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# **CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec Security Target**

Version 0.5  
July 22, 2024

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## 1. Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 provided by CommScope Technologies LLC. The TOE is being evaluated as a network device.

The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

- Conformance Claims (Section 2)
- Security Objectives (Section 3)
- Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
- Security Requirements (Section 5)
- TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)

### Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
  - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example FDP\_ACC.1(1) and FDP\_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP\_ACC.1 requirement.
  - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [**assignment**]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [*selected-assignment*]).
  - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [*selection*]).
  - Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., "... **all** objects ..." or "... ~~some big~~ things ...").
- Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

## 1.1 Security Target Reference

**ST Title** – CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec Security Target

**ST Version** – Version 0.5

**ST Date** – July 22, 2024

## 1.2 TOE Reference

**TOE Identification** – CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10, including the following series and models:

- ICX 7550 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF
  - ICX7550-48ZP (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
  - ICX7550-48P (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
  - ICX7550-48F (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
- ICX 7650 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF Module
  - ICX7650-48ZP (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
  - ICX7650-48P (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
  - ICX7650-48F (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
- ICX 7850
  - ICX7850-48FS (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)

**TOE Developer** – CommScope Technologies LLC

**Evaluation Sponsor** – CommScope Technologies LLC

### 1.3 TOE Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 family of products.

The TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a management processor. The software controls the switching and routing network frames and packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances.

All TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters to allow immediate use of the system's basic features through its Command Line Interface (CLI). However, the product should be configured in accordance with the evaluated configuration (using the Ruckus FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide) prior to being placed into operation. The CLI is a text based interface which is accessible from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. This remote management interface is protected using encryption as explained later in this ST.

The hardware platforms that support the TOE have a number of common hardware characteristics:

- Central processor that supports all system operations
- Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operations
- Flash memory, used to store the operating system image
- Non-volatile memory, which stores configuration parameters used to initialize the system at system startup
- Multiple physical network interfaces either fixed in configuration or removable as in a chassis based product

### 1.4 TOE Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 including the following series and models:

- ICX 7550 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF
  - ICX7550-48ZP (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
  - ICX7550-48P (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
  - ICX7550-48F (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
- ICX 7650 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF Module
  - ICX7650-48ZP (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
  - ICX7650-48P (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
  - ICX7650-48F (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)
- ICX 7850
  - ICX7850-48FS (With 4 \* 10 GF module Broadcom module)

While there are different models in the three series, they differ primarily in physical form factor, number and types of connections and slots, and relative performance. While there are some functional differences among the families, they each provide the same security characteristics as claimed in this security target.

The different series have differing CPUs as described below:

- The ICX 7550 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A72 (ARMv8 architecture)
- The ICX 7650 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A57 1.6GHz (ARMv8 architecture)
- The ICX 7850 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A57 1.6GHz (ARMv8 architecture)

The TOE utilizes the Firmware crypto library referred to as the RUCKUS-IP-CRYPTO-VER-6.0 running on these processors.

### 1.4.1 TOE Architecture

The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with physical network connections. Within the hardware appliance, the ICX is designed to control and enable access to the available hardware functions (e.g., program execution, device access, facilitate basic routing and switching functions). ICX enforces applicable security policies on network information flowing through the hardware appliance.

During normal operation, IP packets are sent to the management IP address or through the appliance over one or more of its physical network interfaces, which processes them according to the system's configuration and state information dynamically maintained by the appliance. This processing typically results in the frames or packets being forwarded out of the device over another interface.

#### 1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries

Each TOE appliance has physical network connections to its environment to facilitate routing and switching of network traffic. The TOE appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides interfaces for its own management.

The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in an environment which can be remote from or directly connected to the TOE.

The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external syslog server in the network environment. This is generally advisable given the limited audit log storage space on the evaluated appliances. This communication is protected by TLS.

The use of a RADIUS authentication server is included in the evaluated configuration with communication occurring over a protected TLS channel.

The TOE can be configured to establish a MACsec connection with a MACsec capable peer.

The TOE can be configured to use an NTP server for network time or it can use its own hardware clock.

Figure 1 shows the TOE in its operating environment.




Figure 1 TOE Operational Environment

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### 1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries

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This section summarizes the security functions provided by CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10:

- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels

#### **Security audit**

The TOE is able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and also to send the logs to a designated log server using TLS to protect the logs while in transit on the network.

#### **Cryptographic support**

The TOE contains a CAVP-tested cryptographic module that provides key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher-level cryptographic protocols including MACsec, SSH and TLS. The TOE supports SHA1 message digest authentication for NTP servers.

#### **Identification and authentication**

The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching/routing rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes.

#### **Security management**

The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.

#### **Protection of the TSF**

The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.

It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). The TOE can also be configured to work with an NTP server for reliable time.

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.

#### **TOE access**

The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.

#### **Trusted path/channels**

The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSH for CLI access to ensure both integrity and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, an attempted connection will not be established.

The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server and authentication server, using TLS or MACsec connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification.

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#### 1.4.2 TOE Documentation

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CommScope Technologies LLC offers a series of documents that describe the installation of the FastIron switch/router products as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the applicable security features. The following document was examined as part of the evaluation:

- Ruckus FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 10.0.10, July 8, 2024.

## 2. Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
  - Part 2 Extended
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
  - Part 3 Conformant
- Protection Profile/Package Claims:
  - PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 2023-03-29 (CFG\_NDcPP-MACsec\_V1.0)
    - Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices', Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e)
    - PP Module: PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023 (MACSEC10)

Package	Technical Decision	Applied	Notes
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0800 - Updated NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0792 - NIT Technical Decision: FIA_PMG_EXT.1 - TSS EA not in line with SFR	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0790 - NIT Technical Decision: Clarification Required for testing IPv6	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0738 - NIT Technical Decision for Link to Allowed-With List	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0670 - NIT Technical Decision for Mutual and Non-Mutual Auth TLSC Testing	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0639 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification for NTP MAC Keys	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0638 - NIT Technical Decision for Key Pair Generation for Authentication	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0636 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key User Authentication for SSH	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0635 - NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and Key Agreement Parameters	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0632 - NIT Technical Decision for Consistency with Time Data for vNDs	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0631 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of public key authentication for SSH Server	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0592 - NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0591 - NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0581 - NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-56Arev3	Yes	



CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0580 - NIT Technical Decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0572 - NiT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0571 - NiT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0570 - NiT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0569 - NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0564 - NiT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0563 - NiT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0556 - NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0555 - NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0547 - NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0546 - NIT Technical Decision for DTLS - clarification of Application Note 63	No	Requirement not claimed
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0537 - NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0536 - NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification Inconsistency	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0528 - NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4	Yes	
CPP_ND_V2.2E	TD0527 - Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)	Yes	
MACSEC10	TD0826: Aligning MOD_MACSEC_V1.0 with CPP_ND_V3.0E	No	Not using CPP_ND_V3.0E
MACSEC10	TD0817: MACsec Data Delay Protection, Key Agreement, and Conditional Support for Group CAK	Yes	
MACSEC10	TD0816: Clarity for MACsec Self Test Failure Response	Yes	
MACSEC10	TD0748 – Correction to FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC Test 21	Yes	
MACSEC10	TD0746 – Correction to FPT_RPL.1 Test 25	Yes	
MACSEC10	TD0728 – Corrections to MACSec PP-Module SD	Yes	

**Table 1 Technical Decisions**

For ease of naming the following abbreviations will be used:

- CPP\_ND\_V2.2E – NDcPP22e
- MOD\_MACsec\_V1.0 – MACSEC10

## 2.1 Conformance Rationale

The ST conforms to the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10. As explained previously, the security problem definition, security objectives, and security requirements have been drawn from the PP.

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### 3. Security Objectives

The Security Problem Definition may be found in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 and this section reproduces only the corresponding Security Objectives for operational environment for reader convenience. The NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 offers additional information about the identified security objectives, but that has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

In general, the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 has defined Security Objectives appropriate for the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec TOE.

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#### 3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

**OE.ADMIN\_CREDENTIALS\_SECURE** The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.

**OE.NO\_GENERAL\_PURPOSE** There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE. Note: For vNDs the TOE includes only the contents of its own VM, and does not include other VMs or the VS.

**OE.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION** The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment.

**OE.PHYSICAL** Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.

**OE.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION** The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. For vNDs, this applies when the physical platform on which the VM runs is removed from its operational environment.

**OE.TRUSTED\_ADMIN** TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that implement ND functionality.

For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE's trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted.

**OE.UPDATES** The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.

## 4. Extended Components Definition

All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10. The NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 defines the following extended requirements and since they are not redefined in this ST the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.

### Extended SFRs:

- NDcPP22e:FAU\_STG\_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
- MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1: MACsec
- MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2: MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality
- MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3: MACsec Randomness
- MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4: MACsec Key Usage
- MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1: MACsec Key Agreement
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1: NTP Protocol
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1: Password Management
- MACSEC10:FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
- NDcPP22e:FPT\_APW\_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
- MACSEC10:FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1: Protection of CAK Data
- NDcPP22e:FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
- NDcPP22e:FPT\_STM\_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
- NDcPP22e:FPT\_TST\_EXT.1: TSF testing
- NDcPP22e:FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1: Trusted update
- NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking

## 5. Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.

The SFRs have all been drawn from the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10. The refinements and operations already performed in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 made a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.

The SARs are the set of SARs specified in NDcPP22e and the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10.

### 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 TOE.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>FAU: Security audit</b>	NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
	MACSEC10:FAU_GEN.1.1/MACSEC: Audit Data Generation (MACsec)
	NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2: User identity association
	NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
<b>FCS: Cryptographic support</b>	NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation
	NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
	NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction
	NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
	MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1/MACSEC: Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption and Decryption)
	NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
	NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
	MACSEC10:FCS_COP.1/CMAC: Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)
	NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen: Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
	MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1: MACsec
	MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2: MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality
	MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3: MACsec Randomness
	MACSEC10:FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4: MACsec Key Usage
MACSEC10:FCS_MKA_EXT.1: MACsec Key Agreement	
<b>FIA: Identification and authentication</b>	NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1: NTP Protocol
	NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
	NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
	NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
	NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1: Authentication Failure Management
	NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
	MACSEC10:FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Pre-Shared Key Composition

	NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback
	NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
	NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
	NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
	NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
<b>FMT: Security management</b>	NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Management of security functions behaviour
	NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Management of TSF Data
	NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys: Management of TSF Data
	NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
	MACSEC10:FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC Specification of Management Functions
	NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles
<b>FPT: Protection of the TSF</b>	NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
	MACSEC10:FPT_CAK_EXT.1: Protection of CAK Data
	MACSEC10:FPT_FLS.1: Failure with Preservation of Secure State
	MACSEC10:FPT_RPL.1: Replay Detection
	NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
	NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
	NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF testing
	NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted update
<b>FTA: TOE access</b>	NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
	NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
	NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
	NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
<b>FTP: Trusted path/channels</b>	MACSEC10:FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC: Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec Communications)
	NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF trusted channel
	NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin: Trusted Path

Table 2 TOE Security Functional Components

### 5.1.1 Security audit (FAU)

#### 5.1.1.1 Audit Data Generation (NDcPP22e:FAU\_GEN.1)

##### NDcPP22e:FAU\_GEN.1.1

The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c) All administrative actions comprising:
  - Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for administrators).
  - Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
  - Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
  - Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
  - [**no other actions**];
- d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 3.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Content
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.2	None	None
NDcPP22e:FAU_STG_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.2	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_CKM.4	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/Hash	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_COP.1/SigGen	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_NTP_EXT.1	Configuration of a new time server Removal of configured time server	Identity if new/removed time server
NDcPP22e:FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session.	Reason for failure.
NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	Failure to establish a TLS Session.	Reason for failure.
NDcPP22e:FIA_AFL.1	Unsuccessful login attempt limit is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU.7	None	None
NDcPP22e:FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate. Any addition, replacement or removal of trust anchors in the TOE's trust store	Reason for failure of certificate validation Identification of certificates added, replaced or removed as trust anchor in the TOE's trust store
NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2	None	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual update.	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	None	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	None	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions	All management activities of TSF data.	None
NDcPP22e:FMT_SMR.2	None	None
NDcPP22e:FPT_APW_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FPT_STM_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time - either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged.	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g., IP address).

	See also application note on FPT_STM_EXT.1)	
NDcPP22e:FPT_TST_EXT.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure).	None
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.	None
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive session.	None
NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1	(if 'lock the session' is selected) Any attempts at unlocking of an interactive session. (if 'terminate the session' is selected) The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism.	None
NDcPP22e:FTA_TAB.1	None	None
NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.
NDcPP22e:FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted path. Failure of the trusted path functions.	None

Table 3 NDcPP Audit Events

**NDcPP22e:FAU\_GEN.1.2**

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the cPP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 3.

**5.1.1.2 Audit Data Generation (MACsec) (MACSEC10:FAU\_GEN.1/MACSEC)****MACSEC10:FAU\_GEN.1.1/MACSEC**

The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b. All auditable events for the not specified level of audit;
- c. All administrative actions;
- d. Specifically defined auditable events listed in the Auditable Events table (**Table 4**)

**MACSEC10:FAU\_GEN.1.2/MACSEC**

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP-Module/ST, information specified in column three of the Auditable Events table (**Table 4**).



Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1	Session establishment	Secure Channel Identifier (SCI)
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3	Creation and update of SAK	Creation and update times
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4	Creation of CA	Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs)
FPT_RPL.1	Detected replay attempt	None

Table 4 MACsec Audit Events

### 5.1.1.3 User identity association (NDcPP22e:FAU\_GEN.2)

#### NDcPP22e:FAU\_GEN.2.1

For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

### 5.1.1.4 Protected Audit Event Storage (NDcPP22e:FAU\_STG\_EXT.1)

#### NDcPP22e:FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP\_ITC.1.

#### NDcPP22e:FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition  
[*The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally,*]

#### NDcPP22e:FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall [*overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [audit is stored in a circular buffer and oldest records are overwritten first]*] when the local storage space for audit data is full.

## 5.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)

### 5.1.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.1)

#### NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.1.1

The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [  
- *RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.3,*  
- *ECC schemes using 'NIST curves' [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.4,*  
- *FFC Schemes using "safe-prime" groups that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography and [RFC 3526].*

### 5.1.2.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.2)

#### NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.2.1

The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [  
- *RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1,*  
- *Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography' (TD0581 applied),*



- *FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography and [groups listed in RFC 3526] (TD0580 applied).*

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### 5.1.2.3 Cryptographic Key Destruction (NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.4)

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#### NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.4.1

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method

- For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [*single overwrite consisting of [zeroes, a new value of the key]*];
- For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [*logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes, a new value of the key]*]

that meets the following: No Standard.

**Note:** That zeroization occurs as follows:

- 1) when deleted from FLASH, the previous value is overwritten once with zeroes;
- 2) when added or changed in FLASH, any old value is overwritten completely with the new value;
- 3) zeroization of values in RAM is achieved by overwriting once with zeroes and by overwriting with a new value.

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### 5.1.2.4 Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm) (MACSEC10:FCS\_COP.1/CMAC)

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#### MACSEC10:FCS\_COP.1.1/CMAC

The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES-CMAC and cryptographic key sizes [*128, 256*] bits and message digest size of 128 bits that meets the following: NIST SP 800-38B.

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### 5.1.2.5 Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) (NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption)

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#### NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1.1/DataEncryption

The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [*CBC, CTR, GCM*] mode and cryptographic key sizes [*128 bits, 256 bits*] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [*CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772*].

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### 5.1.2.6 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) (NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1/Hash)

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#### NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash

The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512*] and message digest sizes [*160, 256, 384, 512*] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.

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### 5.1.2.7 Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) (NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash)

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#### NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyedHash

The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512*] and cryptographic key sizes [*160, 256, 384, 512*] and message digest sizes [*160, 256, 384, 512*] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 'MAC Algorithm 2'.

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### 5.1.2.8 Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption and Decryption) (MACSEC10:FCS\_COP.1/MACSEC)

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#### MACSEC10:FCS\_COP.1.1/MACSEC

The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in AES Key Wrap, GCM and cryptographic key sizes [128, 256] bits that meets the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, AES Key Wrap as specified in NIST SP 800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772.

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### 5.1.2.9 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) (NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1/SigGen)

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#### NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen

The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- *RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048, 3072, 4096 bits]*

- *Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [256, 384, 521 bits]*

that meet the following: [

- *For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1\_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3*

- *For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4].*

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### 5.1.2.10 MACsec (MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1)

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#### MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement MACsec in accordance with IEEE Standard 802.1AE-2018.

#### MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall derive a Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) from a peer's MAC address and port to uniquely identify the originator of an MPDU.

#### MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall reject any MPDUs during a given session that contain an SCI other than the one used to establish that session.

#### MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall permit only EAPOL (Port Access Entity (PAE) EtherType 88-8E), MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5), and MAC control frames (EtherType is 88-08) and shall discard others.

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### 5.1.2.11 MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality (MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2)

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#### MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.1

The TOE shall implement MACsec with support for integrity protection with a confidentiality offset of [0].

#### MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of protocol data units (MPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived with the SAK.

#### MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a Connectivity Association Key (CAK) using a KDF.

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### 5.1.2.12 MACsec Randomness (MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3)

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#### MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall generate unique Secure Association Keys (SAKs) using [*key derivation from*

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*Connectivity Association Key (CAK) per section 9.8.1 of IEEE 802.1X-2010*] such that the likelihood of a repeating SAK is no less than 1 in 2 to the power of the size of the generated key.

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3.2**

The TSF shall generate unique nonces for the derivation of SAKs using the TOE's random bit generator as specified by FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.

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**5.1.2.13 MACsec Key Usage (MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4)**

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**MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall support peer authentication using pre-shared keys (PSK) [*no other method*].

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.2**

The TSF shall distribute SAKs between MACsec peers using AES key wrap as specified in FCS\_COP.1/MACSEC.

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.3**

The TSF shall support specifying a lifetime for CAKs.

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.4**

The TSF shall associate Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with SAKs that are defined by the KDF using the CAK as input data (per IEEE 802.1X-2010, Section 9.8.1).

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.5**

The TSF shall associate CKNs with CAKs. The length of the CKN shall be an integer number of octets, between 1 and 32 (inclusive)

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**5.1.2.14 MACsec Key Agreement (MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1)**

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**MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement Key Agreement Protocol (MKA) in accordance with IEEE 802.1X-2010 and 802.1Xbx-2014.

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of MKA protocol data units (MKPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived from an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK).

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a CAK using a KDF.

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall enforce an MKA Lifetime Timeout limit of 6.0 seconds and [*MKA Hello Time limit of 2 seconds*].

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.5**

The Key Server shall refresh a SAK when it expires. The Key Server shall distribute a SAK by [*pairwise CAKs, derived from MKA, pairwise CAKs that are PSKs*].

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.6**

The Key Server shall distribute a fresh SAK whenever a member is added to or removed from the live membership of the CA.

**MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.7**

The TSF shall validate MKPDUs according to IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 11.11.2. In particular, the TSF shall discard without further processing any MKPDUs to which any of the following conditions apply:

- a. The destination address of the MKPDU was an individual address
- b. The MKPDU is less than 32 octets long
- c. The MKPDU comprises fewer octets than indicated by the Basic Parameter Set body length, as encoded in bits 4 through 1 of octet 3 and bits 8 through 1 of octet 4, plus 16 octets of ICV
- d. The CAK Name is not recognized

If an MKPDU passes these tests, then the TSF will begin processing it as follows:

- a. If the Algorithm Agility parameter identifies an algorithm that has been implemented by the receiver, the ICV shall be verified as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1.
- b. If the Algorithm Agility parameter is unrecognized or not implemented by the receiver, its value can be recorded for diagnosis but the received MKPDU shall be discarded without further processing.

Each received MKPDU that is validated as specified in this clause and verified as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1 shall be decoded as specified in 802.1X, section 11.11.4.

(TD0817 applied)

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#### 5.1.2.15 NTP Protocol (NDcPP22e:FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1)

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##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use only the following NTP version(s) [*NTP v3 (RFC 1305)*, *NTP v4 (RFC 5905)*].

##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall update its system time using [*Authentication using [SHA1] as the message digest algorithm(s)*].

##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall not update NTP timestamp from broadcast and/or multicast addresses.

##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall support configuration of at least three (3) NTP time sources in the Operational Environment.

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#### 5.1.2.16 Random Bit Generation (NDcPP22e:FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1)

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##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [*CTR\_DRBG (AES)*].

##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [*one software-based noise source*] with a minimum of [*256 bits*] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 'Security Strength Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

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#### 5.1.2.17 SSH Server Protocol (NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1)

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##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with: RFC(s) 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [*4256*].

##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [*password-based*]. (TD0631 applied)

##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [*262130*] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [*aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc*].

##### NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [*ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521*] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

**NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6**

The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [*hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512*] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

**NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.7**

The TSF shall ensure that [*ecdh-sha2-nistp256*] and [*diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521*] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

**NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.8**

The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

**5.1.2.18 TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication (NDcPP22e:FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1)****NDcPP22e:FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement [*TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)*] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites: [*TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268, TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268, TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246, TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288, TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289, TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289, TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289, TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289*] and no other ciphersuites.

**NDcPP22e:FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [*the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6*].

**NDcPP22e:FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3**

When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [*Not implement any administrator override mechanism*].

**NDcPP22e:FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall [*present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with the following curves/groups: [ffdhe2048, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other curves/groups*] in the Client Hello.

**5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)****5.1.3.1 Authentication Failure Management (NDcPP22e:FIA\_AFL.1)****NDcPP22e:FIA\_AFL.1.1**

The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [**3-100**] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password.

**NDcPP22e:FIA\_AFL.1.2**

When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [*prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed*].

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### 5.1.3.2 Password Management (NDcPP22e:FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1)

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#### NDcPP22e:FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: ['!', '@', '#', '\$', '%', '^', '&', '(', ')'];
- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [8] and [60] characters.

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### 5.1.3.3 Pre-Shared Key Composition (MACSEC10:FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1)

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#### MACSEC10:FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use PSKs for MKA as defined by IEEE 802.1X-2010, [*no other protocols*].

#### MACSEC10:FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall be able to [*accept*] bit-based PSKs.

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### 5.1.3.4 Protected Authentication Feedback (NDcPP22e:FIA\_UAU.7)

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#### NDcPP22e:FIA\_UAU.7.1

The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress at the local console.

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### 5.1.3.5 Password-based Authentication Mechanism (NDcPP22e:FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2)

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#### NDcPP22e:FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall provide a local [*password-based*] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

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### 5.1.3.6 User Identification and Authentication (NDcPP22e:FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1)

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#### NDcPP22e:FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA\_TAB.1;
- [*network routing services*].

#### NDcPP22e:FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

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### 5.1.3.7 X.509 Certificate Validation (NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev)

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#### NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1/Rev

The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates.
  - The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
  - The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
  - The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [*the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960*]
  - The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
    - o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
    - o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
-



- o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
- o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

**NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2/Rev**

The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

**5.1.3.8 X.509 Certificate Authentication (NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.2)****NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS], and [*no additional uses*].

**NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2**

When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [*not accept the certificate*].

**5.1.4 Security management (FMT)****5.1.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour (NDcPP22e:FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate)****NDcPP22e:FMT\_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate**

The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators.

**5.1.4.2 Management of TSF Data (NDcPP22e:FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData)****NDcPP22e:FMT\_MTD.1.1/CoreData**

The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

**5.1.4.3 Management of TSF Data (NDcPP22e:FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys)****NDcPP22e:FMT\_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys**

The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to Security Administrators.

**5.1.4.4 Specification of Management Functions (NDcPP22e:FMT\_SMF.1)****NDcPP22e:FMT\_SMF.1.1**

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [*digital signature*] capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA\_AFL.1;
- [*Ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity, Ability to manage the cryptographic keys, Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality, Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying, Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps, Ability to configure NTP, Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer, Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors, Ability to import X509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store, Ability to manage the trusted public keys database.*]

(TD0631 applied)

#### 5.1.4.5 Specification of Management Functions (MACsec) (MACSEC10:FMT\_SMF.1/MACSEC)

##### FMT\_SMF.1.1/MACSEC:

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions related to MACsec functionality: Ability of a Security Administrator to:

- *Manage a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device*
- *Manage the Key Server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants [as specified in 802.1X-2020, sections 9.13 and 9.16 (cf. MIB object `ieee8021XKeyMkaParticipantEntry`) and section.12.2 (cf. function `createMKA()`) ]*
- *Specify a lifetime of a CAK*
- *Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using [the MIB object `ieee8021XKeyMkaPartActivateControl` ]*
- *[No other MACsec management functions].*

#### 5.1.4.6 Restrictions on Security Roles (NDcPP22e:FMT\_SMR.2)

##### NDcPP22e:FMT\_SMR.2.1

The TSF shall maintain the roles: - Security Administrator.

##### NDcPP22e:FMT\_SMR.2.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

##### NDcPP22e:FMT\_SMR.2.3

The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely are satisfied.

#### 5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

##### 5.1.5.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords (NDcPP22e:FPT\_APW\_EXT.1)

##### NDcPP22e:FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.

##### NDcPP22e:FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.

##### 5.1.5.2 Protection of CAK Data (MACSEC10:FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1)

##### MACSEC10:FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall prevent reading of CAK values by administrators.

##### 5.1.5.3 Failure with Preservation of Secure State (MACSEC10:FPT\_FLS.1)

##### MACSEC10:FPT\_FLS.1.1

The TSF shall fail-secure when any of the following types of failures occur: failure of the power-on self-tests, failure of integrity check of the TSF executable image, failure of noise source health tests.

##### 5.1.5.4 Replay Detection (MACSEC10:FPT\_RPL.1)

##### MACSEC10:FPT\_RPL.1.1

The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: MPDUs, MKA frames.



**MACSEC10:FPT\_RPL.1.2**

The TSF shall perform discarding of the replayed data, logging of the detected replay attempt when replay is detected.

**5.1.5.5 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys) (NDcPP22e:FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1)****NDcPP22e:FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

**5.1.5.6 Reliable Time Stamps (NDcPP22e:FPT\_STM\_EXT.1)****NDcPP22e:FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

**NDcPP22e:FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall [*allow the Security Administrator to set the time, synchronise time with an NTP server*]. (TD0632 applied)

**5.1.5.7 TSF testing (NDcPP22e:FPT\_TST\_EXT.1)****NDcPP22e:FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [*during initial start-up (on power on)*] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [**cryptographic algorithm self-tests, firmware integrity tests**].

**5.1.5.8 Trusted update (NDcPP22e:FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1)****NDcPP22e:FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [*the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software*].

**NDcPP22e:FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [*no other update mechanism*].

**NDcPP22e:FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [*digital signature*] prior to installing those updates.

**5.1.6 TOE access (FTA)****5.1.6.1 TSF-initiated Termination (NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL.3)****NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL.3.1**

The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.

**5.1.6.2 User-initiated Termination (NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL.4)****NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL.4.1**

The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator's own interactive session.

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**5.1.6.3 TSF-initiated Session Locking (NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1)**

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**NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [*terminate the session*] after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

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**5.1.6.4 Default TOE Access Banners (NDcPP22e:FTA\_TAB.1)**

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**NDcPP22e:FTA\_TAB.1.1**

Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.

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**5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)**

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**5.1.7.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec Communications) (MACSEC10:FTP\_ITC.1/MACSEC)**

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**MACSEC10:FTP\_ITC.1.1/MACSEC**

The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a MACsec peer that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

**MACSEC10:FTP\_ITC.1.2/MACSEC**

The TSF shall permit [*the TSF*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

**MACSEC10:FTP\_ITC.1.3/MACSEC**

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communications with MACsec peers that require the use of MACsec

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**5.1.7.2 Inter-TSF trusted channel (NDcPP22e:FTP\_ITC.1)**

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**NDcPP22e:FTP\_ITC.1.1**

The TSF shall be capable of using [*TLS*] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [*authentication server*] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

**NDcPP22e:FTP\_ITC.1.2**

The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

**NDcPP22e:FTP\_ITC.1.3**

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [**transmitting audit records to an audit server, authenticating using a Radius server**].

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**5.1.7.3 Trusted Path (NDcPP22e:FTP\_TRP.1/Admin)**

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**NDcPP22e:FTP\_TRP.1.1/Admin**

The TSF shall be capable of using [*SSH*] to provide a communication path between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.

**NDcPP22e:FTP\_TRP.1.2/Admin**

The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.

**NDcPP22e:FTP\_TRP.1.3/Admin**

The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions.



## 5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>ADV: Development</b>	ADV_FSP.1: Basic Functional Specification
<b>AGD: Guidance documents</b>	AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
	AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
<b>ALC: Life-cycle support</b>	ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage
<b>ATE: Tests</b>	ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - Conformance
<b>AVA: Vulnerability assessment</b>	AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey

**Table 5 Assurance Components**

### 5.2.1 Development (ADV)

#### 5.2.1.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV\_FSP.1)

##### ADV\_FSP.1.1d

The developer shall provide a functional specification.

##### ADV\_FSP.1.2d

The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

##### ADV\_FSP.1.1c

The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

##### ADV\_FSP.1.2c

The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

##### ADV\_FSP.1.3c

The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.

##### ADV\_FSP.1.4c

The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

##### ADV\_FSP.1.1e

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

##### ADV\_FSP.1.2e

The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

### 5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)

#### 5.2.2.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD\_OPE.1)

##### AGD\_OPE.1.1d

The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

##### AGD\_OPE.1.1c

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

**AGD\_OPE.1.2c**

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.

**AGD\_OPE.1.3c**

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

**AGD\_OPE.1.4c**

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

**AGD\_OPE.1.5c**

The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.

**AGD\_OPE.1.6c**

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

**AGD\_OPE.1.7c**

The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

**AGD\_OPE.1.1e**

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

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**5.2.2.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD\_PRE.1)**

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**AGD\_PRE.1.1d**

The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.

**AGD\_PRE.1.1c**

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

**AGD\_PRE.1.2c**

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

**AGD\_PRE.1.1e**

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**AGD\_PRE.1.2e**

The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.

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**5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)**

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**5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC\_CMC.1)**

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**ALC\_CMC.1.1d**

The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.

**ALC\_CMC.1.1c**

The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.

**ALC\_CMC.1.1e**

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

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### 5.2.3.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC\_CMS.1)

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**ALC\_CMS.1.1d**

The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.

**ALC\_CMS.1.1c**

The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.

**ALC\_CMS.1.2c**

The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

**ALC\_CMS.1.1e**

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

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### 5.2.4 Tests (ATE)

#### 5.2.4.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE\_IND.1)

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**ATE\_IND.1.1d**

The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

**ATE\_IND.1.1c**

The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

**ATE\_IND.1.1e**

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**ATE\_IND.1.2e**

The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

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### 5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)

#### 5.2.5.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA\_VAN.1)

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**AVA\_VAN.1.1d**

The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

**AVA\_VAN.1.1c**

The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

**AVA\_VAN.1.1e**

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

**AVA\_VAN.1.2e**

The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.

**AVA\_VAN.1.3e**

The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

## 6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions:

- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels

### 6.1 Security audit

The TOE produces syslog conformant messages in a number of circumstances including warnings about the device itself (such as temperature, power failures, etc.) as well as security relevant events (the success and failure login of the user, regardless of the authentication mechanism; changing a user's password; and adding and deleting user accounts). In each case the audit record includes the time and date, identification of the responsible subject (e.g., by network address or user ID), the type of event, the outcome of the event, and other information depending on the event type. For cryptographic keys, the TOE generates and deletes SSH host keys. The TOE can support one EC key pair and one RSA key pair. The audit records associated with these actions identify the key as either the EC key pair or RSA key pair. The TOE also generates, imports and deletes keys associated with x509 certificates. Auditing of these actions identify the keys based upon the trustpoint name corresponding to the operation being performed. In all of these audits, the audit records identify the administrator account responsible for the action. The TOE is also capable of importing SSH public keys for user authentication, and audit records identify the key by the user ID with which it is mapped.

The audit records are stored in a log (internal to the TOE appliance) that is protected so that only an authorized TOE User can read (for which tools accessible via the CLI are provided). The protection results from the fact that the logs can be accessed only after a user logs in (see section 6.3 below).

The log stores up to 4,000 entries after which the audit entries will be overwritten, oldest first. The administrator (with Super User privilege) can (and should) choose to configure one or more external syslog servers where the TOE will simultaneously send a copy of the audit records. The TOE can be configured to use TLS (using any of the supported ciphersuites) to protect audit logs exported to an external server.

The TOE includes a hardware clock that is used to provide reliable time information for the audit records it generates.

The Security audit function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e/ MACSEC10:FAU\_GEN.1: The TOE can generate audit records for events including starting and stopping the audit function, administrator commands, and all other events identified in Table 3 (in Section 5). Furthermore, each audit record identifies the date/time, event type, outcome of the event, responsible subject/user, as well as the additional event-specific content indicated in Table 3 (in Section 5).
- NDcPP22e:FAU\_GEN.2: The TOE identifies the responsible user for each event based on the specific administrator or network entity (identified by IP address) that caused the event.
- NDcPP22e:FAU\_STG\_EXT.1: The TOE can be configured to export audit records to an external SYSLOG server. This communication is protected with the use of TLS.

### 6.2 Cryptographic support

The TOE supports a range of cryptographic services using the RUCKUS-IP-CRYPTO-VER-6.0 cryptographic library.

Functions	Requirement	Certificate
<b>Encryption/Decryption</b>		
AES CBC, CTR, GCM (128 and 256 bits)	FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	<a href="#">A5076</a>

AES CMAC (128 and 256 bits)	FCS_COP.1(1)/KeyedHashCM AC	<a href="#">A5076</a>
AES KW (128 and 256 bits)	FCS_COP.1/MACSEC	<a href="#">A5076</a>
<b>Cryptographic hashing</b>		
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 256, 384, 512)	FCS_COP.1/Hash	<a href="#">A5076</a>
<b>Keyed-hash message authentication</b>		
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 256, 384, 512)	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	<a href="#">A5076</a>
<b>Cryptographic signature services</b>		
RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (modulus 2048, 3072, 4096)	FCS_COP.1/SigGen	<a href="#">A5076</a>
ECDSA Digital Signature Algorithm (P-256, P-384, P-521)	FCS_COP.1/SigGen	<a href="#">A5076</a>
<b>Random bit generation</b>		
CTR_DRBG with sw based noise sources with a minimum of 256 bits of non-determinism	FCS_RBC_EXT.1	<a href="#">A5076</a>
<b>Key generation</b>		
RSA Key Generation (2048, 3072, 4096 bits)	FCS_CKM.1	<a href="#">A5076</a>
ECC Key Generation (P-256, P-384, P-521)		<a href="#">A5076</a>
Safe Primes Key Generation		Tested with known good implementation
<b>Key establishment</b>		
RSA	FCS_CKM.2	Tested with known good implementation
ECC KAS		<a href="#">A5076</a>
FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups		Tested with known good implementation

**Table 6 Cryptographic Functions**

Additionally, the Broadcom chip BCM82756 is used to perform ASE\_GCM encryption and decryption for MACsec. That chip has been CAVP tested as well.

Functions	Requirement	Cert #
Encryption/Decryption		
AES GCM (128 and 256 bits)	FCS_COP.1/MACSEC	<a href="#">AES 4550</a>

The TOE uses a software-based random bit generator that complies with Special Publication 800-90 using CTR\_DRBG when operating in the FIPS mode. AES-256 is used in conjunction with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy.

The TOE supports the following secret keys, private keys and CSPs:

Key or CSP:	Zeroized upon:	Stored in:	Zeroized by:
SSH host RSA private key	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
SSH host RSA public key	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
SSH client RSA public key	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
SSH session key	End of session	RAM	Overwriting once with zeros
TLS host RSA private key	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
TLS host RSA digital certificate	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
TLS pre-master secret	Handshake done	RAM	Overwriting once with zeros



Key or CSP:	Zeroized upon:	Stored in:	Zeroized by:
TLS session key	Close of session	RAM	Overwriting once with zeros
MACsec Security Association Key (SAK)	End of session	RAM	Overwriting once with zeros
MACsec Connectivity Association Key (CAK)	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
MACsec Key Encryption Key (KEK)	End of session	RAM	Overwriting once with zeros
MACsec Integrity Check Key (ICK)	End of session	RAM	Overwriting once with zeros
DH Private Exponent	New key exchange	RAM	Overwritten with new value
DH Public Key	Not applicable	RAM	Public value
User Password	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
Port Administrator Password	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
Crypto Officer Password	Command	Flash	Overwriting once with zeros
Firmware Integrity / Load RSA public key	Not applicable	Flash	Public value
DRBG Seed	Every 100ms	RAM	Overwritten with new value
DRBG Value V	Every 100ms	RAM	Overwritten with new value
DRBG Constant C	Every 100ms	RAM	Overwritten with new value

**Table 7 Keys and CSPs**

The TOE stores all persistent secret and private keys in FLASH and stores all ephemeral keys in RAM (as indicated in the above table). The TOE's zeroization has been subjected to FIPS 140 validation and is designed to zeroize secret and private keys when they are no longer required by the TOE. Note that zeroization occurs as follows: 1) when deleted from FLASH, the previous value is overwritten once with zeroes; 2) when added or changed in FLASH, any old value is overwritten completely with the new value; and, 3) the zeroization of values in RAM is achieved by overwriting once with zeroes and by overwriting with a new value.

These supporting cryptographic functions are included to support the SSHv2 (compliant with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, and 4254) and TLS v1.1 (RFC4346), and TLS v1.2 (RFC 5246) secure communication protocols.

The TOE supports TLSv1.1, and v1.2 with the following ciphersuites:

- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES256\_GCM\_SHA384
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES128\_GCM\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES128\_GCM\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES256\_GCM\_SHA384

The TOE supports the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1 and ffdhe2048 by default.

The TOE supports SSHv2 with AES (CTR, CBC) 128 or 256 bit ciphers, in conjunction with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256, or HMAC-SHA2-512. The TOE supports ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, and ecdsa-sha2-nistp3521 as its host public key algorithms, with diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, and ecdh-sha2-nistp521 for the key exchange methods. While other ciphers and hashes are implemented in the product, they are disabled while the TOE is operating in Common Criteria mode.

The TOE allows users to perform SSHv2 authentication using password based authentication and allows users to upload a public key for SSHv2 public key client authentication. The imported SSHv2 public key includes a username provided in the "Subject" field to be verified against an authenticating admin's identity. The TOE can authenticate clients using public keys with RSA keys as well as ECDSA keys using curves P-256, P-384 and P-521. Whenever the timeout period or authentication retry limit is reached, the TOE closes the applicable TCP connection and releases the SSH session resources.

The TOE's SSHv2 implementation limits SSH packets to a size of roughly 256K bytes. As SSH packets are being received, the TOE uses a buffer to build all packet information. Once complete, the packet is checked to ensure it can be appropriately decrypted. However, if it is not complete when the buffer becomes full (262130 bytes) the packet will be dropped and the connection terminated. There is a TOE initiated rekey before 1 hour or before 1GB whichever comes first.

Scheme	Protocol	Service
RSA	SSH	Remote Administration (server)
ECC	SSH	Remote Administration (server)
DH 14, 16 and 18	SSH	Remote Administration (server)
FFC Safe Primes	TLS	Syslog and Radius (client)
ECC	TLS	Syslog and Radius (client)

**Table 8 Service, Protocol and Key Establishment Scheme Mapping**

The Cryptographic support function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.1: The TOE supports asymmetric key generation using RSA key establishment (key size 2048) as part of SSH as described in the section above. The TOE acts as a client for TLS (ECC and FFC safe primes) and a server for SSH (RSA, ECC, DH-14 key generation). The TOE supports DH group 14 key establishment scheme that meets standard RFC 3526, section 3 for interoperability. The TOE implements NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography'.
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.2: See NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.1.
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_CKM.4: Keys are either zeroized or overwritten with a new value when they are no longer needed by the TOE
- MACSEC10:FCS\_COP.1/CMAC: The TOE supports keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with AES-CMAC algorithm with key sizes 128 bits and 256 bits and the message digest size supported is 128 bits. The algorithm conforms to NIST SP 800-38B.
- MACSEC10:FCS\_COP.1/MACSEC: The TOE performs AES key wrap as specified in AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, AES Key Wrap as specified in NIST SP 800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772.
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption: The TOE performs encryption and decryption using AES in CBC CTR and GCM mode with key sizes of either 128 or 256 bits. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above.
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1/Hash: The TOE supports cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with digest sizes 160, 256, 384, and 512. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above,
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash: The TOE supports keyed-hash message authentication using HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512, using SHA-1/256/384/512 with 160/256/384/512 bit keys to produce a 160/256/384/512 output MAC. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_COP.1/SigGen: The TOE supports the use of RSA with 2048/3072/4096 bit key sizes and ECDSA with key sizes 256/384/521 bits for cryptographic signatures. Digital signatures are used in TLS and SSH communications and on product updates. The corresponding CAVP certificate is identified in the table above.
- MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1: The TOE implements MACsec in accordance with IEEE 802.1AE-2018. The TOE derives a Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) from a peer's MAC address and port to uniquely identify the originator of a MACsec Protocol Data Unit (MPDU) and rejects any MPDUs that do not

contain the identifier. Only EAPOL (PAE EtherType 88-8E) and MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5) are permitted and others are rejected.

- MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2: The TOE implements the MACsec requirement for integrity protection with the confidentiality offset of 0. The TOE derives the ICV from a CAK using KDF, using the SCI as the most significant bits of the IV and the 32 least significant bits of the PN as the IV. The supported ICV length is 16 octets. An ICV derived with the SAK is used to provide assurance of the integrity of MPDUs. The ICV is generated by a pre-shared key configured via the CLI.
- MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3: A SAK and CAK are derived by a pre-shared key configured via the CLI. The pre-shared key must be 128 bits when using gcm-aes-128 and 256 bits when using gcm-aes-256. The TOE's random bit generator is used for creating these unique nonces.
- MACSEC10:FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4: The TOE ensures MACsec peer authentication using pre-shared keys. The TOE uses AES Key Wrap to distribute the SAKs between peers using aes-128-cmac or aes-256-cmac. The TOE associates Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with CAKs. The length of the CKN shall be an integer number of octets, between 1 and 32 (inclusive). The TOE's PAE authenticates MACsec peers. If the peer is authenticated successfully a unique connectivity association (CA) is established with the peer. The TOE does not support group CAKs and only supports pairwise CAKs as identified in the selections for FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.5.
- MACSEC10:FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1: The TOE implements Key Agreement Protocol (MKA) in accordance with IEEE 802.1X-2010 and 802.1Xbx-2014. The TOE supports the data delay protection to provide security against delay attack. The TOE enforces an MKA Lifetime Timeout limit of 6.0 seconds and a MKA Bounded Hello Time limit of 2 seconds. Data delay protection is provided by discarding any Data frame which is received out-of-order. Data received in only in Strict-order is accepted by hardware; all others are discarded by the hardware. The TOE verifies the integrity of MKA protocol data units using an ICV derived from the ICK. The ICK is derived from the CAK using KDF (AES-CMAC). The ICV is checked on the reception of each MKA PDU.
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1: The TOE supports NTPv3 and NTPv4, authenticating the NTP server that it synchronizes to using a sha1 message digest. The TOE allows one or more NTP servers to be configured. At least one is required for time synchronization to occur, but more than 3 NTP servers can be specified.
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1: The TOE uses one software-based entropy source to seed for a software-based DRBG that complies with Special Publication 800-90 using CTR\_DRBG when operating in the FIPS mode. AES-256 is used in conjunction with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy for the seed.
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1: The TOE supports SSHv2 interactive command-line secure administrator sessions as indicated above.
- NDcPP22e:FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1: The TOE supports TLS when exporting audit logs to an external server and when communicating with RADIUS authentication servers. Certificate pinning is not supported. The TOE allows administrators to specify FQDN values as reference identifiers (per RFC 6125 only). These values are matched against values in an x509v3 certificate in the CN and SAN:DNS fields. Wildcards are not allowed in certificates.

### 6.3 Identification and authentication

The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, except to display a message of the day banner and to permit network routing services without identification or authentication. The TOE allows unauthenticated network routing services to route network traffic through the TOE as well as unauthenticated network routing protocol traffic destined to the TOE (including DNS, ARP, ICMP, BootP, DHCP, RIP, OSPF, BGP, VRRP, VRRP-E, Multi-VRF) but does not include any management configuration of the TOE's network routing services. The TOE authenticates TOE Users against their user name, password and privilege level. The Authorized Administrator logs on the TOE through either locally using the console or remotely using SSHv2. A successful authentication is determined by a successful username and password combination. An incorrect password will result in a failed authentication attempt. The TOE also allows remote administrators to authenticate over an SSH connection using an RSA public key authentication mechanism.

The Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege represents the "administrator" referred to in the security requirements of the protection profile. Other accounts with privileges other than Super User were not tested during the evaluation. The available mechanisms include the Local Password for the Super User Privilege level and

RADIUS authentication. The Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege defines local user (or TOE User) accounts and assigns passwords and privilege levels to the accounts. Each user account has a user name, password, and a privilege level associated with it. There is a default privilege level account associated with each privilege level and each has its own password. It is up to the Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege to decide whether or how to use these legacy accounts. Note however, that each has an identity, password, and privilege level.

While the Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege can create or otherwise modify accounts freely, other users cannot change their own (or any other) security attributes. Note that the TOE supports a password enforcement configuration where the minimum password length can be set by an administrator from 8 to 60 characters. Passwords can be created using any alphabetic, numeric, and a wide range of special characters ( '!', '@', '#', '\$', '%', '^', '&', '(', ') ').

The Authorized Administrator can set a lockout failure count for remote login attempts (the default is 3). If the count is exceeded, the targeted account is locked for an administrator-configurable time limit. Once the configured time has passed the account is unlocked. No manual administrative action is required. The local console interface is not subject to the lockout failure enforcement.

The Identification and authentication function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FIA\_AFL.1: Remote administrator accounts can be locked for an administrator configured period of time if the failed login threshold is surpassed.
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1: The TOE implements a rich set of password composition constraints as described above.
- MACSEC10:FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1: The TOE supports the use of pre-shared keys for MKA as defined by IEEE 802.1X. The pre-shared keys are not generated by the TOE but rather the TOE will accept bit based pre-shared keys.
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_UAU.7: The TOE does not echo passwords as they are entered; rather '\*' characters are echoed when entering passwords.
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2: The TOE uses local password-based authentication and RADIUS server authentication.
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any services or access to its functions, except for the switching/routing of network traffic and displaying a message of the day banner, without requiring a user to be identified and authenticated.
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev: Certificates are validated as part of the authentication process when they are presented to the TOE and when they are loaded into the TOE. OCSP is supported for X509v3 certificate validation of certificates used for authentication by a TLS server. The TOE performs the same revocation checking on certificates regardless of whether it receives a full certificate chain or only a leaf certificate. Trusted CA's are loaded to the file system in PEM format using a CLI command leveraging SCP. As this requires CLI access this can only be performed by authorized administrators who have been authenticated. The TOE chooses what trusted CA to use for certificate chain validation based on the trustpoint configured for the relevant TLS profile.
- NDcPP22e:FIA\_X509\_EXT.2: Certificates are checked and if found not valid are not accepted or if the OCSP server cannot be contacted for validity checks, then the certificate is not accepted. This behavior is not configurable. Certificates are checked in the following order: chain validation, SAN checks, CN checks, revocation status, and lastly expiration status. The common name (or SAN values if present) needs to be a fully qualified domain name.

## 6.4 Security management

The TOE associates each defined user account with a privilege level. The most privileged level is Super User (with regards to the requirements in this Security Target, users with lesser privilege levels are referred to collectively simply as TOE users since such users do not have complete read-and-write access to the system). Again, as stated in section 6.3, other accounts with privileges other than Super User were not tested during the evaluation. The TOE implements an internal access control mechanism that bases decisions about the use of functions and access to TOE data on those privilege levels. In this manner, the TOE is able to ensure that only the Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege can access audit configuration data, information flow policy ACLs, user and administrator

security attributes (including passwords and privilege levels), authentication method lists, the logon failure threshold, the remote access user list; and cryptographic support settings.

Other than the Super User level, the TOE implements a Read Only level where only basic commands can be issued and no changes can be made and a Port Configuration level where non-security device parameters can be managed. Collectively, this ST refers to all users of the TOE as “TOE Users” where TOE Users privileges are a subset of the broader role of “Authorized Administrator with Super User privilege”.

The TOE offers command line functions which are accessible via the CLI. The CLI is a text-based interface which can be accessed from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. These command line functions can be used to effectively manage every security policy, as well as the non-security relevant aspects of the TOE.

Once authenticated (none of these functions is available to any user before being identified and authenticated), authorized administrators have access to the following security functions:

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA\_AFL.1;
- Ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity;
- Ability to manage the cryptographic keys
- Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
- Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
- Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
- Ability to configure NTP;
- Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;
- Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;
- Ability to import X509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
- Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;

The Security management function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Only the authorized administrator can update the TOE.
- NDcPP22e:FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData: Only the authorized administrator can configure TSF-related functions.
- NDcPP22e:FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys: Only the authorized administrator can configure cryptographic keys. The keys an authorized administrator can manage consist of importing trusted Root CA certs, generating SSH host keys, importing SSH public keys, and configuring a CAK for MACsec. All of these keys can be also be deleted.
- NDcPP22e:FMT\_SMF.1: The TOE provides administrative interfaces to perform the functions identified above.
- MACSEC10:FMT\_SMF.1: The TOE provides the authorized administrator the ability to:
  - Generate a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device.
  - Manage the Key Server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants as specified in 802.1X, sections 9.13 and 9.16 (cf. MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaParticipantEntry) and section.12.2 (cf. function createMKA)
  - Specify a lifetime of a CAK
  - Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using the MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaPartActivateControl
- NDcPP22e:FMT\_SMR.2: The TOE maintains administrative user roles.



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## 6.5 Protection of the TSF

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The TOE is an appliance and as such is designed to work independent of other components to a large extent. Secure communication with third-party peers is addressed in section 6.7 below.

The TOE does not provide access to locally stored passwords (which can be administratively configured to be protected by SHA-1 or SHA-256 hashing) and also, while cryptographic keys can be entered, the TOE does not disclose any cryptographic keys stored in the TOE. The TOE is a hardware appliance that includes a hardware-based real-time clock. The TOE's embedded OS manages the clock and exposes administrator clock-related functions. The TOE can be configured to periodically synchronize its clock with a time server, but the TOE can only ensure its own reliability and not that of an external time mechanism. The TOE also implements the timing elements through timeout functionality due to inactivity for terminating both local and remote sessions. Note that the clock is used primarily to provide timestamp for audit records, but is also used to support timing elements of cryptographic functions.

The TOE includes a number of built in diagnostic tests that are run during start-up to determine whether the TOE is operating properly. If a self-test fails, the TOE is not operational and reboots until the error is cleared or the administrator gets help from Ruckus. When operating in FIPS mode, the power-on self-tests comply with the FIPS 140-2 requirements for self-testing. The module performs Cryptographic algorithm known answer tests, firmware integrity tests using RSA signature verification and conditional self-tests for DRBG, Hardware RNG, Pair-wise consistency tests on generation of RSA keys, and a Firmware load test (RSA signature verification). Upon failing any of its FIPS mode power-on self-tests, the TOE will refuse to boot. The tests are sufficient to ensure the correct operation of the security features as they address firmware integrity and cryptographic operations.

The TOE supports loading a new software image manually by the administrator using CLI commands. From the CLI, an administrator can use SCP in order to download a software image, and the TOE, prior to actually installing and using the new software image, will verify its digital signature using a pre-installed vendor key. An unverified image cannot be installed. The downloaded software image is saved to flash memory and is installed after rebooting the TOE. Images can be downloaded and saved as either a primary or secondary image. The TOE can be configured to boot to either the primary or secondary image. The 'show version' command indicates the currently running TOE version as well as whether the currently running image is primary or secondary. The TOE offers the 'show flash' command to display the image as primary and secondary, to allow administrators the opportunity to determine which should be booted.

The Protection of the TSF function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FPT\_APW\_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any user a plain text password. Furthermore, locally defined passwords are not stored in plaintext form, only their hash value is stored.
- MACSEC10:FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any user a CAK. When an administrator displays the current configuration, a hashed version of the CAK is displayed, despite the CAK being stored in cleartext.
- MACSEC10:FPT\_FLS.1: If the TOE encounters a self-test failure, failure of integrity check of the TSF executable image, failure of noise source health tests it will shutdown. The TOE will not restart as long as it has a failure.
- MACSEC10:FPT\_RPL.1: The TOE detects and logs all attempts to replay MPDUs and MKA frames by verifying the packet number (PN). If the received PN is lower than the current PN, this indicates to the TOE a replay attempt, and the packet is discarded.
- NDcPP22e:FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any users a stored cryptographic key. Keys are stored as identified in Table 6 when they are created
- NDcPP22e:FPT\_STM\_EXT.1: The TOE includes its own hardware clock and can synchronize its time with an external NTP server.
- NDcPP22e:FPT\_TST\_EXT.1: The TOE performs a suite of self-tests to verify its integrity.
- NDcPP22e:FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1: The TOE provides functions to query the version and upgrade the software embedded in the TOE appliance. When installing updated software, digital signatures are used to authenticate the update to ensure it is the update intended and originated by the vendor.

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## 6.6 TOE access

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The TOE can be configured to display an administrator-configured message of the day banner that will be displayed before authentication is completed (before the user enters his password). The banner will be displayed when accessing the TOE via the console or SSH interfaces.

The TOE can be configured by an administrator to set a session timeout value (any value 0-240 minutes for console and SSH with 0 disabling the timeout). The default timeout is 2 minutes for both console and SSH. A session (local or remote) that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing from the remote client) for the defined timeout value will be terminated. Upon exceeding the session timeout (if set), the TOE logs the user off, but leaves the user's console displaying the last contents.

The user will be required to login in after any session has been terminated due to inactivity or after voluntary termination. Of course, administrators can logout of local or remote sessions at any time.

The TOE access function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL.3: The TOE terminates remote sessions that have been inactive for an administrator-configured period of time.
- NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL.4: The TOE provides the function to logout (or terminate) both local and remote user sessions as directed by the user.
- NDcPP22e:FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1: The TOE terminates local sessions that have been inactive for an administrator-configured period of time.
- NDcPP22e:FTA\_TAB.1: The TOE can be configured to display administrator-defined advisory banners when administrators successfully establish interactive sessions with the TOE, allowing administrators to terminate their session prior to performing any functions.

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## 6.7 Trusted path/channels

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The TOE provides a trusted path for its remote administrative users accessing the TOE via the Ethernet ports provided on the TOE using either the command line interface or SSH. Note that local administrator access via the serial port is also allowed for command line access. However, this access is protected by physical protection of the serial interface along with the TOE itself.

When an administrator attempts to connect to the TOE remotely, the TOE attempts to negotiate a TLS-protected session. If the session cannot be negotiated, the connection is dropped.

Remote connections to third-party SYSLOG servers are supported for exporting audit records to an external audit server. Remote connections to an external RADIUS server are supported for external user authentication. Communication with those external servers is protected using TLS.

The TOE can be configured to establish MACsec connections with MACsec capable peers.

In all cases, the endpoints are assured by virtue of the certificates installed, trusted, and reviewable when connecting and by virtue of user authentication.

The Trusted path/channels function satisfies the following security functional requirements:

- MACSEC10:FTP\_ITC.1 The TOE can be configured to establish MACsec connections with MACsec capable peers.
- NDcPP22e:FTP\_ITC.1: In the evaluated configuration, the TOE can be configured to use TLS to ensure that any exported audit records and authentication server communications are sent only to the configured server so they are not subject to inappropriate disclosure or modification..
- NDcPP22e:FTP\_TRP.1/Admin: The TOE uses SSH to provide a trusted path for remote management interfaces to protect the communication from disclosure and modification.