SW
CommandSet_
Extension
Package
V42B_CommandSet_Ext_Package.cs
f
1.2
4 SW
CAT Package
V42B_CAT_Package.csf 1.2
5 SW
DRNG
Package
V42B_DRNG_Package.csf 1.3
6 SW
WIPE Package
V42B_WIPE Package.csf 1.1
Personalization
Script Files in CSF
format, after whose
execution the resp.
code will be loaded
and activated in
EEPROM
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
No Type Term Release Form of Delivery
7 SW
HMAC
Package
(optional)
V42B_HMAC_Package.csf 1.2
8 Documentation CardOS V4.2B User’s Manual 1.0
9 Documentation CardOS V4.2B Packages & Release
Notes
1.0
10 Documentation CardOS V4.2B CAT_DRNG_WIPE
Packages & Release Notes
1.0
11 Documentation Administrator Guidance CardOS
V4.2B FIPS
1.4
12 Documentation User Guidance CardOS V4.2B FIPS 1.4
13 Documentation ADS_Description
CardOS V4.2B FIPS
1.0
Paper form or PDF-
File
32K
Infineon SLE66CX322P
m1484b14
and
m1484f18
Hard-
ware
(Chip)
64K Infineon SLE66CX642P m1485b16
Module
Firmware RMS RMS 1.5
loaded in reserved
area of User ROM
14
Software crypto
library
RSA2048 crypto library 1.30 loaded in ROM
17
Software STS STS Self Test Software V53.10.13
Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Additionally the developer delivers a complete set of Phyton libraries and scripts
to aid the personalization process, which are listed in table 3. These libraries
and scripts are not part of the TOE.
Term Release Form of Delivery
cardlib.py 1.0
Apdu.py 1.14
Chips.py 1.2
codeLen.py 1.6
Constants.py 1.33
CsfParser.py 1.9
DevInifile.py 1.10
DirectInterface.py 1.16
EchoAPDU.py 1.9
EchoInterface.py 1.7
Exceptions.py 1.4
__init__.py 1.0
ExpandedRules.py 1.2
Cardlib Script Files in
Python format which are
not part of the TOE
(necessary for execution
of the Personalization
Scripts)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
Term Release Form of Delivery
Interface.py 1.13
InterfaceToCard.py 1.16
Iso.py 1.26
locate.py 1.39
m_classes.py 1.29
m_functions.py 1.17
m3constants.py 1.1
m4lib.py 1.0
MAC.py 1.0
MAC3.py 1.0
makeOptions.py 1.2
OsVersionCNS.py 1.5
OsVersionHPC1.py 1.15
OsVersionM3.py 1.3
OsVersionM4.py 1.33
OsVersionM401.py 1.2
OsVersionM401a.py 1.2
OsVersionM401x.py 1.2
OsVersionM401y.py 1.3
OsVersionM403.py 1.25
OsVersionM410.py 1.15
OsVersionM420.py 1.4
OsVersions.py 1.11
OsVersionV42B.py 1.7
OsVersionV42BCNS.py 1.2
OsVersionV42CNS.py 1.2
OsVersionV43.py 1.4
OsVersionV43B.py 1.4
OsVersionV43BCNS.py 1.3
OsVersionV43CNS.py 1.2
Pcsc.py 1.13
setBaudRate.py 1.1
SM.py 1.24
tracer.py 1.4
translateAddr.py 1.2
xd.py 1.3
romkeys.py (Default keys) 1.26.1.0
reader.ini 1.0
Card Reader
configuration file
(not part of the TOE)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
Term Release Form of Delivery
M3_Crypto.dll 1.2
Des_crypt.dll 1.2
rsa_crypt.dll 1.1
m3lib.pyd 1.5
Crypto Library
components (used for SM
calculation and not part of
the TOE)
Python-2.3.4.exe 2.3.4
Python Programming
Language
(not part of the TOE)
Python Cryptography Toolkit 2.0.1
Python CryptoLibrary
(used for SM calculation
and not part of the TOE)
Table 3: additional libraries and scripts which are out of the scope
The chip SLE66CX322P is certified for two production sites: Dresden in
Germany (production line indicator ‘2’) and Corbeil Essonnes (called Altis) in
France (production line indicator ‘5’)) (see [17], [19] – [21].). The chip
SLE66CX642P is certified for the production site Dresden [18].
Two different delivery scenarios are possible:
Scenario 1: Pre-loaded Digital Signature Application: The digital signature
application data are put on the card before issuing it to the user. In
order to request a certificate, the future Card Holder must be
present at the LRA.
Scenario 2: Post-loaded Digital Signature Application: The card is issued
without the data for the digital signature application, but with
specific information (keys) necessary to load the digital signature
data in a secure way at a later time. In this scenario, the card
issuer can sell the digital signature application(s) as a separate
service.
The TOE is provided to the end-user in form of a smart card as SSCD.
3 Security Policy
The security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements
and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE implements the Signature Creation Data (private key) used for
signature creation under sole control of the signatory. The TOE implements all
IT security functionality which is necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD.
To prevent the unauthorised usage of the SCD the TOE provides user
authentication and access control.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against physical attacks through the TOE interfaces,
against storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation data, against
deriving the signature-creation data, against forgery and against misuse of the
signature-creation function of the TOE. Hence the TOE shall
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of
the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats
and organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These
aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-
Environment. The following topics are of relevance: the trustworthiness of the
certification-generation application and of the signature-creation application.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
The TOE comprises the underlying hardware, the operating system (OS), the
SCD/SVD generation, SCD storage and use, and signature-creation
functionality.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE CardOS V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital Signature running on
Infineon Chips SLE66CX322P and SLE66CX642P is a SSCD implemented by a
software (SW) with an application (data structure) for creation of digital
signatures running on either the security processor chip hardware (HW)
SLE66CX322P m1484 or SLE66CX642P m1485 from Infineon which have
already been certified at BSI [17] – [21].
The TOE is divided into the following subsystems: the Protocol Manager, the
Command Manager, the Command Layer, the Service Layer, the System Layer,
the Resource Management System (RMS), one or more Applications for Digital
Signature (ADS) and the underlying chip hardware, Infineon SLE66CX322P /
SLE66CX642P.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the
product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information
for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in
chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The evaluators have spent effort for the desired resistance of the TOE against
attackers with a high attack potential. They analysed the test specification and
ensured that the specification has been correctly implemented, they created
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
independent evaluator tests and ensured that the test environment delivered
correct test results.
The developer tests have been compared with the Security Target, the
Functional Specification and the High-Level Design. According to EAL4, testing
is performed down to a depth of subsystem interfaces.
The TOE tested configuration consists of the configured software (OS,
packages and signature application) used to implement the SSCD and the
pertaining guidance documentation ‘Administrator Guidance, CardOS V4.2B
FIPS’ [11] and ‘User Guidance, CardOS V4.2B FIPS’ [12]. For the tests,
modules were used that contain the operating system CardOS V4.2B (mask
number C809) in ROM. The application data structure (SigG application as
defined by scripts identified in Table 2) has been set using the personalization
script files in accordance with [23]. The TOE being tested also contained the
packages Command Set Extension Package, CAT Package, DRNG Package,
and WIPE Package loaded in the EEPROM as listed in Table 2 above. In
addition, the HMAC Package has also been loaded for tests.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX322P Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) platform including
HMAC package signature application; Pre-loaded scenario as described
in Chapter 2
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX322P ICC platform including HMAC package signature
application; Post-loaded scenario as described in Chapter 2
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX642P ICC platform including HMAC package signature
application; Pre-loaded scenario as described in Chapter 2
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX642P ICC platform including HMAC package signature
application; Post-loaded scenario as described in Chapter 2
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX322P ICC platform without HMAC package signature
application; Pre-loaded scenario as described in Chapter 2
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX322P ICC platform without HMAC package signature
application; Post-loaded scenario as described in Chapter 2
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX642P ICC platform without HMAC package signature
application; Pre-loaded scenario as described in Chapter 2
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
• CardOS V4.2B with FIPS packages and applications based on the
Infineon SLE66CX642P ICC platform without HMAC package signature
application; Pre-loaded scenario as described in Chapter 2
All tests have been performed in all possible combinations with and without
HMAC package, both personalization scenarios pre-loaded and post-loaded on
both chip platforms.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
For components beyond EAL4 the evaluation methodology applied was defined
in co-ordination with the Certification Body [4] (AIS 34).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up
to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product .
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic
random number generators
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
(iii) Composite product evaluation
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 26, AIS 36) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following
assurance components:
• All components of the class ASE
• All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C
of this report)
• The components
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• Conformance to the PP: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0006-2002 [9]
• For the functionality: BSI-PP-0006-2002 conformant
plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
• For the assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
AVA_VLA.4, AVA_MSU.3
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function
high:
SF1 – User Identification and Authentication
SF3 – SCD/SVD Pair Generation
SF4 – Signature Creation
SF6 – Secure Messaging
SF7 – SVD Transfer
In order to assess the strength of function the scheme interpretations AIS 20
and AIS 26 (see [4]) were used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in
chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its
security policy:
– hash functions:
• SHA-1
– algorithms for the encryption and decryption:
• RSA
This holds for the following security functions:
– the TOE Security Function SF3 – SCD/SVD Pair Generation is responsible
for the correct generation of the SCD/SVD key pair which is used by the
Signatory to create signatures. The TOE generates RSA signature key pairs
which fulfill the corresponding requirements of [22] for RSA key pairs.
– the TOE Security Function SF4 – Signature Creation is responsible for
signature creation using the SCD of the Signatory. Before a signature is
generated by the TOE, the Signatory has to be authenticated successfully.
Technically, SF4 generates RSA signatures for hash values with PKCS#1
padding (block type 1) using the SCD of the Signatory.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
evaluation (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to [22] the
algorithms are suitable for creation and validation of qualified signatures. The
validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [22] and
summarized in chapter 10.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information
about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE :
• The CM/CA shall choose the ICCSN (16 byte unique Integrated Circuit Card
Serial Number) in such a way, that both 8 byte strings will differ for different
cards. At best, all ICCSN of an arbitrary number of cards will have different
last 8 bytes.
• According to the security assessment of the strength of the cryptographic
algorithms for qualified electronic signatures given in “Geeignete
Algorithmen zur Erfüllung der Anforderungen nach § 17 Abs. 1 bis 3 SigG in
Verbindung mit Anlage 1 Abschnitt I Nr. 2 SigV” [22], the following time
periods for a secure usage of the TOEs algorithms is recommended:
– For the hash function: SHA-1 until the end of 2009
– For the TOEs maximum key length: RSA until the end of 2010
• The number of TOE devices (i.e. smart cards) in operational use must not
exceed 83 million examples (depending on PIN_DS resp. PUK_DS length,
cf. SOF).
• The Initializer and Embedder respectively, and the Certification Authority
issuing the TOE smart cards have to ensure that except for the well-defined
software defined in Table 2 no other executable code is loaded onto the
smart card. It is especially not allowed to load any other or omit loading of
mandatory packages than those listed in Table 2, i.e. the Command Set
Extension Package, the CAT Package, the DRNG Package and the WIPE
Package. The optional HMAC Package can be loaded as well. The CM/CA
has to ensure, that misuse of the functionality to load packages is effectively
prevented.
• The CM/CA shall use cryptographically strong random number generators
for key generation and other aspects (including the challenge-response-
authentication).
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CA Certification Authority
CM Card Manufacturer
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HMAC Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
ICC Integrated Circuit Card
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LRA Local Registration Authority
PIN_DS Digital Signature of the Personal Identification Number
PUK_DS Digital Signature of the Personal Unblocking Key
PP Protection Profile
SCD Signature Creation Data (private key)
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SigG Signaturgesetz
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
SVD Signature Verification Data (public key)
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE specifically:
- AIS 20, Version 2, 2 December 1999 for: CC Supporting
Document, - Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for
deterministic random number generators
- AIS 26, Version 3, 8 August 2007 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.1, July,
Revision 1, April 2006
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
- AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
- AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0476-2007, Version 1.2, 23.07.2007, CardOS
V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital Signature, Siemens AG
[7] Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13
December on an Community framework for electronic signatures
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.02, 10.08.2007, CardOS V4.2B
FIPS with Application for Digital Signature, T-Systems GEI GmbH
(confidential document)
[9] Protection Profile BSI-PP-0006-2002, Version 1.05, 25.07.2001, CWA
14169:2002 (E)
[10] Configuration list, Chipcard Operating System, CardOS V4.2B FIPS,
Version 1.10, 23.07.2007 (confidential document)
[11] Administrator Guidance CardOS V4.2B_FIPS with Application for Digital
Signature, Siemens AG, DS1, Version 1.4, Edition 07/2007
[12] User Guidance CardOS V4.2B_FIPS with Application for Digital
Signature, Siemens AG, DS1, Version 1.4, Edition 06/2007
B-17
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
[13] CardOS V4.2B_FIPS ADS Description, Version 1.0, Siemens AG, DS1,
05/2007
[14] CardOS V4.2B Chipcard Operating System, CAT, DRNG and WIPE
Packages & Release Notes, Version 1.0, Siemens AG, Edition 05/2007
[15] CardOS V4.2B Chipcard Operating System, Packages & Release Notes,
Version 1.0, Siemens AG, Edition 05/2007
[16] CardOS V4.2B Chipcard Operating System, User’s Manual, Version 1.0,
Siemens AG, Edition 09/2005
[17] Certification report for Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX322P with RSA2048/m148418 from Infineon Technologies AG,
certification file BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005, BSI, 22.04.2005, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[18] Certification report for Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX642P / m1485b16 with RSA 2048 V1.30 and specific IC
Dedicated Software from Infineon Technologies, certification file BSI-
DSZ-CC-0315-2005, 12.08.2005, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[19] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005-MA-
01 for Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX322P/m1484b14 and m1484f18 with RSA 2048 V1.30 and
Specific IC Dedicated Software from Infineon Technologies AG,
07.06.2005, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[20] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005-MA-
02 for Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX322P/m1484b14 and m1484f18 with RSA 2048 V1.30 and
Specific IC Dedicated Software from Infineon Technologies AG,
16.05.2006, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[21] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005-MA-
03 for Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX322P/m1484b14 and m1484f18 with RSA 2048 V1.30 and
Specific IC Dedicated Software from Infineon Technologies AG,
25.07.2006, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[22] Geeignete Algorithmen zur Erfüllung der Anforderungen nach § 17 Abs.
1 bis 3 SigG in Verbindung mit Anlage 1 Abschnitt I Nr. 2 SigV,
veröffentlicht am 12. April 2007 im Bundesanzeiger Nr. 69, S.3759, vom
22.Februar 2007, Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas,
Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen
[23] CardOS V4.2B FIBS, Application Digital Signature Description, Version
1.00, Edition 05/2007, Siemens AG, 14.05.2007
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C-1
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC
Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC
Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as
part of the conformance result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for
inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the
corresponding TOE evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-4
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product CardOS V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital Signature
running on Infinion Chips SLE66CX322P and SLE66CX642P (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 29. November 2007, the following
results regarding the development and production environment apply. The
Common Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Siemens AG, Charles de Gaulle Str. 2, D-81737 Muenchen, Germany
(Development)
b) Siemens AG, Building East, Von der Tann Str. 31, D-90439 Nuernberg,
Germany (Development)
Note, that this evaluation has been performed as a composite evaluation
applying the following production sites:
c) Altis Semiconductor S.N.C., Boulevard John Kennedy 224,, 91105
Corbeil Essonnes, France (Production)
d) Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG, Königsbrücker Str.
180, 01099 Dresden, Germany (Production)
The chip SLE66CX322P is certified for two production sites: Dresden in
Germany (production line indicator ‘2’) and Corbeil Essonnes (called Altis) in
France (production line indicator ‘5’)) (see [17], [19] - [21].). The chip
SLE66CX642P is certified for the production site Dresden [18].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-0476-2007, Version 1.2,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0476-2007
23.07.2007, CardOS V4.2B FIPS with Application for Digital Signature, [6]. The
evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the
TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6]) are
fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
D-4