BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026
for
TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0
from
m-privacy GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.56
BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026 (*)
Proxy-Firewall
TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0
from m-privacy GmbH
PP Conformance: Remote-Controlled Browsers Systems (ReCoBS),
Version 1.0, 26 February 2008, BSI-CC-PP-0040-
2008
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ALC_CMS.4, ALC_FLR.3
valid until: 22 February 2031
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bonn, 23 February 2026
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Fabian Hodouschek L.S. Sandro Amendola
Head of Certification Director-General Directorate General S
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................13
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................16
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................17
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................17
13. Definitions................................................................................................................17
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................18
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................20
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 21
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licensing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 4
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBI.
2025, no. 301, p. 2
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 02 December
2025, Bundesgesetzblatt 2025, no. 301
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs – Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) – dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 was conducted by Deutsches
Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz GmbH (DFKI GmbH). The evaluation was
completed on 19 February 2026. DFKI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: m-privacy GmbH.
The product was developed by: m-privacy GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
evaluated guidance documentation, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment as specified and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the
product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor
should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity
program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis. Therefore the BSI reserves the right to revoke the certificate, especially if a
exploitable vulnerability of the certified product gets to known.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 23 February
2026 is valid until 22 February 2031. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly in the listing found at the BSI Website
https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/Zertifizierung-Gesamtlisten. Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
m-privacy GmbH
Werner-Voß-Damm 62
12101 Berlin
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 which is a workstation proxy
firewall, which allows designated hosts to connect to, and use software on the server. By
doing so, any potential threats are restricted to the TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 server, which is
protected and designed to counter threats. TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 is designed to be used
to access all WWW and e-mail content, forwarding only graphical and textual information,
or the result of any executable content, without actually forwarding the code required to
generate a web page.
The Security Target [5] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Remote-Controlled Browsers Systems (ReCoBS), Version 1.0, 26
February 2008, BSI-CC-PP-0040-2008 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ALC_CMS.4, ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [5], chapter 6. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus the
claimed set of SFRs in the ST is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3(t) Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [5], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [5], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [5],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0
server appliance, pre-
installed of specific server
hardware
2.0 Courier service
2 HW
(USB)
TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0
boot media (USB)
2.0 Courier service
3 DOC Password list with initial
passwords and checklist
scope of delivery
n/a Courier service
4 SW TightGate-Viewer (CC) 2.0,
TG-Pro-vnc-
CC_4.8.1_win64-all.msi
Version 4.8.1 Web site download from
https://help.m-privacy.de/doku.p
hp/tightgate-cc
5 DOC Benutzerhandbuch für
TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0
agd_user_tightgate-
pro_cc_20.pdf
Version 1.11 Web site download from
https://help.m-privacy.de/doku.p
hp/tightgate-cc
6 DOC Administrationshandbuch für
TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0
agd-ope_tightgate-
pro_cc_20.pdf
Version 1.23 Web site download from
https://help.m-privacy.de/doku.p
hp/tightgate-cc
7 DOC Installationshandbuch für
TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0
agd-pre_tightgate-
pro_cc_20.pdf
Version 1.14 Web site download from
https://help.m-privacy.de/doku.p
hp/tightgate-cc
8 SW Digital signatures for Web
site downloads
n/a Web site download from
https://help.m-privacy.de/doku.p
hp/tightgate-cc
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 server appliance, boot media (USB), password list and
checklist (scope of delivery) are delivered via a commercial courier service. The customer
will be notified of the delivery in advance.
The TightGate-Viewer (CC) 2.0, the user guidance (Benutzer-, Administrations-,
Installationshandbuch) and the corresponding digital signatures are delivered via web-site
download. The signature verification key cc@m-privacy.de (key ID:
0xC466DE69A41EFD1B, subkey: 0x9C26225432C29B41) can be obtained using GnuPG
via WKD (Web Key Directory) procedure.
The unique reference of the TOE is TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0. TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 server
appliance and boot media as well as the TightGate-Viewer (CC) 2.0 are labelled with the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026 Certification Report
unique TOE reference. The file name of the TightGate-Viewer (CC) 2.0 refers to its
individual unique version number. All parts of the user guidance are labelled with the
unique TOE reference in the document title and their individual unique version number in
the page footer.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Information flow control (FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1) for the exchange of audio-
visual data, keyboard/mouse events, plain-text clipboard data and (only during
client startup) the contents of a clearly identified file.
● Management functionality (FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3(t)) regarding
the rules of information flow control.
● Maintenance of security roles administrator and user (FMT_SMR.1) regarding their
association with user accounts.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The topics listed in the
Security Target [5], chapter 4.2 are of relevance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of two physically separate parts: the TOE client and the TOE server.
Both parts are interconnected by the TOE protocol, which is also part of the TOE itself and
is not considered a TSF interface.
The TOE client (VNC-Viewer) outputs audio-visual information via loudspeaker/screen.
The keyboard and mouse deliver input events to the TOE client. This input/output is not
described as a TSF interface in the functional specification. It is also not mentioned in the
security objectives and the SFRs. Accordingly, no subsystem for input/output has been
identified. The input/output is interpreted as a non-TOE subsystem of the TOE client.
The TOE server (VNC-Server) communicates with browsers or other applications (e-mail,
etc.). This input/output is not described as a TSF interface in the functional specification. It
is also not mentioned in the security objectives and SFRs. Accordingly, no subsystem for
input/output has been identified. The input/output is interpreted as a non-TOE subsystem
of the TOE client.
The TSF subsystems are arranged hierarchically on two levels. The lower-level
subsystems provide all of the security functionality. The upper-level subsystems only
matter in terms of the structure of the security architecture.
The TOE protocol, as part of the TOE, is implemented by the LL-Sub VeNCrypt and LL-
Sub Audio subsystems in both the TOE server (VNC-Server) and TOE client (VNC-
Viewer). The Viewer Menu subsystem is implemented in the TOE client (VNC-Viewer). The
menus for the various administrative roles are implemented in the TOE server (VNC-
Server Management).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026
The LL-Sub VeNCrypt subsystem implements parts of the TOE protocol. VeNCrypt is a
protocol extension of the VNC protocol used by the TOE to negotiate a TLS connection
between the upper-level subsystems VNC-Server and VNC-Viewer. The VNC protocol is
used to transfer visual information and the information required for its display (such as
window size and position) from the VNC server to the VNC viewer, and keystrokes and
mouse events from the VNC-Viewer to the VNC-Server. In addition, if enabled, plain text
can be exchanged between the VNC-Server and VNC-Viewer via the clipboard
(COPYPASTEOUT and COPYPASTEIN).
The LL-Sub audio subsystem implements audio transmission as part of the TOE protocol.
Through the PulseAudio protocol, audio information is transmitted from the VNC-Server to
the VNC-Viewer along an existing VNC connection.
The Viewer Menu Subsystem (accessible with the F8 key) allows the user to control
clipboard exchange with the VNC server (COPYPASTEOUT and COPYPASTEIN).
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Functional developer tests.
The test setup consists of a DMZ and a local network segment connected to it via a
firewall. One of the network interfaces of the TOE server is located in the DMZ, the other is
connected to the Internet. For the tests, a TOE client is operated in the local network
segment. The TOE is tested in the evaluated configuration. All security objectives for the IT
environment are met. In some tests, the TOE server is connected to a log server located in
the DMZ. In addition, the following test tools are occasionally used: a network scanner, an
SSH client and an RDP client.
The developer has devised a test for each SFR element and policy rule, in order to verify
their enforcement. All of the observed test results corresponded to the expected results.
No deviations from the SFRs have been detected.
Independent evaluator tests
An isolated network was used to test the following:
● a TOE server appliance supplied by the developer
● a running TightGate-Viewer version 4.0.7
● a running TightGate-Viewer version 4.8.1
Both the server and the client computers were located within the same network segment
and were not separated by a firewall.
The interfaces tested comprise:
● Config menu
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026 Certification Report
● Maint menu
● VNC viewer menu
Each interface tested provides actions necessary for enforcing the SFRs. All SFR
elements and policy rules are covered by these actions. When selecting developer tests,
those that check the implementation of the SFRs are chosen. All tests have been passed.
No deviations from the SFRs, the functional specification or the TOE design have been
found. Only the test configuration with TightGate-Viewer version 4.8.1 corresponds to the
evaluated configuration. At an earlier stage, the evaluator tests were carried out with
TightGate-Viewer version 4.0.7 on Windows 10. The test procedures and the results
obtained can be transferred to the evaluated configuration because:
● The actions tested on TightGate-Viewer have not changed.
● TightGate-Viewer is based on an open-source product that operates across different
operating systems; therefore, it only uses common functionality and does not rely
on the security features of the operating system.
● The developer has performed all tests with TightGate-Viewer version 4.8.1 on
Windows 11.
Vulnerability analysis
Three potential vulnerabilities have been identified and tested to verify their existence.
Two of these are related to attacks that bypass the maintenance of the administrator role,
i.e. the use of administrative functions without proper authentication. The penetration tests
aimed at bypassing the maintenance of the administrator role were unsuccessful. The third
potential vulnerability relates to the exchange of clipboard content other than plain text.
Two penetration tests revealed that TightGate-Viewer either disconnects from the TOE
host or blocks illicit clipboard content types. The penetration tests have been performed
with the evaluator test configuration. In order to attempt to exchange illicit clipboard
content types, the TOE host has been replaced with a notebook running a specific test
environment.
All penetration tests were carried out using the TightGate-Viewer user interface, with the
results showing that the respective vulnerability does not exist.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE can be operated in a single configuration. The TOE automatically starts up to the
evaluated configuration and operating mode. During start-up, it is possible to select other
operating modes of the TOE host. However, these are neither secure nor compatible with
the evaluated configuration.
The TOE only operates in its evaluated configuration when all configuration settings are
secure. To prevent misconfiguration of the TOE, any settings that differ from the evaluated
configuration are clearly marked in the administration menus.
The TOE consists of the items in the configuration list [8].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_CMS.4, ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Remote-Controlled Browsers Systems (ReCoBS), Version 1.0,
26 February 2008, BSI-CC-PP-0040-2008 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ALC_CMS.4, ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026 Certification Report
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [5] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VNC Virtual Network Computing
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation – The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile – A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension – The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
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Informal – Expressed in natural language.
Object – A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Package – named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile – A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target – An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Subject – An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation – An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality – Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licensing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1240-2026, Common Criteria: Security Target for the
TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0, Version 1.25, 2026-02-14, m-privacy GmbH
[6] Evaluation Technical Report, Evaluation TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 Evaluation
Technical Report Summary, Version 1.1, Date 16.02.2026, including TOE Security
Compendium for utilisation in the Certification Procedure, TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0,
Version 1.1, Date 16.02.2026, DFKI, (confidential documents)
[7] Protection Profile Remote-Controlled Browsers Systems (ReCoBS), Version 1.0, 26
February 2008, BSI-CC-PP-0040-2008
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Filenames TG-Pro-CC-
vnc_Viewer_481_Dateiliste.odt and gen_min_parts_of_the_toe_250728.txt
(confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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[9] TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 – Benutzerhandbuch, Version 1.11, 25.07.2023, m-privacy
GmbH
[10] TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 – Administrationshandbuch, Version 1.23, 26.11.2025, m-
privacy GmbH
[11] TightGate-Pro (CC) 2.0 – Installationshandbuch, Version 1.14, 25.07.2023, m-
privacy GmbH
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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