National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11390-2023
Dated: 12/06/2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Lauren Brandt
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Anne Gugel
Clare Parran
Richard (Rip) Toren
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Furukh Siddique
Toan Truong
Intertek, USA
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................. 6
3.1 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................................6
3.2 Threats.............................................................................................................................................................8
3.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................10
4 Architectural Information .................................................................................................. 11
5 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 12
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 14
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 15
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................15
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................15
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 16
8.1 Developer Testing.........................................................................................................................................16
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 17
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................17
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................17
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................17
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................18
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................18
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................18
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 20
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 21
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 22
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 23
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 24
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers........................................................................................................ 5
Table 2: Assumptions ..................................................................................................................... 8
Table 3: Threats .............................................................................................................................. 9
Table 4: Glossary.......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 3
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12 Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Intertek in December 2023. The information in this report is
largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Intertek. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the NDcPP v2.2e.
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Revision
5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Revision 5),
as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR
applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The Validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings,
the Validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions
justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories
called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against
PPs containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract
with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12
Protection Profile Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e [NDcPP v2.2e]
Security Target Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12 Security Target version 1.8
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12, version 0.8
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Ciena Corporation
Developer Jian Gong
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd. #395
Rockville, MD 20850
CCEVS Validators Lauren Brandt, Jenn Dotson, Sheldon Durrant, Clare Parran, Anne Gugel, Richard (Rip)
Toren
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
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3 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
3.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following table are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
ID Assumption
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be
physically protected in its operational
environment and not subject to
physical attacks that compromise the
security or interfere with the device’s
physical interconnections and correct
operation. This protection is assumed
to be sufficient to protect the device
and the data it contains. As a result, the
cPP does not include any requirements
on physical tamper protection or other
physical attack mitigations. The cPP
does not expect the product to defend
against physical access to the device
that allows unauthorized entities to
extract data, bypass other controls, or
otherwise manipulate the device. For
vNDs, this assumption applies to the
physical platform on which the VM
runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide
networking functionality as its core
function and not provide
functionality/services that could be
deemed as general purpose computing.
For example, the device should not
provide a computing platform for
general purpose applications (unrelated
to networking functionality).
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ID Assumption
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic Network Device
does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that
traverses it. The intent is for the
Network Device to protect data that
originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative
data and audit data. Traffic that is
traversing the Network Device,
destined for another network entity, is
not covered by the ND cPP. It is
assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for
particular types of Network Devices
(e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the
Network Device are assumed to be
trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This
includes appropriately trained,
following policy, and adhering to
guidance documentation.
Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient
strength and entropy and to lack
malicious intent when administering
the device. The Network Device is not
expected to be capable of defending
against a malicious Administrator that
actively works to bypass or
compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3
certificate-based authentication, the
Security Administrator(s) are expected
to fully validate (e.g. offline
verification) any CA certificate (root
CA certificate or intermediate CA
certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust
store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key
Store', or similar) as a trust anchor
prior to use (e.g. offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The Network Device firmware and
software is assumed to be updated by
an Administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product
updates due to known vulnerabilities.
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ID Assumption
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials
(private key) used to access the
Network Device are protected by the
platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that
there is no unauthorized access
possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys,
keying material, PINs, passwords etc.)
on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed
from its operational environment.
Table 2: Assumptions
3.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic:
ID Threat
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access
to the Network Device by nefarious means such as
masquerading as an Administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an Administrator,
replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or
selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle
attacks, which would provide access to the
administrative session, or sessions between Network
Devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access
allows malicious actions that compromise the security
functionality of the device and the network on which it
resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic
algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against
the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms,
modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise
the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and
give them unauthorized access allowing them to read,
manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal
effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices
that do not use standardized secure tunnelling protocols
to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take
advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key
management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle
attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result
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ID Threat
in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical
network traffic, and potentially could lead to a
compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols
that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints, e.g.
a shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly
designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the
Administrator or another device, and the attacker could
insert themselves into the network stream and perform a
man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical
network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of
confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the
Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which undermines
the security functionality of the device. Non-validated
updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak
cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to
surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or
modify the security functionality of the Network Device
without Administrator awareness. This could result in
the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration,
flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the
Administrator would have no knowledge that the device
has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device
data enabling continued access to the Network Device
and its critical data. The compromise of credentials
includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s
credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining
the Administrator or device credentials for use by the
attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides
the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and
may allow them to take advantage of any trust
relationships with other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use of
failed or compromised security functionality and might
therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions
without prior authentication to access, change or modify
device data, critical network traffic or security
functionality of the device.
Table 3: Threats
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3.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the NDcPP v2.2e, Version 3.1, Section 5.
• Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for,
nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities
to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one
that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication, and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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4 Architectural Information
The Ciena Waveserver 5 is a purpose-built, data center interconnect (DCI) platform designed to
facilitate high-speed, high-capacity connections between data centers. This platform has been
designed to meet the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [NDcPP
2.2e]. The Waveserver 5 incorporates a range of advanced security features to ensure the
integrity and confidentiality of network communications. The TOE uses a Marvell CN9130
processor.
While not an exhaustive list, some the main security mechanisms being leveraged include the
following.
1. Encrypted SSH Administration: The device supports encrypted SSH connections for
secure remote administration, protecting the communication channel between
administrators and the device from unauthorized access and eavesdropping.
2. RADIUS via TLS: The Waveserver 5 is capable of using RADIUS authentication with
TLS encryption, ensuring the secure transmission of login credentials and providing an
added layer of protection for user authentication.
3. Encrypted Syslog Traffic: The platform can encrypt syslog traffic via TLS to a syslog
server, safeguarding the privacy and confidentiality of logs and preventing unauthorized
access to sensitive log data.
4. NTP with SHA Authentication: The Waveserver 5 supports the use of NTP with SHA
authentication, providing a secure method for time synchronization across network
devices and reducing the risk of time-based attacks.
These highlighted security mechanisms, along with other measures, contribute to the Waveserver
5's ability to not only meet the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version
2.2e, but also deliver a comprehensive and secure networking solution for end users.
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5 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functions required by the Collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, summarized below.
Security Audit
The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shut-down functions, and all auditable events
as specified in Table 11 of the ST. Audit events are also generated for management actions
specified in FAU_GEN.1. The TOE is capable of storing audit events locally and exporting them
to an external syslog server using TLS v1.1 or TLS v1.2 protocol. Each audit record contains the
date and time of event, type of event, subject identity, and the relevant data of the event. The
syslog server supports the following severity levels: emergency, alert, error, warning, notice, info
and debug. In order to enable the logging to syslog server, a user must be logged in with an
administrative access privilege and provision the settings to use a syslog server.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE leverages Waveserver 5 Cryptographic Library for all cryptographic services. The
related CAVP validation details are provided in Security Target document Table 13. All
algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates. The operating system is Linux Kernel v4.14. The
TOE leverages the Waveserver 5 Cryptographic Library for its cryptographic functionality.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports Role Based Access Control. All users must be authenticated to the TOE prior
to carrying out any management actions. The TOE supports password-based authentication and
public key-based authentication. Based on the assigned role, a user is granted a set of privileges
to access the system.
Security Management
The TOE supports local and remote management of its security functions including:
• Local console CLI administration.
• Remote CLI administration via SSHv2 and HTTPS/TLS.
• Timed user lockout after multiple failed authentication attempts.
• Password configurations.
• Role Based Access Control – Superuser (Security Administrator), Admin and limited
user.
• Configurable banners to be displayed at login.
• Timeouts to terminate administrative sessions after a set period of inactivity.
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• Protection of secret keys and passwords.
TOE Access
Prior to establishing an administration session with the TOE, a banner is displayed to the user.
The banner messaging is customizable. The TOE will terminate an interactive session after 10
minutes of session inactivity. An administrator can terminate their GUI session by clicking on
the logout button. A user can terminate their local CLI session and remote CLI session by
entering exit at the prompt.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects all passwords, pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from
unauthorized disclosure. Passwords are stored in encrypted format. Passwords are stored as
SHA-512 salted hash value as per standard Linux approach. The TOE executes self-tests during
initial start-up to ensure correct operation and enforcement of its security functions. An
administrator can install software updates to the TOE. The TOE maintains the date and time by
the setting of the time manually by a security administrator or by synchronizing with an NTP
server configured by a security administrator.
Trusted Path/ Channel
The TOE supports TLS v1.1 or TLS v1.2 for secure communication to the following IT entities:
Syslog server and Radius server. The TOE supports HTTPS/TLS (WebUI) and SSH v2 (remote
CLI) for secure remote administration.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12 Security Target version 1.8 [ST]
• Ciena Waveserver 5 Rel 2.3.12 Common Criteria Guidance Document, version 1.3
[AGD]
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE boundary is the hardware appliance, which is comprised of hardware and software
components. It is deployed in an environment that contains the various IT components as
depicted in the figure below.
The TOE is shipped with the software pre-installed on it. Software updates are available for
download from the Ciena website.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
• Peer Waveserver is used for communication over the optical network and protected via
encryption. This connection is not part of the evaluated configuration.
• The following interfaces are not in scope of the evaluation:
o NETCONF
o gRPC
o RESTCONF
o Swagger
o FTP
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in ETR for Waveserver 5, which is not publicly available. The AAR
provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP version 2.2.e. The Independent Testing
activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR.
The reader of this document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing
verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 Revision 5 and CEM version 3.1 Revision 5. The evaluation determined the Waveserver 5 to
be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the Assurance Activities specified in the claimed PP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Waveserver 5 that are consistent with the
Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the
NDcPP v2.2e.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the ST's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the NDcPP v2.2e related to the examination of the information contained
in the TOE Summary Specification.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the
Evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
18
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP v2.2e related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the Evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP v2.2e and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence was provided by the Evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed
the test activities in the NDcPP v2.2e, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation team
was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The Evaluation team performed a
public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues
with the TOE.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
addressed the vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPP v2.2e and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
19
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP v2.2e
and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
20
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Ciena Waveserver 5 Rel 2.3.12
Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Version 1.3. No versions of the TOE and software, either
earlier or later were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not
assessed as part of this evaluation. Section 1.4 of the ST defines product functionality not
included in the scope of the evaluation. It is important to understand that connections between
the TOE and a peer Waveserver device as well as connections between the TOE and the
datacenter are over an encrypted optical network connection which is not included in the
evaluated configuration. Therefore, these connections have not been evaluated through the NIAP
certification process. In addition, the following interfaces are not in scope of the evaluation and
have not been NIAP certified: NETCONF, gRPC, RESTCONF, Swagger, FTP and SFTP with
the Update Server. Customers must use this functionality at their own risk. All other
functionality provided by devices in the operational environment, need to be assessed separately
and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
21
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
22
12 Security Target
Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12 Security Target version 1.8
23
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
Term Definition
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) An IT security evaluation facility accredited by
the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation
Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-
based evaluations.
Conformance The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous
way that a given implementation is correct with
respect to the formal model.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product against the
Common Criteria using the Common Criteria
Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or
not the claims made are justified; or the
assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation
Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence
suitable for use as a statement of requirements for
one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
Evaluation Evidence Any tangible resource (information) required from
the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to
perform one or more evaluation activities.
Feature Part of a product that is either included with the
product or can be ordered separately.
Target of Evaluation (TOE) A group of IT products configured as an IT
system, or an IT product, and associated
documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
Validation The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation
Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria
certificate.
Validation Body A governmental organization responsible for
carrying out validation and for overseeing the
day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
Table 4: Glossary
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e
5. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
6. Evaluation Technical Report for Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12, version 0.8
7. Ciena Waveserver 5 Rel 2.3.12 Common Criteria Guidance Document, version 1.3
8. Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12 Security Target version 1.8
9. Assurance Activity Report for Ciena Waveserver 5 OS R2.3.12, version 1.8
10. Test Plan for the Ciena Waveserver 5, version 1.4
11. Vulnerability Assessment for Ciena Waveserver 5, version 1.5