BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
for
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144
from
T-Systems International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.15
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 (*)
Security IC with MRTD EAC/PACE Application
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144
from T-Systems International GmbH
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Extended Access Control with PACE,
Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-
V2-2012-MA-02
and in accordance with
BSI Technische Richtlinie BSI-TR-03116-2, 2017
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 15 December 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
5. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................16
6. Documentation............................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................20
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................33
6 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V2-
2016. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V2-2016 were re-
used.
The evaluation of the product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144 was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 12 December 2017. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:
T-Systems International GmbH.
The product was developed by:
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
T-Systems International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 15
December 2017 is valid until 14 December 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
9 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144, has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
T-Systems International GmbH
Untere Industriestraße 20
57250 Netphen
10 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/
P60D144 provided by T-Systems International GmbH and based on the hardware platform
P60D144 by NXP. It is an electronic Passport (MRTD) representing a contactless smart
card programmed according to the Technical Guideline TR-03110 [14] and provides the
authentication mechanisms Basic Access Control, Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment (PACE) and Extended Access Control version 1.0 and 2.0 (including Chip
Authentication and Terminal Authentication version 1 and version 2). Additionally, it meets
the requirements of the Technische Richtlinie TR-03116-2 [16] as part of the qualification
for the use within electronic Passport card projects of the Federal Republic of Germany.
For CC evaluation the following application of the corresponding product is considered:
● Passport Application (ePassport) containing the related user data (incl. biometric data)
as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); with this application the TOE is
intended to be used as a machine readable travel document (MRTD)
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following certified
Protection Profile:
● Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-
02 [7].
The Protection Profile above is strict conformant to the following Protection Profile. In
result, the TOE is also conformant to this PP:
● Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE
(PACE PP), Version 1.0, 2 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [8].
Please note that in consistency to the claimed protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-
2012-MA-02 the security mechanisms Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
and Extended Access Control are in the focus of this evaluation process. The further
security mechanism Basic Access Control is subject of the separate evaluation process
BSI-DSZ-CC-0809-V3-2017 [18].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
12 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
No TOE Security Functionality / Addressed issue
1 Access control to the User Data stored in the TOE
2 Secure data exchange
3 Identification and authentication of users and components
4 Audit
5 Management of and access to TSF and TSF-data
6 Reliability of the TOE security functionality
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4..
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60D144PVA or
P60D144PVA(X) including its
IC Dedicated Support Software
embedded into modules8
Rom Mask
Identity01B6_ID1.2_
ROM_Daten_02.hex
Delivery type:
Module: MOB4 or MOB6
Inlay SOM010, SOM012
(Inlay package types AA
and AC) and
Inlay SOM030 and SOM31
(Inlay package types AQ
and AT)
basing on MOB4 or MOB6
chip-modules
8
For details on the MRTD chip and the IC Dedicated Software see Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-
0978-V2-2017 [12]
13 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
2 SW IC Embedded Software (the
operating system and
completion data) TCOS
Passport Version 2.1 Release 3
including ePassport Application
(dedicated files for the
application in a file system)
TCOS Passport Version
2.1 Release 3
OS Version:
01 B6
Completion Code Version:
24 or 44
File System Version: 81
Implemented in
ROM/EEPROM of the IC
3 DOC Administrator's Guidance,
Guidance Documentation of
TCOS Passport Version 2.1
Release 3 with BAC,
PACE/SAC and EAC protocol
Version 1.4,
14.09.2017 [10]
Document in electronic
form
4 DOC Operational Guidance,
Guidance Documentation of
TCOS Passport Version 2.1
Release 3 with BAC,
SAC/PACE and EAC protocol
Version 1.4,
14.09.2017 [11]
Document in electronic
form
5 Text
files
Activation command APDUs
and authentication key
Activation command to
open lifecycle phase 5, 6
or 7 and corresponding
authentication keys
Document in electronic
form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The customer specific ROM mask for the TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144
is labelled by NXP as “360 I-0024”. The name of the ROM file transferred from
T-Systems to NXP is Identity01B6_ID1.2_ROM_Daten_02.hex.
The commercial numbering of the TOE by NXP is as follows:
● Configuration '01' (with P60D144PVA)
Application: IdentityCard_01B6_ID1.2
Final Product 12NC
P60D144PU52/9A24200 9352 994 25005
P60D144PAA/9A24200 9353 025 04699
P60D144PAC/9A24200 9353 025 03699
Table 3: Commercial numbering of configuration '01'
● Configuration '02' (with P60D144PVA(X))
Application: IdentityCard_01B6_ID1.2
Final Product 12NC
P60D144PAA/9A24AE0 9353 079 32699
P60D144PAC/9A24AE0 9353 079 33699
P60D144PAQ/9A24AE0 9353 090 99699
P60D144PAT/9A24AE0 9353 090 95699
14 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
Final Product 12NC
P60D144PU52/9A24AE0 9353 079 38005
P60D144PA6/9A24AE0 9353 077 43118
Table 4: Commercial numbering of configuration '02'
The initialisation of the TOE based on the hardware platform P60D144PVA or
P60144PVA(x) takes place using the following scripts:
● Patch-Code:
PATCHCODE-ID_HW04_M9A24M01B6_PV24.txt
or
PATCHCODE-ID_HW04_M9A24M01B6_PV44.txt
● Filesystem:
FileSystemcode-ePassSAC_HW04_M9A24M01B6_PV24_FSV81_PKV02.txt
or
FileSystemcode-ePassSAC_HW04_M9A24M01B6_PV44_FSV81_PKV02.txt
Note that the different Patch-Code and Filesystem versions (‘PV24’ and ‘PV44’) are
identical expect for the Version identifier. The different version identifiers were introduced
by the developer to support the initialisation and personalizing agent to distinguish
between the two TOE configurations using the HW Platform P60D144PVA or
P60D144PVA(X).
The certified file system for the TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3 / P60D144 has the
version '01'.
The TOE is finalized after the Initialisation resp. pre-personalisation phase. Delivery is
performed from the initialisation facility to the personalisation facility by a secured transport
to a specific person of contact at the personalisation site. Furthermore, the personaliser
receives information about the personalisation commands and process requirements. To
ensure that the personaliser receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the
personalisation process as described in the Administrator´s Guide [10] have to be
followed.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD EAC PP [7] by the
Security Objectives and Requirements for the contact-less chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy addresses the advanced security
methods for authentication and secure communication, which are described in detail in the
Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Legislative_Compliance: Issuing of the travel document
15 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
● OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document: Travel document Authentication Key
● OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data: Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference
Data
● OE.Passive_Auth_Sign: Authentication of travel document by signature
● OE.Personalization: Personalization of travel document
● OE.Exam_Travel_Document: Examination of the physical part of the travel
document
● OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document: Protection of data from the logical travel
document
● OE.Ext_Insp_Systems: Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
● OE.Terminal: Terminal operating
● OE.Travel_Document_Holder: travel document holder obligations
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit, IC Embedded
Software and IC Application Software containing the ePassport application. The IC
Embedded software contains the operating system TCOS Passport Version 2.1
Release 3/ P60D144. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the NXP IC see the
evaluation documentation under the certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0978-V2-2017.
The security functions of the TOE are:
● Access control to the User Data stored in the TOE
● Secure data exchange
● Identification and authentication of users and components
● Audit
● Management of and access to TSF and TSF-data
● Reliability of the TOE security functionality
According to the TOE Design these security functions are enforced by the following
subsystems:
● Hardware: Hardware Platform
● Kernel: manages the interfaces between all components
● Crypto Component: processes the cryptographic functions
● Admin Component: processes administrative base functions
● IO Component: controls the input and output
● ROM TCOS-Type Task: APDU processing (system, applications)
16 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 APDU command sequences,
the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.
Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions
where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing.
During their independent testing, the evaluators covered
● testing APDU commands related to Access Control,
● testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication,
● testing APDU commands related to the Generation of a Key Pair,
● testing APDU commands related to the Secure Messaging Channel,
● penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
● source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
● testing the commands which are used to execute the PACE protocol,
● side channel analysis for SHA and ECC (including ECC key generation),
● fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
● testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase,
● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms, and
● fuzzy testing on APDU processing.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing. Within the course of the recertification procedure previous
penetration tests have been reviewed and renewed where necessary.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/ P60D144 consisting of
17 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
● NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D144 (incl. its IC Dedicated Test
Software)
● IC Embedded Software (the operating system) TCOS Passport Version 2.1
Release 3 (implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the IC)
● ePassport application
● The Guidance for TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/ P60D144 consisting of
● Administrator's Guidance, Guidance Documentation of TCOS Passport
Version 2.1 Release 3 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC protocol[10]
● Operational Guidance, Guidance Documentation of TCOS Passport Version
2.1 Release 3 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC protocol [11]
The TOE provides two configurations: Configuration ‘01’ and configuration ‘02’. The two
different configurations of the HW Platform are considered in the [6], namely P60D144PVA
and P60D144PVA(x). Both configurations consist of identical operating system code. The
only difference is the TOE identification which can be read out during Personalization
Phase by the Personalization Agent as described in the Administrator Guidance [10] Annex
D. These configurations are only needed to differentiate between two used hardware
configurations of [12]. There are no differences in security or functionality aspects between
these configurations.
The certified file system for the TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3 / P60D144 has the
version '01'.
The initialisation and personalisation agent can use the “Format” command to read out the
chip information and identify the chip. The following table describes the evaluated
configuration:
Data type Data
Chip Manufacturer '04'
Chip Type '0F'
Card Type (TCOS Identity Card) '02'
OS Version (ROM mask version) '01 B6'
(Pre-) completion code version '24' or '44'
File System Version '81'
Authentication key identifier '01'
Table 5: Evaluated TOE identifier
The used HW Platform of the TOE can be identified with the Completion Code Version:
Completion Code
Version Identifier
HW Platform
'24' P60D144PVA
'44' P60D144PVA(X)
18 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
Table 6: Completion Code Version Identifier
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and
AIS 36 (see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36) were used.
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e.
on hardware [12], [13] have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the certification body for approval subsequently.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V2-2016, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the change of
specific embedded software functionality for improvement in communication protocol
handling.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5
December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [7] and in
accordance with BSI Technische Richtlinie BSI-TR-03116-2,
2017 [16]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5
19 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
Additionally the requirements of the Technische Richtlinie TR-03116-2 [16] are met. This is
part of the qualification of TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144 for the use
within electronic Passport Card projects of the Federal Republic of Germany.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
All cryptographic functionalities are described in detail in the Crypto Disclaimer of the
Security Target [6], “Appendix Results of Cryptographic Assessment“. The strength of the
cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see
BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 1 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition, all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The passport issuing organisation and the national organisation responsible for the risk
management shall consider the results of the certification within the system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be
covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required
and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
20 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
eID Electronic Identity Card
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
21 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017,
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017,
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017, Version 2.1.3, 22.09.2017,
Specification of the Security Target TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/
P60D144, T-Systems International GmbH
[7] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-
0056-V2-2012-MA-02
[8] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.0, 02.11.2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-
2011
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 06.11.2017, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) - TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
9
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
22 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
[10] TCOS Passport Version 2.1, Administrator’s Guidance, Guidance Documentation of
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3 with BAC, PACE/SAC and EAC protocol, T-
Systems International GmbH, Version 1.4, 14.09.2017
[11] TCOS Passport Version 2.1, Operational Guidance, Guidance Documentation of
TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3 with BAC, SAC/PACE and EAC protocol, T-
Systems International GmbH, Version 1.4, 14.09.2017
[12] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0978-V2-2017 for NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60x144/080yVA/yVA(Y/B/X)/yVE with IC Dedicated Software,
27.09.2017, BSI
[13] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 or the Product NXP Secure
Smart Card Controller P60x144/080yVA/yVA(Y/B/X)/yVE with IC Dedicated
Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-0978-V2, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Version 2, 14
September 2017 (confidential document)
[14] Technical Guideline TR-03110: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents and eIDAS Token, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI), Part 1 - eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.20, 26.02.2015, Part 2 -
Protocols for electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services (eIDAS), Version
2.21, 21.12.2016, Part 3 - Common Specifications, Version 2.21, 21.12.2016, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[15] TR-03111, Technical Guideline TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 28.06.2012
[16] TR-03116-2, Technische Richtlinie TR-03116, Kryptographische Vorgaben für
Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 2 – Hoheitliche Dokumente, Stand 2017,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 23.01.2017
[17] Konfigurationsliste von TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144,
Version 1.2, 06.11.2017, T-Systems International GmbH (confidential document)
[18] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0809-V3-2017 for TCOS Passport Version 2.1
Release 3-BAC / P60D144 from T-Systems International GmbH, 15 December
2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[19] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0053-2016-MA-01 for Bundesdruckerei GmbH,
Site for ePassport, eCover, eID card, RP card, -inlay Production of Bundesdruckerei
GmbH, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 28.02.2017
23 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
24 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
25 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
26 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
27 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
28 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
29 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
30 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
31 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
32 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
33 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
34 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product TCOS Passport Version 2.1 Release 3/P60D144 (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 15 December 2017, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1).
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) T-Systems International GmbH, Untere Industriestraße 20, 57250 Netphen-
Dreis-Tiefenbach, Germany (Development)
b) Bundesdruckerei GmbH, Kommandantenstraße 18, 10969 Berlin, Germany,
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0053-2016-MA-01 [19] (Initialisation and Inlay Embedding)
For development and production sites regarding the platforms please refer to the
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0978-V2-2017 [12].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
35 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0808-V3-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
36 / 36