SECURITY TARGET FOR
MTS SERIAL SWITCH V2.4
TOE Version: v9.7.202.3 (for box switch)
v9.7.202.3 (for chassis switch)
Belden Hirschmann © 2020
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1 Introduction
This Security Target is for the evaluation of Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series Ethernet Switches.
1.1 Security Target Identification
ST title Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series Ethernet Switches Security Target
Version v 2.4
Author Belden Hirschmann Industries (Suzhou) Co., Ltd
Date 2023-04-11
1.2 TOE Identification
TOE identification Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series Ethernet Switches
Firmware Version v9.7.202.3 (for box switch) v9.7.202.3 (for chassis switch)
1.3 TOE Overview
Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series Ethernet Switches is a network switch which provides networking
capabilities/communications for enterprise and ITOT convergence networks. It consists of both hardware and
software.
The core of Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series Ethernet Switches has 2 different platforms.
1. Box switch product number includes MTS2700, MTS2800 and MTS2900 series,
2. chassis switch product number includes MTS8000 series.
All switches are based on the same software implementation, share the same CLI and use the same version
control of software repository.
Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series Ethernet Switches are classified into Box Switches and Chassis Switches based
on their physical forms. The forwarding capacity of Chassis Switches is larger than Box Switches and Chassis
Switches can use different LPU (Line Processing Unit) to provide different ports with several types, but there is no
difference in security functionality.
All MTS series Ethernet Switches are Layer 3 switches. As such they provide support for the following routing
protocols with different layer 3 switches shown below. Based on the supporting routing protocols, only Open
Shortest path first (OSPF) routing protocol is part of the evaluation.
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Model Routing Protocols
MTS2724-4X-FP-S Evaluated protocol:
• Open Shortest path first (OSPFv2)
MTS2848-6X-E
MTS2824-6X-E
MTS2848-6X-S
MTS2824-4X-S
MTS2824F-4X-S
MTS2832TF-4X-E
MTS2748-6X-MP-E
MTS2724-6X-MP-E
MTS2948X-6Q-A
MTS8003
MTS8006
MTS8010
Table 1: Hardware models with evaluated routing protocol
1.3.1TOE usage and major security features
Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series Ethernet Switches are to be deployed within a physically secure environment to
provide network communications.
Figure 1: Network management of the TOE
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Figure 2: Network Forwarding
The evaluated Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series Ethernet Switch shown in Figure 1 uses a PC for the TOE network
communications configurations.
The switch supports both L2 and L3 forwarding shown in Figure 2.
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of
several security functionalities, as identified below.
• Authentication
• Access Control
• Information Flow Control
• Auditing
• Communication Security
• Cryptography
• Security functionality management
1.3.2TOE Type
Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series Ethernet Switches is a network switch.
The table below states the 2 different platforms which use Box switch or Chassis switch for the TOE.
Model Description Interfaces
MTS2724-4X-FP-S 24*GE POE/POE+, 4*10G SFP+ slots, fixed
redundancy power supply, POE output 380W
Box switch
MTS2848-6X-E 48*GE TX, 6*10G SFP+ slots, fixed redundancy
power supply
Box switch
MTS2824-6X-E 24*GE TX, 6*10G SFP+ slots, fixed redundancy
power supply
Box switch
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MTS2848-6X-S 48*GE TX, 6*10G SFP+ slots, fixed redundancy
power supply
Box switch
MTS2824-4X-S 24*GE TX, 4*10G SFP+ slots, fixed redundancy
power supply
Box switch
MTS2824F-4X-S 24*1G SFP slots, 4*10G SFP+ slots, fixed
redundancy power supply
Box switch
MTS2832TF-4X-E 24*1G SFP slots, 8*GE TX, 4*10G SFP+ slots,
fixed redundancy power supply
Box switch
MTS2748-6X-MP-E 48*GE POE/POE+, 4*10G SFP+ slots,
1*extended line card slot, 2*Modular PSU slots
Box switch
MTS2724-6X-MP-E 24*GE POE/POE+, 4*10G SFP+ slots,
1*extended line card slot, 2*Modular PSU slots
Box switch
MTS2948X-6Q-A 1U rack mount 40G Core Switch, 48*10G SFP+
slots, 6*40G QSFP+ slots, 2*modular PSU slots,
4*FAN slots
Box switch
MTS8003 Chassis: up to 2 MPU modules of the same
type, 3 LPU modules
Chassis switch
MTS8006 Chassis: up to 2 MPU modules of the same
type, 6 LPU modules
Chassis switch
MTS8010 Chassis: up to 2 MPU modules of the same
type, 10 LPU modules
Chassis switch
Table 2 Hardware models
1.3.3Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
The table below states the hardware and software requirements to support Belden Hirschmann IT MTS Series
Ethernet Switches.
Hardware
Switch Another instance of the TOE or other switches and/or routers used to connect the TOE
for L2/L3 network forward, L3 switch providing routing information to the TOE via OSPF.
Local PC A PC for local administration via a secure channel (SSH).
Remote PC A PC for remote administration via a secure channel (SSH).
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NTP Server A NTP to supply reliable time stamp
Table 3: non-TOE Hardware requirements
Figure 3: Non-TOE components
1.4 TOE Description
The TOE provides several models (see Table 2). These models differ in their modularity and throughput by
supplying more slots in hosting chassis, but they offer exchangeable forwarding unit modules, switch fabrics, and
use the same version of software. All MTS switches have the same security features and their usage to provide
network communications.
1.4.1Physical Scope
The physical boundary of the TOE is the actual switch system itself.
The table below lists the TOE deliverables and their corresponding delivery methods.
Items Description Format Delivery method
Safety and general
information guide v1.0
Safety information regarding the
setting up of the switch.
Hardcopy print Packaged with the switch
and delivered by courier
service
Operational installation
user guidance v1.0
Quick start user manual installation PDF By Belden Trusted website
User Manual 1.3 Configuration MTS serial Switch PDF By Belden Trusted website
Belden Hirschmann IT
MTS Series Ethernet
Switches
Box switch/Chassis switch Hardware By courier service
Table 4: TOE deliverables and delivery methods
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1.4.2 Logical Scope
This section describes the logical security features of TOE.
Security Features Description
Authentication The TOE can authenticate administrative users by username and password.
It provides a local authentication scheme for this. Authentication is always
enforced for virtual terminal sessions via SSH.
Information Flow Control The forwarding engine of the TOE controls the flow of network packets by
making (and enforcing) a decision regarding the network interface that a
packet gets forwarded to. These decisions are made based on a routing
table that is either maintained by administrators (OSPF static routing) or
gets updated dynamically by the TOE when exchanging routing information
with peer routers.
Auditing TOE generates audit records for security-relevant management actions and
stores the audit records in TOE.
For security management purposes, the administrators can select which
events are being audited by enabling auditing for individual modules
(enabling audit record generation for related to functional areas), and by
selecting a severity level. Based on the hard-coded association of audit
records with modules and severity levels, this allows control over the types
of audit events being recorded.
Review functionality is provided via the command line interface, which
allows administrators to inspect the audit log.
Communication Security The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol.
SSH2 (SSH2.0) is implemented. To protect the TOE from eavesdrop and to
ensure data transmission security and confidentiality, SSH provides:
• Authentication by password
• AES encryption algorithms
• Secure cryptographic key exchange by DH-group-exchange-
sha256
• HMAC-SHA256 is used as verification algorithm for SSH
Access Control Access Control for authenticated users by supporting the following
functionalities
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• Support role-based user management
• Support assigning access level to commands
• Support assigning access level to user token
• Support limiting executing commands
Cryptographic functions Cryptographic functions are required by security features as
dependencies, where:
• Supports encryption algorithms, such as AES encryption, for SSH;
• HMAC-SHA256 is used as verification algorithm for SSH;
• SHA256 is used as verification algorithm for packets of OSPF;
• AES Key generation
Security functionality
management
Security functionality management includes not only authentication,
access level, but also managing security related data consisting of
configuration profile and runtime parameters.
Other functionalities include:
• Setup to enable SSH
• Setup to enable authentication for OSPF
• Setup to enable audit, as well as suppression of repeated log
records
• create, delete, and modify rules for ACL configuration
2 CC Conformance Claim
This ST is CC Part 2 conformant [CC] and CC Part 3 conformant [CC]. The CC version of [CC] is 3.1R5. The TOE
claims EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
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3 TOE Security problem definition
3.1 Threats
The information assets to be protected are the information stored, processed, or generated by the TOE.
Configuration data for the TOE, TSF data (such as user account information and passwords, audit records) and
other information that the TOE facilitates access to (such as system software, patches and network traffic routed
by the TOE) are all considered part of information assets.
The threats to the TOE are identified and detailed in the following Table.
Threat Name Threat Definition
T.UnwantedNetworkTraffic Unwanted/malicious network traffic designated to the TOE or pass
through the TOE jeopardizes the integrity of the TOE, causing the traffic
flows to unauthorized destinations
T.UnauthenticatedAccess An unauthenticated user of the TOE gains access to the TOE.
T.UnauthorizedAccess A user of the TOE authorized to perform certain actions and access certain
information gains access to commands or information he is not authorized
for. This threat also includes data leakage to non-intended person or
device
T.Eavesdrop An eavesdropper (remote attacker) can intercept, and potentially modify
or re-use information assets that are exchanged between TOE and
local/remote PC for management.
Table 5: Threats
3.2 Assumptions
Assumption Name Definition
A.Time An NTP server shall be deployed to provide reliable timestamp to the TOE.
A.PhysicalProtection It is assumed that the TOE (including console interface used for initial
configuration, access of storage device) is protected against unauthorized
physical access.
A.NeworkElements The environment is supposed to provide supporting mechanism to the
TOE:
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• Peer switches or router(s) that have been configured with the
TOE for the exchange of dynamic routing information through
OSPF.
• A remote/local entity (PCs) used by administrators of the TOE.
• A NTP server for providing reliable timestamp (A.Time)
These entities are considered trusted and will not attack the TOE.
A.NOEVIL The authorized users will be competent, not careless, willfully negligent,
or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the
TOE documentation.
Table 6: Assumptions
3.3 Organizational Security Policy
There are no OSPs.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Objectives for the TOE
The following objectives must be met by the TOE:
• O.UserAvail: The TOE shall ensure only authorized users can access network resources through the TOE.
• O.DataFilter: The TOE shall ensure that only allowed traffic goes through the TOE.
• O.Communication: The TOE shall ensure secure channel for network communication between the TOE
and local/remote management PC
• O.Authorization: The TOE shall ensure only users with the correct authorization levels access the
authorized functions within the TOE.
• O.Authentication: The TOE shall ensure users are identified and authenticated before the users can
assess the TSF functions.
• O.Audit: The TOE shall provide functionality to generate audit records for security-relevant administrator
actions.
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment
• OE.NetworkElements: The operational environment shall provide secure and correctly working network
devices as resources that the TOE needs to cooperate with. The behaviors of such network devices
provided by operational environment shall be also secure and correct. For example, other configured
routers/switches for the exchange of routing information, NTP server for reliable timestamp, and PCs
(local or remote) used by TOE administrators.
• OE.Physical: The TOE shall be protected against unauthorized physical access.
• OE.Person: Personnel working as authorized administrators shall be carefully selected for trustworthiness
and trained for proper operation of the TOE.
• OE.Time: A NTP server shall be deployed to provide reliable timestamp to the TOE.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
The following table provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats and policies, showing that each objective is at
least covered by one threat or policy.
Threat Rationale for security objectives to remove threats
T.UnwantedTraffic The threat is countered by O.UserAvail which ensures
only authorized user can access the network and
O.DataFilter ensuring that unwanted data is filtered
and cannot access/jeopardize the network resources.
T.UnauthenticatedAccess The threat of unauthenticated access to the TOE is
countered by requiring the TOE to implement an
authentication mechanism for its users
(O.Authentication). In addition, login attempts are
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logged allowing detection of attempts illegal access.
(O.Audit)
T.UnauthorizedAccess The threat of unauthorized access is countered by
requiring the TOE to implement an access control
mechanism (O.Authorization). In addition, actions are
logged allowing detection of attempts illegal access
(O.Audit)
T.Eavesdrop The threat of eavesdropping is countered by requiring
communications security via SSHv2 for
communication between the TOE and local/remote
management PC (O.Communication)
Table 7: Threats to objective rationale
The following table provides a mapping of the objectives for the operational environment to assumptions,
threats, and policies, showing that each objective is covered by at least one assumption, threat, or policy.
Environmental Objective Assumption
OE.NetworkElements A.NetworkElements
OE.Physical A.PhysicalProtection
OE. Person A.NOEVIL
OE.Time A.Time
Table 8: Operational environment to Assumption
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5 Extended Components Definition
No extended components have been defined for this ST.
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6 Security Requirements
6.1 Conventions
The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:
• Strikethrough indicates text removed as a refinement
• (underlined text in parentheses) indicates additional text provided as a refinement.
• Bold text indicates the completion of an assignment.
• Italicized and bold text indicates the completion of a selection.
• Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS_COP.1/AES”), or by appending the
iteration number in parenthesis, e.g. (1), (2), (3).
6.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
6.2.1Security Audit (FAU)
6.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamp
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions.
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 1: Auditable events
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, interface (if applicable),
workstation IP (if applicable), User ID (if applicable), and CLI command
name (if applicable)
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1 Start-up and shutdown of the
audit functions.
No additional information.
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Add user, change user level, or
add service
FAU_GEN.2 None No additional information.
FAU_SAR.1 None No additional information.
FAU_SAR.3 None No additional information.
FAU_STG.1 None No additional information.
FAU_STG.3 None No additional information.
FCS_COP.1/RSA None No additional information.
FCS_COP.1/AES None No additional information.
FCS_COP.1/HMAC-SHA256 None No additional information.
FCS_CKM.1/PKF None No additional information.
FCS_CKM.1/AES None No additional information.
FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256 None No additional information.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
None No additional information.
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow
control - Data plane traffic
None No additional information.
FDP_IFF.1
Simple security attributes -
Data plane traffic control
The events of packets dropped
will be recorded.
No additional information.
FDP_ITC.1 None No additional information.
FDP_ACC.1 None No additional information.
FDP_ACF.1 None No additional information.
FIA_AFL.1 Failed attempts will be recorded. The recorded message includes source
IP address, username, and time stamp.
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FIA_ATD.1 None No additional information.
FIA_UAU.1 None No additional information.
FIA_UID.1 None No additional information.
FMT_MOF.1 None No additional information.
FMT_MSA.1 None No additional information.
FMT_MSA.3 None No additional information.
FMT_SMF.1 All violations will be recorded. The contents depend on the detailed
configuration of each security function.
FMT_SMR.1 None No additional information.
FTA_SSL.3 Terminated session will be
recorded.
No additional information.
FTA_TSE.1 None No additional information.
FTP_TRP.1 None No additional information.
Table 9: Auditable Events
6.2.1.2FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2 User identify association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
6.2.1.3FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
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FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide Administrator and Network Admin with the capability to read
all information from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret
the information.
Application note: Only Administrator can delete the audit records.
6.2.1.4FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply selection of audit data based on filename.
6.2.1.5FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit
records in the audit trail.
Application note: Only Administrator and Network Admin can delete the logs. In the event if the size of the logs
exceeds the size of the log’s capacity, FAU_STG.3.1 will be triggered to overwrite the oldest logs
6.2.1.6FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
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FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall overwrite the oldest files if the audit trail exceeds the size of the
storage device.
6.2.2Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.2.2.1FCS_COP.1/RSA
FCS_COP.1/RSA RSA Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA The TSF shall perform signature generation and verification in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bits that
meet the following: RFC 4716
6.2.2.2FCS_COP.1/AES
FCS_COP.1/AES AES Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AES The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES CTR Mode and cryptographic key sizes 128bits,
192bits, 256bits that meet the following: FIPS 197
6.2.2.3FCS_COP.1/HMAC-SHA256
FCS_COP.1/HMAC-
SHA256
HMAC-SHA256 Cryptographic operation
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/HMAC-
SHA256
The TSF shall perform authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm HMAC-SHA256 and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the
following: RFC 2104
6.2.2.1FCS_CKM.1/PKF
FCS_CKM.1/PKF Public Key Fingerprints Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKF The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm SSH key derivation and specified
cryptographic key sizes 2048 bits that meet the following: RFC 4716
6.2.2.2FCS_CKM.1/AES
FCS_CKM.1/AES AES Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm SSH key derivation and specified
cryptographic key sizes 128bits, 192bits, 256bits that meet the following: RFC 4344
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6.2.2.3FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256 HMAC_SHA256 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/HMAC_SHA256 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm SSH key derivation and specified
cryptographic key sizes 256 bits that meet the following: RFC 4253
6.2.2.4FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none
6.2.3Data Protection (FDP)
6.2.3.1FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute-based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the administrator SFP on
Subject: Administrator, Security Admin
Object: Certificate
Operation: Import
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6.2.3.1FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute-based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the administrator SFP to objects based on the following:
Subject: Administrator, Security Admin
Object: certificate
Security attributes: roles
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
Only Administrator and Security Admin is allowed to import certificate.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none
6.2.3.2FDP_ITC.1
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow or FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the administrator SFP when importing user data, controlled
under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
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FDP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none
6.2.3.3FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control- Data plane traffic control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the ACL on
Subject: Source IP address
Operation: Transmit to destination IP address
Information: Traffic
6.2.3.4 FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes – Data plane traffic control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control or
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the ACL based on the following types of subject and
information security attributes:
Subject: Source IP address
Information: Traffic
Security attributes: Source IP address, Destination IP address, protocol type,
Source port, Destination port, MAC address
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and
controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold:
• If security attributes of incoming traffic are equal to user-configured
security attributes, the traffic is allowed to flow to the destination IP
address.
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• Otherwise, the traffic shall be denied.
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the none.
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the
following rules: none
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: none.
6.2.4Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.2.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication attempts related to user
authentication.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met,
the TSF shall lock the user account or IP address for 10 minutes.
Application note: FIA_AFL.1.1, FIA_AFL.1.2 – A authentication login attempts failure of consecutive 3 times in a
row on a single IP or by a singe user will block the IP address or user for 10 minutes. After 10 minutes, the
unsuccessful authentication counter will reset.
6.2.4.2FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet
1. Minimum 8 characters with
• Upper case
• Lower case
• Numbers
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6.2.4.1FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users: User roles.
6.2.4.2FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication –Administrator
Authentication
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication –Administrator Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow establishment of a secure channel between the user and TOE
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.2.4.3 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification – Administrator
Identification
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification – Administrator Identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
25
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow establishment of a secure channel between the user and TOE
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.2.5Security Management (FMT)
6.2.5.1FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1 Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to determine the behavior of all the
functions defined in FMT_SMF.1 to the administrator-defined roles.
Operations/Roles Administrator Security
Admin
Network
Admin
Audit Admin Network
Operator
Network
Configuration
• OSPF
configuration
• import Cert
• OSPF
configuration
• import Cert
• Show current
configuration
ACL Management • Permit/deny
protocol
• Access control
rules
• Port control
• Show port
security
• Permit/deny
protocol
• Access
control rules
• Port control
• Show port
security
• Show port
security
Audit Records • Clear logs
• Show logs
• Clear logs
• Show logs
User management • Create user
• Show user
• Set Role
• Create user
• Show user
• Set Role
26
• Set password
wrong try
counter
• Set password
complexity
• Set password
wrong try
counter
• Set password
complexity
6.2.5.2 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
a) Network Configuration
b) ACL Management
c) Audit Records
d) User management
Application note: refer to section 8.4 for detailed list of commands
6.2.5.3FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles administrator-defined
roles FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note: the administrator-defined roles are Administrator, Security admin, Network Operator,
Network admin and Audit admin.
Application note: All administrators roles upon successful login can unblock IP or unblock user .
27
6.2.6TOE access (FTA)
6.2.6.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a time interval of user inactivity
which can be configured. SSH session will be terminated after a 5 mins of user
inactivity.
6.2.6.1FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on
a) Signature verification failure
b) Source IP address doesn’t match IP address configured in ACL for user
management.
6.2.7Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
6.2.7.1 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and remote users that is
logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
28
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from
modification, disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit remote users to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for remote management.
Application Note: Trusted path is related to SSH.
6.3 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.3.1Security Requirements Dependency Rationale
Dependencies within the EAL2 package selected for the security assurance requirements have been considered by
the authors of CC Part 3 and are not analyzed here again.
The security functional requirements in this Security Target do not introduce dependencies on any security
assurance requirement; neither do the security assurance requirements in this Security Target introduce
dependencies on any security functional requirement.
The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modeled in CC Part 2 and how the SFRs for the TOE
resolve those dependencies:
Security Functional Requirement Dependencies Resolution
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Fulfilled by OE.Time
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1
FCS_COP.1/RSA FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AES FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/AES
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/HMAC-SHA256 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256
29
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/AES [FCS_CKM.2, or FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AES
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/PKF [FCS_CKM.2, or FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AES
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256 [FCS_CKM.2, or FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/HMAC_SHA256
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.1/AES
FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3 is not required as no
SSH connection will be established
without importing of client cert.
FDP_ITC.1 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3 is not required as no
SSH connection will be established
without importing of client cert.
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1
FMT_MSA.3 is not required as by
default there is no entry in ACL list.
Only when ACL list is filled with the
attribute data then data can flow.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1 No Dependencies None
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 No Dependencies None
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
30
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies None
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FTA_SSL.3 No Dependencies None
FTA_TSE.1 No Dependencies None
FTP_TRP.1 No Dependencies None
Sufficiency and coverage
Objective SFRs Rationale
O.UserAvail FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
These SFRs provides identification and
authentication which only allows authorized users
to gain access through the TOE
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1
These SFRs also apply ACL to limit both packets
going to the Control/Management Plane and
through the TOE further ensuring integrity of TOE
and network resources.
O.Communication FTP_TRP.1 This SFR provides the secure communication
between users and management interface of the
TOE
FCS_COP.1/*
FCS_CKM.1/*
FCS_CKM.4
These SFRS provide the cryptographic services for
the secure communication above.
O.DataFilter FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1
These SFRs apply ACL to limit both packets going
to the Control/Management Plane and through
the TOE and thereby ensure that only protected
traffic goes through.
O.Authentication FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
These SFRs ensure that a user must identify and
authenticate himself by local password
FIA_AFL.1
FTA_TSE.1
FTA_SSL.3
The SFRs support authentication by:
• Refusing logins from certain IP addresses
• Not allowing unlimited login attempts
31
• Logging out users after an inactivity
period
O.Authorization FMT_SMR.1
FIA_ATD.1
FDP_ITC.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
These SFRs define authorization roles and ensure
that upon login an administrator gets the proper
authorization level.
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1
These SFR lists certain management functions and
restricts them to the proper authorization level.
O.Audit FAU_GEN.1,
FAU_GEN.2
These SFRs ensure that audit records can be
generated of significant events and that these
contain useful information, including the correct
time of the events.
FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.3
These SFRs ensure that the correct users can read
the correct information from the audit records.
FAU_STG.1,
FAU_STG.3
These SFRs ensure the audit data is protected
against unauthorized modification and deletion,
and what happens when audit storage fills up.
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level 2+ components augmented
with ALC_FLR.2, as specified in [CC] Part 3. No operations are applied to the assurance components.
6.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The evaluation assurance level 2+ augmented with ALC_FLR.2, has been chosen commensurate with the threat
environment that is experienced by typical consumers of the TOE.
7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functional Specification
This chapter identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are
met by the TOE.
7.1.1Authentication
The TOE can identify administrators by a unique ID and enforces their authentication before granting them access
to any TSF management interfaces. Detailed functions include:
32
a) Support authenticates user login using SSH by password authentication. This function is achieved by
performing authentication for SSH user.
b) Support logout when no operation is performed on the user session within a given interval. This function
is achieved by performing count-down through timing related to clock function.
c) Support max attempts due to authentication failure within certain period of time (default 5 minutes -
configurable). This function is achieved by providing counts on authentication failure.
d) Support for user individual attributes in order to achieve all the enumerated features: user ID, user level.
(FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FTA_SSL.3, FTP_TRP.1, FTA_TSE.1)
7.1.2Information Flow Control
The TOE forwards network traffic, enforcing decisions about the correct forwarding interface and assembling the
outgoing network packets using correct MAC addresses and IP address:
a) Support OSPF protocol. This function is achieved by providing implementation of OSPF protocol.
b) OSPF supports cryptographic algorithm SHA256. This function is achieved by performing verification for
incoming OSPF packets using SHA256 algorithm.
c) ACL to deny unwanted network traffic to pass through itself. IP-based ACL is provided for this situation to
identify traffic flow by matching all or part of IP source address, IP destination address, IP protocol
number, TCP/UDP source port number, TCP/UDP destination, and port number.
(FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1)
7.1.3Auditing
The TOE can provide auditing ability by receiving all types of logs and processing them according to user’s
configuration:
a) Support classification based on severity level. This function is achieved where logging messages are
encoded with severity level and output to log buffer.
b) Support enabling, disabling log output. This function is achieved by interpreting enable/disable
commands and storing results in memory. Log output is performed based on this result.
c) Support redirecting logs to various output channels: monitor, log buffer, trap buffer, log file. This function
is achieved by interpreting commands and storing results in memory or in log files in storage device. Log
channel for output is selected prior to execution of redirecting.
d) Support log output screening, based on filename. This function is performed by providing filtering on
output.
e) Support querying log buffer. This function is achieved by performing querying operation with conditions
input.
f) Support cleaning log buffer. This function is achieved by cleaning log buffer in memory.
g) Support to automatically remove the oldest log file if the space of the storage device storing the log files
is full.
h) Only the authorized administrators can monitor the logfile record, and operate the log files. The
unauthorized users have no access to do those actions. And the actions of the authorized administrators
will be logged.
(FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3)
33
7.1.4Communication Security
The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol. SSHv2 (SSH2.0) is implemented. SSH2
is used for all cases by providing more secure and effectiveness in terms of functionality and performance.
a. Devices that can function as client and server support SSHv2. enables users to remotely and
securely log in to the device and provides the interactive configuration interface.
b. Support diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 as key exchange algorithm of SSH. This function
is achieved by providing implementation of diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 algorithm.
c. Support AES encryption algorithm. This function is achieved by providing implementation of AES
algorithm.
d. Support SHA256 verification algorithm. This function is achieved by providing implementation of
SHA256 algorithm.
e. Support HMAC-SHA256 verification algorithm. This function is achieved by providing
implementation of HMAC-SHA256 algorithm.
f. Support using different encryption algorithms for client-to-server encryption and server-to-client
encryption. This function is achieved by interpreting related commands and storing the result in
memory.
g. Support for Public Key Fingerprint key construction and destruction by overwriting it with 0.
(FCS_COP.1/*, FCS_CKM.1/*, FCS_CKM.4/*, FMT_SMF.1) 8) Support for
AES/HMAC_SHA256/DHKey construction and destruction by Releasing Memory.
(FCS_COP.1/*, FCS_CKM.1/*, FCS_CKM.4/*, FTP_TRP.1)
7.1.5Security Functionality Management
The TOE offers management functionality for its security functions, where appropriate. This is partially already
addressed in more detail in the previous sections of the TSS, but includes:
1. Network Configuration
2. ACL Management
3. Audit Records
4. User management
All of these management options are typically available via the management workstation.
(FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1)
7.1.6Cryptographic functions
Cryptographic functions are required by security features as dependencies. The following cryptographic
algorithms are supported:
a) Support AES /RSA algorithms. This is achieved by providing implementations of AES /RSA algorithms.
b) Support HMAC-SHA256 algorithms. This is achieved by providing implementations of HMAC-SHA256
algorithms.
c) Support for RSA key construction and destruction overwriting it with 0 (FCS_COP.1/*, FCS_CKM.1/*,
FCS_CKM.4)
d) Support for AES/HMAC_SHA256/DHKey construction and destruction by Releasing Memory
34
e) Support diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 algorithm as key exchange algorithm of SSH
(FCS_COP.1/*, FCS_CKM.1/*, FCS_CKM.4)
8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References
8.1 Abbreviations
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command Line Interface
IS-IS Intermediate System to Intermediate System
LMT Local Maintenance Terminal
LPU Line Process Unit
NE NetEngine
NMS Network Management System
NSP Network Service Processor
OFC Optical Flexible Card PIC Physical Interface Card
PP Protection Profile
RMT Remote Maintenance Terminal
SFE Switch Fabric Extend unit
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SFU Switch Fabric Unit
NTP Server Network Time Protocol Server
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
AES Advanced Encryption Standards
RSA Rivest Sharmir Adleman
AES Advanced Encryption Standard Rivest Shamir Adleman
35
VRP Virtual Routing Platform
MPU Main Processing Unit
8.2 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document. Terms
defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.
Administrator An administrator is a user of the TOE who may have been assigned specific
administrative privileges within the TOE. This ST may use the term administrator
occasionally in an informal context, and not in order to refer to a specific role
definition – from the TOE’s point of view, an administrator is simply a user who is
authorized to perform certain administrative actions on the TOE and the objects
managed by the TOE.
Operator See User.
User A user is a human or a product/application using the TOE.
8.3 References
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1-3. Version 3.1 Revision 5, September
2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation methodology, Version
3.1 Revision 5, September 2017
8.4 List of Commands
8.4.1Audit logs commands
# clear logging [ buffer | file ]
# clear logging syslog [ buffer | file ]
# show logging [ buffer | file ]
# show logging filter
# show logging [ syslog ] message-counter
# show logging syslog [ file ]
# show logging time / level
36
8.4.2Import of cert commands
# filesystem
# copy ftp 192.168.1.1 admin private1 authorized_key file-system authorized_key
# crpyto ca identity test
# crpyto ca import certicate to test
# ip ftp secure-identity test
# show crypto ca certificates
8.4.3Access control list commands
# ip access-list standard { access-list-number | access-list-name }
# [ sequence ] permit { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr } [ time-range time-range-
name ] [ l3-action-group l3-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-action-group-name ] [ vfp-
action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# [ sequence ] deny { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr } [ time-range time-range-
name ] [ l3-action-group l3-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-action-group-name ] [ vfp-
action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# [ sequence ] remark comment
# access-list access-list-number { permit | deny } { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr }
[ time-range time-range-name ] [ l3-action-group l3-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-
action-group-name ] [ vfp-action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# access-list access-list-number remark comment
# ip access-list extended { access-list-number | access-list-name }
# [ sequence ] permit protocol { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr } [ operator source-
port ] { any | destination-addr destination-wildcard | host destination-addr } [ operator destination-port ]
[ ack | fin | psh | rst | syn | urg ] [ precedence precedence ] [ tos tos ] [ dscp dscp ] [fragments] [ time-range
time-range-name ] [ l3-action-group l3-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-action-group-
name ] [ vfp-action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# [ sequence ] deny protocol { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr } [ operator source-
port ] { any | destination-addr destination-wildcard | host destination-addr } [ operator destination-port ]
[ ack | fin | psh | rst | syn | urg ] [ precedence precedence ] [ tos tos ] [ dscp dscp ] [fragments] [ time-range
37
time-range-name ] [ l3-action-group l3-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-action-group-
name ] [ vfp-action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# [ sequence ] remark comment
# access-list access-list-number { permit | deny } protocol { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host
source-addr } [ operator source-port ] { any | destination-addr destination-wildcard | host destination-
addr } [ operator destination-port ] [ ack | fin | psh | rst | syn | urg ] [ precedence precedence ] [ tos tos ]
[ dscp dscp ] [fragments] [ time-range time-range-name ] [ l3-action-group l3-action-group-name ] [ egr-
action-group egr-action-group-name ] [ vfp-action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# access-list access-list-number remark comment
# mac access-list standard { access-list-number | access-list-name }
# [ sequence ] permit { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr } [ time-range time-range-
name ] [ l2-action-group l2-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-action-group-name ] [ vfp-
action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# [ sequence ] deny { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr } [ time-range time-range-
name ] [ l2-action-group l2-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-action-group-name ] [ vfp-
action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# [ sequence ] remark comment
# access-list access-list-number { permit | deny } { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr }
[ time-range time-range-name ] [ l2-action-group l2-action-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-action-name ]
[ vfp-action-group vfp-range-name ]
# access-list access-list-number remark comment
# mac access-list extended { access-list-number | access-list-name }
# [ sequence ] permit { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr } { any | destination-addr
destination-wildcard | host destination-addr } [ ether-type type ] [ cos cos ] [ vlan-id vlan ] [ time-range
time-range-name ] [ l2-action-group l2-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-action-group-
name ] [ vfp-action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# [ sequence ] deny { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr } { any | destination-addr
destination-wildcard | host destination-addr } [ ether-type type ] [ cos cos ] [ vlan-id vlan ] [ time-range
time-range-name ] [ l2-action-group l2-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group egr-action-group-
name ] [ vfp-action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# [ sequence ] remark comment
38
# access-list access-list-number { permit | deny } { any | source-addr source-wildcard | host source-addr }
{ any | destination-addr destination-wildcard | host destination-addr } [ ether-type type ] [ cos cos ] [ vlan-
id vlan ] [ time-range time-range-name ] [ l2-action-group l2-action-group-name ] [ egr-action-group
egr-action-group-name ] [ vfp-action-group vfp-action-group-name ]
# access-list access-list-number remark comment
8.4.4Create user role commands.
# role role-name
# rule number { deny | permit } feature {all | feature-name }
# local-user user-name class manager
# local-user user-name class network
# password 0 password
# service-type { ssh | telnet | console | ftp | web}
# user-role role-name
# group group-name
# privilege privilege-level-number
# password-control livetime
# password-control max-try-time
# max-try-time-number
# max-online-num user-number
# filesys-control{read | write | execute | none}
# work-directory directory
# service-type { xauth }
# group group-name
# stat { active / block }
# manager-group group-name
# user-group group-name
# parent group-name
39
# password-control complexity {min-length len| with user-name-check | composition type-number type-
number }
# password-control firstmodify enable
8.4.5Local User Management monitoring and maintaining command
# debug user { manager | network}
# show users class { manager | network } [ username ]
# show role [ rolename ]
8.4.6Login Security service command
# login-secure check-record-interval check-record-interval-number
# login-secure forbid-time forbid-time-number
# login-secure max-try-time max-try-time-number
# login-secure record-aging-time record-aging-time-number
# login-secure quick-connect max-times max-times-number
# login-secure quick-connect restrict-interval restrict-interval-number
# login-secure quick-connect unrestrict-interval unrestrict-interval-number
8.4.7Port Security rule command
# link-aggregation link-aggregation-id
# port-security enable
# port-security permit mac-address mac-address-value [ desc security-rule-description | ip-address ip-
address-value [ desc security-rule-description ] | vlan-id vlan-id [ desc security-rule-description ] ]
# port-security deny mac-address mac-address-value [ ip-address ip-address-value | vlan-id vlan-id ]
# port-security permit ip-address ip-address-value [ to ip-address-value ]
# port-security deny ip-address ip-address-value [ to ip-address-value ]
# port-security maximum maximum-number
# port-security permit mac-address sticky [ mac-address-value [ desc security-rule-description | vlan-id
vlan-id [ desc security-rule-description ] ] ]
40
# port-security permit mac-address sticky mode { mac | mac-ip }
# port-security aging static
# port-security aging time time-value
# port-security violation { protect | restrict | shutdown }
# port-security use-acl
Show port security command
# show port-security
# show port-security ip-address
# show port-security mac-address
# show port-security active-address
# show port-security detect-mac
# show port-security violation log-interval
# show port-security violation-mac
8.4.8OSPF command
# router ospf process-id
# network ip-address wildcard-mask area area-id
# router-id ip-address
# router ospf process-id [ vrf vrf-name ]
# area area-id stub [ no-summary ]
# area area-id default-cost cost-value
# area transit-area-id virtual-link neighbor-id [ [ authentication [ message-digest | null ] | authentication-
key key | message-digest-key key-id md5 key ] / dead-interval seconds hello-interval seconds / retransmit-
interval seconds / transmit-delay seconds ]
# ip ospf network broadcast
# ip ospf network point-to-point
# ip ospf network non-broadcast
41
# router ospf process-id [ vrf vrf-name ]
# neighbor neighbor-ip-address [ cost cost-value / priority priority-value / poll-interval interval-value ]
# ip ospf network point-to-multipoint [ non-broadcast ]
# neighbor neighbor-ip-address [ cost cost-value / priority priority-value / poll-interval interval-value ]
# ip ospf authentication message-digest
# ip ospf message-digest-key 1 hmac-sha256 { 0 } admin
# ip ospf [ ip-address ] authentication-key { 0 | 7 } password
# ip ospf [ ip-address ] key-chain key-chain name
# ip ospf [ ip-address ] message-digest-key key-id {SHA256} { 0 | 7 } password
# redistribute protocol [ protocol-id ] [ metric metric-value / metric-type metric-type / tag tag-value /
route-map route-map-name / match route-type ]
# default-information originate [ always / metric metric-value / metric-type metric-type / route-map
route-map-name ]
# host ip-address area area-id [ cost cost ]
# area area-id range ip-address/mask-length [ advertise [ cost cost ] | cost cost | not-advertise ]summary-
address ip-address mask [ not-advertise | tag tag-value ]
# area area-id filter-list { access { access-list-name | access-list-number } | prefix prefix-list-name } { in |
out }
# distribute-list { access-list-name | access-list-number | prefix prefix-list-name } out [ routing-protocol
[ process-id ] ]
# auto-cost reference-bandwidth reference-bandwidth
# distance { distance [ ip-address wildcard-mask ] [ access-list-name | access-list-number ] | ospf { external
distance | inter-area distance | intra-area distance } }
# ip ospf [ ip-address ] cost cost-value
# maximum-path max-number
# ip ospf [ ip-address ] hello-interval interval-value
# ip ospf [ ip-address ] dead-interval interval-value
# passive-interface { interface-name [ ip-address ] | default }
42
# ip ospf priority priority-value
# ip ospf [ ip-address ] mtu-ignore
# ip ospf transmit-delay delay-value
# ip ospf retransmit-interval interval-value
# ip ospf database-filter all out
8.4.9OSPF monitoring and maintaining command
# clear ip ospf [ process-id ] process
# clear ip ospf process-id neighbor neighbor-ip-address [ neighbor-router-id ]
# clear ip ospf statistics [ interface-name ]
# clear ip ospf [ process-id ] redistribution
# clear ip ospf [ process-id ] route
# show ip ospf [ process-id ]
# show ip ospf [ process-id ] border-routers
# show ip ospf [ process-id ] buffers
# show ip ospf [ process-id ] database [ adv-router router-id | age lsa_age | database-summary | max-age |
[ asbr-summary | external | network | nssa-external | opaque-area | opaque-as | opaque-link | router | self-
originate | summary ] [ [ link-state-id ] [ adv-router advertising-router-id ] | self-originate | summary ] ]
# show ip ospf interface [ interface-name [ detail ] ]
# show ip ospf [ process-id ] neighbor [ neighbor-id | all | detail [ all ] | interface ip-address [ detail ] |
statistic ]
# show ip ospf [ process-id ] route [ ip-address mask | ip-address/mask-length | external | inter-area |
intra-area | statistic ]
# show ip ospf [ process-id ] virtual-links
# show ip ospf [ process-id ] sham-links