1
FED 5 SP1
Security Target 1.2
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Revision history
Document subject FED 5 SP1 Security Target
Configuration document
no.
Version Details Created by Date revised Reviewed by
FED5 SP1_ST_1.0_en 1.0 Created Choi Jae-ho 2022.06.28 Choi Woo-sun
FED5 SP1_ST_1.1_en 1.1 Updated Choi Jae-ho 2022.08.16 Choi Woo-sun
FED5 SP1_ST_1.2_en 1.2 Updated Choi Jae-ho 2022.11.01 Choi Woo-sun
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- Table of Contents -
1. ST Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.1 ST reference .......................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE reference ....................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 TOE overview........................................................................................................................................................ 7
1.4 TOE description ..................................................................................................................................................10
1.4.1. Physical scope of the TOE...............................................................................................................................10
1.4.2. Logical scope of the TOE.................................................................................................................................12
1.4.2.1 Security audit.........................................................................................................................................12
1.4.2.2 Cryptographic support .........................................................................................................................12
1.4.2.3 User data protection ............................................................................................................................13
1.4.2.4 Identification and authentication.......................................................................................................13
1.4.2.5 Security management ..........................................................................................................................14
1.4.2.6 Protection of the TSF............................................................................................................................14
1.4.2.7 TOE access..............................................................................................................................................14
1.5 Terms and definitions ........................................................................................................................................14
1.6 Conventions ........................................................................................................................................................19
2. Conformance claim .........................................................................................................................................................20
2.1 CC, PP and package conformance claim.........................................................................................................20
2.2 Conformance claim rationale ...........................................................................................................................20
3. Security objectives ..........................................................................................................................................................22
3.1 Security objectives for the operational environment...................................................................................22
4. Extended components definition .................................................................................................................................23
4.1 Cryptographic support .................................................................................................................................................23
4.1.1. Random bit generation ...................................................................................................................................23
4.1.1.1. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation...............................................................................................23
4.2 FIA, Identification & authentication...........................................................................................................................23
4.2.1. TOE Internal mutual authentication .............................................................................................................23
4.2.1.1. FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication..............................................................................24
4.3 Security management ..................................................................................................................................................24
4.3.1. ID and password...............................................................................................................................................24
4.3.1.1. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password..............................................................................24
4.4 TSF Protection of the TSF.............................................................................................................................................25
4.4.1. Protection of stored TSF data.........................................................................................................................25
4.4.1.1. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data................................................................................25
4.4.1.2. FPT_PST.2 Availability protection of TSF data..................................................................................25
4.5 TOE Access .....................................................................................................................................................................26
4.5.1. Session locking and termination....................................................................................................................26
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4.5.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions..........................................................................26
5. Security requirements ....................................................................................................................................................27
5.1 Security functional requirements...............................................................................................................................27
5.1.1. Security audit....................................................................................................................................................29
5.1.1.1. FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms.................................................................................................................29
5.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation....................................................................................................29
5.1.1.3. FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis ............................................................................................30
5.1.1.4. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review.....................................................................................................................30
5.1.1.5. FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review ..................................................................................................31
5.1.1.6. FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit...................................................................................................................31
5.1.1.7. FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss ....................................................................31
5.1.1.8. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss.........................................................................................31
5.1.2. Cryptographic support ....................................................................................................................................31
5.1.2.1. FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (Electronic Document Encryption – FED Client)
..............................................................................................................................................................................31
5.1.2.2. FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (Electronic Document Encryption - FED Packager)
..............................................................................................................................................................................32
5.1.2.3. FCS_CKM.1(3) Cryptographic key generation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Server)...................32
5.1.2.4. FCS_CKM.1(4) Cryptographic key generation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Client) ....................32
5.1.2.5. FCS_CKM.1(5) Cryptographic key generation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Packager)...............33
5.1.2.6. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution .....................................................................................33
5.1.2.7. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction ..................................................................................33
5.1.2.8. FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (Electronic Document Encryption- FED Client)...........34
5.1.2.9. FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (Electronic Document Encryption – FED Packager) ...34
5.1.2.10. FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Server) ...........................34
5.1.2.11. FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Client) ............................35
5.1.2.12. FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic operation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Packager).......................35
5.1.2.13. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (Extended) ............................................................................36
5.1.3. User data protection .......................................................................................................................................36
5.1.3.1. FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control (Electronic Document Encryption access control) .........36
5.1.3.2. FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset access control (Electronic Document Usage access control)..................37
5.1.3.3. FDP_ACF.1(1) Security attribute-based access control (Electronic Document Encryption access
control) ................................................................................................................................................................37
5.1.3.4. FDP_ACF.1(2) Security attribute based access control (Document usage access control).......38
5.1.4. Identification and authentication..................................................................................................................38
5.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling ......................................................................................38
5.1.4.2. FIA_IMA.1 Internal mutual authentication......................................................................................39
5.1.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets ......................................................................................................39
5.1.4.4. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication ................................................................................................39
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5.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms........................................................................39
5.1.4.6. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback ..............................................................................39
5.1.4.7 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification .....................................................................................................40
5.1.5. Security management .....................................................................................................................................40
5.1.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour .........................................................40
5.1.5.2. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes ...........................................................................41
5.1.5.3. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization ........................................................................................41
5.1.5.4. FMT_MTD.1 TSF Data management .................................................................................................41
5.1.5.5. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password (Extended) .........................................................42
5.1.5.6. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions.....................................................................42
5.1.5.7. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles..................................................................................................................43
5.1.6. Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................................................................43
5.1.6.1. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection....................................................................43
5.1.6.2. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended) ...........................................................43
5.1.6.3. FPT_PST.2 Availability protection of stored TSF data (Extended).................................................43
5.1.6.4. FPT_RCV.4 Function recovery ............................................................................................................43
5.1.6.5. FPT_TST.1 TSF self-testing...................................................................................................................43
5.1.7. TOE access.........................................................................................................................................................44
5.1.7.1. FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions.............................44
5.1.7.2. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended) ..................................................44
5.1.7.3. FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment ......................................................................................44
5.2 Security assurance requirements ...............................................................................................................................44
5.2.1. Security target ..................................................................................................................................................45
5.2.1.1. ASE_INT.1 Security target introduction ............................................................................................45
5.2.1.2. ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claim..........................................................................................................46
5.2.1.3. ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ................................................47
5.2.1.4. ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition..................................................................................48
5.2.1.5. ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements........................................................................................49
5.2.1.6. ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification.............................................................................................50
5.2.2. Development ....................................................................................................................................................50
5.2.2.1. ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification.........................................................................................50
5.2.3. Guidance documents ......................................................................................................................................51
5.2.3.1. AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance ...........................................................................................51
5.2.3.2. AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures .................................................................................................52
5.2.4. Life-cycle support.............................................................................................................................................53
5.2.4.1. ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE........................................................................................................53
5.2.4.2. ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage............................................................................................................54
5.2.5. Tests ...................................................................................................................................................................54
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5.2.5.1. ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing............................................................................................................54
5.2.5.2. ATE_IND.1 Independent testing: conformance ........................................................................55
5.2.6. Vulnerability assessment................................................................................................................................56
5.2.6.1. AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey........................................................................................................56
5.3. Security requirements rationale................................................................................................................................56
5.3.1. Dependency rationale of security functional requirements .....................................................................56
5.3.2. Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements......................................................................58
6. TOE summary specification............................................................................................................................................59
6.1 TOE security functions..................................................................................................................................................59
6.1.1. Security audit (FAU).........................................................................................................................................59
6.1.1.1 Audit data generation ..........................................................................................................................59
6.1.1.2. Look up/search audit data..................................................................................................................59
6.1.1.3. Protect audit data................................................................................................................................60
6.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS) ..........................................................................................................................60
6.1.3. User data protection .......................................................................................................................................61
6.1.3.1. Electronic Document Encryption access control.............................................................................61
6.1.3.2. Electronic Document Usage access control.....................................................................................61
6.1.4. Identification and authentication..................................................................................................................62
6.1.4.1. Administrator identification and authentication ............................................................................62
6.1.4.2. User identification and authentication.............................................................................................62
6.1.4.3. TOE Internal mutual authentication .................................................................................................63
6.1.4.4. Prevention of authentication information reuse ............................................................................63
6.1.5. Security management (FMT)..........................................................................................................................64
6.1.5.1. Common management .......................................................................................................................64
6.1.5.2. Management of permission settings of secured documents........................................................64
6.1.6. Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................................................................64
6.1.6.1. Protection of the TSF data..................................................................................................................64
6.1.6.2. Client program recovery .....................................................................................................................65
6.1.7. TOE access (FTA)...............................................................................................................................................65
6.1.7.1. Session management ..........................................................................................................................65
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1. ST Introduction
1.1 ST reference
Item Specification
Title FED 5 SP1 Security Target
Version 1.2
Created by Business Strategy team, Fasoo Co., Ltd.
Date created 2022.11.01
Evaluation Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Common Criteria
version
CC v3.1 R5
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1+ (ATE_FUN.1)
Keywords Document, Encryption
1.2 TOE reference
Item Specification
TOE FED 5 SP1
Version 5.4.0.2
Components FED Server
(Management
Server)
FED 5 Server 1.4.0.2
Software
(CD)
FED Client
(Agent)
FED 5 Client 1.4.0.2
FED Packager
(API module)
FED 5 Packager 1.4.0.2
Guidance Documents FED 5 SP1_AGD_OPE(admin)_1.2
PDF
(CD)
FED 5 SP1_AGD_OPE(user)_1.2
FED 5 SP1_AGD_OPE(developer)_1.2
FED 5 SP1_AGD_PRE_1.2
Developer Fasoo Co., Ltd.
1.3 TOE overview
‘FED 5 SP1' (hereinafter referred to as “TOE”) is used to protect important documents managed by the
organization. The TOE encrypts electronic documents to protect the important documents managed by the
organization according to the policy set by the administrator, and a document is decrypted according to the
document user’s request and right.
The TOE can encrypt or decrypt documents to be protected by specifying individual documents, document
types, document paths, etc., and the TOE encrypt the entire contents of the documents.
The primary security features provided by the TOE include the encryption/decryption of the document to be
protected and cryptographic key management. For this encryption function, the TOE uses a validated
cryptographic module, Fasoo Crypto Framework V2.4.
1.3.1 TOE type
The TOE is “Electronic Document Encryption” that prevents information leakage by encrypting/decrypting
important documents within the organization and is provided as software. The TOE supports both of “user
device encryption” type and “information system encryption” type.
The FED Server, FED Client, and FED Packager are the indispensable TOE components that perform the security
features of the TOE.
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1.3.2 TOE usage and major security features
The TOE performs document encryption/decryption according to the policy set by the administrator in order to
protect the important documents managed within the organization, it includes the cryptographic key
management function. Besides, the TOE also provides other functions, such as the security audit function that
records major events at the time of starting up the security or management function as the audit data for
management, identification and authentication function (e.g., administrator and document user identity
verification, authentication failure processing, and mutual authentication among TOE components), security
management function for security function, role definition, and configuration, the function of protecting the
data stored in the repository controlled by the TSF, TSF protection function like the TSF’s self-test, and the TOE
access function to manage the interacting session of the authorized administrator.
The TOE uses the data encryption key (hereinafter referred to as “DEK”) and key encryption key (hereinafter
referred to as “KEK”) for the document encryption/decryption function. The main body of the protected
document is encrypted with the DEK according to the policy set by the administrator, and the DEK is stored in
the header of the security document. When the DEK is stored in the header, it is encrypted with the KEK.
The FED Server generates the KEK and distributes it to the mutually-authenticated FED Client. At this time, the
cryptographic key is distributed safely through encrypted communication. The FED Client generates the DEK
and encrypts the main body of the protected document and decrypts the encrypted main body using the DEK.
The FED Client encrypts the DEK using the distributed KEK and stores the encrypted DEK in the header. The FED
Packager generates the DEK upon the document encryption request from the information system and encrypts
the main body of the protected document. The FED Packager encrypts the DEK using the server’s public key
issued by the FED Server and stores the encrypted DEK in the document header.
Each component of the TOE provides a cryptographic key destruction function if the cryptographic key is not
used anymore.
The administrator can specify documents that shall be encrypted/decrypted through the FED Server, and assign
the document access right to the document user. Only the authorized document user can encrypt/decrypt the
document, as the FED Server distributes a cryptographic key to the document user according to policy
configured.
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1.3.3 Non-TOE and TOE operational environment
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment where the TOE is operated. The TOE is composed of the FED
Server, FED Client, and FED Packager and should be installed and operated inside the internal network of the
protected organization.
[Figure 1] TOE operational environment
The TOE is composed of the FED Server which manages the security policy and cryptographic key, the FED
Client that performs Electronic Document encryption/decryption installed in the user PC, and the FED Packager
that performs Electronic Document encryption installed in the information system in the form of API module. A
wrapper is used for compatibility between the FED Packager and various information systems, but it is excluded
from the scope of the TOE
The administrator sets the policy for each document user or information system through the FED Server, which
distributes the policy and cryptographic key configured by the administrator to the FED Client and FED Packager.
The FED Client performs Electronic Document encryption/decryption using the validated cryptographic module
according to the distributed policy, and the encrypted/decrypted document is stored in the user PC as a file.
Upon the request from the information system, the FED Packager performs Electronic Document
encryption/decryption using the validated cryptographic module according to the distributed policy, and the
encrypted document is stored in the user device and information system.
The validated cryptographic module, Fasoo Crypto Framework V2.4, is used for the cryptographic operation of
the major security features of the TOE. For the communication between the TOP component and the
administrator (e.g., when the administrator accesses the FED Server using the web browser and web server to
configure policies), TLS 1.2 is used.
As other external entities necessary for the operation of the TOE, there is the email server to send alerts by
email to the authorized administrator.
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The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE are as in the following.
[Table 1] TOE installation requirements
Component Requirement
FED Server HW CPU : Intel Xeon 2GHz or higher
Memory : 8GB or higher
HDD : 500GB or higher for the installation of TOE
NIC : 100/1000 Mbps 1Port or higher
SW Jetty 10
OpenJDK 17
MariaDB 10.6
OS Linux Ubuntu 20.04 [Kernel 5.4] (64bit)
FED Packager HW CPU : Intel Xeon 2GHz or higher
Memory : 4GB or higher
HDD : 1GB or higher for the installation of TOE
NIC : 100/1000 Mbps 1Port or higher
SW OpenJDK 17
OS Linux Ubuntu 20.04 [Kernel 5.4] (64bit)
FED Client HW CPU : Intel Core2 Duo 2GHz or higher
Memory : 4GB or higher
HDD : 200GB or higher for the installation of TOE
NIC : 100/1000 Mbps 1Port or higher
OS Windows 10 Pro (32, 64)
SW Visual C++ 2008 redistributable 9.0.30729.17
The external IT entities and software necessary for the operation of the TOE are as in the following, and the
following are excluded from the scope of the assessment.
⚫ SMTP server used to send security alerts by email to the administrator
⚫ DBMS to store audit data of the FED Server
- MariaDB 10.6
⚫ Web application server used by the FED Server
- Jetty 10
⚫ Environment to operate the FED Server and FED Packager
- OpenJDK 17
⚫ For installation of the FED Client, required library must be installed for compatibility.
- Visual C++ 2008 redistributable 9.0.30729.17
⚫ Software that supports the document types that FED Client can encrypt
- MS Notepad, MS Wordpad, MS Paint
- Microsoft Office 2019
- Hancom Office 2020
- Acrobat Reader DC
- Autodesk AutoCAD 2021
The requirements for the administrator PC for TOE security management are as in the following
Component Requirement
SW Chrome 98
1.4 TOE description
1.4.1. Physical scope of the TOE
The TOE is composed of the FED Server, FED Client, FED Packager, and FED guidance documents. The FED
Server is software that provides functions of sending the policy and license to the FED Client for the security
policy to be applied. The FED Client is software that controls the permissions to use secured documents
according to the policy and licensed sent by the FED Server. The FED Packager is software that is integrated
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with the information system server and performs Electronic Document encryption for documents stored in the
information system server. The components of the distributed TOE are as follows.
TOE
component
FED 5 Server 1.4.0.2
(FED5_Server_1.4.0.2.tar)
Software
(Distributed as a
CD)
FED 5 Client 1.4.0.2
(FED5_Client_1.4.0.2.exe, FED5_Client_1.4.0.2_x64.exe)
FED 5 Packager 1.4.0.2
(FED5_Packager_1.4.0.2.tar)
FED
Guidance
documents
FED 5 SP1_AGD_OPE(admin)_1.2
(FED 5 SP1_AGD_OPE(admin)_1.2.pdf)
PDF
(Distributed as a
CD)
FED 5 SP1_AGD_OPE(user)_1.2
(FED 5 SP1_AGD_OPE(user)_1.2.pdf)
FED 5 SP1_AGD_OPE(developer)_1.2
(FED 5 SP1_AGD_OPE(developer)_1.2.pdf)
FED 5 SP1_AGD_PRE_1.2
(FED 5 SP1_AGD_PRE_1.2.pdf)
※ The FED 5 Packager 1.4.0.2 is installed as an API module in the information system server and provides the
document encryption function in the information system through the wrapper, and does not provide the
security function by itself.
The hardware and operation system where the TOE is installed, the word processing program that a user uses,
the wrapper for compatibility with information systems and external systems and other software necessary to
operate the TOE are excluded from the scope of the TOE.
[Figure 2] TOE’s physical scope
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1.4.2. Logical scope of the TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is as in [Figure 3] below.
[Figure 3] TOE’s logical scope
1.4.2.1 Security audit
The TOE creates and records audit data of the events relating to the start/end of the audit functions and
security functions in the DBMS. Among the audit data, the document usage log can selectively generate audit
data by event type. The authorized administrator can view the stored audit records and search for the records
by various criteria such as ID, date and event type.
If any potential security violation such as integrity violation, self-test failure, and audit trail amount exceed is
detected, the TOE sends an email to the administrator to inform the administrator of the potential violation. In
case of a situation when the audit data storage limit exceeds, the TOE sends an alert by email to the
administrator and overwrites the old data.
1.4.2.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE performs cryptographic operation and cryptographic key management such as generation, distribution
and destruction through Fasoo Crypto Framework V2.4. HASH_DRBG is used to generate document encryption
key (DEK) and RSAES-OAEP algorithm is used to generate the key pair based on the public key. The key
encryption key (KEK) is also generated using HASH_DRBG in the same way as the document encryption key
(DEK). For secure key distribution among components, RSAES-OAEP is used.
The TOE performs operation in the ARIA-CTR mode for encryption/decryption of document, and in the ARIA-
CBC or RSA-OAEP mode for encryption/decryption of encryption key. For generating the message
authentication code in the header of the secured document, HMAC_SHA-256 is used, and for the signature of
transmission data and policy file, RSASSA-PSS is used. The authentication data of the administrator and
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document user are saved (one-way encryption) using SHA-256. For destruction of the encryption key after use,
it is overwritten with ‘0’ three times in memory.
1.4.2.3 User data protection
The TOE protects user data.
1) The TOE creates a secured document by encrypting a plain document and protects the secured
document by controlling access to the secured document according to the policy by user set by
the administrator. The policy is set differently depending on the user ID, group, role, job title,
group head, document owner, or document class. Permissions to access the secured documents
are view, edit, print, screen capture, change permission, extract, decrypt, change class, macro,
allowed time period to view, revoke, etc. and depending on the permissions granted, access to
the secured document is controlled.
2) The secured document is encrypted through the cryptographic support function so that only
authorized users can use the secured document. Even if the secured document is sent through a
distribution path, unauthorized users cannot access the document.
The FED Client of the TOE encrypts a document as a secured document when it is saved or downloaded in a
user PC and protects the secured document. Also, the FED Packager of the TOE encrypts a document as a
secured document upon a request from the information system and protects the document in transit.
The file formats that the FED Client of the TOE supports encryption are as follows.
Application File format (extension)
Hancom Office hwp
MS Office Word. doc, docx,
MS Office Powerpoint ppt, pptx
MS Office Excel xls, xlsx
Adobe Reader pdf
Autodesk AutoCAD dwg
NOTEPAD txt
MS Paint jpg, png
Wordpad rtf
1.4.2.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE provides identification and authentication process based on ID/PW for the administrators and
document users. Only the authorized administrators can manage the security functions through the web
browser. The identification and authentication process of a user are performed through the FED Client, and
when the user login to the FED Client, the FED Server and FED Client go through a mutual authentication
process.
When an administrator or user enters password to login to the FED Server or FED Client, it is masked to prevent
disclosure and in case of authentication failure, the reason is not provided. In addition, the password must be
at least 12 characters in length, with at least one alphabetic character, numeric character, and special character.
If the number of authentication failures by the administrator or user exceeds the threshold, the account will be
locked.
The reuse of the authentication information used when an administrator login to the FED Server is prevented.
When an administrator attempts to login through a web browser, a NONCE value generated by the random bit
generator is first issued from the FED Server and stored in the session. After that, when the administrator
attempts to login to the FED Server with the ID and password through the browser, the entered ID, password,
and NONCE value are sent to the FED Server. Then, the server checks whether the received NONCE value
matches the value stored in the session. If it does match, the authentication process proceeds. When the
process is complete, the NONCE value stored in the session is destroyed to prevent reuse.
The reuse of the authentication information used when a user login to the FED Client is prevented. When a
user attempts to login, a NONCE value generated by the random bit generator is first issued from the FED
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Server and stored in the DB with the user ID. After that, when the user attempts to login to the FED Client with
the ID and password, the entered ID, password, and NONCE value are sent to the FED Server. Then, the server
checks whether the received user ID and NONCE value match the values stored in the DB. If it does match, the
authentication process proceeds. When the process is complete, the NONCE value stored in the DB is
destroyed to prevent reuse.
1.4.2.5 Security management
Only the authorized administrator who can access the management interface provided by TOE can performs
security management. In case of initial access to the interface, the administrator ID/PW should be registered
first. The authorized administrator can manage security function, security attribute and TSF data, and provide
security functions using the general setting, document class and security policy menus provided by TOE’s
management interface. In addition to this, the administrator can add more document users and create or
modify user IDs and passwords. Administrators can be added more if needed, but the newly authorized
administrators can access only the menus allowed by the initial administrator.
1.4.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE communicates securely to protect transmission data between components and secures confidentiality
and integrity. The TOE also protects TSF data against unauthorized exposure and modification through
encryption, digital signature and proprietary encoding.
The TOE periodically performs self-tests and integrity checks when operating, and prevents process
termination and file deletion by conducting mutual monitoring between TOE related processes so that the
running agent is not terminated. In case of integrity corruption, the TOE provides automated recovery function.
1.4.2.7 TOE access
The TOE terminates the login session after a time interval of inactivity from logging in for secure session
management of the authorized administrator or document user. If logging in with an account, after logging in
with the same account from one device, from another device is tried, the new connection attempt is blocked,
and administrators can access only from the devices whose IP is designated as accessible.
1.5 Terms and definitions
Terms used in this ST, which are the same as in the CC, follow those in the CC.
Private Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely associated with an
entity (the subject using the private key), not to be disclosed
Object
Passive entity in the TOE containing or receiving information and on which subjects perform operations
Approved cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm selected by Korean Cryptographic Module Validation Authority for block cipher,
secure hash algorithm, message authentication code, random bit generation, key agreement, public key cipher,
digital signatures cryptographic algorithms considering safety, reliability and interoperability
Validated Cryptographic Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a validation number by validation authority
Attack potential
Measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE expressed as an attacker's expertise, resources and
motivation
Public Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is associated with an unique
15
entity (the subject using the public key), it can be disclosed
Public Key (asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm that uses a pair of public and private keys
Management access
The access to the TOE by using the HTTPS, SSH, TLS, IPSec, etc. to manage the TOE by administrator, remotely
Recommend/be recommended
The ‘recommend’ or ‘be recommended’ presented in Application notes is not mandatorily recommended, but
required to be applied for secure operations of the TOE
Random bit generator (RBG)
A device or algorithm that outputs a binary sequence that is statistically independent and is not biased. The
RBG used for cryptographic application generally generates 0 and 1 bit string, and the sequence can be
combined into a random bit block. The RBG is classified into the deterministic and non-deterministic type. The
deterministic type RBG is composed of an algorithm that generates bit strings from the initial value called a
“seed key,” and the non-deterministic type RBG produces output that depends on the unpredictable physical
source.
Symmetric cryptographic technique
Encryption scheme that uses the same secret key in mode of encryption and decryption, also known as secret
key cryptographic technique
Data Encryption Key (DEK)
Key that encrypts the data
Local access
The access to the TOE by using the console port to manage the TOE by administrator, directly
Word processing program
Program used to process the important documents, such as generation, modification, manipulation, and print
of documents (e.g., Hangul word processor, MS word processor, Acrobat, Excel, Computer Aided Design (CAD),
etc.)
Iteration
Use of the same component to express two or more distinct requirements
Security Target (ST)
Implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE
Protection Profile (PP)
Implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type
Decryption
The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
Secret Key
A cryptographic key which is used in a symmetric cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely associated with one
or several entity, not to be disclosed
User
See “external entity”, a user means authorized administrator and authorized document user
16
Selection
Specification of one or more items from a list in a component
Identity
Representation uniquely identifying entities (e.g., user, process or disk) within the context of the TOE
Encryption
The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext using the encryption key
KCMVP, Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program
A system to validate the security and implementation conformance of cryptographic modules used for the
protection of important but not classified information among the data communicated through the information
and communication network of the government and public institutions
Element
Indivisible statement of a security need
Role
Predefined set of rules on permissible interactions between a user and the TOE
Operation (on a component of the CC)
Modification or repetition of a component. Allowed operations on components are assignment, iteration,
refinement and selection
Operation (on a subject)
Specific type of action performed by a subject on an object
External Entity
Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary
Threat Agent
Entity that can adversely act on assets
Authorized Administrator
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE
Authorized Document User
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE
Authentication Data
Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user
Application Programming Interface (API)
A set of system libraries existing between the application layer and the platform system, enables the easy
development of the application running on the platform
Self-tests
Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the cryptographic module
Assets
Entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon
17
Refinement
Addition of details to a component
Access Control List (ACL)
The list including entities who are permitted to access the entity and the types of these permission
Information System
Systematic system of devices and software related to the collection, processing, storage, search, sending,
receiving, and utilization of the information
Organizational Security Policies
Set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines for an organization wherein the set is currently given by actual
or virtual organizations, or is going to be given
Dependency
Relationship between components such that if a requirement based on the depending component is included
in a PP, ST or package, a requirement based on the component that is depended upon must normally also be
included in the PP, ST or package
Subject
Active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects
Augmentation
Addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package
Component
Smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements may be based
Class
Set of CC families that share a common focus
Key Encryption Key (KEK)
Key that encrypts another cryptographic key
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
Set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)
Set of assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a point on the CC predefined assurance
scale, that form an assurance package
Family
Set of components that share a similar goal but differ in emphasis or rigo
Assignment
The specification of an identified parameter in a component (of the CC) or requirement
Shall/must
The ‘shall’ or ‘must’ presented in Application notes indicates mandatory requirements applied to the TOE
Can/could
The ‘can’ or ‘could’ presented in Application notes indicates optional requirements applied to the TOE by ST
author’s choice
18
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
Security-related information that, if exposed or changed, may compromise the security of the cryptographic
module (e.g., secret/private key, authentication data such as a password or personal identification number)
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the
correct enforcement of the SFRs
TSF Data
Data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement of the SFR relies
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
This is a security protocol proposed by Netscape to ensure confidentiality, integrity and security over a
computer network
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
This is a cryptographic protocol between a SSL-based server and a client and is described in RFC 2246
Wrapper
Interface to connect the TOE with various types of information system
Document Class
The permission of users for using documents is defined in the document class by the authorized administrator.
At least one document class should be set for operating the FED 5 service, and at the time when a FED-N
document is created, one of the document classes is selected for the created document.
Permission
Logical unit that allows authorized users to manipulate data in secured documents (e.g., view, edit, print,
screen capture, extract, decrypt, change permission, macro, allowed time period to view, revoke, etc.)
Encryption Policy
Policy that defines how to create FED-N documents. There are 4 types of encryption - encryption upon user
selection, encryption by application, encryption by extension and batch encryption.
Secured document
Documents encrypted by the FED Client or FED Packager and of which the usage is controlled by the FED Client
Encryption Key Password
Password that acts as an input to derive the actual secure encryption key used for encryption when the FED
Server saves important parameters. The administrator should generate the encryption key password at the
first login after installing the FED Server and enter it every time when starting the FED Server service.
FED
The abbreviation for Fasoo Enterprise DRM, a digital rights management (DRM) solution provided by Fasoo Co.,
Ltd.
FED-N Secured Document
Secured document created on a user PC and encrypted according to the document encryption policy. It is
subject to the document class where the permission of users for using the document is defined.
FED-R License
19
Information containing the permission of users for using the FED-R document. It is issued by the FED Server in
connection with the ACL of the information system when an authorized user tries to access the document.
FED-R Secured Document
Secured document encrypted by the FED Packager. When a document is downloaded from the information
system, the document is encrypted by the FED Packager. Unlike FED-N secured documents, the access to the
FED-R secured documents is controlled by the ACL permission policy of the information system.
CRM (Customer relationship management)
Processes implemented to manage a company's interactions with customers and prospects.
1.6 Conventions
The notation, formatting and conventions used in this ST are consistent with the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation.
The CC allows several operations to be performed for functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection
and refinement. Each operation is used in this PP.
Iteration
Iteration is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. The result of iteration is marked with
an iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier, i.e., denoted as (iteration No.).
Assignment
This is used to assign specific values to unspecified parameters (e.g., password length). The result of
assignment is indicated in square brackets like [ assignment_value ].
Selection
This is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. The result of selection
is shown as underlined and italicized.
Refinement
This is used to add details and thus further restrict a requirement. The result of refinement is shown in bold
text.
“Application notes” is provided in this ST to clarify the intent of requirements, provide the information for the
optional items in implementation, and define "Pass/Fail" criteria for a requirement. The application notes is
provided with corresponding requirements if necessary.
20
2. Conformance claim
2.1 CC, PP and package conformance claim
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 5
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation. Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version
3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-001, April, 2017)
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation. Part 2: Security Functional Components, Version
3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-002, April, 2017)
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation. Part 3: Security Assurance Components, Version
3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017)
Part 2 Security functional
components
Extended: FCS_RGB.1, FIA_IMA.1, FMT_PWD.1, FPT_PST.1, FPT_PST.2,
FTA_SSL.5
Part 3 Security assurance
components
Conformant
PP Korean National Protection Profile for Electronic Document Encryption
V1.1
Package Augmented : EAL1 augmented(ATE_FUN.1)
2.2 Conformance claim rationale
This ST claims conformance to security objectives and security requirements by strict adherence to ‘Korean
National Protection Profile for Electronic Document Encryption V1.1’.
[Table 2] Conformance claim rationale
Item PP ST Rationale
TOE type Electronic Document
encryption
Electronic Document
encryption
Same as PP
Security
functional
components
FAU_ARP.1 FAU_ARP.1 Same as PP
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 Same as PP
FAU_SAA.1 FAU_SAA.1 Same as PP
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 Same as PP
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.3 Same as PP
FAU_SEL.1 FAU_SEL.1 Same as PP
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.3 Same as PP
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.4 Same as PP
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.1(1) Same as PP
FCS_CKM.1(2) Same as PP
FCS_CKM.1(3) Same as PP
FCS_CKM.1(4) Same as PP
FCS_CKM.1(5) Same as PP
FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.2 Same as PP
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4 Same as PP
FCS_COP.1 FCS_COP.1(1) Same as PP
FCS_COP.1(2) Same as PP
FCS_COP.1(3) Same as PP
FCS_COP.1(4) Same as PP
FCS_COP.1(5) Same as PP
21
FCS_RBG.1(extended) FCS_RBG.1(extended) Same as PP
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(1) Same as PP
FDP_ACC.1(2) Same as PP
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(1) Same as PP
FDP_ACF.1(2) Same as PP
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_AFL.1 Same as PP
FIA_IMA.1 FIA_IMA.1 Same as PP
FIA_SOS.1 FIA_SOS.1 Same as PP
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 Same as PP
FIA_UAU.4 FIA_UAU.4 Same as PP
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.7 Same as PP
FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 Same as PP
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_MOF.1 Same as PP
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1 Same as PP
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 Same as PP
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1 Same as PP
FMT_PWD.1(extended) FMT_PWD.1(extended) Same as PP
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 Same as PP
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 Same as PP
FPT_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1 Same as PP
FPT_PST.1(extended) FPT_PST.1(extended) Same as PP
FPT_PST.2(extended) FPT_PST.2(extended) Same as PP
FPT_RCV.4 FPT_RCV.4 Added when creating ST
FPT.TST.1 FPT.TST.1 Same as PP
FTA_MCS.2 FTA_MCS.2 Same as PP
FTA_SSL.5(extended) FTA_SSL.5(extended) Same as PP
FTA_TSE.1 FTA_TSE.1 Same as PP
Security
assurance
components
ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1 Same as PP
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1 Same as PP
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1 Same as PP
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1 Same as PP
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1 Same as PP
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1 Same as PP
ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1 Same as PP
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1 Same as PP
AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1 Same as PP
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1 Same as PP
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1 Same as PP
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1 Same as PP
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1 Same as PP
AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1 Same as PP
22
3. Security objectives
The followings are the security objectives handled by technical and procedural method supported from
operational environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality accurately.
3.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
The following table describes the security objectives for the operational environment.
[Table 3] Security objectives for the operational environment
Item Description
OE. PHYSICAL_CONTROL The place where the management server among the TOE components are
installed and operated shall be equipped with access control and protection
facilities so that only authorized administrator can access.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users, have
appropriately trained for the TOE management functions and accurately fulfill
the duties in accordance with administrator guidance.
OE.LOG_BACKUP The authorized administrator shall periodically checks a spare space of audit
data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data
backup (external log server or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent audit
data loss.
OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_RE
INFORCEMENT
The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and
security of the operating system by removing all unnecessary services or
means and performing the reinforcement on the latest vulnerabilities of the
operating system in which the TOE is installed and operated.
OE.SECURE_DEVELOPMENT The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification
and authentication function in the operational environment of the business
system shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely
applied in accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the
TOE.
OE.PREVENTION_AUDIT_DA
TA_LOSS
The audit record where the audit trail, such as the DBMS interacting with the
TOE, is saved should be protected against unauthorized deletion or
modification.
OE.RELIABLE_TIME_STAMP The TOE shall accurately record the security related events using the reliable
time stamp from the TOE operational environment.
OE.MANAGEMENT_ACCESS For communication between the web browser of the administrator PC and
the web server which is the operation environment of the management
server, TLS 1.2 shall be used to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of
the transmitted data.
23
4. Extended components definition
4.1 Cryptographic support
4.1.1. Random bit generation
Family Behaviour
This family defines requirements for the TSF to provide the capability that generates random bits required for
TOE cryptographic operation.
Component leveling
FCS_RBG Random bit generation 1
FCS_RBG.1 random bit generation, requires the TSF to provide the capability that generates random bits
required for TOE cryptographic operation.
Management: FCS_RBG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RBG.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
4.1.1.1. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FCS_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bits required to generate a cryptographic key using the
specified random bit generator that meets the following [assignment: list of standards].
4.2 FIA, Identification & authentication
4.2.1. TOE Internal mutual authentication
Family Behaviour
This family defines requirements for providing mutual authentication function between TOE components in the
process of user identification and authentication.
Component leveling
FIA_IMA TOE Internal mutual authentication 1
FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication requires that the TSF provides mutual authentication function
between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.
Management: FIA_IMA.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
24
Audit: FIA_IMA.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Success and failure of mutual authentication
4.2.1.1. FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [assignment: different
parts of TOE] by [assignment: authentication protocol] that meets the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
4.3 Security management
4.3.1. ID and password
Family Behaviour
This family defines the capability that is required to control ID and password management used in the TOE, and
set or modifies ID and/or password by authorized users.
Component leveling
FMT_PWD ID and password 1
FMT_PWD.1 ID and password management, requires that the TSF provides the management function of ID and
password.
Management : FMT_PWD.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Management of ID and password configuration rules.
Audit: FMT_PWD.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
PP/ST:
a) Minimal: All changes of the password.
4.3.1.1. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [assignment: list of
functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
1. [assignment: password combination rules and/or length]
2. [assignment: other management such as management of special
characters unusable for password, etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [assignment: list of
functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
1. [assignment: ID combination rules and/or length]
25
2. [assignment: other management such as management of
special characters unusable for ID,etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for [selection, choose one of: setting ID and
password when installing, setting password when installing, changing the ID and
password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time, changing the
password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time].
4.4 TSF Protection of the TSF
4.4.1. Protection of stored TSF data
Family Behaviour
This family defines rules to protect the TSF data stored within containers controlled by the TSF from the
unauthorized modification or disclosure.
Component leveling
FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data requires the protection of TSF data stored in containers
controlled by the TSF.
FPT_PST.2 Availability protection of TSF data requires the TSF to ensure the defined levels of availability for the
TSF data.
Management: FPT_PST.1, FPT_PST.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_PST.1, FPT_PST.2
There are no auditable events foreseen.
4.4.1.1. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [assignment: TSF data] stored in containers controlled by the TSF
from the unauthorized [selection: disclosure, modification].
4.4.1.2. FPT_PST.2 Availability protection of TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.2.1 The TSF shall [selection: detect, prevent] the unauthorized deletion for [assignment: TSF
data].
FPT_PST.2.2 The TSF shall [selection: detect, prevent] the unauthorized termination for [assignment:
TSF data].
26
4.5 TOE Access
4.5.1. Session locking and termination
Family Behavior
This family defines requirements for the TSF to provide the capability for TSF-initiated and user-initiated
locking, unlocking, and termination of interactive sessions.
Component leveling
In CC Part 2, the session locking and termination family consists of four components. In this ST, it consists of
five components by extending one additional component as follows.
※ The relevant description for four components contained in CC Part 2 is omitted.
FTA_SSL.5 The management of TSF-initiated sessions, provides requirements that the TSF locks or terminates
the session after a specified time interval of user inactivity.
Management: FTA_SSL.5
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Specification for the time interval of user inactivity during which the session locking and termination occurs
to each user
b) Specification for the time interval of default user inactivity during which the session locking and termination
occurs.
Audit: FTA_SSL.5
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Locking or termination of interactive session
4.5.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FIA_UAU.1 authentication or No dependencies.]
FTA_SSL.5.1 The TSF shall [selection: lock the session and re-authenticate the user before unlocking
the session, terminate] an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of user
inactivity].
FTA_SSL Session locking and termination
27
5. Security requirements
The security requirements specify security functional requirements and assurance requirements that must be
satisfied by the TOE.
The following table defines all the subjects, objects, operations, security attributes used in the security
functional requirements:
[Table 4] Definition of subjects, objects, relevant security properties and operations
Subject (user)
Subject (user)
security
attributes
Object (information)
Object
(information)
security
attributes
Operation
Authorized
administrator
User ID,
Password,
IP address
Security management data
-
Query, modify
Authentication data Query, modify
Organization chart
management data
Query, modify
Administrator permission
setting data
Query, modify
Security policy setting data Query, modify
Audit data Query
Cryptographic key data Query, modify
Certificate data Query, modify
Authorized
document user
User ID,
Group code,
Job role,
Job title,
Head of group
FED-N secured documents
Document class,
Owner ID,
Owner group
code
View
Edit
Encrypt
Decrypt
Print
Screen capture
Change permission
Extract
Change class
Macro
Period of usage
Revoke
User ID FED-R secured documents
System name,
Document ID
View
Edit
Encrypt
Decrypt
Print
Screen capture
Extract
5.1 Security functional requirements
[Table 5] Security functional requirements
Security
functional class
Security functional component
FAU
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
28
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FCS
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (Electronic Document Encryption
- FED Client)
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (Electronic Document Encryption
- FED Packager)
FCS_CKM.1(3) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption - FED
Server)
FCS_CKM.1(4) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption - FED Client)
FCS_CKM.1(5) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption - FED
Packager)
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (Electronic Document Encryption -
FED Client)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (Electronic Document Encryption -
FED Packager)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption - FED Server)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption - FED Client)
FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption - FED Packager)
FCS_RBG.1(Extended) Random bit generation
FDP
FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control (Electronic Document Encryption access
control)
FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset access control (Electronic Document Usage access
control)
FDP_ACF.1(1) Security attribute-based access control (Electronic Document
Encryption access control)
FDP_ACF.1(2) Security attribute-based access control (Electronic Document
Usage access control)
FIA
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_PWD.1(Extended) Management of ID and password
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
29
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transmission protection
FPT_PST.1(Extended) Basic protection of stored TSF data
FPT_PST.2(Extended) Availability protection of TSF data
FPT_TST.1 TSF self-testing
FPT_RCV.4 Function recovery
FTA
FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_SSL.5(Extended) Management of TSF-initiated sessions
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
5.1.1. Security audit
5.1.1.1. FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis.
FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [sending email to the administrator] upon detection of a potential
security violation.
5.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps.
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) [Refer to the “auditable events” in [Table 6] Audit events, [none]].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the ST [ Refer to the contents of “additional
audit record” in [Table 6] Audit events, [none]].
[Table 6] Audit events
Functional
component
Auditable event Additional audit record
FAU_ARP.1 Actions taken due to potential security violations
FAU_SAA.1 Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis mechanisms,
automated responses performed by the tool
FAU_STG.3 Actions taken due to exceeding of a threshold
FAU_STG.4 Actions taken due to the audit storage failure
FCS_CKM.1 Success and failure of the activity
FCS_CKM.2 Success and failure of the activity
(applying to distribution of key related to Electronic
Document Encryption)
FCS_CKM.4 Success and failure of the activity (applying to destruction of
key related to Electronic Document Encryption)
FCS_COP.1 Success and failure, and the type of cryptographic operation
30
FDP_ACF.1 Successful request of operation execution regarding the
object handled by SFP
Object identification
information
FIA_AFL.1 The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful
authentication attempts and the actions taken, and the
subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state
FIA_IMA.1
(Extended)
Success and failure of mutual authentication
FIA_UAU.1 All use of the authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 Attempts to reuse authentication data
FIA_UID.1 All use of the user identification mechanism, including the
user identity provided
FMT_MOF.1 All modifications in the behaviour of the functions in the TSF
FMT_MSA.1 All modifications to the security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Modifications to the basic settings of allowance or
restriction rules
All modifications to the initial values of security attributes
FMT_MTD.1 All modifications to the values of TSF data Modified values of TSF data
FMT_PWD.1
(Extended)
All changes of the password
FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the user group of rules divided
FPT_TST.1 TSF self-testing and the results of the tests Modified TSF data or
module information in case
of integrity violation
FTA_MCS.2 Denial of a new session based on the limitation of multiple
concurrent sessions
FTA_SSL.5
(Extended)
Locking or termination of interactive session
FTA_TSE.1 Denial of a session establishment due to the session
establishment mechanism
All attempts at establishment of a user session
5.1.1.3. FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and
based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.
FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events:
a) Accumulation or combination of [integrity violation and self-test failure of the
validated cryptographic module, the reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful
login attempts/audit trail, overwriting the oldest stored audit records if the audit trail
is full, Control rules violation] known to indicate a potential security violation;
b) [none]
5.1.1.4. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide the [authorized administrator] with the capability to read [all the
audit data] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the authorized
31
administrator to interpret the information.
5.1.1.5. FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [descending order by time] of audit data
based on [and operation].
[Table 7] Searching conditions for audit data
Type of audit records Basic search conditions
Administrator audit log User ID, name, IP address, period, task type, accessible menu
Document usage log User ID, name, document name, IP address, period, document type, document
class, usage type, result
System usage log User ID, name, IP address, period, usage type, result
5.1.1.6. FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FMT_MTD.1 TSF Management of TSF data
FAU_SEL.1.1 The TSF shall be able to select the set of events to be audited from the set of all
auditable events based on the following attributes:
a) event type
b) [none]
5.1.1.7. FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [notify the authorized administrator, [none]], if the audit trail exceeds
[the threshold set by the authorized administrator].
5.1.1.8. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [send a notification email
to the authorized administrator] if the audit trail is full.
5.1.2. Cryptographic support
5.1.2.1. FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (Electronic Document Encryption – FED Client)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [Cryptographic key generation algorithm in [Table 8]] and a
specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size in [Table 8]] that meet the
following [List of standards in [Table 8]].
32
[Table 8] Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Cryptographic key generation
algorithm
cryptographic key size List of standards
HASH_DRBG 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0190
5.1.2.2. FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (Electronic Document Encryption - FED Packager)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [Cryptographic key generation algorithm in [Table 9]] and a
specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size in [Table 9]] that meet the
following [List of standards in [Table 9]].
[Table 9] Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Cryptographic key generation
algorithm
cryptographic key size List of standards
HASH_DRBG 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0190
5.1.2.3. FCS_CKM.1(3) Cryptographic key generation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Server)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [Cryptographic key generation algorithm in [Table 10]] and a
specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size in [Table 10]] that meet the
following [List of standards in [Table 10]].
[Table 10] Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Cryptographic key generation
algorithm
cryptographic key size List of standards
RSAES-OAEP 2048bit KS X ISO/IEC 18033
HASH_DRBG 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0331
PBKDF 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0334
5.1.2.4. FCS_CKM.1(4) Cryptographic key generation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Client)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [Cryptographic key generation algorithm in [Table 11]] and a
specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size in [Table 11]] that meet the
following [List of standards in [Table 11]].
33
[Table 11] Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Cryptographic key generation
algorithm
cryptographic key size List of standards
HASH_DRBG 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0331
PBKDF 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0334
5.1.2.5. FCS_CKM.1(5) Cryptographic key generation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Packager)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [Cryptographic key generation algorithm in [Table 12]] and a
specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size in [Table 12]] that meet the
following [List of standards in [Table 12]].
[Table 12] Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Cryptographic key generation
algorithm
cryptographic key size List of standards
HASH_DRBG 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0331
PBKDF 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0334
5.1.2.6. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified
cryptographic distribution method [Cryptographic key distribution method of [Table 13]
Cryptographic key distribution] that meets the following [List of standards of [Table 13]
Cryptographic key distribution].
[Table 13] Cryptographic key distribution
Cryptographic key
distribution method
Cryptographic key
distribution algorithm
Cryptographic key length List of standards
Public key cryptographic
method
RSAES-OAEP 2048bit KS X ISO/IEC 18033
5.1.2.7. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destruct cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified
cryptographic key destruction method [key zeroization] that meets the following:
[No other components].
34
5.1.2.8. FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (Electronic Document Encryption- FED Client)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform the cryptographic operation list [Cryptographic operation list in
[Table 14]] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm in [Cryptographic
algorithm in Table 14] and a specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size in
[Table 14]] that meet the following [List of standards in [Table 14]].
[Table 14] Cryptographic operation
Cryptographic
algorithm
Cryptographic key size List of standards Cryptographic operation list
ARIA-CTR 256bit KS X 1213-1 Encryption/decryption of
electronic documents
5.1.2.9. FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (Electronic Document Encryption – FED Packager)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform the cryptographic operation list [Cryptographic operation list in
[Table 15]] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Cryptographic
algorithm in [Table 15]] and a specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size
in [Table 15]] that meet the following [List of standards in [Table 15]].
[Table 15] Cryptographic operation
Cryptographic
algorithm
Cryptographic key size List of standards Cryptographic operation list
ARIA-CTR 256bit KS X 1213-1 Encryption of electronic
documents
5.1.2.10. FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Server)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform the cryptographic operation list [Cryptographic operation list in
[Table 16]] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Cryptographic
algorithm in [Table 16]] and a specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size
in [Table 16]] that meet the following [List of standards in [Table 16]].
35
[Table 16] Cryptographic operation
Cryptographic
algorithm
Cryptographic key size List of standards Cryptographic operation list
ARIA-CBC 256bit KS X 1213-1 Encryption/decryption of private
key and transmitted data
Encryption/decryption of
cryptographic key
RSAES-OAEP 2048bit KS X ISO/IEC 18033 Decryption of data for
communication
RSASSA-PSS 2048bit KS X ISO/IEC 14888 Digital signature
SHA-256 N/A KS X ISO/IEC 10118 Encryption of authentication data
5.1.2.11. FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Client)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform the cryptographic operation list [Cryptographic operation list in
[Table 17]] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Cryptographic
algorithm in [Table 17]] and a specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size
in [Table 17]] that meet the following [List of standards in [Table 17]].
[Table 17] Cryptographic operation
Cryptographic
algorithm
Cryptographic key size List of standards Cryptographic operation list
ARIA-CBC 256bit KS X 1213-1 Encryption of transmitted data
Encryption/decryption of
password of device cryptographic
key file
Encryption/decryption of
cryptographic key
RSAES-OAEP 2048bit KS X ISO/IEC 18033 Encryption of data for
communication
Decryption of electronic
document cryptographic key
RSASSA-PSS 2048bit KS X ISO/IEC 14888 Digital signature and verification
HMAC_SHA-256 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0330 Integrity check of document
header data
5.1.2.12. FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic operation (TSF Data Encryption – FED Packager)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform the cryptographic operation list [Cryptographic operation list in
[Table 18]] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Cryptographic
algorithm in [Table 18]] and a specified cryptographic key size [Cryptographic key size
36
in [Table 18]] that meet the following [List of standards in [Table 18]].
[Table 18] Cryptographic operation
Cryptographic
algorithm
Cryptographic key size List of standards Cryptographic operation list
ARIA-CBC 256bit KS X 1213-1 Encryption/decryption of
transmitted data
RSAES-OAEP 2048bit KS X ISO/IEC 18033 Encryption of electronic
document cryptographic key
RSASSA-PSS 2048bit KS X ISO/IEC 14888 Digital signature and verification
HMAC_SHA-256 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0330 Integrity check of document
header data
5.1.2.13. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies
FAU_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bits using the specified random bit generator that
meets the following [[Table 19] Random bit generation].
[Table 19] Random bit generation
Random bit generation
algorithm
Cryptographic key size List of standards
HASH_DRBG (SHA-256) 256bit TTAK.KO-12.0331
5.1.3. User data protection
5.1.3.1. FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control (Electronic Document Encryption access control)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute-based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 TSF shall enforce the [electronic document encryption access control SFP] on [list of
subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by SFP].
[
a) Permission policy by document class
A. Subject: authorized user
B. Object : FED-N secured document
C. Operation list
i. View
ii. Edit
iii. Encrypt
iv. Decrypt
b) ACL-based access control policy
A. Subject: authorized user
B. Object: FED-R secured document
C. Operation list
i. View
ii. Edit
iii. Encrypt
37
iv. Decrypt
]
5.1.3.2. FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset access control (Electronic Document Usage access control)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute-based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 TSF shall enforce the [electronic document usage access control SFP] on [list of
subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by SFP].
[
a) Permission policy by document class
A. Subject: authorized user
B. Object : FED-N secured document
C. Operation list
i. Print
ii. Screen capture
iii. Change permission
iv. Extract
v. Change class
vi. Macro
vii. Period of usage
viii. Revoke
b) ACL-based access control policy
A. Subject: authorized user
B. Object: FED-R secured document
C. Operation list
i. Print
ii. Screen capture
iii. Extract
]
5.1.3.3. FDP_ACF.1(1) Security attribute-based access control (Electronic Document Encryption access control)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 TSF shall enforce the [Electronic Document Encryption access control SFP] on objects
based on the [list of subjects and objects controlled by the following SFP, security
attribute appropriate for SFP regarding each subject and object, or group of named
security attributes].
[
a) Permission policy by document class
A. Subject: authorized user
B. Object : FED-N secured document
C. Security attribute of authorized user: user ID, group code, job role, job title, head of group
D. Security attribute of secured document: document class, owner’s user ID, owner’s group
code
b) ACL-based access control policy
A. Subject: authorized user
B. Object: FED-R secured document
C. Security attribute of authorized user: user ID
D. Security attribute of secured document: system name, document ID
]
38
FDP_ACF.1.2 TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
a) If the security attribute for the subject is included to the security attribute which
is permitted to access for the object and the operation is matched with the
security attribute of the object, the corresponding operation is allowed.
b) none ]
FDP_ACF.1.3 TSF shall explicitly authorize access of the subject to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none]
FDP_ACF.1.4 TSF shall explicitly deny access of the subject to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none]
5.1.3.4. FDP_ACF.1(2) Security attribute based access control (Document usage access control)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 TSF shall enforce the [Electronic Document usage access control SFP] on objects based
on the [list of subjects and objects controlled by the following SFP, security attribute
appropriate for SFP regarding each subject and object, or group of named security
attributes].
[
a) Permission policy by document class
A. Subject: authorized user
B. Object : FED-N secured document
C. Security attribute of authorized user: user ID, group code, job role, job title, head of group
D. Security attribute of secured document: document class, owner’s user ID, owner’s group
code
b) ACL-based access control policy
A. Subject: authorized user
B. Object: FED-R secured document
C. Security attribute of authorized user: user ID
D. Security attribute of secured document: system name, document ID
]
FDP_ACF.1.2 TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
a) If the security attribute for the subject is included to the security attribute which
is permitted to access for the object and the operation is matched with the
security attribute of the object, the corresponding operation is allowed.
b) none ]
FDP_ACF.1.3 TSF shall explicitly authorize access of the subject to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none]
FDP_ACF.1.4 TSF shall explicitly deny access of the subject to objects based on the following
additional rules: [none]
5.1.4. Identification and authentication
5.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
39
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within [3~5]
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [authentication of administrator,
document user].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the
TSF shall [disable identification and authentication feature (enable after issuing a
temporary password].
5.1.4.2. FIA_IMA.1 Internal mutual authentication
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [FED Server and FED Client, FED
Server and FED Client] in accordance with a specified [internally implemented
authentication protocol] that meets the following: [none].
5.1.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_SOS1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [the following
permission criteria].
a) Combination rules
1) 52 English letters (case sensitive)
2) 10 numbers (0~9)
3) 10 special characters (!,@,#,$,%,^,*,+,=,-)
4) The password must be at least 12 characters, but not more than 30 characters in length.
5) Password shall embed one of the above 1) ~ 3) rules
5.1.4.4. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [the following list] on behalf of the user to be performed before
the user is authenticated.
[
a) document user
A. Policy download: domain policy, default policy
b) Administrator: none
]
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user, except for the actions specified in
FIA_UAU.1.1.
5.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [ID/PW based
authentication].
5.1.4.6. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to No other components.
40
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [the following feedback list] to the user while the
authentication is in progress.
[
a) Mask all passwords shown through GUI with “●” instead of the letters or numbers originally
typed in.
b) Do not provide feedback for failure causes when authentication failed.
]
5.1.4.7 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [the following list] on behalf of the user to be performed before
the user is identified.
[
a) document user
A. Policy download: domain policy, default policy
b) Administrator: none
]
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.5. Security management
5.1.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to conduct administrative actions of [the following]
List of functions in [Table 20]] to [the authorized administrator].
[
[Table 20] List of functions
Menu Category Administrative behaviour
General Setting User/Group Modify behaviour, determine behaviour
Administrator Modify behaviour, determine behaviour
System Modify behaviour, determine behaviour
Cryptographic key Modify behaviour, determine behaviour
Document Class Permission management Modify behaviour, determine behaviour
Security Policy Integrated system management Modify behaviour, determine behaviour
DRM client policy management Modify behaviour, determine behaviour
Document encryption policy
management
Modify behaviour, determine behaviour
41
Exceptional usage management Modify behaviour, determine behaviour
Statistics Statistics management Enable
Log Log management Enable
]
5.1.5.2. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to restrict the ability to change_default,
modify, delete, [add] the security attributes of [the following] to [the authorized
administrator].
[
a) Administrator permission coverage: accessible menu, scope of management (group)
b) Permission by FED-N secured document class: view, edit, print, screen capture, change
permission, extract, decrypt, change class, macro, period of usage, revoke
c) FED-N secured document permission coverage: all, user, team member, direct supervisor
d) Permission assignment criteria of FED-N secured document: user ID, group code, job role, job
title
e) FED-R integrated system list
f) Extensions for encryption upon user selection
g) Document identification method upon real time/administrator encryption: extension, document
format (MS Office, Hancom Office, PDF)
h) Applications targeted for auto encryption: Hancom HWP, MS Excel, MS Word, MS PowerPoint,
MS Notepad, MS WordPad, MS Paint, Adobe Reader, Autodesk Autocad
i) Document class upon encryption
j) Virtual printer to be allowed
k) Capture program to be allowed
]
5.1.5.3. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to provide restrictive default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow [the authorized administrator] to specify alternative initial values
to override the default values when an object or information is created.
5.1.5.4. FMT_MTD.1 TSF Data management
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the [the following TSF data list] to [the
authorized administrator].
42
[Table 21] TSF data list
Category Authorized administrator
Security management data
Number of authentication
failure and password validity
period
Query, change
IP setting data for
management access
Query, change
Log threshold setting data Query, change
Authentication data
ID Query, change
PW change
Organization chart management data Query, change
Administrator permission setting data Query, change
Security policy setting data
Document class-specific
permission setting
Query, change
Encryption policy setting Query, change
Exception policy setting Query, change
Audit data
Administrator audit log data Query
Document usage statistics
data
Query
Client login statistics data Query
Document usage log data Query
System usage log data Query
Cryptographic key data Query, change
Authentication data Query, change
5.1.5.5. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [none] to [the authorized
administrator].
1. [none]
2. [none]
FMT_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [none] to [the authorized
administrator].
1. [none]
2. [none]
FMT_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for setting ID and password when installing.
5.1.5.6. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[
43
a) TSF function management: items specified in FMT_MOF.1
b) TSF security attributes management: items specified in FMT_MSA.1
c) TSF data management: items specified in FMT_MTD.1.1
]
5.1.5.7. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the role of [the authorized administrator].
FMT_SMR.1.2 TSF shall be able to associate users and their roles defined in FMT_SMR.1.1.
5.1.6. Protection of the TSF
5.1.6.1. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FMT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure, modification when it is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE.
5.1.6.2. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FMT_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [cryptographic data, password of administrator and document
user, password for device cryptographic key file and TOE setting value] stored in
containers controlled by the TSF from unauthorized disclosure, modification.
5.1.6.3. FPT_PST.2 Availability protection of stored TSF data (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.2.1 TSF shall prevent the unauthorized deletion for [execution file of FED Client, registry
value].
FPT_PST.2.2 TSF shall prevent the unauthorized termination for [execution file of FED Client].
5.1.6.4. FPT_RCV.4 Function recovery
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_RCV.4.1 The TSF shall guarantee a recovery feature capable of returning to the consistent and
secure state when one of the [following] is successfully complete or for the specified
failure scenarios.
[
a) Integrity error in major setting values or files of the FED client
b) Deletion of major setting values or files of the FED client
c) Termination of the FED client execution process while the operation system is running
]
5.1.6.5. FPT_TST.1 TSF self-testing
Hierarchical to No other components.
44
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal
operation to demonstrate the correct operation of TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide a function that verifies integrity of TSF data to the authorized
administrator.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide a function that verifies integrity of TSF to the authorized
administrator.
5.1.7. TOE access
5.1.7.1. FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Hierarchical to FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FTA_MCS.2.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that belong to the
same user according to the rules [The maximum number of concurrent sessions for
administrator management access session restricted to one, rule for the maximum
number of { the maximum number of concurrent sessions for general user access
session restricted to one } concurrent sessions].
FTA_MCS.2.2 The TSF shall enforce, by default, a limit of [ 1 ] sessions per user.
5.1.7.2. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_ SSL.5.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session of the authorized administrator and
document user after a [time interval of administrator inactivity].
Application notes: The time interval of authorized administrator inactivity is set to 10 minutes and the
default value is 10 minutes. The period of document user inactivity depends on the
policy set by the administrator and the default value is 5 minutes.
5.1.7.3. FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny administrator’s management access session
establishment based on [connection IP, whether or not to activate the management
access session of the same account].
5.2 Security assurance requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are comprised of
assurance components in CC part 3, and the evaluation assurance level is EAL1+. The following table
summarizes assurance components.
Security
assurance class
Security assurance component
Security Target
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
45
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Tests ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
5.2.1. Security target
5.2.1.1. ASE_INT.1 Security target introduction
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a
TOE overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarize the usage and major security
features of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE
hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
46
Evaluator action elements
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview,
and the TOE description are consistent with each other.
5.2.1.2. ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claim
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 Security target introduction
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Developer action elements
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that
identifies the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim
conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to
CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to
CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended
components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement
packages to which the ST claims conformance.
47
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance to a package of
the ST as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being
claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement
of the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of
the security problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is
being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement
of security objectives is consistent with the statement of security
objectives in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement
of security requirements is consistent with the statement of security
requirements in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.1.3. ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
Dependencies No dependencies
Developer action elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security
objectives for the operational environment.
48
Evaluator action elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.1.4. ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Dependencies No dependencies
Developer action elements
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended
security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended
component for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and
classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC
components, families, classes, and methodology as a model for
presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective
elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these
elements can be demonstrated.
49
Evaluator action elements
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using the existing components.
5.2.1.5. ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Dependencies No dependencies
Developer action elements
ASE_REQ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.2D The developer shall provide security requirements rationale.
Content and presentation elements
ASE _REQ.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
ASE _REQ.1.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities
and other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be
defined.
ASE _REQ.1.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on
the security requirements.
ASE _REQ.1.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE _REQ.1.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied,
or the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not
being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.1.6C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
50
Evaluator action elements
REQ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.1.6. ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each
SFR.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is
consistent with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
5.2.2. Development
5.2.2.1. ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Dependencies No dependencies
Developer action elements
ADV_FSP.1.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
51
ADV_FSP.1.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification
to the SFRs.
Content and presentation elements
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of
use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated
with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit
categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the
functional specification.
Evaluator action elements
ADV_FSP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an
accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
5.2.3. Guidance documents
5.2.3.1. AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and presentation elements
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
user-accessible functions and privileges that shall be controlled in a
52
secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to
use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall display, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters
under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible
functions that need to be performed, including changing the security
characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of
operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or
operational error), their consequences and implications for maintaining
secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action elements
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.3.2. AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Dependencies No dependencies
Developer action elements
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative
procedures.
53
Content and presentation elements
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for
secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the
developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for
secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the
operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for
the operational environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action elements
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that
the TOE can be securely prepared for operation.
5.2.4. Life-cycle support
5.2.4.1. ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
Dependencies No dependencies
Developer action elements
ALC_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements
ALC_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the evaluation evidence required by
the TOE and the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
54
Evaluator action elements
ALC_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meet
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.4.2. ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Dependencies ALC_CMS.1 TOE configuration management coverage
Developer action elements
ALC_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and the TOE reference.
Content and presentation elements
ALC_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall label for the unique reference.
Evaluator action elements
ALC_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.5. Tests
5.2.5.1. ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Dependencies ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
Developer action elements
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
Content and presentation elements
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plan, expected test results
and the actual test results.
55
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any
ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test
results.
Evaluator action elements
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.5.2. ATE_IND.1 Independent testing: conformance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements
ATE_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements
ATE_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements
ATE_IND.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
56
5.2.6. Vulnerability assessment
5.2.6.1. AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements
AVA_VAN.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements
AVA_VAN.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements
AVA_VAN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to
identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the
identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is
resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing success
potential of basic attack.
5.3. Security requirements rationale
5.3.1. Dependency rationale of security functional requirements
The following table shows dependency of security functional requirement.
No. Security
functional
requirements
Dependency Reference No.
1 FAU_ARP.1 FAU_SAA.1 3
2 FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 OE. time stamp
3 FAU_SAA.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
4 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
5 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 4
6 FAU_SEL.1 FAU_GEN.1
FMT_MTD.1
2
36
7 FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 OE. protection of audit data
8 FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 OE. protection of audit data
9 FCS_CKM.1(1) [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
14
16
57
FCS_CKM.4 15
10 FCS_CKM.1(2) [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
14
17
15
11 FCS_CKM.1(3) [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
14
18
15
12 FCS_CKM.1(4) [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
14
19
15
13 FCS_CKM.1(5) [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
14
20
15
14 FCS_CKM.2 [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
-
-
9, 10, 11, 12, 13
15
15 FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
-
-
9, 10, 11, 12, 13
16 FCS_COP.1(1) [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
-
-
9
15
17 FCS_COP.1(2) [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
-
-
10
15
18 FCS_COP.1(3) [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
-
-
11
15
19 FCS_COP.1(4) [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
-
-
12
15
20 FCS_COP.1(5) [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
-
-
13
15
21 FCS_RBG.1 - -
22 FDP_ACC.1(1) FDP_ACF.1 24
23 FDP_ACC.1(2) FDP_ACF.1 25
24 FDP_ACF.1(1) FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
22
35
25 FDP_ACF.1(2) FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
23
35
26 FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 29
27 FIA_IMA.1 - -
28 FIA_SOS.1 - -
29 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 32
30 FIA_UAU.4 - -
31 FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 29
32 FIA_UID.1 - -
58
33 FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
38
39
34 FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
22, 23
-
38
39
35 FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
34
39
36 FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
38
39
37 FMT_PWD.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
38
39
38 FMT_SMF.1 - -
39 FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 32
40 FPT_PST.1 - -
41 FPT_PST.2 - -
42 FPT_ITT.1 - -
43 FPT_RCV.4 - -
44 FPT_TST.1 - -
45 FTA_MCS.2 FIA_UID.1 32
46 FTA_SSL.5 FIA_UAU.1 29
47 FTA_TSE.1 - -
FAU_GEN.1 has a subordinate relationship with FPT_STM.1. However, as the TOE accurately records security-
related events using reliable time stamp provided in the TOE operational environment,
a subordinate relationship with FAU_GEN.1 is satisfied by the security objectives for OE. Time Stamp instead of
FPT_STM.1
FAU_STG.3 and FAU_STG.4 has a subordinate relationship with FAU_STG.1. However, as the audit trail protects
the audit record from unauthorized deletion or modification (DBMS interacting with the TOE in the TOE
operational environment), a subordinate relationship with FAU_STG.3 and FAU_STG.4 is satisfied by the
security objectives for OE. Protection of Audit Data instead of FAU_STG.1.
5.3.2. Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements
The dependency of EAL1 assurance package provided in the CC is already satisfied, the rationale is omitted.
The augmented ATE_FUN.1 has dependency on ATE_COV.1. However, ATE_FUN.1 is augmented to require
developer testing in order to check if the developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test
documentation, ATE_COV.1 is not included in this PP since it is not necessarily required to show the
correspondence between the tests and the TSFIs.
59
6. TOE summary specification
This chapter briefly and explicitly specifies how the security functions of the TOE are implemented and how the
functions meet the assurance requirements.
6.1 TOE security functions
This chapter describes the security functions provided by the TOE and how the security functions of FED 5 SP1
satisfy all the security requirements specified in Chapter 5.
◼ Security audit (FAU)
◼ Cryptographic support (FCS)
◼ User data protection (FDP)
◼ Identification and authentication (FIA)
◼ Security management (FMT)
◼ Protection of the TSF (FPT)
◼ TOE access (FTA)
6.1.1. Security audit (FAU)
Security audit performs the following functions:
◼ Audit data generation
◼ Audit data lookup/search
◼ Audit data protection
6.1.1.1 Audit data generation
Audit data generation is a function which creates and stores logs regarding the events incurred from the
security functions of the TOE. The logs are created and stored as classified into the following three categories.
The document usage log can be selectively collected depending on the usage type such as creation, view, edit,
change permission, change owner, print, revoke or decrypt. In addition, the TOE records significant security
violations on the system usage logs and sends a notification email to the administrator.
[Table 22] Types of audit data generation
Types of audit records Description
Administrator audit log
Logs about changes of security policies made by the administrator while
executing security management functions.
Document usage log
Logs about users’ document usage such as viewing, editing and printing
secured documents on users’ PC.
System usage log
Booting and termination of the FED Server, user’s logging in and out, system
usage log such as (policy update on FED Client), violation of integrity, self-
test failure, problems regarding protection of audit log, rejection of
duplicate login, security alerts including attempts for reusing authentication
data
6.1.1.2. Look up/search audit data
The TOE provides the function for looking up the audit data stored in the audit data container (DBMS) for the
authorized administrator through management access. Lookup of the audit data is classified as document
usage logs, administrator audit logs, and system usage logs, and each type of audit data is shown in the
appropriate format for the authorized administrator to interpret. Also, the audit data can be found selectively
by the combined search condition of user ID, IP address, data, event type, etc. by the AND operator.
60
6.1.1.3. Protect audit data
The TOE provides the function for the authorized administrator to set the threshold (default value: 1,000,000)
for the audit trail by log type (document usage log, system usage log, and administrator audit log), and when
the number of the stored records exceeds 90% of the set threshold, the TOE sends an email warning to the
administrator. When the number reaches (exceeds) the threshold, the oldest audit records are overwritten and
the administrator is notified by email.
Related SFRS: FAU_SAA.1, FAU_ARP.1, FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SEL.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.3, FAU_SAR.4
6.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)
The TOE performs cryptographic key generation, cryptographic operation, and cryptographic key destruction as
in the following and distributes the cryptographic key using RSAES-OAEP. For the standard list of each algorithm,
refer to 5.1.2 Cryptographic support(FCS).
Key Used for
Cryptographic
key generation Cryptographic key and
parameter destruction
Cryptographic
operation
DEK Encrypts documents HASH_DRBG
(256bit)
After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
ARIA-CTR
Generates MAC value in the
header of the secured document
HASH_DRBG
(256bit)
After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
HMAC_SHA-256
Encrypts TOE setting HASH_DRBG
(256bit)
After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
ARIA-CBC
Application server
public key
Encrypts the DEK called from the
packager. (KEK)
RSA (2048bit) After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
RSAES-OAEP
Encrypts transmitted data
(request).
RSA (2048bit) After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
RSAES-OAEP
Digital signature for the
transmitted data (response).
RSA (2048bit) After digital signature,
overwrite three times
with ‘0’ value and release
memory.
RSASSA-PSS
Domain key Encrypts the DEK called from the
client. (KEK)
HASH_DRBG
(256bit)
After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
ARIA-CBC
Device public key Encrypts the DEK in the license
file. (KEK)
RSA (2048bit) After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
RSAES-OAEP
61
Digital signature for the
transmitted data (request).
RSA (2048bit) After digital signature,
overwrite three times
with ‘0’ value and release
memory.
RSASSA-PSS
Encrypts transmitted data
(response).
RSA (2048bit) After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
RSAES-OAEP
ARIA-CBC
Cryptographic key for
storing DB
Encrypts key data DB when
stored.
PBKDF (256bit) After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
ARIA-CBC
Device encryption key Encrypts the key in the device
cryptographic key file (KEK).
HASH_DRBG
(256bit)
After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
ARIA-CBC
Device encryption key
for transmission
Encrypts the device cryptographic
key for transmission (KEK).
HASH_DRBG
(256bit)
After encryption·
decryption, overwrite
three times with ‘0’ value
and release memory.
ARIA-CBC
The validated cryptographic module used in cryptographic management is as follows:
Category Sub category Description
Validated
cryptographic
module
Name Fasoo Crypto Framework V2.4
Validation number CM-193-2026.11
Developer Fasoo Co., Ltd.
Date verified Nov. 18, 2021
Related SFRs: FCS_CKM.1(1), FCS_CKM.1(2), FCS_CKM.1(3), FCS_CKM.1(4), FCS_CKM.1(5), FCS_CKM.2,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), FCS_COP.1(5), FCS_RBG.1
6.1.3. User data protection
User data protection performs the following functions:
◼ Electronic Document Encryption access control
◼ Electronic Document Usage access control
6.1.3.1. Electronic Document Encryption access control
The authorized administrator can set permissions for encryption or decryption of secured documents (view,
edit, encrypt, decrypt) and related policies, and according to the set security policies, document encryption or
decryption activities by document users are controlled. Based on the security properties of the document user
(user ID, group code, role, and job title) and the security properties of the secured document (document class,
owner’s user ID, owner’s group code, system name, and document ID), access control of electronic document
encryption is performed. By comparing the security properties of the document user and the security
properties of the secured document with the security policies set by the authorized administrator, if they
match, electronic document encryption or decryption is allowed.
6.1.3.2. Electronic Document Usage access control
The authorized administrator can set permissions for use of secured documents (print, screen capture, change
permission, extract, change class, macro, period of usage, revoke) and related policies, and according to the set
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security policies, document use activities by document users are controlled. Based on the security properties of
the document user (user ID, group code, role, and job title) and the security properties of the secured
document (document class, owner’s user ID, owner’s group code), access control of electronic document use is
performed. By comparing the security properties of the document user and the security properties of the
secured document with the security policies set by the authorized administrator, if they match, electronic
document use is allowed.
Related SFRs: FDP_ACC.1(1), FDP_ACF.1(1), FDP_ACC.1(1), FDP_ACF.1(1)
6.1.4. Identification and authentication
Identification and authentication performs the following functions:
◼ Identification and authentication of administrator
◼ Identification and authentication of user
6.1.4.1. Administrator identification and authentication
It is mandatory to create a new administrator upon the installation of the TOE, and using the ID and password
inputted, administrator authentication data is generated. The generated data is encrypted (SHA-256) and
stored in the DBMS. There is no executable action until the identification and authentication of the
administrator are complete. The password inputted during the access attempt is masked with “●” to prevent
disclosure on the screen and the authentication succeeds if the inputted ID and password are verified by the
DBMS. In the case of authentication failure, the reason for the failure is not provided.
The TOE generates a new authentication identification value upon the authentication attempt for management
access by the administrator, detects reuse, and if reuse is detected performs administrator authentication
failure.
Regarding the authentication attempt for management access by the administrator, if the number of
unsuccessful authentication attempts reaches the authentication attempt threshold (3-5 with no timeout value,
5 by default) settable by the authorized administrator, login is permanently blocked and a security alert is sent
to the administrator by email. If the login blocking needs to be cleared, the authorized administrator issues a
temporary password and the administrator is required to change the password once logging in with the
temporary password.
The administrator authentication password must contain at least one alphabetical character, one numeric
character, and one special character as in the following and be at least 12 characters in length.
1) 52 alphabetical characters (Capitalization matters.)
2) 10 numeric characters (0-9)
3) 10 special characters (!,@,#,$,%,^,*,+,=,-)
6.1.4.2. User identification and authentication
Before the document user identification and authentication, enter the device password in the device password
input window and click the OK button to verify that the device password is the same one set in the certificate
registration window at the time of installation. Then, the default policy and the domain policy are received
before the identification and authentication of the document user, and the user policy is received after the
successful authentication. The TOE provides the ID/password-based authentication function, and the
document user is required to change the password upon the initial authentication. The password inputted is
masked with “●” to prevent disclosure on the screen, and in the case of authentication failure, the reason for
the failure is not provided.
During the authentication of the document user through the FED client, the mutual authentication with the
FED server is performed. The FED client authenticates the FED server using the server certificate, encrypts the
device ID/authentication data of the FED client using the server’s public key, and transmits the encrypted data
to the FED server. The FED server decrypts the transmitted data using the server’s private key and
authenticates the FED client through the authentication process.
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The TOE generates a new authentication identification value upon the authentication attempt of the document
user, detects reuse, and if reuse is detected performs user authentication failure.
Regarding the authentication attempt of the document user, if the number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts reaches the authentication attempt threshold (3-5, 5 by default) settable by the authorized
administrator, login is permanently blocked and a security alert is sent to the administrator by email. If the
login blocking needs to be cleared, the authorized administrator issues a temporary password and the user is
required to change the password once logging in with the temporary password.
The authentication password of the document user must contain at least one alphabetical character, one
numeric character, and one special character as in the following and be at least 12 characters in length.
1) 52 alphabetical characters (Capitalization matters.)
2) 10 numeric characters (0-9)
3) 10 special characters (!,@,#,$,%,^,*,+,=,-)
Related SFRs : FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.1, FIA_IMA.1
6.1.4.3. TOE Internal mutual authentication
Data is transmitted through the internal mutual authentication mechanism among TOE components. When
data is transmitted, TLS 1.2 is used for communication by default, and the message transmission between the
FED Client and FED Server is as follows:
1) When sending messages from the FED Client to FED Server (verify the client messages)
i. Data that the FED Client will send
a. Request data with the digital signature of FED Client device certificate’s private key and FED
Client device certificate
b. Encryption of ‘a’ using the application server certificate
ii. Data that the FED Server will receive
a. Decryption using the private key of the application server certificate
b. Verification of ‘a’ (digital signature) using the FED Client device certificate
2) When returning messages from the FED Server to FED Client (verify the server messages)
i. Data that the FED Server will send
a. Response data with the digital signature of application server certificate’s private key and
application server certificate
b. Encryption of ‘a’ using the FED Client device certificate
ii. Data that the FED Client will receive
a. Decryption using the private key of the FED Client device certificate
b. Verification of ‘a’ (digital signature) using the application server certificate
6.1.4.4. Prevention of authentication information reuse
1) When an administrator login to the FED Server through a web browser
a. When a web browser requests a NONCE value from the FED Server, the FED Server stores the
NONCE value generated by the random bit generator in the session and send it to the web
browser.
b. When an administrator login by entering the admin ID and password, the NONCE value
received at ‘a’ above is sent together.
c. The FED Server proceeds authentication process after verifying the admin ID, password and
NONCE value stored in the session and destroys the session to prevent the reuse of the
stored NONCE.
2) When a user login to the FED Client (DRM Client)
a. When the FED Client requests a NONCE value from the FED Server, the FED Server stores the
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NONCE value generated by the random bit generator in the session and send it to the FED
Client.
b. When a user login to the FED Client by entering the user ID and password, the NONCE value
received at ‘a’ above is sent together.
c. The FED Server proceeds authentication process after verifying the user ID, password and
NONCE value stored in the session and destroys the session to prevent the reuse of the
stored NONCE.
6.1.5. Security management (FMT)
Security management performs the following functions:
◼ Common management
◼ Permission policy management of secured documents
6.1.5.1. Common management
The TOE confines the role of executing security management to the authorized administrator, and upon the
initial access of the authorized administrator, the ID and password are newly generated. The TOE can register,
add, delete group, user, job title, and role and issue temporary passwords through the management access to
the FED server. The TOE can control the accessible menu and group management permission on the
management access differently depending on the type of the administrator. The TOE also provides the
functions for system management such as the settings of the threshold for unsuccessful authentication
attempts and audit trail and the IP address setting for administrator’s access and the functions for generation
and management of the cryptographic keys.
6.1.5.2. Management of permission settings of secured documents
The TOE provides the functions for managing the permissions and policies related to secured documents for
the authorized administrator. User permissions for secured documents can be set on the management access
screen, and depending on the permission setting, user activities such as view, edit, print, capture screen,
change permission, extract, decrypt, change class, macro, and revoke and the period of usage may be
restricted. The authorized administrator can specify such permission settings differently by user ID, group head
ID, owner, group, document class, role, and job title. Also, the TOE provides the function for setting the policies
for encryption upon user selection, encryption by application, encryption by extension, and batch encryption.
6.1.6. Protection of the TSF
Protection of the TSF performs the following functions:
◼ Protection of the TSF
◼ Self-testing and recovery
6.1.6.1. Protection of the TSF data
For the safe cryptographic communication among the TOE components, the transmitted TSF data is protected
using the confidentiality (ARIA-CBC, 256bit) and integrity (RSASSA-PSS, 2048bit) algorithms of the validated
cryptographic module. The types and protection methods for the TSF data stored in the container controlled by
TSF are as follows:
TOE
component
Container controlled by the TSF Protection method
File system Registry DBMS
FED Server - Domain key
- CA private key,
ARIA-CBC
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Application server
private key, Device
private key
- Admin password
and user password
SHA-256
FED Client - Domain key
- Device private key
ARIA-CBC
- Application server
public key
RSAES-OAEP
- User password SHA-256
- FED-R license file
- Policy file
RSASSA-PSS /
proprietary
encoding
FED Packager - Domain key
- Application server
public key
- Device public key
- Device private key
ARIA-CBC
- Policy file Proprietary
encoding
6.1.6.2. Client program recovery
The TOE provides the function for self-testing during the operation to examine the main functions such as the
cryptographic function, user authentication, user addition, certificate issuance, policy issuance, etc. if they
operate properly regularly (24 hours). The FED client prevents termination of the process using the mutual
monitoring among the TOE-related processes so that the running TOE is not to be stopped and prevents file
deletion by opening the file handling information about the processes and modules. Also, during the operation
of the TOE, integrity check on the TSF (execution file and library file of the FED server, execution file and library
file of the FED client) and the TSF data (registry configuration information) is performed regularly (24 hours) for
self-protection. The TOE provides the function for recovering the status back to the available status through
automatic recovery if the integrity is damaged.
Related SFRs : FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PST.1(Extended), FPT_PST.2(Extended), FPT_TST.1, FPT_RCV.4
6.1.7. TOE access (FTA)
The TOE access performs the following functions:
◼ Session management
6.1.7.1. Session management
The TOE registers the accessible IP address of the authorized administrator upon the installation, and
maximum two IP addresses can be registered. Access from the terminal with an unregistered IP address is not
allowed. If access is attempted from the terminal with an unregistered IP address, the error page is displayed
instead of the login page. For the management access session of the authorized administrator, the maximum
number of concurrent sessions allowed is one, which means concurrent access is not allowed and a new access
will be denied, and if a login is attempted with another authorized administrator account in a situation in which
there is an administrator who has already logged in, the new access will be denied. If the authorized
administrator’s period of inactivity for management access reaches 10 minutes, the management access
session is terminated.
The maximum number of concurrent sessions for the document user logged in to the FED client is one. After a
login session of a specific document user is created, if a login is attempted with the same user account from
another terminal, the new access will be denied. The user gets automatically logged out when the inactivity
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time elapses, and the inactivity period can be set as the policy (10 minutes by default, 10 – 99,999 minutes) by
an administrator.
Related SFRs : FTA_MCS.2, FTA_SSL.5, FTA_TSE.1