BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
for
Electronic Health Card Terminal eHealth GT900
Hardwareversion: 2.1.0 & 2.1.1, Firmwareversion:
2.1.1
from
GT German Telematics Gesell. für Telematik GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 (*)
eHealth: Smart Card Readers
Electronic Health Card Terminal eHealth GT900
Hardwareversion: 2.1.0 & 2.1.1, Firmwareversion: 2.1.1
from GT German Telematics Gesell. für Telematik GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic
Health Card Terminal (eHCT) Version 3.7, BSI-CC-
PP-0032-V2-2015-MA-01, 22 May 2017
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.4
valid until: 19 November 2029
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 November 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy........................................................................................................... 12
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................22
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................23
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................23
13. Definitions................................................................................................................23
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................26
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 27
5 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
6 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Electronic Health Card Terminal eHealth GT900, Hardwareversion: 2.1.0 &
2.1.1, Firmwareversion: 2.1.1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-2023. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-2023 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Electronic Health Card Terminal eHealth GT900,
Hardwareversion: 2.1.0 & 2.1.1, Firmwareversion: 2.1.1 was conducted by Deutsche
Telekom Security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 October 2024. Deutsche
Telekom Security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: GT German Telematics
Gesell. für Telematik GmbH.
The product was developed by: GT German Telematics Gesell. für Telematik GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 20
November 2024 is valid until 19 November 2029. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Electronic Health Card Terminal eHealth GT900, Hardwareversion: 2.1.0 &
2.1.1, Firmwareversion: 2.1.1 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which
is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
GT German Telematics Gesell. für Telematik GmbH
Libellenstraße 9
14129 Berlin
9 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a stationary smart card terminal which fulfils the
requirements to be used with the German electronic Health Card and the German Health
Professional Card based on the regulations of the German healthcare system.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Health Card Terminal
(eHCT) Version 3.7, BSI-CC-PP-0032-V2-2015-MA-01, 22 May 2017 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.SECDOWN Secure update of TSP CA list, firmware list and/or firmware core
‍
SF.DRILLSEC Protection against physical manipulation
‍
SF.SELFTEST Self-tests
‍
SF.I&A User identification and authentication
‍
SF.CLRMEM Residual information protection
‍
SF.MNGT Management functions
‍
SF.PINCMD Protected PIN entry
‍
SF.TRUSTCH Protected data exchange between the TOE and a connector
SF.ADMCH Protected data exchange between the TOE and a remote TOE
administrator
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
11 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Electronic Health Card Terminal eHealth GT900Hardwareversion: 2.1.0 & 2.1.1,
Firmwareversion: 2.1.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1‍
‍
‍
HW Hardware - Version: 2.1.0 colour white Version 2.1.0 Delivered as a package.
Hardware - Version: 2.1.0 SW color black Version 2.1.0 Delivered as a package.
Hardware - Version: 2.1.0 SI colour silver Version 2.1.0 Delivered as a package.
Hardware - Version: 2.1.1 colour white Version 2.1.1 Delivered as a package.
Hardware - Version: 2.1.1 SW color black Version 2.1.1 Delivered as a package.
Hardware - Version: 2.1.1 SI colour silver Version 2.1.1 Delivered as a package.
‍
2 SW Firmware Version 2.1.1 Integrated into #1
3 DOC Short guidance [10] Version 1.0.4 Delivered together with #1
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. Overview of the Delivery Process
The TOE is delivered to the customer by the GT German Telematics Gesellschaft für
Telematikdienste mbH and Card Assist CA GmbH using the following delivery procedure:
The TOE is delivered in a package from the storage of GT German Telematics
Gesellschaft für Telematikdienste mbH directly to the customer. The short guidance
document [10] is delivered as part of this package. This document contains unambiguous
references to the official guidance document [11], which can be downloaded from the
developer’s website.
2.2. Identification of TOE
The TOE can be identified using the sticker attached to the TOE’s housing at the bottom,
which lists the hardware version number. The firmware version can be identified on the
screen as described in section 2.3 of [11]. The values can be then compared to the
information in [6].
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Cryptographic Support
● User data protection
● Identification and Authentication
● Security Management
12 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
● Protection of the TSF
● TOE Access
● Trusted path/channels
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
OE.ENV: It is assumed that the TOE is used in a controlled environment. Specifically it is
assumed:
● The card terminal prevents (not visible) physical manipulations for at least 10 minutes.
The environment ensures beyond these 10 minutes that the card terminal is protected
against unauthorized physical access or such is perceptible,
● That the user handles his PIN with care; specifically, that the user will keep their PIN
secret,
● That the user can enter the PIN in a way that nobody else can read it,
● That the user only enters the card PIN when the TOE indicates a secure state,
● That the medical supplier checks the sealing and the physical integrity of the TOE
regularly before it is used,
● The medical supplier sends the TOE back to the manufacturer in case he suspects an
unauthorized reset to factory defaults has been performed by unauthorized personnel,
and
● That the network of the medical supplier is appropriately secured so authorized entities
are trustworthy.
OE.ADMIN: The administrator of the TOE and the medical supplier shall be non-hostile,
well trained and have to know the existing guidance documentation of the TOE. The
administrator and the medical supplier shall be responsible for the secure operation of the
TOE. Specifically it shall be ensured:
● That they enforce the requirements on the environment (see A.ENV),
● That the administrator ensures that the medical supplier received the necessary
guidance documents (especially for firmware updates),
● That the physical examination of the TOE is performed according to the pro-cess
described by the manufacturer in the evaluation process (e.g. seal checking),
● That the administrator checks the integrity of the terminal before the initial start-up
procedure (every new pairing process) and the medical supplier checks the integrity of
the terminal before every start-up procedure,
● That they react to breaches of environmental requirements according to the process
described by the manufacturer (e.g. reshipment to the manufacturer), and
● That the administrator checks the secure state of the TOE regularly
OE.CONNECTOR: The connector in the environment has to be trustworthy and provides
the possibility to establish a Trusted Channel with the TOE including a mean for mutual
13 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
authentication. The connector has to undergo an evaluation and certification process in
compliance with the corresponding Protection Profiles. Further the connector has to
periodically check the pairing state with the TOE and warn the administrator accordingly.
OE.SM: The TOE will use a secure module (SM-KT) that rep-resents the cryptographic
identity of the TOE in form of an X.509 certificate. It is assumed that the crypto-graphic
keys in this module are of sufficient quality and the process of key generation and
certificate generation is appropriately secured to ensure the confidentiality, authenticity and
integrity of the private key and the authenticity and integrity of the public key/certificate.
The random number generator of the SM-KT shall provide entropy of at least 100 bit for
key generation. It is further assumed that the secure module is secured in a way that
protects the communication be-tween the TOE and the module from eavesdrop-ping and
manipulation and that the SM-KT is securely connected with the TOE (according to TR-
03120). The secure module has undergone an evaluation and certification process in
compliance with the corresponding Protection Profile and complies with the specification.
OE. PUSH_SERVER: The internal network of the medical supplier is equipped with a so
called Push Server for automatic firmware updates according to the push update
mechanism. The TOE administrator is responsible for the opera-ion of the Push Server
and able to select the particular firmware version that the server is allowed to install on the
card terminals. Every time an update pro-cess is performed for a card terminal the push
server logs the following information: identifier of involved card terminal, version of
firmware to install, result of the update process.
OE.ID000_CARDS: All smartcards of form factor ID000 shall be properly sealed after they
are brought into the TOE. Further, the developer shall provide guidance documentation on
how a TOE administrator could renew a sealing after an ID000 card is replaced by another
one.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The architecture of the complete system is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Architecture of the complete system
14 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
Internally TOE consists of nine subsystems as shown in the following table:
Subsystem Description
Start und
Initialisierung
The subsystem is used for the superordinate task scheduler of the TOE. Through
this subsystem all other subsystems are started and their return values are
processed. The subsystem implements parts of SF.SELFTEST: Checking for
incomplete firmware updates, checking of messages of SF.DRILLSEC, checking if
there was a security alarm, checking if the TOE was disconnected from power-,
checking the integrity of files, checking the signature of the PIC32MM key, hash
values of important files, installed CA certificates and cross certificates, and
processing self-tests of the cryptographic functions.
Admin This subsystem includes functionality for the local configuration (SF.MNGT)
including firmware and CA certificates and updates. The subsystem implements the
SF.SECDOWN, parts of SF.SELFTEST, SF.I&A for the administrator roles, and
SF.CLRMEM for PINS.
Bohrschutz This subsystem implements SF.DRILLSEC and supports SF.SELFTEST by
monitoring the security sensors of the TOE. For this, the drill protection foil, the
keyboard foil, the SIM slots, and the PIC32MM micro controller on the display board
are monitored so that an alarm is raised in case of a security critical event.
Kernel This subsystem is the basic OS functionality provided by the Linux kernel, which
includes drivers and CPU specific functions to communicate with the internal
hardware components.
SICCT This subsystem implements SF.TRUSTCH, SF.PINCMD and parts of
SF.SELFTEST, SF.I&A, SF.MNGT, and SF.CLRMEM and enables the SICCT
communication with the connector including using TLS secured channels.
Remote-Admin This subsystems enables a remote administrator to access the TOE over a secured
15 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
TLS channel (SF.ADMINCH, SF.I&A, and SF.MNGT).
Crypto-TLS This subsystems implements the cryptographic functions of SF.TRUSTCH and
SF.ADMINCH used for TLS.
Services This subsystem provides services to other subsystems, namely the managing of
passwords and password-related error counters, temporary locking mechanisms,
handling of configuration files, and handling of network configuration.
SICCT Service
Discovery (SDD)
This subsystem implements the service discovery functionality of the SICCT port.
Table 3: Subsystems of the TOE
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Description of the Test Concept for ATE_FUN
The developer considered the TOE environment as defined in the Security Target. The
developer tests cover all subsystems.
Moreover, aspects of the security architecture of the TOE are also covered by tests
conducted by the developer. Each test is implemented as a manual test with assistance of
the following tools: Konnektorsimulator, virtual.card.kit, VirtualCardKitTestSystemInterface,
PuTTY, GT900 LAN Setup, Gencode2, OpenSSL, Packet Sender, and Wireshark. All tests
are executed and evaluated manually by the tester.
The test documentation consists of a test coverage and depth of testing analysis and test
specifications divided into sections for SF.SECDOWN, SF.DRILLSEC, SF.SELFTEST,
SF.I&A, SF.CLRMEM, SF.MNGT, SF.PINCMD, SF.TRUSTCH, and SF.ADMCH. All security
functions as defined in the ST are covered by the developer tests. For each of the security
functions the developer defined a set of tests that shall demonstrate the correct behaviour
of the involved modules/subsystems of the TOE.
Each test specification has the same structure. It consists of:
● test case ID,
● short description,
● test requirements,
● test steps,
● an expected result, and
● the actual test result.
16 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
For each test different configurations and parameters were used to do positive and
negative tests. By testing the security functionality of the TOE, the correct behaviour is
also tested because the functions of the TOE are used for the tests.
The test result logs show that the tests identified in the test coverage and depth of testing
analysis have been executed as expected by the developer.
7.2. Description of the Test Concept for ATE_IND
Overview:
The independent testing was performed using the developer’s testing environment.
Since the TOE has only one configuration, all configurations of the TOE being intended to
be covered by the current evaluation were tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
Independent testing approach:
The TOE was independently tested with respect to three specific subject areas: a) The
processing of firmware updates over the publicly available USB and SICCT interface, b)
the connection handling to the gSMC-KT, and c) the correct functionality of the
management interface.
TOE test configurations:
The testing from the former evaluation is re-used.
No special configuration is made. The TOE has only one single configuration, and the TOE
is always this default configuration state.
The TOE under test is “electronic Health Card Terminal eHealth GT900” consisting of the
following components:
● Hardware-Version: 2.1.0
● Firmware-Version 1.22.4
Note that section 1.1 of [6] lists firmware version 2.1.1 and an additional hardware version
2.1.1. The evaluators confirm, that all of the tests and their respective test results remain
valid for the firmware version 2.1.1 and hardware version 2.1.1 as these combined
versions only include code changes that do not change the validity of the test results
compared to the version under test. The evaluators checked by source code reviews that
each change between 1.22.4 and 2.1.1 does not affect the code relevant for the test cases
listed in ATE. Therefore, the functionality tested in all test cases is not affected by the
changes.
Independent test subset chosen incl. a short justification:
The interfaces tested by independent evaluator tests cover all major interface
functionalities like USB firmware update, communication with the gSMC-KT as well as
network capabilities. Because these interfaces are most critical for the security that the
TOE provides, the selection of independent evaluator tests has a good coverage of the
possible attack paths an attacker can use from outside the TOE.
Developer’s test subset repeated incl. a short justification:
The evaluators repeated developer tests for no specific subject areas: The tests covered
the whole range of TSFIs, most of the modules, and most SFRs. This includes tests that
17 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
cover a broad code fraction of the TOE’s implementation. All those tests cover critical
security functionalities of the TOE and are backed by developer-coded implementations.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.3. Description of the Test Concept for AVA
Overview:
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of the ITSEF.
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Moderate was
actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
The evaluator examined the developer document [11] to find relevant information about
how to bring the TOE in a proper and known state. He then searched for potential
vulnerabilities through CVE entries based on the development documents for ARC and
TDS. In addition to that the evaluator searched for potential vulnerabilities for the current
TOE whilst evaluating the developer contributions for the single evaluation aspects in the
context of the assurance classes ADV, AGD and ATE. The evaluator then derived attack
scenarios which cover all potential vulnerabilities. For these scenarios the evaluator
created penetration tests, so that every attack scenario is tested by at least one relevant
penetration test.
TOE test configurations:
No special configuration is made. The TOE has only one single configuration, and the TOE
is always this default configuration state.
The TOE under test is “Electronic Health Card Terminal eHealth GT900” consisting of the
following components:
● Hardware version: 2.1.1
● Firmware version: 2.1.1
Note that section 1.1 of [6] also lists hardware version 2.1.07
. The evaluators confirm, that
all of the tests and their respective test results remain valid for the version 2.1.0 as this is
only a version that does not change the validity of the test results compared to the version
under test.
The evaluator confirms that all test results of this report remain valid for the firmware
version 2.1.1 since the TOE parts covered by the other tests are not affected by the
changes.
The TOE is connected via Ethernet to the test network of the valuation facility, which
contains apart from the TOE other network devices used to penetrate the TOE’s network
interfaces.
7
The hardware versions 2.1.1 of the TOE have a battery with an enhanced capacity.
18 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
Attack scenarios having been tested:
Various attack scenarios had been tested. These scenarios cover
● eavesdropped for timing signals during AES processing,
● receiving malicious data input to circumvent authentication8
,
● receiving malicious data input to circumvent authentication9
,
● receiving malicious data input over TLS interfaces and
● network interfaces that offer services that can be attacked by a remote user.
SFRs penetration tested:
● FCS_CKM.1/Connector, FCS_CKM.1/Management, FCS_CKM.1/Management,
FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym, FCS_COP.1/Management, FCS_COP.1/SIG,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW
● FDP_ACF.1/Management, FDP_ACF.1/Terminal, FDP_IFC.1/NET, FDP_IFC.1/PIN,
FDP_IFF.1/NET, FDP_IFF.1/PIN
● FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.7
● FMT_SMF.1,
● FPT_FLS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.2, FPT_TST.1, FTP_ITC.1/Connector
The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not penetration tested due to non-exploitability of
the related attack scenarios in the TOE’s operational environment also including an
attacker with a Moderate attack potential.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Moderate was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The eHealth GT900 is only available in one evaluated configuration. The hardware can be
of two different versions (2.1.0, 2.1.1), which are treated as one configuration because
they provide the same physical properties. The hardware case can be of three different
colours (white, black silver), which are treated as one configuration because they provide
the same functionality.
The versions are detailed in Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE.
8
For this the evaluator took a look at various software hardening measures and did some white-box fuzz
testing on specific code extracts.
9
Further scenarios.
19 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.4
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-2023, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible.
The re-certification focused on improvements made by the developer to the security
measures of the TOE and the addition of minor functionalities summarized as follows:
● Support and usage of elliptic curve cipher suites for TLS
● Enhancing the remote management interface with functionality from the local
management interface
● Small architectural changes in the firmware
● Replacement of the battery by another model
● Involving a contractor for delivery of the TOE
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Health Card
Terminal (eHCT) Version 3.7, BSI-CC-PP-0032-V2-2015-MA-01, 22 May 2017 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3,
ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VAN.4
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
20 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above 120
Bits
Comments
1 TLS 1.2
(Konnektor)
Ciphersuite
TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_128_
CBC_SHA1 (0x00, 0x33)
RFC3447, RFC3526,
RFC5246, RFC3268,
RFC2104
128 yes FCS_CKM.1.1/
Connector,
FCS_COP.1.1/Con
_Sym
2 TLS 1.2
(Konnektor)
Ciphersuite
TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_256_
CBC_SHA1 (0x00, 0x39)
RFC3447, RFC3526,
RFC5246, RFC3268,
RFC2104
256 yes FCS_CKM.1.1/
Connector,
FCS_COP.1.1/Con
_Sym
3 TLS 1.2
(Konnektor)
Ciphersuite
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA2
56 (0xc0, 0x2b) with brain-
poolP256r1 and brain-
poolP384r1
RFC3447, RFC3526,
RFC5246, RFC3268,
RFC2104, RFC4492,
RFC5480
128 yes FCS_CKM.1.1/
Connector,
FCS_COP.1.1/Con
_Sym
4 TLS 1.2
(Konnektor)
Ciphersuite
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA3
84 (0xc0, 0x2c) with brain-
poolP256r1 and brain-
poolP384r1
RFC3447, RFC3526,
RFC5246, RFC3268,
RFC2104, RFC4492,
RFC5480
256 yes FCS_CKM.1.1/
Connector,
FCS_COP.1.1/Con
_Sym
5 TLS 1.2 (Re-
mote
Management)
Ciphersuite
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA3
84 (0xc0, 0x2c) with
secp256r1 and secp384r1
RFC3447, RFC3526,
RFC5246, RFC3268,
RFC2104, RFC4492,
RFC5480
256 yes FCS_CKM.1.1/
Management,
FCS_COP.1.1/Man
agement
6 TLS 1.2 (Re-
mote
Management)
Ciphersuite
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA2
56 (0xc0, 0x2b) with
secp256r1 and secp384r1
RFC3447, RFC3526,
RFC5246, RFC3268,
RFC2104, RFC4492,
RFC5480
128 yes FCS_CKM.1.1/
Management,
FCS_COP.1.1/Man
agement
7 TLS 1.2 (Re-
mote
Management)
Ciphersuite
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_AES_128_SHA256
(0xc0, 0x23) with secp256r1
and secp384r1
RFC3447, RFC3526,
RFC5246, RFC3268,
RFC2104, RFC4492,
RFC5480
128 yes FCS_CKM.1.1/
Management,
FCS_COP.1.1/Man
agement
8 TLS 1.2 (Re-
mote
Management)
Ciphersuite
TLS_ECDHE_EC-
DSA_AES_256_SHA384
(0xc0, 0x24) with secp256r1
and secp384r1
RFC3447, RFC3526,
RFC5246, RFC3268,
RFC2104, RFC4492,
RFC5480
256 yes FCS_CKM.1.1/
Management,
FCS_COP.1.1/Man
agement
9 Signature
generation
and checking
for Konnektor
certificate and
Konnektor
pairing
RSASSA-PSS [PKCS#1] mit
SHA256
RFC 3447 2048 yes FCS_COP.1.1/SIG
10 Signature
generation
and checking
for Konnektor
certificate and
Konnektor
pairing
ECDSA-SHA256 RFC 3447 256 yes FCS_COP.1.1/SIG
11 Signature
check for
firmware
updates
PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-
PKCS-v1_5
RFC 3447 4096 yes FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_FW
12 Signature
check for TSP
CA update
PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-
PKCS-v1_5
RFC 3447 4096 yes FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_TSP
21 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above 120
Bits
Comments
13 Checking
exchange of
gSMC-KT and
challenge
response
RSA RFC 3447 2048 yes -
14 Communicatio
n between
mainboard
and display
board
RSA and AES-CBC RFC3447, RFC5246, NIST
SP 800-38A
2048
(RSA), 192
(AES)
yes -
Table 7: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to the application standards in the table above, especially the standards issued
by gematik, the algorithms are suitable for the intended purposes listed above. An explicit
validity period is not given.]
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The user is advised to follow the instructions of the document “Checkliste sichere
Lieferkette” referenced in section 1.3 of [11] before the first use of the TOE.
● Furthermore, the user is advised to check the case’s integrity according to section 1.3.1
of [11] and the seals’ integrity according to section 1.3.2 of [11]. Please note that the
seals do not contribute to the 10 minutes attack resistance the TOE hast to provide
against physical attacks but are considered as an additional security feature.
● During the operation of the TOE the user is advised to follow the instructions of section 1
of [11], especially the hint in section 1.4 covering the requirements for unoccupied
storage of the TOE for a longer period than 10 minutes.
22 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
● In case the TOE is put out of order, the user is advised to follow the instructions of
section 11 of [11].
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
ADV Development
AGD Guidance Documents
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ALC Life-Cycle Support
ARC Security Architecture
ASE Security Target Evaluation
ATE Tests
AVA Vulnerability Assessment
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eGK Elektronische Gesundheitskarte
eHC Electronic Health Card
eHCT Electronic Health Card Terminal
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KVK Krankenversichertenkarte
LAN Local Area Network
OSP Organisational Security Policy
23 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
SAC Signature Application Component
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMC Security Module Card
SM-KT Security Module Kartenterminal
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VAN Vulnerability analysis
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
24 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024, Version 2.1.3, 2024-08-05, Electronic
Health Card Terminal eHealth GT900 Security Target, GT German Telematics
Gesellschaft für Telematikdienste mbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.2, 2024-10-14, Deutsche Telekom Security
GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT) Version
3.7, BSI-CC-PP-0032-V2-2015-MA-01, 22 May 2017
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.9.2, 2024-08-28, Chipkartenterminal
eHealth GT900, – Dokumentation des Produktlebenszyklus –,GT German
Telematics Gesellschaft für Telematikdienste mbH GmbH (confidential document)
[10] Kurzanleitung Kartenterminal eHealth GT900, GT German Telematics Gesellschaft
für Telematikdienste mbH GmbH, Version 1.0.4
[11] Kartenterminal eHealth GT900 –Benutzerhandbuch–, GT German Telematics
Gesellschaft für Telematikdienste mbH, Version 2.2.4, 2024-08-08
10
specifically
AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
25 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
26 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1171-V2-2024 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
27 / 27