CommScope Technologies LLC,
Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
Security Target
Version 0.5
July 22, 2024
Prepared for:
CommScope Technologies LLC
130 Holger Way
San Jose, CA 95134
Prepared By:
www.gossamersec.com
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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................3
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE......................................................................................................................3
1.2 TOE REFERENCE............................................................................................................................................3
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................4
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION .........................................................................................................................................4
1.4.1 TOE Architecture...................................................................................................................................5
1.4.2 TOE Documentation ..............................................................................................................................7
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..............................................................................................................................8
2.1 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE...........................................................................................................................9
3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................................................................10
3.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................10
4. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ................................................................................................11
5. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................12
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................12
5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)............................................................................................................................13
5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)..............................................................................................................16
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) ...............................................................................................21
5.1.4 Security management (FMT) ...............................................................................................................23
5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................24
5.1.6 TOE access (FTA)................................................................................................................................25
5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)...............................................................................................................26
5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................................................................28
5.2.1 Development (ADV).............................................................................................................................28
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)................................................................................................................28
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC) .....................................................................................................................29
5.2.4 Tests (ATE) ..........................................................................................................................................30
5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)...........................................................................................................30
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................31
6.1 SECURITY AUDIT ..........................................................................................................................................31
6.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ...........................................................................................................................31
6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.......................................................................................................35
6.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................36
6.5 PROTECTION OF THE TSF .............................................................................................................................38
6.6 TOE ACCESS.................................................................................................................................................39
6.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS ...........................................................................................................................39
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Technical Decisions........................................................................................................................................9
Table 2 TOE Security Functional Components ......................................................................................................13
Table 3 NDcPP Audit Events....................................................................................................................................15
Table 4 MACsec Audit Events..................................................................................................................................16
Table 5 Assurance Components ...............................................................................................................................28
Table 6 Cryptographic Functions ............................................................................................................................31
Table 7 Keys and CSPs .............................................................................................................................................33
Table 8 Service, Protocol and Key Establishment Scheme Mapping...................................................................34
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST
conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron
ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 provided by CommScope Technologies LLC. The TOE is being evaluated as a
network device.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Conformance Claims (Section 2)
• Security Objectives (Section 3)
• Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
• Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,
iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example
FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the
FDP_ACC.1 requirement.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using
bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a
selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-
assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated
using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions,
and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
• Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
ST Title – CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
Security Target
ST Version – Version 0.5
ST Date – July 22, 2024
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification – CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10,
including the following series and models:
• ICX 7550 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF
o ICX7550-48ZP (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7550-48P (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7550-48F (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
• ICX 7650 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF Module
o ICX7650-48ZP (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7650-48P (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7650-48F (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
• ICX 7850
o ICX7850-48FS (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
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TOE Developer – CommScope Technologies LLC
Evaluation Sponsor – CommScope Technologies LLC
1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router
10.0.10 family of products.
The TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a management processor. The
software controls the switching and routing network frames and packets among the connections available on the
hardware appliances.
All TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters to allow immediate use of the system’s basic
features through its Command Line Interface (CLI). However, the product should be configured in accordance with
the evaluated configuration (using the Ruckus FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide) prior to
being placed into operation. The CLI is a text based interface which is accessible from a directly connected terminal
or via a remote terminal using SSH. This remote management interface is protected using encryption as explained
later in this ST.
The hardware platforms that support the TOE have a number of common hardware characteristics:
• Central processor that supports all system operations
• Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operations
• Flash memory, used to store the operating system image
• Non-volatile memory, which stores configuration parameters used to initialize the system
at system startup
• Multiple physical network interfaces either fixed in configuration or removable as in a
chassis based product
1.4 TOE Description
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router
10.0.10 including the following series and models:
• ICX 7550 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF
o ICX7550-48ZP (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7550-48P (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7550-48F (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
• ICX 7650 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF Module
o ICX7650-48ZP (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7650-48P (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7650-48F (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
• ICX 7850
o ICX7850-48FS (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
While there are different models in the three series, they differ primarily in physical form factor, number and types
of connections and slots, and relative performance. While there are some functional differences among the families,
they each provide the same security characteristics as claimed in this security target.
The different series have differing CPUs as described below:
• The ICX 7550 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A72 (ARMv8 architecture)
• The ICX 7650 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A57 1.6GHz (ARMv8 architecture)
• The ICX 7850 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A57 1.6GHz (ARMv8 architecture)
The TOE utilizes the Firmware crypto library referred to as the RUCKUS-IP-CRYPTO-VER-6.0 running on these
processors.
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1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with physical network connections.
Within the hardware appliance, the ICX is designed to control and enable access to the available hardware functions
(e.g., program execution, device access, facilitate basic routing and switching functions). ICX enforces applicable
security policies on network information flowing through the hardware appliance.
During normal operation, IP packets are sent to the management IP address or through the appliance over one or more
of its physical network interfaces, which processes them according to the system’s configuration and state information
dynamically maintained by the appliance. This processing typically results in the frames or packets being forwarded
out of the device over another interface.
1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE appliance has physical network connections to its environment to facilitate routing and switching of
network traffic. The TOE appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides interfaces for its
own management.
The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in an environment which can be remote from or
directly connected to the TOE.
The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external syslog server in the network environment.
This is generally advisable given the limited audit log storage space on the evaluated appliances. This
communication is protected by TLS.
The use of a RADIUS authentication server is included in the evaluated configuration with communication
occurring over a protected TLS channel.
The TOE can be configured to establish a MACsec connection with a MACsec capable peer.
The TOE can be configured to use an NTP server for network time or it can use its own hardware clock.
Figure 1 shows the TOE in its operating environment.
Figure 1 TOE Operational Environment
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1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX
Series Switch/Router 10.0.10:
- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels
Security audit
The TOE is able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store
the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and also to send the logs to a designated log server using
TLS to protect the logs while in transit on the network.
Cryptographic support
The TOE contains a CAVP-tested cryptographic module that provides key management, random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher-level
cryptographic protocols including MACsec, SSH and TLS. The TOE supports SHA1 message digest authentication
for NTP servers.
Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, with
the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching/routing rules. It provides the
ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these
attributes.
Security management
The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of security management
functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions including security management
commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user
identification and authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use
of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Super
User can actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions
to facilitate effective management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security
features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible
even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for log accountability). The TOE can also be configured to work with an NTP server for reliable
time.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes
mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while
ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator establishes an interactive
session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive
session (local or remote) will be terminated.
Trusted path/channels
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The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSH for CLI access to ensure both integrity
and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization
for remote administration, an attempted connection will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server and authentication server, using TLS or
MACsec connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification.
1.4.2 TOE Documentation
CommScope Technologies LLC offers a series of documents that describe the installation of the FastIron
switch/router products as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the applicable security features.
The following document was examined as part of the evaluation:
• Ruckus FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 10.0.10, July 8, 2024.
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2. Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 3 Conformant
• Protection Profile/Package Claims:
• PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 2023-03-
29 (CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_V1.0)
▪ Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices', Version 2.2e, 23 March
2020 (NDcPP22e)
▪ PP Module: PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
(MACSEC10)
Package Technical Decision Applied Notes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0800 - Updated NIT Technical Decision for
IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance
No Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0792 - NIT Technical Decision:
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 - TSS EA not in line with SFR
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0790 - NIT Technical Decision: Clarification
Required for testing IPv6
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0738 - NIT Technical Decision for Link to
Allowed-With List
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0670 - NIT Technical Decision for Mutual and
Non-Mutual Auth TLSC Testing
No Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0639 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification
for NTP MAC Keys
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0638 - NIT Technical Decision for Key Pair
Generation for Authentication
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0636 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification
of Public Key User Authentication for SSH
No Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0635 - NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server
and Key Agreement Parameters
No Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0632 - NIT Technical Decision for Consistency
with Time Data for vNDs
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0631 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification
of public key authentication for SSH Server
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0592 - NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage
of Audit Records
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0591 - NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs
and hypervisors
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0581 - NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic
curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-
56Arev3
Yes
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CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0580 - NIT Technical Decision for clarification
about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0572 - NiT Technical Decision for Restricting
FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0571 - NiT Technical Decision for Guidance on
how to handle FIA_AFL.1
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0570 - NiT Technical Decision for Clarification
about FIA_AFL.1
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0569 - NIT Technical Decision for Session ID
Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7
No Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0564 - NiT Technical Decision for Vulnerability
Analysis Search Criteria
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0563 - NiT Technical Decision for Clarification
of audit date information
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0556 - NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077
question
No Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0555 - NIT Technical Decision for RFC
Reference incorrect in TLSS Test
No Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0547 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification
on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0546 - NIT Technical Decision for DTLS -
clarification of Application Note 63
No Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0537 - NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect
reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0536 - NIT Technical Decision for Update
Verification Inconsistency
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0528 - NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs
for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4
Yes
CPP_ND_V2.2E TD0527 - Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing
(FIA_X509_EXT.1)
Yes
MACSEC10 TD0826: Aligning MOD_MACSEC_V1.0 with
CPP_ND_V3.0E
No Not using CPP_ND_V3.0E
MACSEC10 TD0817: MACsec Data Delay Protection, Key
Agreement, and Conditional Support for Group
CAK
Yes
MACSEC10 TD0816: Clarity for MACsec Self Test Failure
Response
Yes
MACSEC10 TD0748 – Correction to FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC
Test 21
Yes
MACSEC10 TD0746 – Correction to FPT_RPL.1 Test 25 Yes
MACSEC10 TD0728 – Corrections to MACSec PP-Module SD Yes
Table 1 Technical Decisions
For ease of naming the following abbreviations will be used:
• CPP_ND_V2.2E – NDcPP22e
• MOD_MACsec_V1.0 – MACSEC10
2.1 Conformance Rationale
The ST conforms to the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10. As explained previously, the security problem definition, security
objectives, and security requirements have been drawn from the PP.
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3. Security Objectives
The Security Problem Definition may be found in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 and this section reproduces only the
corresponding Security Objectives for operational environment for reader convenience. The NDcPP22e/MACSEC10
offers additional information about the identified security objectives, but that has not been reproduced here and the
NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
In general, the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 has defined Security Objectives appropriate for the CommScope
Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec TOE.
3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must
be protected on any other platform on which they reside.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user
applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support
of the TOE. Note: For vNDs the TOE includes only the contents of its own VM, and does not include other VMs or
the VS.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It
is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational
environment.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by
the environment.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible
for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking
equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. For vNDs, this applies
when the physical platform on which the VM runs is removed from its operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted
manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that implement ND
functionality.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor
the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE's trust store
in case such certificate can no longer be trusted.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the
release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
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4. Extended Components Definition
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10. The
NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 defines the following extended requirements and since they are not redefined in this ST the
NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.
Extended SFRs:
- NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
- MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1: MACsec
- MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2: MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality
- MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3: MACsec Randomness
- MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4: MACsec Key Usage
- MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1: MACsec Key Agreement
- NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: NTP Protocol
- NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
- NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
- NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
- NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
- MACSEC10:FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
- NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
- NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
- NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
- NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
- NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
- MACSEC10:FPT_CAK_EXT.1: Protection of CAK Data
- NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
- NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
- NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF testing
- NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted update
- NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
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5. Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that
serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10. The refinements and operations already performed
in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied
from the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the
NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 made a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the
Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.
The SARs are the set of SARs specified in NDcPP22e and the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX
Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 TOE.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FAU: Security audit NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
MACSEC10:FAU_GEN.1.1/MACSEC: Audit Data Generation
(MACsec)
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2: User identity association
NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS: Cryptographic support NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: Cryptographic Operation
(AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1/MACSEC: Cryptographic Operation
(MACsec AES Data Encryption and Decryption))
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation (Hash
Algorithm)
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation (Keyed
Hash Algorithm)
MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1/CMAC: Cryptographic Operation (AES-
CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen: Cryptographic Operation (Signature
Generation and Verification)
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1: MACsec
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2: MACsec Integrity and
Confidentiality
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3: MACsec Randomness
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4: MACsec Key Usage
MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1: MACsec Key Agreement
NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: NTP Protocol
NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual
Authentication
FIA: Identification and
authentication
NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1: Authentication Failure Management
NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
MACSEC10:FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Pre-Shared Key Composition
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NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback
NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication
Mechanism
NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT: Security management NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Management of security
functions behaviour
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Management of TSF Data
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys: Management of TSF Data
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
MACSEC10: FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC Specification of Management
Functions
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
MACSEC10:FPT_CAK_EXT.1: Protection of CAK Data
MACSEC10:FPT_FLS.1: Failure with Preservation of Secure State
MACSEC10:FPT_RPL.1: Replay Detection
NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of
all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF testing
NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted update
FTA: TOE access NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTP: Trusted path/channels MACSEC10:FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC: Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
(MACsec Communications)
NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF trusted channel
NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin: Trusted Path
Table 2 TOE Security Functional Components
5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)
5.1.1.1 Audit Data Generation (NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1)
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions comprising:
- Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user
accounts are required for administrators).
- Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information
that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
- Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the
action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
- Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
- [no other actions];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 3.
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Requirement Auditable Events Additional Content
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1 None None
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2 None None
NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1 None None
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1 None None
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2 None None
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4 None None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash None None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen None None
NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1 Configuration of a new time
server Removal of
configured time server
Identity if new/removed
time server
NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None None
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH
session.
Reason for failure.
NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS
Session.
Reason for failure.
NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempt
limit is met or exceeded.
Origin of the attempt
(e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None None
NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7 None None
NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt
(e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt
(e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to
validate a certificate. Any
addition, replacement or
removal of trust anchors in
the TOE's trust store
Reason for failure of
certificate validation
Identification of
certificates added,
replaced or removed as
trust anchor in the TOE's
trust store
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2 None None
NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a
manual update.
None
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None None
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys None None
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of
Management Functions
All management activities of
TSF data.
None
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2 None None
NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1 None None
NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None None
NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to
time - either Administrator
actuated or changed via an
automated process. (Note
that no continuous changes
to time need to be logged.
For discontinuous
changes to time: The old
and new values for the
time. Origin of the
attempt to change time for
success and failure (e.g.,
IP address).
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See also application note on
FPT_STM_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1 None None
NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of
the update attempt (success
or failure).
None
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote
session by the session
locking mechanism.
None
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an
interactive session.
None
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if 'lock the session' is
selected) Any attempts at
unlocking of an interactive
session. (if 'terminate the
session' is selected) The
termination of a local session
by the session locking
mechanism.
None
NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1 None None
NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted
channel. Termination of the
trusted channel. Failure of
the trusted channel functions.
Identification of the
initiator and target of
failed trusted channels
establishment attempt.
NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path.
Termination of the trusted
path. Failure of the trusted
path functions.
None
Table 3 NDcPP Audit Events
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a)Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or
failure) of the event; and
b)For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the cPP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 3.
5.1.1.2 Audit Data Generation (MACsec) (MACSEC10:FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC)
MACSEC10:FAU_GEN.1.1/MACSEC
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events for the not specified level of audit;
c. All administrative actions;
d. Specifically defined auditable events listed in the Auditable Events table (Table 4)
MACSEC10:FAU_GEN.1.2/MACSEC
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components
included in the PP-Module/ST, information specified in column three of the
Auditable Events table (Table 4).
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Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1 Session establishment Secure Channel Identifier (SCI)
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3 Creation and update of SAK Creation and update times
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4 Creation of CA Connectivity Association Key
Names (CKNs)
FPT_RPL.1 Detected replay attempt None
Table 4 MACsec Audit Events
5.1.1.3 User identity association (NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2)
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.1.1.4 Protected Audit Event Storage (NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted
channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition
[The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally,]
NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [audit is stored
in a circular buffer and oldest records are overwritten first]] when the local storage space for
audit data is full.
5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1)
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm: [
- RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.3,
- ECC schemes using 'NIST curves' [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB
186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.4,
- FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: NIST Special Publication
800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography and [RFC 3526]].
5.1.2.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2)
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2.1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key establishment method: [
- RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,
- Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography' (TD0581 applied),
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- FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: NIST Special Publication
800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography and [groups listed in RFC 3526] (TD0580 applied)].
5.1.2.3 Cryptographic Key Destruction (NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4)
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method
- For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite
consisting of [zeroes, a new value of the key]];
- For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of
an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [logically addresses the storage
location of the key and performs a [single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes, a
new value of the key]]
that meets the following: No Standard.
Note: That zeroization occurs as follows:
1) when deleted from FLASH, the previous value is overwritten once with zeroes;
2) when added or changed in FLASH, any old value is overwritten completely with the new value;
3) zeroization of values in RAM is achieved by overwriting once with zeroes and by overwriting with a
new value.
5.1.2.4 Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm) (MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1/CMAC)
MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1.1/CMAC
The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES-CMAC and cryptographic key sizes [128, 256] bits and message
digest size of 128 bits that meets the following: NIST SP 800-38B.
5.1.2.5 Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) (NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption)
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption
The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm AES used in [CBC, CTR, GCM] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits]
that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR
as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772].
5.1.2.6 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) (NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash)
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1.1/Hash
The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and message digest sizes [160,
256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
5.1.2.7 Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) (NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash)
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash
The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-
512] and cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384,
512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 'MAC Algorithm 2'.
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5.1.2.8 Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption and Decryption)
(MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1/MACSEC)
MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1.1/MACSEC
The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm AES used in AES Key Wrap, GCM and cryptographic key sizes [128, 256] bits that
meets the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, AES Key Wrap as specified in NIST SP
800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772.
5.1.2.9 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) (NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen)
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen
The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
- RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048, 3072, 4096
bits]
- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [256, 384, 521 bits]]
that meet the following: [
- For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 5.5, using
PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC
9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3
- For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and
Appendix D, Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3,
Section 6.4]].
5.1.2.10 MACsec (MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1)
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement MACsec in accordance with IEEE Standard 802.1AE-2018.
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall derive a Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) from a peer's MAC address and port to
uniquely identify the originator of an MPDU.
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall reject any MPDUs during a given session that contain an SCI other than the one
used to establish that session.
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall permit only EAPOL (Port Access Entity (PAE) EtherType 88-8E), MACsec frames
(EtherType 88-E5), and MAC control frames (EtherType is 88-08) and shall discard others.
5.1.2.11 MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality (MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2)
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2.1
The TOE shall implement MACsec with support for integrity protection with a confidentiality
offset of [0].
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of protocol data units (MPDUs) using an Integrity
Check Value (ICV) derived with the SAK.
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2.3
The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a
Connectivity Association Key (CAK) using a KDF.
5.1.2.12 MACsec Randomness (MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3)
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall generate unique Secure Association Keys (SAKs) using [key derivation from
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Connectivity Association Key (CAK) per section 9.8.1 of IEEE 802.1X-2010] such that the
likelihood of a repeating SAK is no less than 1 in 2 to the power of the size of the generated key.
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall generate unique nonces for the derivation of SAKs using the TOE's random bit
generator as specified by FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
5.1.2.13 MACsec Key Usage (MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4)
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.1
The TSF shall support peer authentication using pre-shared keys (PSK) [no other method].
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.2
The TSF shall distribute SAKs between MACsec peers using AES key wrap as specified in
FCS_COP.1/MACSEC.
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.3
The TSF shall support specifying a lifetime for CAKs.
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.4
The TSF shall associate Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with SAKs that are defined
by the KDF using the CAK as input data (per IEEE 802.1X-2010, Section 9.8.1).
MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.5
The TSF shall associate CKNs with CAKs. The length of the CKN shall be an integer number of
octets, between 1 and 32 (inclusive)
5.1.2.14 MACsec Key Agreement (MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1)
MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement Key Agreement Protocol (MKA) in accordance with IEEE 802.1X-2010
and 802.1Xbx-2014.
MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of MKA protocol data units (MKPDUs) using an
Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived from an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK).
MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a CAK using
a KDF.
MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall enforce an MKA Lifetime Timeout limit of 6.0 seconds and [MKA Hello Time
limit of 2 seconds].
MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1.5
The Key Server shall refresh a SAK when it expires. The Key Server shall distribute a SAK by [
pairwise CAKs, derived from MKA,
pairwise CAKs that are PSKs].
MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1.6
The Key Server shall distribute a fresh SAK whenever a member is added to or removed from the
live membership of the CA.
MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1.7
The TSF shall validate MKPDUs according to IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 11.11.2. In particular,
the TSF shall discard without further processing any MKPDUs to which any of the following
conditions apply:
a. The destination address of the MKPDU was an individual address
b. The MKPDU is less than 32 octets long
c. The MKPDU comprises fewer octets than indicated by the Basic Parameter Set body
length, as encoded in bits 4 through 1 of octet 3 and bits 8 through 1 of octet 4, plus 16
octets of ICV
d. The CAK Name is not recognized
If an MKPDU passes these tests, then the TSF will begin processing it as follows:
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a. If the Algorithm Agility parameter identifies an algorithm that has been implemented by
the receiver, the ICV shall be verified as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1.
b. If the Algorithm Agility parameter is unrecognized or not implemented by the receiver,
its value can be recorded for diagnosis but the received MKPDU shall be discarded
without further processing.
Each received MKPDU that is validated as specified in this clause and verified as specified in
IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1 shall be decoded as specified in 802.1X,
section 11.11.4.
(TD0817 applied)
5.1.2.15 NTP Protocol (NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall use only the following NTP version(s) [NTP v3 (RFC 1305), NTP v4 (RFC 5905)].
NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall update its system time using [Authentication using [SHA1] as the message digest
algorithm(s);].
NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall not update NTP timestamp from broadcast and/or multicast addresses.
NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall support configuration of at least three (3) NTP time sources in the Operational
Environment.
5.1.2.16 Random Bit Generation (NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with
ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy
from [[one] software-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal
to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 'Security Strength
Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.1.2.17 SSH Server Protocol (NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with: RFC(s) 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254,
[4256].
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user
authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-based]. (TD0631
applied)
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [262130] bytes in an
SSH transport connection are dropped.
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption
algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-cbc,
aes256-cbc].
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [ssh-rsa,
rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521] as
its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.
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NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256,
hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7
The TSF shall ensure that [ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and [diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-
hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-
nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8
The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold
of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte
of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.
5.1.2.18 TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication (NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all other TLS
and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:
[TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289]
and no other ciphersuites.
NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [the reference identifier per RFC 6125
section 6].
NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the
server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [Not implement any administrator override
mechanism].
NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall [present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with the
following curves/groups: [ffdhe2048, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other
curves/groups] in the Client Hello.
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.1.3.1 Authentication Failure Management (NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1)
NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [3-100]
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate
remotely using a password.
NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall
[prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any
authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has
elapsed].
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5.1.3.2 Password Management (NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative
passwords:
a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and the following special characters: ['!', '@', '#', '$', '%', '^', '&', '(', ')'];
b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [8] and [60] characters.
5.1.3.3 Pre-Shared Key Composition (MACSEC10:FIA_PSK_EXT.1)
MACSEC10:FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall use PSKs for MKA as defined by IEEE 802.1X-2010, [no other protocols].
MACSEC10:FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to [accept] bit-based PSKs.
5.1.3.4 Protected Authentication Feedback (NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7)
NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication
is in progress at the local console.
5.1.3.5 Password-based Authentication Mechanism (NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2)
NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a local [password-based] authentication mechanism to perform local
administrative user authentication.
5.1.3.6 User Identification and Authentication (NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the
identification and authentication process:
- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
- [[network routing services]].
NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.
5.1.3.7 X.509 Certificate Validation (NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev)
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev
The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path
length of three certificates.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the
certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [the Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960]
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have
the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-
kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
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o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp
2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose
(id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is
present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.1.3.8 X.509 Certificate Authentication (NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2)
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
[TLS], and [no additional uses].
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF
shall [not accept the certificate].
5.1.4 Security management (FMT)
5.1.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour (NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate)
NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security
Administrators.
5.1.4.2 Management of TSF Data (NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData)
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData
The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.
5.1.4.3 Management of TSF Data (NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys)
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys
The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to Security Administrators.
5.1.4.4 Specification of Management Functions (NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1)
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature] capability prior to
installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
- [Ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity,
Ability to manage the cryptographic keys,
Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality,
Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying,
Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps,
Ability to configure NTP,
Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer,
Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors,
Ability to import X509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store,
Ability to manage the trusted public keys database.]
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(TD0631 applied)
5.1.4.5 Specification of Management Functions (MACsec) (MACSEC10:FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC)
FMT_SMF.1.1/MACSEC:
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions related to MACsec
functionality: Ability of a Security Administrator to:
- Manage a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device
- Manage the Key Server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants [as specified in
802.1X-2020, sections 9.13 and 9.16 (cf. MIB object
ieee8021XKayMkaParticipantEntry) and section.12.2 (cf. function createMKA()) ]
- Specify a lifetime of a CAK
- Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using [the MIB object
ieee8021XKayMkaPartActivateControl ]
- [No other MACsec management functions].
5.1.4.6 Restrictions on Security Roles (NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2)
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles: - Security Administrator.
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2.3
The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
are satisfied.
5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.5.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords (NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.
5.1.5.2 Protection of CAK Data (MACSEC10:FPT_CAK_EXT.1)
MACSEC10:FPT_CAK_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent reading of CAK values by administrators.
5.1.5.3 Failure with Preservation of Secure State (MACSEC10:FPT_FLS.1)
MACSEC10:FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall fail-secure when any of the following types of failures occur: failure of the power-
on self-tests, failure of integrity check of the TSF executable image, failure of noise source health
tests.
5.1.5.4 Replay Detection (MACSEC10:FPT_RPL.1)
MACSEC10:FPT_RPL.1.1
The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: MPDUs, MKA frames.
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MACSEC10:FPT_RPL.1.2
The TSF shall perform discarding of the replayed data, logging of the detected replay attempt
when replay is detected.
5.1.5.5 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
(NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
5.1.5.6 Reliable Time Stamps (NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time, synchronise time with an NTP
server]. (TD0632 applied)
5.1.5.7 TSF testing (NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [cryptographic algorithm self-tests, firmware
integrity tests].
5.1.5.8 Trusted update (NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version
of the TOE firmware/software and [the most recently installed version of the TOE
firmware/software].
NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a
[digital signature] prior to installing those updates.
5.1.6 TOE access (FTA)
5.1.6.1 TSF-initiated Termination (NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3)
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable
time interval of session inactivity.
5.1.6.2 User-initiated Termination (NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4)
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4.1
The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator's own interactive
session.
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5.1.6.3 TSF-initiated Session Locking (NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1)
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after a Security
Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
5.1.6.4 Default TOE Access Banners (NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1)
NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-
specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.
5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.1.7.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec Communications) (MACSEC10:FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC)
MACSEC10:FTP_ITC.1.1/MACSEC
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a MACsec peer that is
logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
MACSEC10:FTP_ITC.1.2/MACSEC
The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
MACSEC10:FTP_ITC.1.3/MACSEC
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communications with MACsec
peers that require the use of MACsec
5.1.7.2 Inter-TSF trusted channel (NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1)
NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of using [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel between
itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [authentication
server] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of
modification of the channel data.
NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [transmitting audit records to
an audit server, authenticating using a Radius server].
5.1.7.3 Trusted Path (NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin)
NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin
The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a communication path between itself and
authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from
disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.
NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin
The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.
NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all
remote administration actions.
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5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have
effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1: Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey
Table 5 Assurance Components
5.2.1 Development (ADV)
5.2.1.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.1.1d
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2d
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1.1c
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2c
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3c
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as
SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4c
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2e
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.2.2.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
AGD_OPE.1.1d
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
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AGD_OPE.1.2c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and
interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure
values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-
relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including
changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be
followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7c
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.2.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
AGD_PRE.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)
5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
ALC_CMC.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.1.1c
The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
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5.2.3.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
ALC_CMS.1.1d
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.1.1c
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence
required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2c
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.4 Tests (ATE)
5.2.4.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
ATE_IND.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2e
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.2.5.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
AVA_VAN.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2e
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities
in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3e
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
• Security audit
• Cryptographic support
• Identification and authentication
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE access
• Trusted path/channels
6.1 Security audit
The TOE produces syslog conformant messages in a number of circumstances including warnings about the device
itself (such as temperature, power failures, etc.) as well as security relevant events (the success and failure login of
the user, regardless of the authentication mechanism; changing a user’s password; and adding and deleting user
accounts). In each case the audit record includes the time and date, identification of the responsible subject (e.g., by
network address or user ID), the type of event, the outcome of the event, and other information depending on the
event type. For cryptographic keys, the TOE generates and deletes SSH host keys. The TOE can support one EC
key pair and one RSA key pair. The audit records associated with these actions identify the key as either the EC key
pair or RSA key pair. The TOE also generates, imports and deletes keys associated with x509 certificates. Auditing
of these actions identify the keys based upon the trustpoint name corresponding to the operation being performed.
In all of these audits, the audit records identify the administrator account responsible for the action. The TOE is also
capable of importing SSH public keys for user authentication, and audit records identify the key by the user ID with
which it is mapped.
The audit records are stored in a log (internal to the TOE appliance) that is protected so that only an authorized TOE
User can read (for which tools accessible via the CLI are provided). The protection results from the fact that the
logs can be accessed only after a user logs in (see section 6.3 below).
The log stores up to 4,000 entries after which the audit entries will be overwritten, oldest first. The administrator
(with Super User privilege) can (and should) choose to configure one or more external syslog servers where the
TOE will simultaneously send a copy of the audit records. The TOE can be configured to use TLS (using any of the
supported ciphersuites) to protect audit logs exported to an external server.
The TOE includes a hardware clock that is used to provide reliable time information for the audit records it generates.
The Security audit function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• NDcPP22e/ MACSEC10:FAU_GEN.1: The TOE can generate audit records for events including starting
and stopping the audit function, administrator commands, and all other events identified in Table 3 (in
Section 5). Furthermore, each audit record identifies the date/time, event type, outcome of the event,
responsible subject/user, as well as the additional event-specific content indicated in Table 3 (in Section 5).
• NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2: The TOE identifies the responsible user for each event based on the specific
administrator or network entity (identified by IP address) that caused the event.
• NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1: The TOE can be configured to export audit records to an external SYSLOG
server. This communication is protected with the use of TLS.
6.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE supports a range of cryptographic services using the RUCKUS-IP-CRYPTO-VER-6.0 cryptographic
library.
Functions Requirement Certificate
Encryption/Decryption
AES CBC, CTR, GCM (128 and 256 bits) FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption A5076
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AES CMAC (128 and 256 bits) FCS_COP.1(1)/KeyedHashCM
AC
A5076
AES KW (128 and 256 bits) FCS_COP.1/MACSEC A5076
Cryptographic hashing
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (digest sizes 160,
256, 384, 512)
FCS_COP.1/Hash A5076
Keyed-hash message authentication
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 , HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 256, 384, 512)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash A5076
Cryptographic signature services
RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (modulus 2048, 3072,
4096)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen A5076
ECDSA Digital Signature Algorithm (P-256, P-384, P-521) FCS_COP.1/SigGen A5076
Random bit generation
CTR_DRBG with sw based noise sources with a minimum
of 256 bits of non-determinism
FCS_RBC_EXT.1 A5076
Key generation
RSA Key Generation (2048, 3072, 4096 bits) FCS_CKM.1 A5076
ECC Key Generation (P-256, P-384, P-521) A5076
Safe Primes Key Generation Tested with
known good
implementation
Key establishment
RSA FCS_CKM.2 Tested with
known good
implementation
ECC KAS A5076
FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups Tested with
known good
implementation
Table 6 Cryptographic Functions
Additionally, the Broadcom chip BCM82756 is used to perform ASE_GCM encryption and decryption for MACsec.
That chip has been CAVP tested as well.
Functions Requirement Cert #
Encryption/Decryption
AES GCM (128 and 256 bits) FCS_COP.1/MACSEC AES 4550
The TOE uses a software-based random bit generator that complies with Special Publication 800-90 using
CTR_DRBG when operating in the FIPS mode. AES-256 is used in conjunction with a minimum of 256 bits of
entropy.
The TOE supports the following secret keys, private keys and CSPs:
Key or CSP: Zeroized upon: Stored in: Zeroized by:
SSH host RSA private key Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
SSH host RSA public key Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
SSH client RSA public key Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
SSH session key End of session RAM Overwriting once with zeros
TLS host RSA private key Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
TLS host RSA digital certificate Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
TLS pre-master secret Handshake done RAM Overwriting once with zeros
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Key or CSP: Zeroized upon: Stored in: Zeroized by:
TLS session key Close of session RAM Overwriting once with zeros
MACsec Security
Association Key (SAK)
End of session RAM Overwriting once with zeros
MACsec Connectivity
Association Key (CAK)
Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
MACsec Key Encryption
Key (KEK)
End of session RAM Overwriting once with zeros
MACsec Integrity Check Key (ICK) End of session RAM Overwriting once with zeros
DH Private Exponent New key exchange RAM Overwritten with new value
DH Public Key Not applicable RAM Public value
User Password Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
Port Administrator Password Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
Crypto Officer Password Command Flash Overwriting once with zeros
Firmware Integrity / Load RSA public
key
Not applicable Flash Public value
DRBG Seed Every 100ms RAM Overwritten with new value
DRBG Value V Every 100ms RAM Overwritten with new value
DRBG Constant C Every 100ms RAM Overwritten with new value
Table 7 Keys and CSPs
The TOE stores all persistent secret and private keys in FLASH and stores all ephemeral keys in RAM (as indicated
in the above table). The TOE’s zeroization has been subjected to FIPS 140 validation and is designed to zeroize secret
and private keys when they are no longer required by the TOE. Note that zeroization occurs as follows: 1) when
deleted from FLASH, the previous value is overwritten once with zeroes; 2) when added or changed in FLASH, any
old value is overwritten completely with the new value; and, 3) the zeroization of values in RAM is achieved by
overwriting once with zeroes and by overwriting with a new value.
These supporting cryptographic functions are included to support the SSHv2 (compliant with RFCs 4251, 4252,
4253, and 4254) and TLS v1.1 (RFC4346), and TLS v1.2 (RFC 5246) secure communication protocols.
The TOE supports TLSv1.1, and v1.2 with the following ciphersuites:
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES256_GCM_SHA384
The TOE supports the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with secp256r1, secp384r1,
secp521r1 and ffdhe2048 by default.
The TOE supports SSHv2 with AES (CTR, CBC) 128 or 256 bit ciphers, in conjunction with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-
SHA2-256, or HMAC-SHA2-512. The TOE supports ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, and ecdsa-sha2-nistp3521 as its host public key algorithms, with diffie-hellman-group14-
sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,
and ecdh-sha2-nistp521 for the key exchange methods. While other ciphers and hashes are implemented in the
product, they are disabled while the TOE is operating in Common Criteria mode.
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The TOE allows users to perform SSHv2 authentication using password based authentication and allows users to
upload a public key for SSHv2 public key client authentication. The imported SSHv2 public key includes a username
provided in the "Subject" field to be verified against an authenticating admin’s identity. The TOE can authenticate
clients using public keys with RSA keys as well as ECDSA keys using curves P-256, P-384 and P-521. Whenever
the timeout period or authentication retry limit is reached, the TOE closes the applicable TCP connection and releases
the SSH session resources.
The TOE’s SSHv2 implementation limits SSH packets to a size of roughly 256K bytes. As SSH packets are being
received, the TOE uses a buffer to build all packet information. Once complete, the packet is checked to ensure it can
be appropriately decrypted. However, if it is not complete when the buffer becomes full (262130 bytes) the packet
will be dropped and the connection terminated. There is a TOE initiated rekey before 1 hour or before 1GB whichever
comes first.
Scheme Protocol Service
RSA SSH Remote Administration (server)
ECC SSH Remote Administration (server)
DH 14, 16 and 18 SSH Remote Administration (server)
FFC Safe Primes TLS Syslog and Radius (client)
ECC TLS Syslog and Radius (client)
Table 8 Service, Protocol and Key Establishment Scheme Mapping
The Cryptographic support function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1: The TOE supports asymmetric key generation using RSA key establishment (key
size 2048) as part of SSH as described in the section above. The TOE acts as a client for TLS (ECC and
FFC safe primes) and a server for SSH (RSA, ECC, DH-14 key generation). The TOE supports DH group
14 key establishment scheme that meets standard RFC 3526, section 3 for interoperability. The TOE
implements NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography'.
• NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2: See NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1.
• NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4: Keys are either zeroized or overwritten with a new value when they are no longer
needed by the TOE
• MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1/CMAC: The TOE supports keyed-hash message authentication in accordance
with AES-CMAC algorithm with key sizes 128 bits and 256 bits and the message digest size supported is
128 bits. The algorithm conforms to NIST SP 800-38B.
• MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1/MACSEC:The TOE performs AES key wrap as specified in AES as specified in
ISO 18033-3, AES Key Wrap as specified in NIST SP 800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772.
• NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: The TOE performs encryption and decryption using AES in CBC
CTR and GCM mode with key sizes of either 128 or 256 bits. The corresponding CAVP certificate is
identified in the table above.
• NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash: The TOE supports cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512 with digest sizes 160, 256, 384, and 512. The corresponding CAVP certificate is
identified in the table above,
• NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: The TOE supports keyed-hash message authentication using HMAC-
SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512, using SHA-1/256/384/512 with
160/256/384/512 bit keys to produce a 160/256/384/512 output MAC. The corresponding CAVP
certificate is identified in the table above
• NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen: The TOE supports the use of RSA with 2048/3072/4096 bit key sizes and
ECDSA with key sizes 256/384/521 bits for cryptographic signatures. Digital signatures are used in TLS
and SSH communications and on product updates. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the
table above.
• MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1: The TOE implements MACsec in accordance with IEEE 802.1AE-
2018. The TOE derives a Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) from a peer's MAC address and port to uniquely
identify the originator of a MACsec Protocol Data Unit (MPDU) and rejects any MPDUs that do not
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contain the identifier. Only EAPOL (PAE EtherType 88-8E) and MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5) are
permitted and others are rejected.
• MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2: The TOE implements the MACsec requirement for integrity
protection with the confidentiality offset of 0. The TOE derives the ICV from a CAK using KDF, using the
SCI as the most significant bits of the IV and the 32 least significant bits of the PN as the IV. The supported
ICV length is 16 octets. An ICV derived with the SAK is used to provide assurance of the integrity of
MPDUs. The ICV is generated by a pre-shared key configured via the CLI.
• MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3: A SAK and CAK are derived by a pre-shared key configured via the
CLI. The pre-shared key must be 128 bits when using gcm-aes-128 and 256 bits when using gcm-aes-256.
The TOE’s random bit generator is used for creating these unique nonces.
• MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4: The TOE ensures MACsec peer authentication using pre-shared
keys. The TOE uses AES Key Wrap to distribute the SAKs between peers using aes-128-cmac or aes-256-
cmac. The TOE associates Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with CAKs. The length of the
CKN shall be an integer number of octets, between 1 and 32 (inclusive). The TOE’s PAE authenticates
MACsec peers. If the peer is authenticated successfully a unique connectivity association (CA) is
established with the peer. The TOE does not support group CAKs and only supports pairwise CAKs as
identified in the selections for FCS_MKA_EXT.1.5. .
• MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1: The TOE implements Key Agreement Protocol (MKA) in accordance
with IEEE 802.1X-2010 and 802.1Xbx-2014. The TOE supports the data delay protection to provide
security against delay attack. The TOE enforces an MKA Lifetime Timeout limit of 6.0 seconds and a
MKA Bounded Hello Time limit of 2 seconds. Data delay protection is provided by discarding any Data
frame which is received out-of-order. Data received in only in Strict-order is accepted by hardware; all
others are discarded by the hardware. The TOE verifies the integrity of MKA protocol data units using an
ICV derived from the ICK. The ICK is derived from the CAK using KDF (AES-CMAC). The ICV is
checked on the reception of each MKA PDU.
• NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: The TOE supports NTPv3 and NTPv4, authenticating the NTP server that it
synchronizes to using a sha1 message digest. The TOE allows one or more NTP servers to be configured.
At least one is required for time synchronization to occur, but more than 3 NTP servers can be specified.
• NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: The TOE uses one software-based entropy source to seed for a software-
based DRBG that complies with Special Publication 800-90 using CTR_DRBG when operating in the FIPS
mode. AES-256 is used in conjunction with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy for the seed.
• NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: The TOE supports SSHv2 interactive command-line secure administrator
sessions as indicated above.
• NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: The TOE supports TLS when exporting audit logs to an external server
and when communicating with RADIUS authentication servers. Certificate pining is not supported. The
TOE allows administrators to specify FQDN values as reference identifiers (per RFC 6125 only). These
values are matched against values in an x509v3 certificate in the CN and SAN:DNS fields. Wildcards are
not allowed in certificates.
6.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE,
except to display a message of the day banner and to permit network routing services without identification or
authentication. The TOE allows unauthenticated network routing services to route network traffic through the TOE
as well as unauthenticated network routing protocol traffic destined to the TOE (including DNS, ARP, ICMP,
BootP, DHCP, RIP, OSPF, BGP, VRRP, VRRP-E, Multi-VRF) but does not include any management configuration
of the TOE’s network routing services. The TOE authenticates TOE Users against their user name, password and
privilege level. The Authorized Administrator logs on the TOE through either locally using the console or remotely
using SSHv2. A successful authentication is determined by a successful username and password combination. An
incorrect password will result in a failed authentication attempt. The TOE also allows remote administrators to
authenticate over an SSH connection using an RSA public key authentication mechanism.
The Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege represents the “administrator” referred to in the security
requirements of the protection profile. Other accounts with privileges other than Super User were not tested during
the evaluation. The available mechanisms include the Local Password for the Super User Privilege level and
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RADIUS authentication. The Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege defines local user (or TOE User)
accounts and assigns passwords and privilege levels to the accounts. Each user account has a user name, password,
and a privilege level associated with it. There is a default privilege level account associated with each privilege level
and each has its own password. It is up to the Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege to decide whether
or how to use these legacy accounts. Note however, that each has an identity, password, and privilege level.
While the Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege can create or otherwise modify accounts freely, other
users cannot change their own (or any other) security attributes. Note that the TOE supports a password
enforcement configuration where the minimum password length can be set by an administrator from 8 to 60
characters. Passwords can be created using any alphabetic, numeric, and a wide range of special characters ( ‘!', '@',
'#', '$', '%', '^', '&', '(', ') ).
The Authorized Administrator can set a lockout failure count for remote login attempts (the default is 3). If the count
is exceeded, the targeted account is locked for an administrator-configurable time limit. Once the configured time has
passed the account is unlocked. No manual administrative action is required. The local console interface is not subject
to the lockout failure enforcement.
The Identification and authentication function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1: Remote administrator accounts can be locked for an administrator configured
period of time if the failed login threshold is surpassed.
• NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: The TOE implements a rich set of password composition constraints as
described above.
• MACSEC10:FIA_PSK_EXT.1: The TOE supports the use of pre-shared keys for MKA as defined by IEEE
802.1X. The pre-shared keys are not generated by the TOE but rather the TOE will accept bit based pre-
shared keys.
• NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7: The TOE does not echo passwords as they are entered; rather ‘*’ characters are
echoed when entering passwords.
• NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: The TOE uses local password-based authentication and RADIUS server
authentication.
• NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any services or access to its functions, except for the
switching/routing of network traffic and displaying a message of the day banner, without requiring a user to
be identified and authenticated.
• NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: Certificates are validated as part of the authentication process when
they are presented to the TOE and when they are loaded into the TOE. OCSP is supported for X509v3
certificate validation of certificates used for authentication by a TLS server. The TOE performs the same
revocation checking on certificates regardless of whether it receives a full certificate chain or only a leaf
certificate. Trusted CA’s are loaded to the file system in PEM format using a CLI command leveraging
SCP. As this requires CLI access this can only be performed by authorized administrators who have been
authenticated. The TOE chooses what trusted CA to use for certificate chain validation based on the
trustpoint configured for the relevant TLS profile.
• NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2: Certificates are checked and if found not valid are not accepted or if the
OCSP server cannot be contacted for validity checks, then the certificate is not accepted. This behavior is
not configurable. Certificates are checked in the following order: chain validation, SAN checks, CN
checks, revocation status, and lastly expiration status. The common name (or SAN values if present) needs
to be a fully qualified domain name.
6.4 Security management
The TOE associates each defined user account with a privilege level. The most privileged level is Super User (with
regards to the requirements in this Security Target, users with lesser privilege levels are referred to collectively
simply as TOE users since such users do not have complete read-and-write access to the system). Again, as stated in
section 6.3, other accounts with privileges other than Super User were not tested during the evaluation. The TOE
implements an internal access control mechanism that bases decisions about the use of functions and access to TOE
data on those privilege levels. In this manner, the TOE is able to ensure that only the Authorized Administrator with
Super User privilege can access audit configuration data, information flow policy ACLs, user and administrator
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security attributes (including passwords and privilege levels), authentication method lists, the logon failure
threshold, the remote access user list; and cryptographic support settings.
Other than the Super User level, the TOE implements a Read Only level where only basic commands can be issued
and no changes can be made and a Port Configuration level where non-security device parameters can be managed.
Collectively, this ST refers to all users of the TOE as “TOE Users” where TOE Users privileges are a subset of the
broader role of “Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege”.
The TOE offers command line functions which are accessible via the CLI. The CLI is a text-based interface which
can be accessed from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. These command line functions
can be used to effectively manage every security policy, as well as the non-security relevant aspects of the TOE.
Once authenticated (none of these functions is available to any user before being identified and authenticated),
authorized administrators have access to the following security functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability
prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
• Ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT
entity;
• Ability to manage the cryptographic keys
• Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
• Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
• Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
• Ability to configure NTP;
• Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;
• Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust
anchors;
• Ability to import X509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
• Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;
The Security management function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Only the authorized administrator can update the TOE.
• NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Only the authorized administrator can configure TSF-related
functions.
• NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys: Only the authorized administrator can configure cryptographic
keys. The keys an authorized administrator can manage consist of importing trusted Root CA certs,
generating SSH host keys, importing SSH public keys, and configuring a CAK for MACsec. All of these
keys can be also be deleted.
• NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1: The TOE provides administrative interfaces to perform the functions identified
above.
• MACSEC10:FMT_SMF.1: The TOE provides the authorized administrator the ability to:
- Generate a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device.
- Manage the Key Server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants as specified in 802.1X,
sections 9.13 and 9.16 (cf. MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaParticipantEntry) and section.12.2 (cf.
function createMKA)
- Specify a lifetime of a CAK
- Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using the MIB object
ieee8021XKayMkaPartActivateControl
• NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2: The TOE maintains administrative user roles.
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6.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE is an appliance and as such is designed to work independent of other components to a large extent. Secure
communication with third-party peers is addressed in section 6.7 below.
The TOE does not provide access to locally stored passwords (which can be administratively configured to be
protected by SHA-1 or SHA-256 hashing) and also, while cryptographic keys can be entered, the TOE does not
disclose any cryptographic keys stored in the TOE. The TOE is a hardware appliance that includes a hardware-
based real-time clock. The TOE’s embedded OS manages the clock and exposes administrator clock-related
functions. The TOE can be configured to periodically synchronize its clock with a time server, but the TOE can only
ensure its own reliability and not that of an external time mechanism. The TOE also implements the timing elements
through timeout functionality due to inactivity for terminating both local and remote sessions. Note that the clock is
used primarily to provide timestamp for audit records, but is also used to support timing elements of cryptographic
functions.
The TOE includes a number of built in diagnostic tests that are run during start-up to determine whether the TOE is
operating properly. If a self-test fails, the TOE is not operational and reboots until the error is cleared or the
administrator gets help from Ruckus. When operating in FIPS mode, the power-on self-tests comply with the FIPS
140-2 requirements for self-testing. The module performs Cryptographic algorithm known answer tests, firmware
integrity tests using RSA signature verification and conditional self-tests for DRBG, Hardware RNG, Pair-wise
consistency tests on generation of RSA keys, and a Firmware load test (RSA signature verification). Upon failing
any of its FIPS mode power-on self-tests, the TOE will refuse to boot. The tests are sufficient to ensure the correct
operation of the security features as they address firmware integrity and cryptographic operations.
The TOE supports loading a new software image manually by the administrator using CLI commands. From the CLI,
an administrator can use SCP in order to download a software image, and the TOE, prior to actually installing and
using the new software image, will verify its digital signature using a pre-installed vendor key. An unverified image
cannot be installed. The downloaded software image is saved to flash memory and is installed after rebooting the
TOE. Images can be downloaded and saved as either a primary or secondary image. The TOE can be configured to
boot to either the primary or secondary image. The ‘show version’ command indicates the currently running TOE
version as well as whether the currently running image is primary or secondary. The TOE offers the ‘show flash’
command to display the image as primary and secondary, to allow administrators the opportunity to determine which
should be booted.
The Protection of the TSF function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any user a plain
text password. Furthermore, locally defined passwords are not stored in plaintext form, only their hash
value is stored.
• MACSEC10:FPT_CAK_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any user a
CAK. When an administrator displays the current configuration, a hashed version of the CAK is displayed,
despite the CAK being stored in cleartext.
• MACSEC10:FPT_FLS.1: If the TOE encounters a self-test failure, failure of integrity check of the TSF
executable image, failure of noise source health tests it will shutdown. The TOE will not restart as long as
it has a failure.
• MACSEC10:FPT_RPL.1: The TOE detects and logs all attempts to replay MPDUs and MKA frames by
verifying the packet number (PN). If the received PN is lower than the current PN, this indicates to the
TOE a replay attempt, and the packet is discarded.
• NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any users a stored
cryptographic key. Keys are stored as identified in Table 6 when they are created
• NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1: The TOE includes its own hardware clock and can synchronize its time
with an external NTP server.
• NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE performs a suite of self-tests to verify its integrity.
• NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE provides functions to query the version and upgrade the software
embedded in the TOE appliance. When installing updated software, digital signatures are used to
authenticate the update to ensure it is the update intended and originated by the vendor.
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6.6 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display an administrator-configured message of the day banner that will be displayed
before authentication is completed (before the user enters his password). The banner will be displayed when accessing
the TOE via the console or SSH interfaces.
The TOE can be configured by an administrator to set a session timeout value (any value 0-240 minutes for console
and SSH with 0 disabling the timeout). The default timeout is 2 minutes for both console and SSH. A session (local
or remote) that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing from the remote client) for the defined timeout value will be
terminated. Upon exceeding the session timeout (if set), the TOE logs the user off, but leaves the user’s console
displaying the last contents.
The user will be required to login in after any session has been terminated due to inactivity or after voluntary
termination. Of course, administrators can logout of local or remote sessions at any time.
The TOE access function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3: The TOE terminates remote sessions that have been inactive for an administrator-
configured period of time.
• NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4: The TOE provides the function to logout (or terminate) both local and remote user
sessions as directed by the user.
• NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: The TOE terminates local sessions that have been inactive for an
administrator-configured period of time.
• NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1: The TOE can be configured to display administrator-defined advisory banners
when administrators successfully establish interactive sessions with the TOE, allowing administrators to
terminate their session prior to performing any functions.
6.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE provides a trusted path for its remote administrative users accessing the TOE via the Ethernet ports
provided on the TOE using either the command line interface or SSH. Note that local administrator access via the
serial port is also allowed for command line access. However, this access is protected by physical protection of the
serial interface along with the TOE itself.
When an administrator attempts to connect to the TOE remotely, the TOE attempts to negotiate a TLS-protected
session. If the session cannot be negotiated, the connection is dropped.
Remote connections to third-party SYSLOG servers are supported for exporting audit records to an external audit
server. Remote connections to an external RADIUS server are supported for external user authentication.
Communication with those external servers is protected using TLS.
The TOE can be configured to establish MACsec connections with MACsec capable peers.
In all cases, the endpoints are assured by virtue of the certificates installed, trusted, and reviewable when connecting
and by virtue of user authentication.
The Trusted path/channels function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• MACSEC10:FTP_ITC.1 The TOE can be configured to establish MACsec connections with MACsec
capable peers.
• NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1: In the evaluated configuration, the TOE can be configured to use TLS to ensure
that any exported audit records and authentication server communications are sent only to the configured
server so they are not subject to inappropriate disclosure or modification..
• NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin: The TOE uses SSH to provide a trusted path for remote management
interfaces to protect the communication from disclosure and modification.