Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
for
IBM Tivoli Access Manager for
Operating Systems
Version 5.1 with Fixpack 17
from
IBM Corporation
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.23
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
IBM Tivoli Access Manager for
Operating Systems
Version 5.1 with Fixpack 17
from
IBM Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic Flaw Remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, March 24th, 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic algorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006 Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006 Certification Report
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Tivoli Access Manager for Operating Systems, Version 5.1
with Fixpack 17 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM Tivoli Access Manager for Operating
Systems, Version 5.1 with Fixpack 17 was conducted by atsec information
security GmbH. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The developer is:
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on March 24th
, 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006 Certification Report
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-30.
The product IBM Tivoli Access Manager for Operating Systems, Version 5.1
with Fixpack 17 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which
is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006 Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 12
3 Security Policy 13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 14
5 Architectural Information 15
6 Documentation 17
7 IT Product Testing 18
8 Evaluated Configuration 20
9 Results of the Evaluation 21
10 Comments/Recommendations 23
11 Annexes 24
12 Security Target 25
13 Definitions 26
14 Bibliography 28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
1 Executive Summary
IBM Tivoli Access Manager for Operating Systems, Version 5.1 with Fixpack 17
is a specific implementation of the access control framework defined by the ISO
10181-3 standard [9] and the Authorization API (aznAPI) [10].
IBM Tivoli Access Manager for Operating Systems, Version 5.1 with Fixpack 17
is a complete authorization solution for Operating Systems. The TOE's
authorization services allow an organization to control user access to protected
information and resources. By providing a centralized, flexible, and scalable
access control solution, the TOE allows secure and well-managed operating
systems infrastructures to be built.
In addition to the security policy management feature, the TOE supports
authentication decision enforcement for administrative users, the application of
login and password policies to user accounts of underlying resources,
authorization, data security, secure communication and resource management
capabilities.
The product bundle IBM Tivoli Access Manager for Operating Systems, Version
5.1 with Fixpack 17 comprises the following product components, representing
the TOE:
• Tivoli Access Manager Base 5.1, with Fixpack 6
(also called Policy Server in the following)
• Tivoli Access Manager Operating Systems 5.1, with Fixpack 17
(also called TAMOS Resource Manager in the following)
These two product components in turn comprise several installation packages.
Details on these packages and how to obtain them can be found in chapter 2 of
this report.
Details on the user guidance documentation delivered with the TOE can be
found in chapter 6 of this report.
The operating system platforms the TOE is allowed to run on are the following:
• IBM AIX 5.2
• Sun Solaris 2.8
• HP-UX 11i V1
• RedHat Enterprise Linux AS/WS Version 3 Update 2 on i386 architectures
• Novell SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 Service Pack 3 on i386 architectures
For more details on environmental constraints and the evaluated configuration
of the TOE please refer to chapters 1.5 and 1.6 of this report. For possible
combinations of operating system platforms runing the the Policy Server and
TAMOS Resource Manager please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 2.8.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006 Certification Report
The IT product IBM Tivoli Access Manager for Operating Systems, Version 5.1
with Fixpack 17 was evaluated by atsec information security GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 15.03.2006. The atsec information security GmbH
is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The developer is:
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL3 (Evaluation Assurance Level augmented). The assurance level was
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic Flaw Remediation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table:
Security Functional
Requirement Identifier
Components taken from CC part 2:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAR.1(1) & (2) Audit Review (Policy Server & TAMOS RM)
FAU_SEL.1(1) & (2) Selective audit (Policy Server & TAMOS RM)
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric
algorithms)
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (RSA)
FCS_CKM.2(1) Cryptographic key distribution (RSA public keys)
FCS_CKM.2(2) Cryptographic key distribution (Symmetric keys)
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (RSA)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (Symmetric operations)
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
Security Functional
Requirement Identifier
FDP_ACC.2(1) Complete access control (Object-space access
control policy)
FDP_ACC.2(2) Complete access control (Management access
control policy)
FDP_ACF.1(1) Security attribute based access control (Object-
space)
FDP_ACF.1(2) Security attribute based access control
(Management)
FIA_AFL.1(1) & (2) Authentication failure handling (Policy Server &
TAMOS RM)
FIA_ATD.1(1) & (2) User attribute definition (User & Administrator)
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action (Policy
Server)
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action (Policy Server)
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1(1) Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1(2) Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_TRC.1 Internal TSF consistency
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Componentes not been taken from CC part 2:
FAU_GEN.3-TAMOS Audit data generation
Table 1: SFRs claimed for the TOE
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided here.
For more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.2.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006 Certification Report
Security Functional
Requirement Identifier
Components for the LDAP Server located in the TOE environment:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Components for the Operating System underlying the Policy Server:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Components for the Operating System underlying the TAMOS RM:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Table 2: SFRs claimed for the TOE environment
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapters 5.3.1 to
5.3.3.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.Audit Configurable Audit of security relevant events for the Policy
Server and the TAMOS RM.
F.Authentication Authentication of users and administrators.
Please note that user authentication is supported by a LDAP
server being part of the operational environment of the TOE.
F.Authorization Authorization decisions of the TOE are based on Access
Control Lists (ACL) and “Protected Object Policies” (POP).
The following kinds of objects can be protected by the TOE: (i)
Operating System Objects (like Files, Directories, Network
connections, ...) and (ii) Tivoli Access Manager Management
Objects.
F.Management The TOE provides management functionality for
administrators concerning the following aspects: (i) User and
group Management, (ii) ACL and POP Management and (iii)
TOE Certificate Management.
F.Communication The TOE uses the SSL v3 protocols to secure the
communication between different parts of the TOE and
between the TOE and the TOE environment.
Table 3: TOE Security Function
For more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘medium’ (SOF-medium) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [7], chapter 5.4 and 6.2.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic
algorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3,
Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The following threats as defined in the Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.1 are
averted by the TOE:
Name of Threat Description
T.BYPASS An authorized user of a managed resource or network-based
attacker accesses resources protected by the TOE in a way
that bypasses the TSF, exploiting non-TSF portions of the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006 Certification Report
Name of Threat Description
TOE.
T.COM_ATT An attacker intercepts the communication between the TOE
and an external entity or between distributed parts of the TOE
in order to get access to protected information, to impersonate
as an authorized user or part of the TOE or to manipulate the
data transmitted between the TOE and an external or internal
entity.
T.UAACTION An undetected violation of the TSP may be caused as a result
of an authorized user of a managed resource or network-
based attacker attempting to perform actions that they are not
authorized to do.
T.UAUSER An authorized user of a managed resource or a network-
based attacker may impersonate an authorized user of the
TOE. This includes the threat of an authorized user that tries
to impersonate as another authorized user without knowing
the authentication credentials.
Table 4: Threats to be averted by the TOE
The TOE and its environment has to comply to the following Organisational
Security Policy (OSP) (refer to [7], chapter 3.3):
Name of OSP Description
P.ACCOUNTABILITY The administrators of the system shall be held accountable for
their actions within the system.
P.ADM_DELEGATION Specific administration tasks as well as management
operations to defined subsets of the resources protected by
the TOE may be delegated to administrators that are only
allowed to perform the management tasks within their defined
area of responsibility and are not able to extend this area
themselves.
Table 5: Organisational Securit Policies
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The following constraints are given for the TOE (refer also to Security Target
[7], chapter 2.7):
1. The evaluated configuration has one Policy Server system and one or more
Resource Manager/Authorization Evaluator systems:
• The Policy Server component of the TOE is installed and operated on a
dedicated system within a physically protected environment. Optionally,
the TAMOS RM can be installed on the Policy Server.
• Resource Manager and Authorization Evaluator are always installed and
operated on the same system. The evaluated configuration does not
include Authorization Evaluator components running on a machine
separate from the Resource Manager that uses them.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
• All Resource Manager/Authorization Evaluator systems operate
independent from each other and are only connected to the central Policy
Server.
• The Policy Server and all the Resource Manager/Authorization Evaluator
systems only use the operating systems platform combinations as defined
in [7], chapter 2.7, Table 1.
2. The following components and/or configurations are not part of the
evaluated configuration and must not be used:
• The use of the Web Portal Manager and integration with the Tivoli
Desktop for the administration of the TOE is not supported. Instead only
the command line interfaces of pdadmin and TAMOS RM and the
pdadmin C API are supported in the evaluated configuration.
• No Application Development Kit is installed.
• Active Directory is not supported. Only LDAP is supported as interface to
the user registry. Multiple LDAP replicas are supported, whereas the
number of LDAP masters in the environment is restricted to one.
• No hardware encryption device is used. The cryptographic services are
fully provided by the software implementation of the GSKit component.
• Language packs other than English are not supported. Only the English
language pack for the TOE is evaluated.
• Non-certified authentication mechanisms and non-password based
authentication mechanisms are not supported. On underlying operating
systems managed by TAMOS RM the TOE supports only password-
based authentication mechanisms listed in the Administrator Guide for
the TAMOS ROM as being certified.
For administrators requesting access via the pdadmin interface for the
Policy Server, only password-based authentication is supported.
• Weak or no encryption of internal communications. Communication
between the LDAP server and the TOE as well as the communication
between the Policy Server and the Resource Manager/Authorization
Evaluator systems is protected using the SSLv3 protocol with one of the
ciphersuites defined in this Security Target. The use of unencrypted
communication is disabled in the TOE.
3. The following components of the TAMOS product are not evaluated as part
of the TOE, but can be used and are then considered part of the IT
environment:
• The log router daemon operating on the audit log files for remote
distribution.
• The Tivoli Enterprise Console daemon providing audit data for remote
access.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006 Certification Report
4. The following components of the TAMOS product are part of the TOE, but
do not contain security functionality that is subject to evaluation:
• The integrated Watchdog functionality of the TOE.
• The TCB mechanisms of the TAMOS product, such as checksum
verification of files being defined as a member of the TCB.
To install, set-up and use the evaluated configuration of the TOE the guidance
documents as outlined in chapter 6 have to be followed.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the operating environment are made in the
Security Target [7], chapter 3.1. They are reproduced here:
Name of Assumption Description
A.ADMIN The system administrative personnel are not careless, willfully
negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the
instructions provided by the administrator guidance. Base
administrators will perform administration activities from a
secure environment using terminals and/or workstations they
trust via secured connections to the Policy Server. All
administrative commands themselves will be executed on the
Policy Server or on a TAMOS RM.
A.BOOT During operating system startup it is ensured that the TAMOS
RM is started before user logins can occur.
A.DIR_PROT The directory server used by the TOE provides protection
mechanisms against unauthorized access to TSF data stored
in the directory. This includes the assumptions that queries
are properly authenticated, that replicas are held consistent
according to a well-defined policy, and that communication
between TOE and LDAP server is SSL v3 encrypted.
A.FRIENDLY_OS The underlying operating system of a resource manager
works as specified. In particular, the operating system kernel
is assumed to be well behaved with regard to the TSF parts
operating in kernel mode. It does not alter, hinder or otherwise
influence the kernel mode operation of the TOE, it rather
supports them.
A.OS_CONF_MGMT The operating systems of the machines running the TOE are
assumed to be configured and maintained by trained and
trustworthy personnel such that the underlying systems
provide a reliable basis for the operation of the TOE software.
A.PAM The authentication mechanisms in the underlying operating
system for the TAMOS RM effectively identify the operating
system users and associate them with correct user IDs.
Furthermore, the PAM mechanism (or loadable authentication
module mechanism on AIX) enforces the invocation of the
TOE’s login module, if so configured.
A.PHYS_PROT The machines running the TOE software need to be protected
against unauthorized physical access and modification. All
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006
Name of Assumption Description
machines running parts of the TOE software require this
protection.
A.PWD_SAFE Administrators and other users have to protect their
passwords used for authentication to the TOE such that no
unauthorized access to them is possible.
A.USER Users of the TOE are not hostile and do not try to deliberately
attack the TSF. Especially, they do not possess greater attack
potential as assumed in the description of the threat
environment for the TOE.
A.USER_PASSWORD The underlying operating system for a resource manager
ensures that users are authenticated.
A.FRIENDLY_LDAP The LDAP server performs its functions as specified.
Table 6: Assumption for the operational environment
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Tivoli Access Manager for Operating Systems, Version 5.1 with
Fixpack 17
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Tivoli Access Manager Base comrising the
installation packages:
• Policy Server (pdmgrd)
• Runtime
• IBM GSKit
• IBM Directory Client (LDAP)
5.1 Secure
Download9
2 SW Tivoli Access Manager for Operating Systems
comprising the installation packages:
• TAMOS
• Runtime
• IBM GSKit
• IBM Directory Client (LDAP)
5.1 Secure Download
3 SW Fixpack 6 for Tivoli Access Manager Base 5.1
and Fixpack 17 for Tivoli Access Manager for
Operating Systems comprising:
• Fixpack 6 for Policy Server and Runtime
• Fixpack 17 for TAMOS
• GSKit 7.0.3.3
• IBM Directory Client 5.2.
see column
Identifer
Seucre Download
3 DOC Guidance documents as outlined in chapter 6 of
this report.
see chapter
6
Secure Download
Table 7: Deliverables of the TOE
The installation of the packages as listed above will result in the following
component versions, comprising the evaluated configuration:
• Policy Server 5.1.0.6
• TAMOS 5.1.0.17
• Runtime 5.1.0.6
• GSKit 7.0.3.3
• IBM Directory Client 5.2
9
Only the IBM’s Passport Advantage’s secure download (Restartable Transfer) applet is
allowed for downloading the TOE. Simple HTTP or FTP download is not an evaluated way
to get the TOE.
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is an implementation of the ISO 10181-3 and the Authorization API
(aznAPI) framework. Its main purpose is to provide Authentication and
Authorization decisions and allow/deny access to protected resources. This is
supplemented by audit functionality, secure communication between TOE
components and between the TOE and the outside world. Management
functionality as well as non-bypassability is provided as well.
Therefore the Security Policy of the TOE is defined by the following TOE
security functional requirements:
• All SFR components being part of the CC class FIA (like FIA_SOS.1
defining the authentication policy constraints).
• Iterations of FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_ACF.1 defining (i) the Object-Space
access control policy and (ii) the management access control policy that
controls access to resources protected by the TOE.
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [7], chapter 5.2.1.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
The following assumptions are identified as been relevant for a secure TOE
usage. A complete definition of these assumptions can be found in [7], chapter
3.1 or chapter 1.6 of this report.
• A.ADMIN
• A.OS_CONF_MGMT
• A.PWD_SAFE
• A.USER
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions are related to physical and connectivity aspects. A
definition can be found in the Security Target [7], chapter 3.1. They are also
provided in chapter 1.6 of this report.
• A.BOOT
• A.DIR_PROT
• A.FRIENDLY_OS
• A.PAM
• A.PHYS_PROT
• A.USER_PASSWORD
• A.FRIENDLY_LDAP
4.3 Clarification of scope
The following threat is not averted by the TOE. Additional support from the
operating environment of the TOE is necessary (for detailed information about
the threat and how it is covered by the environment refer to the Security Target
[7], especially chapter 3.2.2 and chapter 8.1).
TE.BYPASS: An authorized user of a managed resource or network-based
attacker accesses resources protected by the TOE in a way that bypasses the
TSF due to the absence of protection mechanisms in the underlying system.
In addition the TOE is supported by a LDAP directory server (being part of the
operational environment) in performing user authentication. The TOE does also
rely on the underlying operating systems.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a specific implementation of the access control model defined in
[ISO 10181-3] and [AZNAPI]. The overall TOE architecture and boundaries are
illustrated in figure 1. The TOE offers the enforcement of Access Control
Decisions based on Access Control Policy (ACL) rules. The Authentication
Mechanism as well as the “Initiator Security Attributes” Database are
implemented using a Directory Server, which holds the user and ACL
information and is itself is not part of the TOE. Also the Target system which
holds the actual resource to be protected is not part of the TOE.
In this model a user submits a request for a resource (e. g. accessing a file that
is protected by the TOE). This request is intercepted by the TOE, which
implements access control checking on top of the native operating system
functions. The TOE performs the following actions:
• Checking if the requested resource is known to be not protected. If this is
true, the request is passed through to the operating system.
• Checking if the user has the right to access the requested resource for the
requested operation. If not, the request is rejected. If yes, the request is
passed through to the underlying operating system.
To explain how the access rights are checked an overview on the Tivoli Access
Manager components is provided first (please see figure 1 for an architectural
overview of the TOE):
The “Resource Manager” is implemented as part of the TOE by the TAMOS
RM. This component includes also the “Authorization Evaluator” as a
subsystem.
The “Policy Server” is responsible to define and maintain the access control
policy. It uses the “Master Authorization Policy” database to store the access
control policy rules. To speed up the time required to make an access decision,
the “Authorization Evaluator” manages a replica of the “Master Authorization
Policy”.
The Policy Server informs all Authorization Evaluators about modifications to
the “Master Authorization Policy“. An Authorization
Evaluator can also request the Policy Server to submit a new copy of the
Master Authorization Policy. Also the Policy Server can request an
Authorization Evaluator to update the replica of the Master Authorization Policy
to make sure that the Authorization Evaluator has the latest version.
Administration of the TOE is performed via a workstation or terminal directly
connected to the Policy Manager component. Only the command line interface
and C language API for administration are part of the evaluated configuration.
The TAMOS RM can be further managed by commands provided by the
TAMOS RM. These commands can be initiated by an appropriately authorized
user logged into the underlying operating system the TAMOS RM is running on.
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Administration includes the management of the Master Authorization Policy
(defining access rules for protected objects) as well as management of the
TOE. It should be noted that access rights of administrators to administrative
objects of the TOE are also stored and maintained in the Master Authorization
Policy; this specifically includes the management commands provided by the
TAMOS RM.
To enhance authentication capabilities the TOE uses modules that extend the
native authentication process of the host operating system by applying a login
policy defined within the TOE.
For administrator authentication, the TOE uses a directory server. The directory
server provides a repository for user and administrator attributes and
credentials. Authentication of users is done by the Resource Manager in
combination with host operating system, authentication of administrators is
performed by the Policy Server by using the external Directory Server.
The communication link between the TOE and the LDAP server is protected
using the SSL v3 protocol. The TOE uses the GSKit library for the
implementation of those protocols and their underlying cryptographic functions.
The GSKit library is therefore part of the Policy Server and part of the Resource
Manager. Also, the communication link between the Policy Server and the
different Resource Managers is secured by SSL v3 using the GSKit library.
The Master Authorization Policy as well as the Replica Authorization Policy are
databases. The Master Authorization Policy is a database held by the Policy
Server and the Replica Authorization Policy is a database held by each
Authorization Evaluator.
Figure 1: TOE Architecture
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product and has to be
followed for a secure usage of the TOE.
• Base Installation Guide, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
• Base Administrator Guide, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
• TAMOS Installation Guide, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
• TAMOS Administrator Guide, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
• Command Reference, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
• Base Patch 5.1-TAM-FP06 Readme (05 October 2005)
• TAMOS Patch 5.1-PDO-FP17 Readme (16 December 2005)
• Administration C API Developer’s Reference (November 2003)
• Error Message Reference (November 2003)
• TAMOS Release Notes (November 2003)
• TAMOS Problem Determination Guide (November 2003)
• Common Criteria Guide (December 2005)
Please note that for the purpose of the certified configuration of the TOE the
Common Criteria Guide is the most important document.
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7 IT Product Testing
Test configuration:
The evaluated configuration, as specified in the Security Target of IBM Tivoli
Access Manager for Operating Systems, Version 5.1 with Fixpack 17, is based
on five types of underlying operating systems: IBM AIX 5.2, Sun Solaris 8, HP-
UX 11i, SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3.
Complete testing on all of these platforms has been carried out.
The notes on secure installation and configuration of the TOE, as provided to
the customer, reflect specific constraints and requirements for the evaluated
configuration, as mandated by the TOE description, IT security environment and
objectives for the TOE environment defined in the Security Target. By requiring
the test scenario to be set up according to this guidance, compliance with the
evaluated configuration is achieved.
All test scenarios contained a system comprising the Policy Manager (pdmgrd)
and the TAMOS RM resource manager of the TOE.
Test coverage/depth:
The developer has provided a test coverage and depth of testing analysis,
demonstrating that all aspects of TSF behavior have been tested.
Tests for the evaluated configuration of the TOE have been devised to test all
aspects of TSF behaviour, as it has been specified throughout the functional
specification and high-level design. A correspondence analysis provided by the
developer shows coverage of all TSF, subsystems and interfaces that affect the
security functional behaviour of the TOE. The coverage has been determined to
be overall sufficient.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort:
Test configuration:
The tests have been carried out on the test configuration as described above.
Testing approach:
To demonstrate that all aspects of TSF behavior are tested the developer used
a mixed approach of automated and manual testing.
Complete testing on all of the OS platforms described above have been
performed.
Testing results:
The test records of the developer show that all tests on all test platforms were
executed successfully, i.e. the actual test results met the expected test results.
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Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort:
Test configuration:
All tests were run at the developer’s site in Austin, TX. The developer granted
access to their testing environment and their network.
The TOE was installed as required by the respective guidance documentation
(please refer to chapter 6 of this report).
Testing approach:
A subset of the automated and manual developer tests were re-run and
subsequently analyzed for correct results.
In addition a set of own evaluator tests have been devised and performed
focusing on different kinds of TOE security functionality.
Testing result:
All evaluator tests on the tested OS platforms were executed successfully.
Evaluator penetration testing:
Penetration tests have been performed by the evaluation facility to assess
possible vulnerabilities found during the evaluation of the different CC
assurance classes. The TOE withstood the penetration efforts.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation is the IBM Tivoli Access Manager for Operating
Systems, Version 5.1 with Fixpack 17. The product bundle comprises the
following product components, representing the TOE
• Tivoli Access Manager Base 5.1, with Fixpack 6
• Tivoli Access Manager Operating Systems 5.1, with Fixpack 17
These product components in turn comprise several installation packages which
are listed in detail in chapter 2 of this report.
A customer has to download all installation packages via a secured internet
download. For the evaluated version of the TOE these installation packages
have to be updated to Fixpack 6 and Fixpack 17 for the TAM OS part
respectively (also available via secure download). Applying this two step
installation process will result in the following versions of TOE components:
• Policy Server 5.1.0.6
• TAMOS 5.1.0.17
• Runtime 5.1.0.6
• GSKit 7.0.3.3
• IBM Directory Client 5.2
The operating system platforms the TOE is allowed to run on are the following:
• IBM AIX 5.2
• Sun Solaris 2.8
• HP-UX 11i V1
• RedHat Enterprise Linux AS/WS Version 3 Update 2 on i386 architectures
• Novell SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 8 Service Pack 3 on i386 architectures
For setting up and running the TOE according to the evaluated configuration all
guidance documents (refer to chapter 6) and the implications given by the
Security Target have to be followed. These implications can also be found in
chapter 1.5 and 1.6 of this report.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components included
in evluation levels up to EAL4. In addition the CEM supplementation on
“ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 was used.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic Flaw Remediation and the class ASE for the
Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table:
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation controls ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
Table 8: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• The assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
F.Authentication (SOF-medium). Please see also chapter 10 of this report
for a recommendation.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic
algorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3,
Clause 2).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the IBM Tivoli Access
Manager for Operating Systems, Version 5.1 with Fixpack 17 in the
configuration as described in this report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
Please note that the likelihood of a password guessing attack (related to the
SOF claim) will increase if a customer chooses to use centrally managed user
IDs on several resource manager instances and the attack is performed in
parallel. To keep the claimed strength of function it is therefore recommended to
lock-out an account permanently after three unsuccessful tries.
The operational documents as liste in chapter 6 of this report contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered.
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11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0305-2006, Version 1.6.5, 2006-02-01, Tivoli
Access Manager for Operating Systems 5.1 Security Target, IBM
Corporation
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0305-2006, Release 3, 2006-
03-15, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[9] ISO/IEC 10181-3: Information Technology – Open Systems
Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Access control
framework, 1996
[10] Open Group Technical Standard: Authorization (AZN) API, The Open
Group, January 2000
Developer Guidance Documentation:
[11] Base Installation Guide, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
[12] Base Administrator Guide, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
[13] TAMOS Installation Guide, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
[14] TAMOS Administrator Guide, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
[15] Common Criteria Guide, (December 2005)
[16] Command Reference, Version 5.1 (November 2003)
[17] Base Patch 5.1-TAM-FP06 Readme (05 October 2005)
[18] TAMOS Patch 5.1-PDO-FP17 Readme (16 December 2005)
[19] Administration C API Developer’s Reference (November 2003)
[20] Error Message Reference (November 2003)
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[21] TAMOS Release Notes (November 2003)
[22] TAMOS Problem Determination Guide (November 2003)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 9: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 10: Evaluation assurance level summary
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
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Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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