National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Commscope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11492-2024
Dated: July 23, 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Lauren Brandt
Randy Heimann
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Ryan Hagedorn
Cornelius Haley
Will Micknick
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 1
2 Identification........................................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ....................................................................................................... 4
3.1 TOE Description............................................................................................................. 4
3.2 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................ 4
3.3 TOE Architecture............................................................................................................ 5
3.4 Physical Boundaries........................................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 6
4.1 Security audit .................................................................................................................. 6
4.2 Cryptographic support .................................................................................................... 6
4.3 Identification and authentication..................................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management...................................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF...................................................................................................... 7
4.6 TOE access...................................................................................................................... 7
4.7 Trusted path/channels ..................................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ................................................................................... 8
5.1 Assumptions.................................................................................................................... 8
5.2 Clarification of Scope ..................................................................................................... 8
6 Documentation........................................................................................................................ 9
7 IT Product Testing ................................................................................................................ 10
7.1 Developer Testing......................................................................................................... 10
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ......................................................................... 10
8 Results of the Evaluation ...................................................................................................... 11
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)...................................................................... 11
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)........................................................................ 11
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ........................................................... 11
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)............................................... 12
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ........................... 12
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)................................................................... 12
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.................................................................................... 13
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................................. 14
10 Annexes............................................................................................................................. 15
11 Security Target.................................................................................................................. 16
12 Glossary ............................................................................................................................ 17
13 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 18
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
Validation team of the evaluation of CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec solution provided by CommScope Technologies LLC. It
presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation
Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S.
government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
July 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation
determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and
meets the assurance requirements of the PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec
Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 29 March 2023 (CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_v1.0) which includes
the Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e) with the PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023
(MACSEC10).
The TOE is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router
10.0.10 with MACsec. The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved
CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR
applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive
versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target
(ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the CommScope Technologies
LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec Security Target, version
0.5, July 22, 2024, and analysis performed by the Validation team.
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
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Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful
completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router
10.0.10 with MACsec
(Specific models identified in Section 3.2)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption,
Version 1.0, 29 March 2023 (CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_v1.0) which includes the
Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23
March 2020 (NDcPP22e) with the PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption,
Version 1.0, 02 March 2023 (MACSEC10)
ST CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router
10.0.10 with MACsec Security Target, version 0.5, July 22, 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron
ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec, version 0.3, July 22, 2024
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Commscope Technologies LLC
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Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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Item Identifier
Developer Commscope Technologies LLC
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Lauren Brandt, Randy Heimann, Jenn Dotson, Sheldon Durrant, Lori Sarem
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The TOE is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router
10.0.10 family of products. The TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded
software installed on a management processor. The software controls the switching and routing
network frames and packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances.
All TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters to allow immediate use
of the system’s basic features through its Command Line Interface (CLI). However, the product
should be configured in accordance with the evaluated configuration (using the RUCKUS FastIron
FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 10.0.10, July 8, 2024) prior to being placed into
operation. The CLI is a text-based interface which is accessible from a directly connected terminal
or via a remote terminal using SSH.
The hardware platforms that support the TOE have several common hardware characteristics:
• Central processor that supports all system operations
• Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operations
• Flash memory, used to store the operating system image
• Non-volatile memory, which stores configuration parameters used to
initialize the system at system startup
• Multiple physical network interfaces either fixed in configuration or
removable as in a chassis-based product.
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router
10.0.10, including the three series identified in Section 3.2. While there are different models in the
three series, they differ primarily in physical form factor, number and types of connections and
slots, and relative performance. In addition, while there are some functional differences among the
families, they each provide the same security characteristics.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models:
• ICX 7550 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF
o ICX7550-48ZP (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7550-48P (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7550-48F (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
• ICX 7650 SKUS with ICX7600-4X10GF Module
o ICX7650-48ZP (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7650-48P (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
o ICX7650-48F (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
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• ICX 7850
o ICX7850-48FS (With 4 * 10 GF module Broadcom module)
The different series have differing CPUs as described below:
• The ICX 7550 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A72 (ARMv8 architecture)
• The ICX 7650 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A57 1.6GHz (ARMv8
architecture)
• The ICX 7850 Series utilizes a Quad-core ARM Cortex A57 1.6GHz (ARMv8
architecture)
The TOE utilizes the Firmware crypto library referred to as the RUCKUS-IP-CRYPTO-VER-6.0
running on these processors.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with physical
network connections. Within the hardware appliance, the ICX is designed to control and enable
access to the available hardware functions (e.g., program execution, device access, facilitate basic
routing and switching functions). ICX enforces applicable security policies on network
information flowing through the hardware appliance.
During normal operation, IP packets are sent to the management IP address or through the
appliance over one or more of its physical network interfaces, which processes them according to
the system’s configuration and state information dynamically maintained by the appliance. This
processing typically results in the frames or packets being forwarded out of the device over another
interface.
3.4 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE appliance has physical network connections to its environment to facilitate routing and
switching of network traffic. The TOE appliance can also be the destination of network traffic,
where it provides interfaces for its own management.
The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in an environment which can
be remote from or directly connected to the TOE. The remote connection is protected by SSH.
The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external syslog server in the network
environment. This is generally advisable given the limited audit log storage space on the evaluated
appliances. In addition, the use of a RADIUS authentication server is included in the evaluated
configuration. Both the syslog and RADIUS communication occur over a protected TLS channel.
The TOE can be configured to establish a MACsec connection with a MACsec capable peer. In
addition, it can be configured to use an NTP server for network time or it can use its own hardware
clock.
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4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE can generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE can be
configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and to send the
logs to a designated log server using TLS to protect the logs while in transit on the network.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE contains a CAVP-tested cryptographic module that provides key management, random
bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing
features in support of higher-level cryptographic protocols including MACsec, SSH and TLS. The
TOE supports SHA1 message digest authentication for NTP servers.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated
by the TOE, except for passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching/routing
rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (usernames, passwords and privilege levels)
and to authenticate users against these attributes.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides CLI commands to access the wide range of security management functions to
manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions including security
management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have
provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The security
management functions are controlled using privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to
TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Super User can manage the security policies
provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective
management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.
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4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements several features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its
security features.
It protects sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not
accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that
reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). The TOE can also be
configured to work with an NTP server for reliable time.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it can detect when it is failing. It also
includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE
itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other
unexpected changes in the TOE.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator
establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity
timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSH for CLI access to
ensure both integrity and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or
if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, an attempted connection will
not be established.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server and authentication
server, using TLS or MACsec connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification.
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
• PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023 (MACSEC10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e/MACSEC/10 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
5.2 Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 as described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices
needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified
in the NDcPP22e and the MACSEC10 and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific MACsec
Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and, therefore, should not
be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines
an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
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Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• RUCKUS FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 10.0.10, July 8,
2024.
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and, therefore, should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in
the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Commscope Technologies
LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec, Version 0.3, July 22, 2024
(DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report for Commscope Technologies
LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec, Version 0.3, July 22, 2024
(AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification document
and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 including the tests associated with
optional requirements. The proprietary DTR lists the tested devices, provides a list of test tools,
and has diagrams of the test environment.
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
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Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented
in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Commscope Technologies
LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec TOE to be Part 2
extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10.
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Commscope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron
ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec products that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST and
Guidance document. Additionally, the Evaluation team performed the assurance activities
specified in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 related to the examination of the information contained
in the TSS.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely
administer the TOE. The guide was assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation
to ensure it was complete.
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The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e/MACSEC10 and recorded the results in a
Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The Evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is contained
in the DTR prepared by the Evaluation team. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search
for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual
vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the following sites:
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search)
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories )
• cve.org CVE Database (https://www.cve.org/),
• Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The search was conducted on July 22, 2024, with the following search terms: “CommScope”,
“Ruckus”, “FastIron”, “TLS”, “SSH”, “macsec”, “ICX7550”, “ICX7650”, “ICX7850”, “ARM
Cortex”, “RUCKUS-IP-CRYPTO-VER-6.0”.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
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Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the Evaluation
team was justified.
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the
claims in the ST.
The Validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured
per the evaluated configuration instructions in the RUCKUS FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria
Configuration Guide, 10.0.10, July 8, 2024, document. As noted in Section 6, consumers are
encouraged to download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
Any additional customer documentation, not listed in Section 6, provided with the product, or that which
may be available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore, should not be
relied upon to configure or operate the TOE as evaluated.
The Validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of
the TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the ST, and the only evaluated functionality was that which
was described by the SFRs claimed in the ST. All other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be
assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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10 Annexes
Not applicable
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Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec Security Target, Version 0.5, July 22, 2024.
CommScope Technologies LLC, Validation Report Version 1.0, July 23, 2024
Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec
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12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
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13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e).
[5] PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023 (MACSEC10).
[6] CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with
MACsec Security Target, Version 0.5, July 22, 2024 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec, Version 0.3, July 22, 2024 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec, Version 0.3, July 22, 2024 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX
Series Switch/Router 10.0.10 with MACsec, Version 0.3, July 22, 2024 (ETR).
[10] RUCKUS FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 10.0.10, July 8,
2024 (AGD).