JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
Certification Report
TOMITA Tatsuo, Chairman
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
2-28-8 Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
IT Product (TOE)
Reception Date of Application
(Reception Number)
2022-04-25 (ITC-2810)
Certification Identification JISEC-C0774
Product Name
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2020AC/2520AC all of the above
with FAX Unit and FIPS Hard Disk Kit
Version and Release Numbers SYS V2.1
Product Manufacturer TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION
Conformance of Functionality PP conformant functionality, CC Part 2 Extended
Protection Profile Conformance
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0
dated September 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
Name of IT Security Evaluation
Facility
Information Technology Security Center, Evaluation
Department
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows.
2023-02-22
YANO Tatsuro, Technical Manager
IT Security Technology Evaluation Department
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards
prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification
Scheme Document."
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
Evaluation Result: Pass
"TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2020AC/2520AC all of the above with FAX Unit and FIPS Hard Disk
Kit, Version SYS V2.1" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance
with the provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Information-
technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published
by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Product Overview............................................................................................................. 1
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package................................................................. 1
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality.............................................................................. 1
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives....................................................................... 2
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions ....................................................................... 2
1.1.3 Disclaimers................................................................................................................ 2
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation...................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Certification...................................................................................................................... 3
2 Identification............................................................................................................................ 4
3 Security Policy ......................................................................................................................... 5
3.1 Users.................................................................................................................................. 5
3.2 Assets ................................................................................................................................ 5
3.3 Threats.............................................................................................................................. 6
3.4 Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................... 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ................................................................................ 8
4.1 Usage Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 8
4.2 Environmental Assumptions ........................................................................................... 9
4.3 Clarification of Scope ..................................................................................................... 10
5 Architectural Information......................................................................................................11
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components ...................................................................................11
5.2 IT Environment.............................................................................................................. 13
6 Documentation....................................................................................................................... 14
7 Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results ................................................ 15
7.1 Evaluation Facility......................................................................................................... 15
7.2 Evaluation Approach...................................................................................................... 15
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity.................................................................................... 15
7.4 IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................... 16
7.4.1 Developer Testing.................................................................................................... 16
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing ............................................................................. 16
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing............................................................................... 18
7.5 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................... 20
7.6 Evaluation Results......................................................................................................... 20
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations ..................................................................... 21
8 Certification ........................................................................................................................... 22
8.1 Certification Result ........................................................................................................ 22
8.2 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 22
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
9 Annexes .................................................................................................................................. 23
10 Security Target................................................................................................................... 23
11 Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 24
12 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 26
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2020AC/2520AC all of the above with FAX
Unit and FIPS Hard Disk Kit, Version SYS V2.1" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE")
developed by TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION, and the evaluation of the TOE was
completed on 2023-01-31 by Information Technology Security Center, Evaluation
Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to report
to the sponsor, TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION, and provide security information to
procurement entities and consumers who are interested in the TOE.
Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter
referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional
requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements
of the TOE are described in the ST.
This Certification Report assumes procurement entities who purchase the TOE to be
readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on
assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an
individual IT product itself.
1.1 Product Overview
An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows.
Refer to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package
The TOE conforms to the following Protection Profile [14][15] (hereinafter referred to as
the "Conformance PP").
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
The TOE is a multifunction product (hereinafter referred to as "MFP"), which has
functions such as copy, print, scan and fax.
The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP to prevent the
document data processed by the MFP and the setting data etc. affecting security from
unauthorized disclosure and alteration.
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For these security functions, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the
implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance requirements of the
Conformance PP.
Threats and assumptions assumed for the TOE are described in the following sections.
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives
The following threats are assumed for the TOE.
There are threats that user document data and data affecting security functions, which
are assets to be protected by the TOE, may be disclosed or altered by unauthorized
operation of the TOE or unauthorized access to the network to which the TOE is
connected.
There are also threats that security functions of the TOE may be compromised by the
failure of the TOE itself or installation of unauthorized software.
The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP such as
identification and authentication, access control, encryption, and digital signature to
counter these threats.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
The TOE is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and assumptions.
It is assumed that the TOE is operated in the environment where unauthorized physical
access is restricted and it is connected to a LAN separated from the Internet.
The setting, administration and maintenance of the TOE must be performed in
accordance with the guidance documents by a trusted administrator. Users of the TOE
must have been trained in order to use the TOE securely.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
The following operation is not ensured by this evaluation:
- An environment different from that described in "4.2 Environmental Assumptions"
- TOE with settings different from those described in "7.5 Evaluated Configuration"
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in 2023-
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01, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE according
to the publicized documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme
Document"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for
Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.
1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] and the Observation
Reports prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and
confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The certification oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns
found in the certification process. The Certification Body confirmed that all the concerns
were fully resolved, and that the TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in
accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]). The
Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical
Report and fully concluded certification activities.
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2 Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
TOE Name: TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2020AC/2520AC all of the above with FAX
Unit and FIPS Hard Disk Kit
TOE Version: SYS V2.1
Developer: TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION
The TOE is one of the following:
・Sales area: North America, Europe
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2020AC with FAX Unit and FIPS Hard Disk kit SYS V2.1
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2520AC with FAX Unit and FIPS Hard Disk kit SYS V2.1
Users can verify that a product is the TOE, which is evaluated and certified, by the
following means.
Users confirm the following information displayed on the main unit of the MFP, the
control panel of the MFP and the print output of the function list as described in the
guidance document.
- Model number: One of the following:
“e-STUDIO2020AC”
“e-STUDIO2520AC”
- FAX unit:
For North America: “GD-1370NA-N”
For Europe: “GD-1370EU”
- FIPS Hard Disk kit GE-1260:
“9401 TOSHIBA MQ01ABU032BW”
- Software:
“SYS V2.1”
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the basic functions of the MFP such as copy, print, scan, and fax
functions. It has the functionality to store the user document data in the TOE and to
communicate with user terminals and various servers via a network.
The TOE provides security functions that satisfy the requirements of the Conformance
PP, to protect the document data processed by the MFP and setting data etc. affecting
security.
As the background of the security functions provided by the TOE, user roles, assets,
threats, and organizational security policies assumed for the TOE are described in
following Section 3.1 to 3.4. Details of the security functions of the TOE are described in
Chapter 5.
3.1 Users
The user roles assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1 User Roles
Designation Definition
Normal User A User who has been identified and authenticated and does not
have an administrative role
Administrator A User who has been identified and authenticated and has an
administrative role
3.2 Assets
The assets assumed to be protected by the TOE are shown in Table 3-2, Table 3-3 and
Table 3-4. There are two categories of the assets, User Data and TSF Data, as shown in
Table 3-2. Furthermore, User Data is classified as shown in Table 3-3 and TSF Data is as
shown in Table 3-4.
Table 3-2 Assets
Designation Category Definition
D.USER User Data Data created by and for Users that do not
affect the operation of the TSF
D.TSF TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE that might
affect the operation of the TSF
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Table 3-3 Assets (User Data)
Designation Type Definition
D.USER.DOC User Document
Data
Information contained in a User’s Document,
in electronic or hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB User Job Data Information related to a User’s Document or
Document Processing Job
Table 3-4 Assets (TSF Data)
Designation Type Definition
D.TSF.PROT Protected TSF
Data
TSF Data for which alteration by a User who
is neither the data owner nor in an
Administrator role might affect the security of
the TOE, but for which disclosure is
acceptable
D.TSF.CONF Confidential
TSF Data
TSF Data for which either disclosure or
alteration by a User who is neither the data
owner nor in an Administrator role might
affect the security of the TOE
3.3 Threats
The threats assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5 Threats
Designation Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete)
User Document Data or change (modify or delete)
User Job Data in the TOE through one of the TOE’s
interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF
Data in the TOE through one of the TOE’s
interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security
if the TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE An attacker may cause the installation of
unauthorized software on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise
compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring
or manipulating network communication.
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3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The organizational security policies required for the TOE are shown in Table 3-6.
Table 3-6 Organizational Security Policies
Designation Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing
Document Processing and administrative
functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and
the log of such actions must be protected and
transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE must be able to identify itself to other
devices on the LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION If the TOE stores User Document Data or
Confidential TSF Data on Field-Replaceable
Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such
data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or
any other values that contribute to the creation of
encryption keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage of User Document Data or Confidential
TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized
access and must not be stored on that storage
device.
P.FAX_FLOW If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will
ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and
the LAN.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the
TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine whether to use the TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE. The effective performances of the TOE
security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.
Table 4-1 Assumptions
Designation Definition
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be
provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the
TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE
according to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according
to site security policies.
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4.2 Environmental Assumptions
Figure 4-1 shows the operational environment assumed for the TOE. The TOE is installed
in a general office and used in an environment connected to the public telephone line and
a LAN which is the internal network of the organization. Users operate the control panel
of the TOE or a client PC connected to LAN to use the TOE.
FTP
Server
Client PC
LAN
Firewall
Internet
Communication
Network
Mail
Server
SYSLOG
Server
Public Switched
Telephone
Networks
MFP (TOE)
Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.
(1) Client PC
It is a general PC used by users. The following software is required.
- Printer Driver:
TOSHIBA Universal Printer Driver2 (Version：7.222.5412.30)
- Web browser:
Microsoft Edge
(2) SYSLOG Server (Audit server)
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It is an audit server to store the audit log generated by the TOE. It must use the
syslog protocol and support TLS 1.2. Installation of this server is mandatory. Syslog-
ng 3.14 was used in this evaluation.
(3) Mail Server
The mail server is required when the user document data scanned by the "scan
function" is sent as an attachment of an email. It must support TLS 1.2. Sendmail
8.15.2 was used in this evaluation.
(4) FTP Server
The FTP server is required when the user document data scanned by the "scan
function" is sent to the specified FTP server. It must support TLS 1.2. ProFTPD
1.3.6 was used in this evaluation.
It should be noted that the reliability of the hardware and the software other than the
TOE shown in this configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation. Those are
assumed to be trustworthy.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
Secure operation is required so that the communication protocol operates correctly in the
client PC and various servers in order to protect the data on the communication path
between the TOE and client PC, and the TOE and various servers.
Administrators are responsible for operating servers and client PCs cooperating with the
TOE securely.
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5 Architectural Information
This chapter explains the scope and the main components of the TOE.
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components
Figure 5-1 shows the composition of the TOE. The TOE is the area surrounded by the
frame indicated as TOE in Figure 5-1.
Logical
Boudary
TOE
TSF Self
Protection
Audit Function
User
Control Panel Unit
TSF Data Protection
Trusted Communication Function
Mail
Server
Identification and Authentication Function
FTP
Server
Client PC
Public
Switched
Telephone
Networks
SYSLOG
Server
HDD
D.USER.DOC
D.TSF.PROT D.TSF.CONF
D.USER.JOB
Data Encryption
Basic Functions
Copy
Function
Scan
Function
Print
Function
FAX
Function
Access Control
Function
FROM
D.TSF.PROT
D.TSF.CONF
NVRAM
D.TSF.PROT
D.TSF.CONF
Function
which
separate
PSTN Fax
and
Network
Software
Update
Verification
Figure 5-1 TOE boundary
In Figure 5-1, the colored squares within the frame indicated as TOE show the functions
provided by the TOE. These functions consist of basic functions and security functions.
Identification and Authentication Function
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
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The security functions of the TOE are described below. For details on the basic functions,
see Chapter 11.
(1) Identification and Authentication Function
This function is a function to identify and authenticate users with the user ID and
password when users use the TOE from the control panel of the MFP or the Web
browser of a client PC. When using the TOE from the printer driver of a client PC,
users are identified by the user ID.
This function has the following functionality to reinforce the identification and
authentication.
- Restriction on the minimum password length.
- Account lockout after successive authentication failures.
- Termination of the session if there is no operation for a certain time after the
successful authentication.
(2) Access Control Function
This function is a function to control the access to the user data when users operate
the basic functions of the MFP on them.
The access control is performed based on the owner information of the user data and
on the user's identification information and role.
(3) Data Encryption
This function is a function to store the user document data, etc. in the self-
encrypting drive in the TOE.
The self-encryption drive has been validated by JCMVP.
(4) Trusted Communication Function
This function is a function to protect communication data between the TOE and IT
devices using encryption communication protocol, TLS 1.2.
(5) TSF Data Protection
This function is a function to control the access to the TSF data in order to restrict
the setting, etc. of security functions to administrators.
(6) TSF Self Protection
This function is a function to verify the digital signature of the firmware, etc. at
start-up of the TOE.
(7) Software Update Verification
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This function is a function to verify the digital signature of new firmware when the
firmware is updated.
(8) Audit Function
This function is a function to generate audit logs on audit events relevant to the
security functions and send them to an audit server.
(9) Function which separate PSTN Fax and Network
This function is a function to separate the Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN) and the LAN. The use of the PSTN is limited to fax and no other
communication is possible.
5.2 IT Environment
The TOE communicates with servers and client PCs via LAN.
The function of the TOE described in "(4) Trusted Communication Function" works in
cooperation with those IT devices and uses the following protocols:
- Client PC (Web browser): HTTP over TLS
- Client PC (Printer driver): IPP over TLS
- SYSLOG server: syslog over TLS
- Mail server: SMTP over TLS
- FTP server: FTP over TLS
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6 Documentation
The identification of the guidance documents of the TOE is listed in Table 6-1. TOE users
are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to
satisfy the assumptions.
Table 6-1 Guidance
Name Identification
Preparation of Paper OME21000400
Troubleshooting OME21000600
Quick Start Guide OME21001200
Safety Information OME21001400
Information About Equipment OME21001600
Copy OME21001800
Scan OME21002000
Fax OME21002200
Template OME21002600
User Functions OME21002800
Frequently Asked Questions OME21003000
Installation OME21003200
Print OME21003400
TopAccess OME21003600
Specifications OME21003800
High Security Mode OME210040B0
FAX Unit Precautions for GD-1370 OME21004600
Information to our customers OMM210083B0
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7 Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
7.1 Evaluation Facility
Information Technology Security Center, Evaluation Department that conducted the
evaluation as the Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE
(National Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins
Mutual Recognition Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation
Cooperation). It is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the
requirements on the appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining
the quality of evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation Approach
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the assurance requirements in the CC
Part 3 required by the Conformance PP using the evaluation methods prescribed in the
CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.
Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The
Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of
the evaluation and the verdict for each work unit in the CEM and assurance activity of
the Conformance PP.
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report
as follows.
The evaluation started in 2022-04 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2023-01. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation
deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the
evidence in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Furthermore, the evaluator
conducted the evaluator testing at the developer site in 2022-06.
Concerns found in evaluation activities were issued as the Observation Reports and
reported to the developer. Those concerns were reviewed by the developer, and all the
concerns were solved eventually.
Concerns in the evaluation process that the Certification Body found were described as
the certification oversight reviews and sent to the Evaluation Facility.
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After the Evaluation Facility and the developer examined the concerns, those were
reflected in the Evaluation Technical Report.
7.4 IT Product Testing
As the verification results of the evidence presented in the evaluation process, the
evaluator performed the evaluator independent testing to ensure that the security
functions of the product are accurately implemented and the evaluator penetration
testing based on the vulnerability assessment.
7.4.1 Developer Testing
The developer testing is not included in the assurance requirements of this evaluation.
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator conducted evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as
"independent testing") based on the evidence presented during the evaluation to ensure
that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented. The independent
testing performed by the evaluator is explained as follows.
1) Independent Testing Environment
The environment for the independent testing is based on the operational
environment of the TOE shown in Figure 4-1. The components used in the
independent testing environment are listed in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1 Components of Independent Testing
Components Description
TOE For North America
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2020AC with FAX Unit and FIPS Hard
Disk kit
Version: SYS V2.1
For Europe
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2520AC with FAX Unit and FIPS Hard
Disk kit
Version: SYS V2.1
SYSLOG server Syslog-ng 3.14
Mail server Sendmail 8.15.2
FTP server ProFTPD 1.3.6
Client PC Web browser :
- Microsoft Edge 98.0.1108.50
Printer Driver:
- TOSHIBA Universal Printer Driver2 7.222.5412.30
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There are following differences between the configuration of the independent testing
and the TOE configuration identified in the ST. The evaluator determined that there
are no problems with those differences and that the security functions of the TOE
configuration identified in the ST can be considered properly tested.
(1) Tested models
In the models of the TOE described in Chapter 2 "TOE identification," there are
multiple models due to the following differences:
- Differences in FAX Unit by sales area (Europe, North America)
- Difference in printing speed
The evaluator determined that the security functions of all the models of the TOE
can be considered to have been tested by testing the representative two models
considering the above differences, because the security functions of each models
are the same.
(2) Using additional testing tools
In the independent testing, some testing tools were used to confirm and alter the
communication data and to confirm the encryption functions. The validity of those
testing tools was confirmed by the evaluator.
2) Summary of the Independent Testing
A summary of the independent testing is as follows.
a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing
The viewpoints of the independent testing devised by the evaluator based on the
requirements of the Conformance PP and on the evaluation documentation
submitted for evaluation are shown below.
<Viewpoints of the Independent Testing>
1. Confirm security functions for each Security Functional Requirement (SFR).
2. Confirm that the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms is correct.
b. Independent Testing Outline
An outline of the independent testing that the evaluator performed is as follows.
<Independent Testing Approach>
The behavior of the TOE for inputs using the control panel of the TOE, the client
PC and the testing tools was confirmed by following means:
- If the behavior can be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the
external interfaces of the TOE including audit logs are used.
- If the behavior cannot be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the
developer interface of the TOE is used.
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<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>
The independent testing was performed on 18 items by the evaluator.
Table 7-2 shows contents of the independent testing corresponding to the
viewpoints.
Table 7-2 Content of the Performed Independent Testing
Viewpoint Outline of the Independent Testing
1 Confirmation of security functions
Confirm that all security functions work as the specification with the test
items created based on the assurance activities of the Conformance PP for
each SFR or the requirements of the SFR.
2 Confirmation of implementation of cryptographic algorithms
Confirm the following cryptographic algorithms are implemented as the
specification using the test program installed in the TOE.
- RSA (key generation, signature generation/verification)
- AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256
- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512
- Hash_DRBG, CTR_DRBG
- KDF in Counter Mode
c. Result
All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed,
and the evaluator confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed
consistencies between the expected behavior and all the testing results.
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised and performed the evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter
referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of
concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the evidence
presented in the process of the evaluation. The penetration testing performed by the
evaluator is explained as follows.
(1) Summary of the Penetration Testing
A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
a. Vulnerability of Concern
The evaluator searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
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information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following
vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.
1. There is a concern that unintended network ports of the TOE may be open, and
known vulnerabilities may exist in the network services running on the TOE.
2. There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the Web interface of
the TOE.
3. There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the print processing
of the TOE.
4. There is a concern that the identification and authentication function may be
bypassed by the malicious input from the control panel of the TOE or Web
interface.
b. Penetration Testing Outline
The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially
exploitable vulnerabilities.
<Penetration Testing Environment>
The penetration testing was performed in the same environment as that of the
evaluator independent testing, except for the additional tools for penetration
testing. Table 7-3 shows the tools used in the penetration testing.
Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Tools
Name Outline and Purpose of Use
Nmap 7.9.2 A tool to detect available network service ports.
Nessus 10.2.0 A tool to detect known vulnerabilities at
network ports.
OWASP ZAP 2.11.1 A tool to detect known vulnerabilities at Web
application.
PRET 0.40 A tool to inspect various vulnerabilities in a
printing processing.
<Content of the Performed Penetration Testing>
Table 7-4 shows contents of the penetration testing corresponding to the
vulnerabilities of concern.
Table 7-4 Content of the Performed Penetration Testing
Vulnerability Penetration Testing Outline
1 - Confirm that unexpected network ports of the TOE are not open using
Nmap.
- Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in the available
network ports of the TOE using Nessus.
2 - Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in the Web interface
of the TOE using OWASP ZAP.
3 - Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in print processing of
the TOE using PRET and exploit codes obtained on the Internet.
4 - Confirm that unexpected behaviour is not observed even if the
character strings that may cause unauthrised processing are input in
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
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the control panel and Web interface of the TOE.
c. Result
In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find
any exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack
potential could exploit.
7.5 Evaluated Configuration
The conditions of the TOE configuration, that are prerequisites for this evaluation, are as
described in the guidance documents listed in Chapter 6. In order to use the TOE securely
as ensured by the evaluation, the TOE must be set as described in the guidance
documents. Different settings are not subject to assurance by this evaluation.
7.6 Evaluation Results
The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM
and all assurance activities in the Conformance PP as per the Evaluation Technical
Report.
In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance:
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance [16]
Temporary treatment regarding FDP_DSK_EXT.1
Treatment regarding FCS_RBG_ EXT.1 Test
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following
assurance components required by the Conformance PP.
ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_REQ.1,
ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1,
ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE
corresponding to the identification described in the Chapter 2.
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7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
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8 Certification
Based on the evidence submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation
process, the Certification Body has performed certification by checking that the following
requirements are satisfied:
1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall properly be solved.
3. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related
work units in the CEM and assurance activities of the Conformance PP shall be
evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report
shall conform to the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.
Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight
reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed
such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight reviews were solved in the ST and
the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.
8.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Reports and
related evaluation documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification
Body determined that the TOE evaluation satisfies the assurance requirements required
by the Conformance PP.
8.2 Recommendations
Procurement entities who are interested in the TOE are advised to refer "4.2
Environmental Assumptions" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" to make sure the scope
of the evaluation and the operational requirements of the TOE meet the operational
conditions assumed by each user.
The old audit data will be lost in the case the audit data is not sent and the capacity of
the storage area inside the TOE becomes full. Thus the operator has to periodically
confirm whether the audit data is sent to the SYSLOG server.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
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9 Annexes
There is no annex.
10 Security Target
The Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document from this
Certification Report.
Title: TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2020AC/2520AC all of the above with FAX
Unit and FIPS Hard Disk kit Security Target
Version: 2.08
Publication Date: 2023-01-27
Author: TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
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11 Glossary
The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
MFP Multifunction Product
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
The abbreviations relating to information technology used in this report are listed below.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CTR_DRBG Counter (CTR) mode block cipher algorithm DRBG
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IPP Internet Printing Protocol
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.
Field Replaceable
(Unit)
The smallest subassembly that can be swapped in the field
to repair a fault.
Hardcopy Device A system producing or utilizing a physical embodiment of an
electronic document or image. These systems include
printers, scanners, fax machines, digital copiers, MFPs
(multifunction products), MFDs (multifunction devices), “all-
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
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in-ones” and other similar products.
JCMVP It is an abbreviation of Japan Cryptographic Module
Validation Program.
Copy Function It is a function to copy and print the user document data
scanned from paper documents by user's operation from the
control panel.
Scan Function It is a function to scan paper documents and send the
scanned user document data to the mail server and FTP
server by user's operation from the control panel.
FAX Function It is a function to send and receive the document data to and
from external fax machines conforming to the G3 standard
connected by the PSTN.
It consists of the fax transmission function, in which paper
documents are scanned and the scanned document data are
sent to the external fax machine, and the fax reception
function, in which document data sent from an external fax
machine are received and printed by user's operation.
Print Function It is a function to receive the user document data via the LAN
from the printer driver of the client PC and print it by user's
operation from the control panel.
Assurance Activity Evaluation work to be performed by an evaluator in order to
conform to a PP. It is a supplement of the CEM. In the case of
the Conformance PP [14], it is described in the Conformance
PP.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
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12 Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, October 2020,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, October 2020,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, October 2021,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
001, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004
[11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[12] TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2020AC/2520AC all of the above with FAX Unit and FIPS Hard
Disk Kit Security Target, Version 2.08, January 27, 2023, TOSHIBA TEC
CORPORATION
[13] TOSHIBA e-STUDIO2020AC/2520AC all of the above with FAX Unit and FIPS Hard
Disk Kit Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.4, January 31, 2023, Information
Technology Security Center, Evaluation Department
[14] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 (Certification
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0774-01-2023
27
Identification: JISEC-C0553)
[15] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
[16] Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance, Version 1.8,
November 11, 2020, Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, JISEC-CERT-
2020-A18