National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Google Pixel Devices on Android 16
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11647-2026
Dated: May 12, 2026
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 Validation Report Version 1.0, May 12, 2026
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Randy Heimann
Lisa Mitchell
Jaemond Reyes
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Patrick Dones
Nate Feldman
Douglas Kalmus
Raymond Smoley
Rizheng Sun
Coby Ziv
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 4
3.1 TOE Description................................................................................................. 4
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 5
3.3 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 5
3.4 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 7
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 7
4.3 User data protection ............................................................................................ 7
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 8
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 8
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 8
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 9
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 9
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ..................................................................... 10
5.1 Assumptions...................................................................................................... 10
5.2 Clarification of scope........................................................................................ 10
6 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 12
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 13
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 13
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 13
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 14
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 15
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 15
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................ 15
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 15
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 16
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 16
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 17
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................. 18
11 Annexes................................................................................................................. 19
12 Security Target...................................................................................................... 20
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................ 21
14 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 22
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) Validation team of the evaluation of Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 solution
provided by Google LLC. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed
or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in May 2026. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-
Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrolment and verification – for
unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 16 August
2023 (CFG_MDF-BIO-BT-MDMA-WLANC_V1.0) which includes the Base PP:
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022
(MDFPP33) with the collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification -
for unlocking the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11), the
PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10), the PP-Module for MDM
Agents, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10), and the PP-Module for WLAN Clients,
Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10) with the Functional Package for Transport Layer
Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 (PKGTLS11).
The TOE is the Google Pixel Devices on Android 16. The TOE identified in this VR has
been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Google Pixel Devices
on Android 16 – Security Target, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026 and analysis performed by the
Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Google Pixel Devices on Android 16
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrolment and
verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, and WLAN
Clients, Version 1.0, 16 August 2023 (CFG_MDF-BIO-BT-MDMA-
WLANC_V1.0) which includes the Base PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device
Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022 (MDFPP33) with the
collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking
the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11), the PP-
Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10), the PP-Module for
MDM Agents, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10), and the PP-Module for
WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10) with the Functional
Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11)
ST Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 – Security Target, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16, Version
0.3, May 12, 2026
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
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Item Identifier
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor Google LLC
Developer Google LLC
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jenn Dotson, Sheldon Durrant, Randy Heimann, Lisa Mitchell, Jaemond Reyes,
Lori Sarem
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.
The TOE is Google Pixel Devices on Android 16. All the included phones have the following
information in common:
Android OS
Version
Device Policy
Version
Architecture Security Patch
Level
Android 16 144 ARMv8 December 2025
The TOE consists of the specific devices found in Section 8.
Google manufactures some of the phones in multiple variants, differing in size (the
designations vary, from the “base” device not having any, and other models having
something like “a” or “Pro”) or build materials (entry and premium). The primary differences
between variants of a given device are build materials, screen type and size, battery capacity,
cameras, RAM and Flash storage. The Pro phones are normally physically larger and have
larger screen sizes, battery capacity and possibly RAM, while the “a” phones may have a
smaller screen or different build materials (an “a” device may also use a processor that is
common to a different base device). Storage options vary with each release and may be
selectable by the customer of the device at purchase. Biometric sensors and Wi-Fi chips may
vary between models as noted in the ST.
The TOE allows basic telephony features (make and receive phone calls, send and receive
SMS/MMS messages) as well as advanced network connectivity (allowing connections to
both 802.11 Wi-Fi and 5G/4G LTE/3G/2G mobile data networks). The TOE supports using
client certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2/WPA3 networks with
802.1x/EAP-TLS or alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile
data.
The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including
those provided by the Android framework and supports API calls to the Android
Management APIs.
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is a mobile device to support enterprises and individual users alike.
Some features and settings must be enabled for the TOE to operate in its evaluated
configuration. The following features and settings must be enabled:
1. Enable a password screen lock
2. Do not use Smart Lock
3. Enable encryption of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth secrets (NIAP mode DPM API)
4. Do not use USB debugging
5. Do not allow installation of applications from unknown sources
6. Enable security logging
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7. Disable ‘Usage & Diagnostic’ settings
8. Disable Captive Portal Checking
9. Loaded applications must be implemented utilizing the NIAPSEC library
Doing this ensures that the phone complies with the MDFPP33 requirements. Please refer to
the Admin Guide on how to configure these settings and features.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Details regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a rich API to mobile applications and provides users installing an
application the option to either approve or reject an application based upon the API access
that the application requires (or to grant applications access at runtime).
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE
uses a key hierarchy that combines a REK with the user’s password to provide protection to
all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
The TOE includes an additional hardware security chip (the Titan M2) that provides
dedicated key storage. The TOE makes this secure, hardware key storage available to mobile
applications through the StrongBox extensions to the Android Keystore. Currently, the
StrongBox extension is not used for any system keys but remains an option for applications
to use should they desire the protection it provides.
Finally, the TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system to allow
enterprise control of the configuration and operation of the device so as to ensure adherence
to enterprise-wide policies (for example, restricting use of a corporate provided device’s
camera, forced configuration of maximum login attempts, pulling of audit logs off the TOE,
etc.) as well as policies governing enterprise applications and data. An MDM is made up of
two parts: the MDM Agent and MDM Server. The MDM Agent is installed on the phone as
an administrator with elevated permissions (allowing it to change the relevant settings on the
phone) while the MDM Server is used to issue the commands to the MDM Agent. The TOE
includes an MDM Agent as part of the evaluated configuration. A user may choose to install
a third-party MDM Agent, which is out-of-scope for this evaluation.
The TOE includes several different levels of execution including (from lowest to highest)
hardware, a Trusted Execution Environment, Android’s bootloader, and Android’s user
space, which provides APIs allowing applications to leverage the cryptographic functionality
of the device
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE runs
Android as its software/OS, executing on the Google Tensor processors. The TOE does not
include the user applications that run on top of the operating system but does include controls
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that limit application behavior. Further, the device provides a built-in MDM Agent
(downloadable MDM Agents are not considered in-scope) to be installed to limit or permit
different functionality of the device.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and through that connectivity interacts with
MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
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4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE implements the SecurityLog and logcat that are stored in circular memory buffers.
An MDM agent can read/fetch the logs (both the SecurityLog and logcat) and then handle
appropriately (potentially storing the log to Flash or transmitting its contents to the MDM
server). These log methods meet the logging requirements outlined by FAU_GEN.1 in
MDFPP33.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with CAVP certified algorithms for a
wide range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation
and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing
and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random
bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key
storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are
used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, and HTTPS and to encrypt the
media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the
TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications
running on the TOE allowing application developers to ensure their application meets the
required criteria to remain compliant to MDFPP33 standards.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The
TOE’s evaluated configuration supports Android Enterprise profiles to provide additional
separation between application and application data belonging to the Enterprise profile.
Please see the Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use Enterprise
profiles.
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4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports several features related to identification and authentication. From a user
perspective, except for FCC mandated (making phone calls to an emergency number) or non-
sensitive functions (e.g., choosing the keyboard input method or taking screen shots), a
password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the
TOE. Also, even when unlocked, the TOE requires the user re-enter the password to change
the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's
display and the frequency of entering passwords is limited. When a configured number of
failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed
using upper- and lower-case characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up
to 16 characters are supported. The TOE can also be configured to utilize a biometric
authentication factor (fingerprints or face depending on the device) to unlock the device (this
only works after the password has been entered after the device powers on).
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can both use and validate X.509v3
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile
devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are
restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once
the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it will
remove Enterprise applications and remove MDM policies.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements several features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity
of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so
that they are not accessible or exportable using the application processor’s hardware. The
TOE disallows all read access to the Root Encryption Key (REK) and retains all keys derived
from the REK within its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Application software can
only use keys derived from the REK by reference and receive the result. The TEE is a
Separate Execution Environment (SEE), running outside the Android operating system on
the device.
The TOE also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page
protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow
protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from
modification by applications as well as isolating the address spaces of applications from one
another to protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will
not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital
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signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the
updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital
signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all
applications must have signatures (even if self-signed).
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using the
TOE’s MDM API) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first
use after reboot.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and TLS, HTTPS
to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022
(MDFPP33)
• collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking
the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11)
• PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10)
• PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10)
• PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10)
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11)
That information has not been reproduced here and the
MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 should be consulted if there is
interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11 as described for this TOE in
the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation.
All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile with the
Biometric, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, and WLAN Clients Modules and the TLS
Package and performed by the Evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide identified in Section 6, additional customer
documentation for the specific Mobile Device models was not included in the scope
of the evaluation and, therefore, should not be relied upon when configuring or
operating the device as evaluated.
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• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/
PKGTLS11 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related
functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following document was available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Google Pixel Phones on Android 16 Administrator Guidance Documentation,
Version 1.0, May 4, 2026
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured
as evaluated.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and, therefore, should not be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Google Pixel
Devices on Android 16, Version 0.3, 05/12/26 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation
Assurance Activity Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16, Version 0.3, 05/12/2026
(AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/
WLANC10/PKGTLS11 including the tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR,
in section 3.4.1 provides a list of test tools and has a diagram of the test environment.
In addition, a remote testing request was approved by NIAP for testing that required
proprietary hardware. Remote testing occurred on February 19, 2026, with representatives
from the Evaluation team, Validation team, and NIAP observing the testing.
Additional information on both the Lab’s test environment and the remote test execution can
be found in the proprietary DTR.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following devices:
Google
Product
Model # SoC Kernel
Pixel 10 Pro XL G45RY, GUL82, GYPW4 Google Tensor G5 6.6
Pixel 10 Pro GEHN3, G4QUR, GN4F5 Google Tensor G5 6.6
Pixel 10 GK2MP, GL066, GLBW0 Google Tensor G5 6.6
Pixel 10 Pro
Fold
GU0NP, GM66V Google Tensor G5 6.6
Pixel 10a G4H7L, GV0BP, GE1GQ Google Tensor G4 6.1
Pixel 9 Pro XL GZC4K, GQ57S, GGX8B Google Tensor G4 6.1
Pixel 9 Pro GEC77, GWVK6, GR83Y Google Tensor G4 6.1
Pixel 9 GUR25, G1B60, G2YBB Google Tensor G4 6.1
Pixel 9 Pro Fold GGH2X, GC15S Google Tensor G4 6.1
Pixel 9a GXQ96, GTF7P, G3Y12 Google Tensor G4 6.1
Pixel 8 Pro G1NMW, GC3VE Google Tensor G3 6.1
Pixel 8 GKWS6, G9BQD Google Tensor G3 6.1
Pixel 8a G5760D, G6GPR, G8HHN Google Tensor G3 6.1
Pixel Tablet GTU8P Google Tensor G2 6.1
Pixel Fold G9FPL, G0B96 Google Tensor G2 6.1
Pixel 7 Pro GVU6C, G03Z5, GQML3 Google Tensor G2 6.1
Pixel 7 GE2AE, GFE4J, GP4BC Google Tensor G2 6.1
Pixel 7a GWKK3, GHL1X, G82U8,
G0DZQ
Google Tensor G2 6.1
Pixel 6 Pro GF5KQ, G8V0U, GLU0G Google Tensor 6.1
Pixel 6 GR1YH, GB7N6, G9S9B Google Tensor 6.1
Pixel 6a GX7AS, GB62Z, G1AZG,
GB17L
Google Tensor 6.1
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Pixel Devices
on Android 16 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/PKGTLS11.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Google Pixel Devices on Android 16
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the ST and Guidance documents. Additionally, the Evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/WLANC10/
PKGTLS11 related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
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was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP33/BIO11/BT10/MDMA10/
WLANC10/PKGTLS11 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the Evaluation team. The vulnerability
analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities
did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
MITRE CVE Database, National Vulnerability Database, and CVE details
(https://www.cve.org/, https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search, and
https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-search.php) and Known Vulnerability Exploit
Catalog (https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog) on 5/7/2026 (from
4/1/2025) with the following search terms: "Google", "Google LLC", "BoringSSL",
"Android Locksettings Service KBKDF", "Titan M2", "Google Tensor", "Google Tensor
G2", "Google Tensor G3", "Google Tensor G4", "Google Tensor G5", "Tensor UFS Inline
Storage Engine", "Google Trusty TEE", "Android 16", "Android", "Pixel 6", "Pixel 6a",
"Pixel 6 Pro", "Pixel 7", "Pixel 7a", "Pixel 7 Pro", "Pixel Fold", "Pixel Tablet", "Pixel 8",
"Pixel 8a", "Pixel 8 Pro", "Pixel 9", "Pixel 9a", "Pixel 9 Pro", "Pixel 9 Pro XL", "Pixel 9
Pro Fold", "Pixel 10a", "Pixel 10", "Pixel 10 Pro", "Pixel 10 Pro XL", and "Pixel 10 Pro
Fold".
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The Validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Google Pixel Phones on
Android 16 Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026 and any
additional guidance that it references. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or
later, were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not
assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by devices in the
operational environment needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
Note that Section 1.4 of the ST lists features and settings that must be enabled for the TOE
to operate in its evaluated configuration, including disabling USB debugging. The Admin
Guide should be consulted on how to configure these features and settings. In addition, Per
NIAP/CCEVS Publication #6, user installation of vendor-delivered bug fixes and security
patches is encouraged between completion of the evaluation and the Assurance Maintenance
Date; with such updates properly installed, the product is still considered by NIAP to be in
its evaluated configuration.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable
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12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 – Security Target,
Version 1.0, May 4, 2026.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 12 September 2022
(MDFPP33).
[5] collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking
the device - [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1, 12 September 2022 (BIO11).
[6] PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10).
[7] PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, 25 April 2019 (MDMA10).
[8] PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10).
[9] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11).
[10] Google Pixel Devices on Android 16 - Security Target, Version 1.0, May 4, 2026
(ST).
[11] Google Pixel Phones on Android 16 Administrator Guidance Documentation,
Version 1.0, May 4, 2026 (AGD).
[12] Assurance Activity Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16, Version 0.3, May
12, 2026 (AAR).
[13] Detailed Test Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16, Version 0.3, May 12,
2026 (DTR).
[14] Evaluation Technical Report for Google Pixel Devices on Android 16, Version 0.3,
May 12, 2026 (ETR).