BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023
for
PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0
from
Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.46
BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023 (*)
PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0
from Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A.
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control with PACE
(EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-
CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE_PP),
Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-
2011-MA-01
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2, ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 22 May 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Matthias Intemann L.S.
Head of Branch
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................21
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................24
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0, has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0, was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 30 March 2023. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Polska Wytwórnia Papierów
Wartościowych S.A..
The product was developed by: Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A..
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 22 May 2023
is valid until 21 May 2028. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych S.A.
1 Sanguszki St.
00-222 Warsaw
Poland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite TOE named PWPW SmartApp-MRTD
and has been evaluated in version 1.0. The TOE is an electronic travel document
representing a contactless smart card. The TOE provides cryptographic services according
to the protection profiles [8].
The PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0 comprises of:
• the hardware (microcontroller, the integrated circuit, IC),
• the native implementation of the e-passport,
• the guidance documentation.
The Composite TOE is provided by Infineon through the delivery channel certified in scope
of the IC certification BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V5-2022-MA-01.
The TOE supports the following security protocols/mechanisms specific for travel
documents:
1. PACE or PACE with CAM,
2. Extended Access Control, i.e.:
• Chip Authentication,
• Terminal Authentication,
3. Passive Authentication.
Passive Authentication data is calculated by the TOE environment and stored securely in
the TOE during its personalization.
The TOE comprises of at least:
• the circuitry of the travel document’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC);
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software;
• the IC Embedded Software (application) and
• the associated guidance documentation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profiles Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended
Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-
V2-2012-MA-02,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE_PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-
0068-V2-2011-MA-01 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ATE_DPT.2, ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
Identifier Security functionalities and features
SF.MRTD The security functionality provides the mechanism, which allows to control
the TOE life cycle phases, check user roles and enforce national and/or
international security policies relevant for the travel documents.
SF.CRYPTO The security functionality generates random challenges intended for various
authentication mechanisms.
SF.SAUTH The security functionality concerts symmetric authentication mechanism as
well as it allows replacing the existing authentication key.
SF.PACE The security functionality authenticates the inspection system, which tries to
establish connection with the TOE.
SF.SM The security functionally is used to secure communication between the
TOE and the Personalization Agent or the TOE and the inspection system.
SF.CA Chip Authentication is used by the TOE to prove its identity (to prevent
cloning).
SF.TA Terminal authentication is used to authenticates the inspection system.
SF.SEC Hardware security protection.
SF.CONF The security functionality is used to configure the application with the e-
passport functionality.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.3 to 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8 of this
report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0,
The following tables outline the TOE deliverables:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023 Certification Report
No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
1 SW PWPW SmartApp-MRTD
application
1.0.44.0 PGP encrypted software
data from PWPW via
internet portal SecureX
to IFX.
Table 2: TOE Deliverables for IC manufacturer Infineon
No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW PWPW SmartApp-MRTD
composite product on certified
Infineon IC
1.0.44.0 The Composite TOE is
provided by Infineon
through the delivery
channel certified in
scope of the IC
certification BSI-DSZ-
CC-1110-V5-2022-MA-
01.
2 DOC PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0:
Preparative procedures
1.0.11.0 PGP encrypted and
public key certificate
authenticated from
PWPW to
personalization agent.
3 DOC PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0:
Operational user guidance
1.0.9.0 PGP encrypted and
public key certificate
authenticated from
PWPW to
personalization agent.
4 DATA Personalization Agent Key
and its identifier
- Delivered to the
personalization agent
via extranet portal of
Infineon – CC SecureX.
5 DATA Secure Messaging seed
material
- Delivered to the
personalization agent
via extranet portal of
Infineon – CC SecureX.
Table 3: TOE Deliverables for travel document manufacturer
The developer states, that effectively no delivery to customers will take place for the
certified TOE and delivery procedures. More so, 1.3.4.2 of the Security Target [6] identifies
the travel document manufacturer as the only client. Likewise, Infineon (IFX by ST [6]) is
identified as the only (unique) client and customer for the delivery of the MRTD App from
the developer, with the procedures certified for the Infineon IC the composite TOE is based
on. The delivery of the composite TOE, consisting of the Application integrated on the
certified IC, is then delivered via the delivery channels certified in scope of the HW IC
certification. The IC manufacturer Infineon locks the Flash Loader during the
manufacturing process which will permanently disable the ability to reload or delete the
Embedded Software.
Delivery of guidance documents for personalization are delivered from PWPW to the
personalization agent as a pgp encrypted and signed file.
The TOE can be identified in accordance with the described processes in chapter 3 of
[10]. The application version and its state can verified using the GET DATA (Version)
command as described in chapter 3.2 of [10].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• Key management,
• Key generation,
• Data encryption,
• Authentication and attestation of the TOE, trusted channel,
• Identification and authentication,
• Access control,
• User data protection
• Security Audit,
• Security management, and
• Protection of the security features.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
6.1 and 6.2 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• OE.Legislative_Compliance: Issuing of the travel document,
• OE.Passive_Auth_Sign: Authentication of travel document by Signature,
• OE.Personalization: Personalization of travel document,
• OE.Terminal: Terminal operating,
• OE.Travel_Document_Holder: Travel document holder Obligations,
• OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document: Travel document Authentication Key,
• OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data: Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference
Data,
• OE.Exam_Travel_Document: Examination of the physical part of the travel
document,
• OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document: Protection of data from the logical travel
document,
• OE.Ext_Insp_Systems: Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE comprises the following subsystems:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023 Certification Report
• mrtd: Subsystem mrtd ensures the MRTD application functionality. It controls all
primary subsystems. Based on established protocols and application’s lifecycle, the
subsystem decides to permit or discard each operation and gives or discards
access to the sensitive data.
• conf: Subsystem conf is used to configure the MRTD application behavior. It allows
to configure the following: communication interface, used protocols and operating
system behavior (i.e. deactivate Flash Loader, disable chip serial number).
• fs: Subsystem fs has access to the nonvolatile memory NVM and stores information
of each file localization, size, identifier and security conditions. It allows creating,
deleting, erasing, updating and reading specified files. The subsystem also allows
to select the Master File as well as the MRTD application.
• sauth: Subsystem sauth ensures the personalization agent functionality. It allows
the following operations: changing personalization agent key, changing
personalization agent key identifier, changing secure messaging seed (used to
derivate secure messaging keys which are used during configuration, pre-
personalization and personalization), enabling personalization Agent secure login
and switch to the next life cycle phase. The operational phase is the last phase in
the application. PA (Personalization Agent) is permanently disabled in the
operational phase.
• ta: Subsystem ta is responsible for the terminal authentication protocol. It allows the
following: reading and validating certificates, loading CVCA certificates, updating
CV-Link certificates and TA protocol establishment.
• ca: Subsystem ca is responsible for the Chip Authentication protocol. It allows CA
protocol establishment and stores additional information used by the ta subsystem,
i.e. the X-coordinate of the terminal’s public key.
• pace: Subsystem pace is responsible for the Password Authentication Connection
Establishment (PACE) protocol. It allows PACE protocol establishment and stores
additional information used by the ta subsystem, i.e. Id PICC - defined as the X
coordinate of the ephemeral PACE public key.
• test: Subsystem test is used only during testing life cycle to verify the syntax of all
supported APDU commands as well as to perform proprietary internal tests. It is
used to test the following subsystems: crypto, sec and nvm. The subsystem is used
only in the development phase. For operational usage, the subsystem is
permanently removed from the application execution code.
• sm: Subsystem sm performs secure messaging operations. It is used to perform the
following operations: converting command in plain text to its protected
representation and converting protected command to the command in plain text.
Moreover, the subsystem verifies the integrity of protected commands.
• gc: Subsystem gc is used to recover the NVM after file deletion. The subsystem is
able to move files inside the memory, to achieve bigger memory space for the new
file.
• main: Subsystem main is a representation of the application main entry. The
following operations are performed in the subsystem: application configuration,
verification of the security measures and execution of the mrtd subsystem.
• apdu: Subsystem apdu performs conversion from received raw bytes into the APDU
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023
structure. The structure contains following fields: class byte, instruction byte, P1
parameter byte, P2 parameter byte, data length, response length, APDU’s case and
information if command or response was split into parts. The APDU structure is
used by executive methods dedicated for specified APDUs.
• timer: Subsystem timer is used to configure internal timers available in
microcontroller. Timers are used by proto subsystem, com subsystem and pace
subsystem.
• ram: Subsystem ram is used to manage RAM. It performs the following operations:
setting memory pool, allocating and freeing memory.
• crypto: Subsystem crypto is a one common interface for all functionalities related to
the cryptographic operations. There were specified three groups of such
functionalities: cryptographic operations realized with crypto library support,
operations realized with SCP support and proprietary operations realized by
PWPW, which are: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and RetailMac,
CMAC. RetailMac and CMAC are realized based on SCP and proprietary
implementation.
• nvm: Subsystem nvm is used to manage nonvolatile memory NVM. It allows the
following operations: reading data, writing data, filling specified memory range with
solid data values, setting additional variable key for more secured memory areas,
configuring and processing data recovery on accidental power cut.
• reg: Subsystem reg is a wrapper for operations on microcontroller registers.
• sec: Subsystem sec ensures the application security. It is used to perform the
following operations: flow counter management, sensitive data management and
interception of critical exceptions reported by the hardware.
• imm: Subsystem imm is used to manage and control communication interfaces –
contact base and contactless. It controls based on configuration settings which
interface should be available: only contact based, only contactless or both
interfaces.
• proto: Subsystem proto is used to control communication protocol correctness and
its flow. It supports the following communication protocols: T=0, T=1 and T=CL. For
contactless communication this subsystem is the only entry point for the outside
world, which enables the terminal to ex-change data with the MRTD application.
• com: Subsystem com ensures contact based communication. For contact based
communication this subsystem is the only entry point for the outside world, which
enables the terminal to exchange data with the MRTD application.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 3 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023 Certification Report
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
TOE configurations:
• RELEASE firmware,
• DEBUG firmware (available only during development phase), and
• TEST firmware (available only during development phase).
Developer test suites:
• PWPW-SCrdUVXTester,
• GoogleTest Framework, and
• Keolabs SCRIPTIS.
Testing approach:
• Automatically executed tests within test suites,
• Each line of code is mapped to one test (APDU or GoogleTest),
• Coverage and depth analysis by mapping of the test cases to the code (i.e.
subsystems and interfaces of the TOE), and
• APDU tests split in scenarios, test cases and steps.
The developer’s testing efforts have been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the TSFIs
and subsystems perform as expected.
7.2. Evaluator Tests - Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
In the following the evaluator’s independent testing efforts are summarized:
Approach for independent testing:
• Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the
developer’s test goals and plan for identification of gaps.
• Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment, is operating as specified
using iterations of developer’s tests.
• Independent testing was performed by the evaluator in Essen using developer’s
and evaluator’s test equipment.
• During sample testing the evaluator chose to repeat all developer functional tests at
the Evaluation Body for IT Security in Essen.
• Penetration tests as outcome of the vulnerability analysis were performed to cover
potential vulnerabilities. Fuzzy tests, laser fault injections and side-channel analysis
were conducted during testing.
• The evaluator repeated all tests of the developer’s testing documentation, therefore
no sampling strategy was applied.
Verdict for the activity:
During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified.
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7.3. Evaluator Tests - Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜVIT in the
evaluator’s test environment with the evaluator’s test equipment. The samples were
provided by the developer. The test samples were configured and parameterized by the
evaluator according to the guidance documentation. The one configuration of the TOE
being intended to be covered by the current evaluation was tested. The overall result is
that no deviations were found between the expected result and the actual result of the
tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of High was actually
successful.
Penetration testing approach:
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment created within vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created
attack scenarios for the penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion that the
vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing so, the evaluator also considered all
aspects of the security architecture of the TOE being not covered by the functional
developer tests.
The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the
development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported
testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly
be covered by test cases.
The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities
identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test
set was devised.
TOE test configurations:
The tests were performed with the one configuration of the TOE as stated in the security
target.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the ST [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE configuration is identical with the one described in part B., Chapter 1
of this report, which in turn is the delivered product. There is only one configuration of the
TOE. For all tests the TOE is configured and parameterized, if necessary, according to the
guidance documents.
The TOE needs to be initialized, configured, personalized and operated according to the
guidance documentation.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices according to AIS
36 (see [4]). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the
underlying platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform
evaluations [19, 20] have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(ii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (AIS 37, see [4]).
(iii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (AIS 26, see [4]).
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (AIS 26, see [4]).
(v) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (AIS 25, see [4]).
(vi) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(AIS 25, see [4]).
(vii) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6 (AIS 34,
see [4])
(viii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic
random number generators (AIS 20 and AIS 31, see [4]).
(ix) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (AIS 46, see [4]).
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34,
AIS 36, AIS 37 and AIS 46 (see [4]) were used. For RNG assessment the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted
to the certification body for approval subsequently.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ATE_DPT.2, ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5
December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE
(PACE_PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-
2011-MA-01 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2, ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table A.1 presented in Annex A of the Security Target [6] gives an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the
standard of application where its specific appropriateness is stated. The strength of the
cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see
BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). An explicit validity period is not given.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 3 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, a Security Target Lite [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
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13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CVCA Country Verifying Certificate Authority
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023: “PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0 Security
Target”, Version 1.0.14.0, 2023-03-09, PWPW (confidential document)
Security Target Lite “PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0 Security Target Lite”, Version
1.0.3.0, 2023-03-09, PWPW (public document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, Date 2023-03-21, Evaluation Technical
Report Summary BSI-DSZ-CC-1176, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[8] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-
V2-2012-MA-02,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE_PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014,
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01
[9] Certification Report – BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V5-2022 for Infineon Security Controller
IFX_CCI_000003h, 000005h, 000008h, 00000Ch, 000013h, 000014h, 000015h,
00001Ch, 00001Dh, 000021h, 000022h in the design step H13 and including
optional software libraries and dedicated firmware in several versions from Infineon
Technologies AG, 2022-04-29, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V5-2022-MA-01
Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_000003h, 000005h, 000008h, 00000Ch,
000013h, 000014h, 000015h, 00001Ch, 00001Dh, 000021h, 000022h in the design
step H13 and including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware in several
versions from Infineon Technologies AG, 2022-09-09, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik.
[10] “PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0 Preparative procedures – pre-personalization”,
Version 1.0.11.0, Date 2022-12-13, PWPW
[11] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
1110-V5-2022, v1, 2022-03-29, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH.
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1176-2023
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product PWPW SmartApp-MRTD 1.0, (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 22 May 2023, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) PWPW SmartApp Development Site; Sanguszki 1 Street, 00-222 Warsaw,
Poland; SW Development; Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0168-2021-MA-01.
b) For development and production sites regarding the platform IC from Infineon
Technologies AG, please refer to the certification report [9], Product Certificate
(Initialization/Pre-personalization, IC Development, IC Manufacturing)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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