National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung SDS Co, Ltd.
123, Olympic-ro 35-gil, Songpa-gu, Seoul,
Korea 138-240
Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM Suite
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10618-2015
Dated: May 8, 2015
Version: 0.5
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Kenneth Elliott
Jerry Myers
Ken Stutterheim
Aerospace Corporation
Columbia, MD
Sheldon Durrant
MITRE Corporation
Bedford, MA
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Neal Haley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Security Audit..................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................... 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
7.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 9
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 9
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 10
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 10
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 10
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 10
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 11
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 11
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 11
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 12
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 12
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 12
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 13
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Samsung SDS Co., LTD CellWe EMM Suite
provided by Samsung SDS Co., LTD. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications,
and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in May 2015. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of EAL 1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the is the Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung SDS
CellWe EMM Suite version 1.1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The Gossamer Security Solutions evaluation team concluded that the Common Criteria
requirements for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung SDS Co.,
LTD Samsung SDS CellWe EMM Suite (MDMPP11) Security Target and analysis
performed by the evaluation team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
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program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment
Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung SDS CellWe EMM Suite version 1.1
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management, Version 1.1, 7 March 2014
ST: Samsung SDS Co., LTD EMM Suite (MDMPP11) Security Target, Version 0.6,
May 8, 2015
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung SDS Co., LTD EMM Suite
(MDMPP11), Version 1.4, May 8, 2015
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Samsung SDS Co., LTD.
Developer Samsung SDS Co., LTD.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Kenneth Elliott, The Aerospace Corporation
Jerry Myers, The Aerospace Corporation
Ken Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
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Item Identifier
Sheldon Durrant, The MITRE Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The EMM Suite consists of an EMM Server and Agent, where the Server provides
centralized management of mobile devices and the Agent software (installed on each
device) enforces the policies of the Server on each device
Samsung SDS offers the EMM Server as a software installation for Java 1.7 and Tomcat
7.0 running on Microsoft Windows Server 64-bit operating systems from 2008 R2 through
to Windows Server 2012 R2. Once installed, the EMM Server allows administrators to
configure policies for devices. Administrators connect securely to the EMM Server using a
web browser (whether local to the Server itself or remote) and, through the EMM Server’s
web interface, can enroll, audit, lock, unlock, manage, and set policies for enrolled mobile
devices. The EMM Server includes the RSA Crypto-J 6.1 cryptographic module as part of
its software, and the EMM Server’s Microsoft Windows platform includes SQL server
2008-2012 and an EJBCA certificate authority.
Samsung SDS provides the EMM Agent software for evaluated Samsung mobile devices
(including the Galaxy S4, Note 3, S5, Note 4, and Galaxy Note Edge), and the Agent
software, once installed and enrolled with the EMM Server, will apply and enforce
administrator configured policies communicated through the EMM to the Agent software.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of collection of server components (MDM server) and
mobile device applications (MDM agent).
 EMM Server – Runs on the Java 1.7 and Tomcat 7.0 platforms installed on
Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 operating system through to Windows Server
2012 R2. The EMM Server also interacts with Microsoft SQL Server 2008 through
2012 and an EJBCA v 4.0.16 certificate authority. While one may deploy the
system in several compliant and equivalent configurations, the specific
configuration tested during this evaluation consisted of the server running on
Windows Server 2012 R2, along with SQL Server 2012 and EJBCA v 4.0.16
certificate authority.
 Agent – The Agent can run on any evaluated Samsung mobile device (including the
Galaxy S4, Note 3, S5, Note 4, and Galaxy Note Edge). This evaluation was
performed using 32-bit versions of the Android operating system.
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3.2 TOE Architecture
The EMM Server actually consists of the following different servers:
1. EMM Server – the main server running to which remote administrators connect.
The EMM Server bears responsibility for all logic needed to manage mobile
devices.
2. Push Server – the Push Server accepts connections from mobile devices and then
relays the messages to and from the EMM Server (for example, to send policies to
an agent, or to send back a reply from an agent). One can install multiple Push
Servers, in order to allow the overall solution to scale the supported number of
mobile devices. Testing was performed using a single Push Server configuration.
3. AppTunnel Server – this server accepts connections from the EMM Client (one of
the three portions of the agent software on Android) and allows the Client to upload
log files or download mobile applications to be installed by the agent.
The EMM Server allows two types of profiles
An MDM Profile – to control all MDM configurable extensions (for example
enforcing password complexity requirements).
EMM Client profile - controls only the configuration of the SDS client app itself
(e.g., how a user logs in)
The EMM Agent consists of three different components on evaluated Android platforms:
1. The EMM Client – at the highest level, this provides a UI through which the user
may enroll their mobile device. This Client is also responsible for uploading audit
logs to the EMM Server and for downloading mobile applications that the Server
directs the agent to install.
2. The EMM Agent – this component provides most of the agent’s core functionality
including the application of policies, reporting policy event triggers to the Server,
installation of applications, communication with the Server, among other things.
The Agent operates without user intervention and enforces the policies of the
Server.
3. The Push Agent – this lowest level component facilitates Push communications
with a Push server. It allows both the EMM Agent and other mobile applications to
send and receive Push messages.
The EMM Client presents the UI to allow users to start the enrollment process and, once
enrolled, to log in and log out.
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3.3 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundaries of the EMM Suite are the physical perimeter of the servers hosting
the EMM Server and the physical perimeter of the mobile devices being managed by the
EMM Server (put another way, the mobile devices running the EMM Agent).
The EMM Server also interacts with Microsoft SQL server and an EJBCA certificate
authority.
4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security Audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security Audit
The EMM Server can generate and store audit records for security-relevant events as they
occur. These events are stored and protected by the EMM Server and can be reviewed by
an authorized Administrator. The EMM Server can be configured to export the audit
records to an external SYSLOG server utilizing TLS for protection of the records on the
network. The EMM Server also supports the ability to query information about MDM
agents and export MDM configuration information.
The EMM Agent includes the ability to the EMM Server to indicate (i.e., respond) when it
has been enrolled and when it applies policies successfully. The EMM Server can be
configured to alert an administrator based on its configuration. For example, it can be
configured to alert he administrator when a policy update fails or an MDM Agent has been
enrolled.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The EMM Server and EMM Agent both include and have access to cryptographic modules
with FIPS 140-2 certified algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including:
asymmetric key generation and establishment, encryption/decryption, cryptographic
hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with
suitable random bit generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key
and protected data destruction.
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The primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security communication
protocols: TLS and HTTPS used for communication between the Server and Agent and
between the Server and remote administrators.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The EMM Server authenticates mobile device users (MD users) and administrators prior to
allowing those operators to perform any functions. This includes MD users enrolling their
device with the EMM Server using the EMM Agent as well as an administrator logging on
to manage the EMM Server configuration, MDM policies for mobile devices, etc.
In addition, both the EMM Server and Agent utilize X.509 certificates, including certificate
validation checking, in conjunction with TLS to secure communications between the EMM
Server and EMM Agents as well as between the EMM Server and administrators using a
web-based user interface for remote administrative access.
4.4 Security management
The EMM Server is designed to two distinct user roles: administrator and Mobile Device
user (MD user). The former interacts directly with the EMM Server through HTTPS (using
a browser) while the latter is the user of a mobile device with the EMM Agent installed.
The EMM Server provides all the functions necessary to manage its own security functions
as well as to manage mobile device policies that are sent to EMM Agents. In addition, the
EMM Server ensures that security management functions are limited to authorized
administrators while allowing MD users to perform only necessary functions such as
enrolling with the EMM Server.
The EMM Agents provide the functions necessary to securely communicate with and enroll
with the EMM Server, apply policies received from the EMM Server, and report the results
of applying policies.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The EMM Server and Agent work together to ensure that all security related
communication between those components is protected from disclosure and modification.
Both the EMM Server and Agent include self-testing capabilities to ensure that they are
functioning properly as well as to cryptographically verify that their executable images
have not been corrupted.
The EMM Server also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of
each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will
not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
4.6 TOE access
The MDM Server has the capability to display an advisory banner when users attempt to
login in order to manage the TOE.
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4.7 Trusted path/channels
The EMM Server uses TLS/HTTPS to secure communication channels between itself and
remote administrators accessing the Server via a web-based user interface. It also uses TLS
to secure communication channels between itself and mobile device users (MD users). In
this latter case, the protected communication channel is established between the EMM
Server and EMM Agent.
5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management, Version 1.1, 7 March 2014 (MDMPP).
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDMPP should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The vendor has stated that the TOE will operate correctly with multiple Push Servers. That
capability was outside of the scope of this evaluation. The TOE was only tested with a
single Push Server, because none of the functionality specified in the functional
requirements has a direct dependence on whether there are multiple Push Servers.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and performed by the
evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
6 Documentation
The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the Samsung SDS
Co., LTD’s EMM Suite
 Samsung SDS CellWe Enterprise Mobility Management Administrator’s Guide,
v1.1.0, March 2015
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 Samsung SDS CellWe Enterprise Mobility Management User’s Guide, Version
1.1.0, March 2015.
 Samsung SDS CellWe Enterprise Mobility Management Installation Guide, Version
1.1.0, March 2015
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or available through
download was not included in the scope of the evaluation and hence should not be relied
upon when using the products as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary document: Detailed Test Report
(MDMPP11) for Samsung SDS Co. Ltd CellWe EMM Suite, Version 0.5, May 8, 2015. A
nonproprietary version of the tests performed and the evidence generated is summarized in
the document: Assurance Activity Report (MDMPP11) for Samsung SDS Co., LTD.
CellWe EMM Suite, Version 0.6, May 8, 2015.
The following diagram depicts the test environments used by the evaluators.
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No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the Samsung SDS CellWe Enterprise
Mobility Management Installation Guide, Version 1.1.0, March 2015 document and ran the
tests specified in the MDMPP. The evaluation team conducted almost all testing
independently of the vendor, with exception of two specific test cases, the nature of which
required developer assistance. These test cases have been documented in the Assurance
Activity Report (AAR), and described in detail in a corresponding Detailed Test Report
(DTR) provided for the validation team’s review. Some testing of the TOE was performed
remotely in a vendor-provided environment. The results of those tests were confirmed and
validated during independently-run testing in the evaluation team’s local facility, thereby
providing a high level of assurance in the accuracy of the testing results.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of collection of server components (MDM server) and
mobile device applications (MDM agent). The MDM server was evaluated on Java 1.7 and
Tomcat 7.0 running on Windows Server 2012 R2, along with SQL Server 2012 and
EJBCA v 4.0.16 certificate authority. The MDM Agent was evaluated on 32-bit versions of
the Android operating system, and covers evaluated Samsung devices (including the
Galaxy S4, Note 3, S5, Note 4, and Galaxy Note Edge).
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in Samsung SDS CellWe Enterprise Mobility Management Installation Guide,
Version 1.1.0, March 2015.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
EAL1 work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM Suite version 1.1 to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the Part 3
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL 1).
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
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of security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung SDS Co., LTD EMM Suite that
are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that
support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team
assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the
TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the
evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the MDMPP related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran
the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDMPP and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team
performed a public search for vulnerabilities and did not discover any public issues with
the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the product. The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFRs within the Security Target was evaluated.
1. While the CellWe EMM suite is designed to support a wide variety of operational
environments it is important to understand that testing was performed using only a
limited set of the possible deployments. As explained in section 1.2 of the
Assurance Activity Report, testing was performed using proxy servers in a multi-
host configuration and without using any proxies in a single host configuration.
While the TOE could be deployed using different combinations of hosts and
proxies, including the possibility of multiple Push servers, those alternate
deployment scenarios have not been tested. Furthermore, while a range of supported
operating system and SQL server versions are supported and while the Assurance
Activity Report explains there are no security dependencies in each case, users
should be aware that testing has been conducted using only the latest versions in
each case.
2. As explained in section 3.4.1 of the Assurance Activity Report, the evaluators
performed much of their testing in an environment hosted by the product developer.
While the evaluators had significant access to that environment, their level of
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control was less than absolute given the nature of the configuration. Consequently,
in order to add assurance and independence in the overall test results, the evaluators
substantially repeated the test cases using an alternate TOE configuration installed
and controlled within the evaluator’s laboratory.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as Samsung SDS Co., LTD EMM Suite (MDMPP11)
Security Target, Version 0.6, May 8, 2015.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
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 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management, Version 1.1, 7 March 2014.
[5] Assurance Activity Report (MDMPP11) for Samsung SDS Co., LTD. CellWe
EMM Suite, Version 0.6, May 8, 2015
[6] Samsung SDS Co., LTD EMM Suite (MDMPP11) Security Target, Version 0.6,
May 8, 2015
[7] Detailed Test Report (MDMPP11) for Samsung SDS Co. Ltd CellWe EMM Suite,
Version 0.5, May 8, 2015