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REF: 2010-15-INF-681 v1
Difusión: Expediente
Fecha: 05.07.2011
Creado: CERT2
Revisado: TECNICO
Aprobado: JEFEAREA
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Expediente: 2010-15
Datos del solicitante: 440301192W HUAWEI
References:
EXT - 1098 Certification Request of Huawei Carrier Grade Platform
(CGP) software (Unique version identifier: CGP
V100R005C00). 30/08/2010. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
EXT - 1257 Evaluation Report for Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP)
software. (Unique version identifier: CGP V100R005C00)
ETRHUAW001_ETR_M0. LGAI-Applus
EXT - 1273 Evaluation Report for Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP)
software. (Unique version identifier: CGP V100R005C00)
ETRHUAW001_ETR_M1. LGAI-Applus
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria
Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security,
May 2000.
SOGIS European Mutual Recognition Agreement of IT Security
Evaluation Certificates v3.0, January 2010.
Certification report for the Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) software (Unique
version identifier: CGP V100R005C00) with the following patch
V100R005C00SPC604, as requested by Huawei Technologies in [EXT-1098] dated
30-8-2010, and evaluated by the laboratory LGAI-APPLUS, as detailed in the
Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-1273] received on May 23rd
2011, and in
compliance with [CCRA] and for components up to EAL3. This CR also is covered by
the [SOGIS] agreement but only for components until EAL2.
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Table Of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. 3
TOE SUMMARY.............................................................................................................................................. 3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................... 5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................................ 5
IDENTIFICATION.......................................................................................................................................... 6
SECURITY POLICIES ................................................................................................................................... 7
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT........................................................................ 7
THREATS ........................................................................................................................................................ 8
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OBJECTIVES..................................................................................................... 8
TOE ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................................ 10
DOCUMENTS ................................................................................................................................................ 11
TOE TESTING............................................................................................................................................... 12
PENETRATION TESTING ................................................................................................................................ 13
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ............................................................................................................. 14
EVALUATION RESULTS............................................................................................................................ 15
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM................................... 16
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................ 17
GLOSSARY.................................................................................................................................................... 18
ACRONYMS................................................................................................................................................... 19
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................................... 21
SECURITY TARGET.................................................................................................................................... 22
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Executive Summary
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the product for the Huawei
Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) software (Unique version identifier: CGP
V100R005C00) with the following patch V100R005C00SPC604 developed by
Huawei Technologies.
Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies.
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN). Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: LGAI Technological Center. APPLUS.
Protection Profile: No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
Evaluation Level: EAL3.
Evaluation end date: 23/05/2011.
All the assurance components required by the level EAL3 have been assigned a
“PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory (LGAI-APPLUS) assigns the “PASS”
VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the
EAL3 methodology, as define by of the Common Criteria [CC-P3] and the Common
Methodology [CEM].
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) software (Unique version identifier: CGP
V100R005C00) with the following patch V100R005C00SPC604, a positive resolution
is proposed.
TOE Summary
The TOE is Huawei’s Carrier Grade Platorm, software for the management of
cellular core network devices, such as Home Location Registers, Mobile Softswitch
Centers, Service GPRS Support Nodes, or Call Session Control Functions. It is
commonly used as a component throughout a number of Huawei networking
products to offer management functionality for these products
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The central (server) side of Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) runs within a physical
Operation and Management Unit (OMU) on top of a Linux operating system.
Operation and Management Unit (OMU)s are boards (blades) that get inserted into
network device cabinets (racks) which also contain application-specific boards,
resulting in a product offering. Remote clients (a GUI, called Local Maintenance
Terminal (LMT) client, and a web-based interface) are available for management
access to the server. This evaluation of CGP covers the use of CGP in six particular
products, the Huawei CSC3300, HLR9820, MSOFTX3000, SGSN9810, ATS9900,
and HSS9820. The application-specific functionality of these products is out of scope
for this evaluation.
The major security features implemented by CGP and subject to evaluation are:
- Authentication. Operators using the GUI client or a web browser to access
the TOE in order to execute device management functions are identified
by individual user names and authenticated by passwords.
- Role-based access control. CGP implements role-based access control,
limiting access to different management functionality to different roles as
defined in administrator-defined access control associations.
- Lawful Interception (LI) support. CGP offers management functionality for
Lawful Interception (LI), including access control mechanisms that enforce
the separation of LI operators from other operators.
- Communications security. CGP offers Secure Socket Layer
(SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) channels for File transport protocol
(FTP), Hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), and Simple object access
protocol (SOAP) access to the OMU, as well as the encryption of X1/X2
channels for LIG communication. This includes the possibility to restrict
remote sessions to the CGP server to specific client Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses.
- Auditing. Audit records are created for security-relevant events related to
the use of CGP.
- Security function management. The TOE offers management functionality
for its security functionality.
The operational environment of the TOE comprises, on the server side, an operating
system that runs within the OMU board hardware and hosts both the TOE and a
relational database (which is part of the operational environment as well) used by
the TOE to store configuration and audit data.
The LMT client part of the TOE runs on top of a Windows operating system.
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In a larger context, the remaining parts of the product that integrates the TOE as its
management component is also considered part of the operational environment.
Security Assurance Requirements
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil EAL3, according to
CC Part 3 [CC-P3].
Assurance
Class
Assurance Components
Security Target ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1
Development ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.3, ADV_TDS.2
Guidance AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1
Life Cycle ALC_CMC.3, ALC_CMS.3, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1,
ALC_LCD.1
Tests ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2
Vulnerability
Analysis
AVA_VAN.2
Security Functional Requirements
The product security functionality satisfies several requirements as stated by its
Security Target, and according to CC Part 2 [CC-P2]. They are requirements for
security functions such as information flow control, identification and authentication.
These functional requirements satisfied by the product are:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review FAU_SAR.3
Security Audit (FAU)
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of
possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.3
Cryptographic Support
(FCS)
FCS_COP.1: Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1
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FDP_ACC.1: Subset access control FDP_ACC.1
User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_ACF.1: Security attribute based
access control
FDP_ACF.1
FIA_AFL.1: Authentication failure
handling
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_ATD.1: User attribute definition FIA_ATD.1
FIA_SOS.1: Verification of secrets FIA_SOS.1
FIA_UAU.2: User authentication
before any action
FIA_UAU.2
Identification and
Authentication (FIA)
FIA_UID.2: User identification before
any action
FIA_UID.2
FMT_MSA.1: Management of security
attributes
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3: Static attribute
initialization
FMT_MSA.3a
FMT_MSA.3: Static attribute
initialization
FMT_MSA.3b
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of
Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1
Security Management
(FMT)
FMT_SMR.1: Security roles FMT_SMR.1
Protection of the TSF (FPT) FPT_ITT.1: Basic internal TSF data
transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1
TOE Access (FTA) FTA_TSE.1: TOE session
establishment
FTA_TSE.1
Trusted Path/Channels
(FTP)
FTP_TRP.1: Trusted path FTP_TRP.1
Identification
Product: Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) software (Unique version identifier:
CGP V100R005C00) with the following patch V100R005C00SPC604.
Security Target: Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5
Security Target. v0.28 2011/03/09.
Protection Profile: No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
Evaluation Level: CC v3.1 r3 EAL3
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Security Policies
There are no security policies declared in the ST.
Assumptions and operational environment
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target, and briefly
described below. These same assumptions have been applied during the evaluation
in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
In this TOE ST there are only these assumptions to be considered:
- A.PhysicalProtection It is assumed that the TOE and its operational
environment (in particular, the network device that the TOE is a
component of, but also the workstation that is hosting the client part of the
TOE) are protected against unauthorized physical access.
- A.TrustworthyUsers It is assumed that the organization responsible for
the TOE and its operational environment has measures in place to
establish trust into and train users of the TOE commensurate with the
extent of authorization that these users are given on the TOE. (For
example, super users and users that are assigned similar privileges are
assumed to be fully trustworthy and capable of operating the TOE in a
secure manner abiding by the guidance provided to them.)
- A.NetworkSegregation It is assumed that the network interfaces that
allow access to the TOE’s user interfaces are in a management network
that is separate from the application (or, public) networks that the network
device hosting the TOE serves.
This includes the assumption that the operational environment implements
measures that ensure that the source IP address in remote client session
establishment requests has not been tampered with, and that no bogus
OMU servers exist in the management network.
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- A.Support The operational environment must provide the following
supporting mechanisms to the TOE:
- Reliable time stamps for the generation of audit records.
- The database that stores the data of TOE must be protected and
available.
Threats
This section describes the security threats to the TOE:
- T.AccountabilityLoss Records of security-relevant actions of users for
forensic and accountability purpose are not created properly.
- T.Eavesdrop An eavesdropper (remote attacker) in the management
network that is served by the TOE is able to intercept, and potentially
modify or re-use, information assets that are exchanged between TOE
(LMT) and non-TOE (WebUI) clients, and the TOE server part (OMU).
- T.UnauthenticatedAccess A user who is not a user of the TOE gains
access to the TOE.
- T.UnauthorizedAccess A user of the TOE authorized to perform certain
actions and access certain information gains access to commands or
information he is not authorized to access.
Any other threats not included in this list are not necessarily resisted by the TOE.
Operational environment objectives
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil the
requirements listed in its Security Target. This section identifies the IT security
objectives that are to be satisfied by the imposing of technical or procedural
requirements on the TOE operational environment. These security objectives are
assumed by the Security Target to be permanently in place in the TOE environment.
With this purpose, the security objectives declared for the TOE environment are the
following:
- OE.Administration Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its
operational environment must ensure that only authorized users have
access to the OMU, and in particular to the part of the TOE and its data
that is running on the OMU. This includes ensuring that audit records
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stored in the operational environment are protected against unauthorized
access, and that cryptographic keys and certificates are properly managed
to support the communications security mechanisms implemented by the
TOE.
This also includes the restriction of physical access to the network device
that contains the OMU to authorized personnel, and making the OMU
unavailable to access from the consumer/application networks served by
the network device.
The TOE must be operated in its evaluated configuration as specified in
this ST and the guidance that is part of the TOE.
- OE.Support Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its
operational environment must ensure that the operational environment
provides the following supporting mechanisms to the TOE:
- Reliable time stamps for the generation of audit records.
- The database that stores the data of TOE must be protected and
available.
- OE.Users Those responsible for the operation of the TOE and its
operational environment must be trustworthy, and trained such that they
are capable of securely managing the TOE and following the provided
guidance.
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TOE Architecture
The TOE is Huawei’s Carrier Grade Platform software (Unique version identifier:
CGP V100R005C00) – in particular the software that provides the Operation
Administration and Maintenance (OAM) functionality for core network devices to their
users. The TOE is implemented based on a client/server architecture – the server
functionality is located in the network device itself, while a client GUI – commonly
referred to as Local Maintenance Terminal (LMT) – can be run on PCs for remote
management of the device.
Physically, the server part of the TOE is located on an OMU board, a type of
Universal Process Blade that is located within the network device. The TOE server
communicates product-internally with application-specific boards (Network Elements)
of the product in order to provide management and maintenance functionality for the
device.
Remote communication between LMT client and the OMU of a device is based on
TCP/IP. In addition to using the proprietary link between the LMT client software and
the OMU, the OMU also serves a web interface – commonly referred to as WebUI –
that remote users can access directly using their web browsers in order to obtain
performance statistics, access the OMU via a console provided by a virtual KVM
switch, perform software upgrades, and download a copy of the LMT GUI.
Also, a SOAP interface is available for communication with the operational
environment (namely Huawei’s Enterprise Management System, a separate product
offering), as well as an SNMPv3 interface.
Via these interfaces, the OMU offers management functionality for the network
device. To be more precise, the LMT GUI implements security function
management. The management functionality offered by the WebUI is not security-
relevant in terms of the TOE – but authentication and communications security
provided for the interface are.
The TOE supports Lawful Interception (LI) technology. CGP offers the management
of LI functionality via X1/X2 channels. In particular, this includes the configuration of
communication parameters that instruct CGP how to interoperate with a Lawful
Interception Gateway (LIG) in the operational environment for exchanging control
messages and alerts.
The TOE stores configuration data, such as user attributes and access control
associations, as well as audit records, in a configuration database in the operational
environment.
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Documents
The basic documentation distributed with the TOE to be used with the security
assurance provided by the certificate issued is:
- Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. CGP Customer Product Information, User
Guides, v1, 2009-08-12
- Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. CGPV100R005C00 CGP Function
Description, v1.4, 2011-02-10
- Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. ETSI Lawful Interception, User Guides, v
N/A, N/A
- Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 Security
Target, Security Target, v0.28
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TOE Testing
The manufacturer has developed testing for the TOE TSF. All these tests have been
performed by the manufacturer in their location and facilities with success.
The process has verified each unit test, checking that the security functionality that
covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the function
that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the
established architecture in the security target.
It is been checked also that the obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to
the previously estimated results.
The evaluator examined the evaluation evidences and determined that the developer
has been provided in the test documentation a cross-table that unambiguously maps
each test with a TSFI of the functional specification.
The TOE’s configuration that has been tested meets what has been described in the
ST by the developer. All the products that the TOE can manage have been
configured (once at a time) and different tests (developer and evaluator) have been
executed while the TOE is configured for the specific product.
While the developer test plan is focused on cover the entire TSF and on
demonstrating his correct implementations, the evaluator test approach is to gain in
depth respect the developer tests.
All the developer’s tests were executed changing the managed product to observe if
there were differences on the behaviour of the TOE produced by the managed
product. All the results obtained during this stage were as expected and, actually, the
TOE behaviour is the same independently of the product under management.
The evaluator executed the tests and updated the test documentation with new
devised tests. The evaluator verified that the obtained results were agreed with
expected results.
The result of independent tests was successfully performed and there were neither
inconsistencies nor deviations between the actual and the expected results.
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Penetration Testing
The independent penetration testing devised several test cases covering attacks
including SQL Injection, Xpath injection, cross-site Scripting, cross-site request
forgery, buffer overflows, race conditions, replay attacks, MiTM attacks, brute force
or IP spoofing.
During the penetration testing the evaluator used the product configured as indicated
in the guidance. The CGP is used in six commercial products configurations, so the
evaluator executed the test cases over all the configurations and in all the products.
The testing effort validates the public interfaces available to potential attacker.
The evaluator did not find either exploitable vulnerabilities or residual vulnerabilities
in the operational environment as a result of independent penetration testing.
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Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined by its name and version number:
- Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) software (Unique version
identifier: CGP V100R005C00) with the following patch
V100R005C00SPC604.
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Evaluation Results
The product Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) software (Unique version
identifier: CGP V100R005C00) with the following patch V100R005C00SPC604 has
been evaluated in front of the “Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1
Release 5 Security Target, Security Target, v0.28”, 2011/03/09.
All the assurance components required by the level EAL3 have been assigned a
“PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory (LGAI-APPLUS) assigns the “PASS”
VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the
EAL3 methodology, as define by of the Common Criteria [CC-P3] and the Common
Methodology [CEM].
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Comments & Recommendations from the Evaluation Team
There are no recommendations.
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Certifier Recommendations
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) software (Unique version identifier:
CGP V100R005C00) with the following patch V100R005C00SPC604 product, a
positive resolution is proposed.
This certification is recognised under the terms of the Recognition Agreement
[CCRA] for components up to EAL3 according to the mutual recognition levels of it
and the accreditation status of the Spanish Scheme.
The assurance derived from this CR also is covered by the [SOGIS] agreement but
only for components until EAL2.
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Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part
3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for
a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and
user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
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Acronyms
CC Common Criteria
CM Configuration Management
CGP Carrier Grade Platform
FTP File transport protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext transfer protocol
IP Internet Protocol
LI Lawful Interception
LMT Local Maintenance Terminal
MML Man Machine Interface
NTP Network Time Protocol
OMU Operation and Management Unit
OSP Organizational Security Policies
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOAP Simple object access protocol
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSFI TOE Security Functionality Interface
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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CGP Carrier Grade Platform
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Página 21 de 22
Avenida del Padre Huidobro s/n
Fax: + 34 91 372 58 08
Email: certificación.ccn@cni.es
Bibliography
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
Common Criteria
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation- Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, r3, July 2009.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional requirements, Version 3.1, r3, July 2009.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, r3, July 2009.
[CEM] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, r3, July 2009.
MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
Página 22 de 22
Avenida del Padre Huidobro s/n
Fax: + 34 91 372 58 08
Email: certificación.ccn@cni.es
Security Target
It is published jointly with this certification report the security target,
“Huawei Carrier Grade Platform (CGP) Version 1 Release 5 Security Target,
Security Target, v0.28”, 2011/03/09